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Taiwan Affairs Office: The obstacle to fully restoring direct cross-Strait flights lies with the DPP authorities.

At the April 15 State Council Taiwan Affairs Office press conference, a reporter asked about mainland civil aviation authorities again urging Taiwan to fully restore normalized direct cross-Strait passenger flights.

TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua said direct flights have greatly facilitated cross-Strait travel and improved welfare on both sides. He said current routes remain disrupted by the DPP authorities, with only 15 destinations in 14 mainland cities and more than 300 weekly passenger flights, compared with 61 mainland destinations and up to 890 weekly flights before 2020.

Chen added that more than 5.78 million passengers traveled on direct cross-Strait flights in 2025, and that current average load factors exceed 80%, showing strong demand for full restoration.

He said the mainland has no policy restrictions on fully restoring cross-Strait direct flights, and that the obstacle lies entirely with the DPP authorities. He urged Taiwan to remove what he called unreasonable aviation restrictions and allow airlines on both sides to arrange flights according to market demand.

Taiwan Affairs Office: We will continue actively promoting cross-Strait personnel exchanges and cooperation.

At the April 15 State Council Taiwan Affairs Office press conference, a reporter asked about National Immigration Administration data showing that, despite DPP restrictions on cross-Strait exchanges, Taiwan Compatriot Permit applications rose 11.8% year-on-year in Q1, while Taiwanese entries into mainland China rose 27.6% year-on-year.
TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua said this again proves that Taiwan’s mainstream public opinion favors “peace, development, exchanges, and cooperation.” He said the DPP authorities are ignoring public opinion and “moving against the tide,” and are therefore “doomed to fail.”
Chen said the mainland will continue to uphold the idea that “both sides of the Strait are one family,” follow the principles of “greater openness, maximum convenience, and greater security,” and actively promote cross-Strait travel and exchanges across various fields. He said the mainland welcomes Taiwanese people, especially young people, to take a spontaneous trip to the mainland, see the “magnificent mountains and rivers of the motherland,” and experience mainland development and what he called omnipresent familial warmth.

Taiwan Affairs Office: Taiwanese entertainers are welcome to come to mainland China to participate in cultural activities.

At the April 15 State Council Taiwan Affairs Office press conference, a reporter asked about Hunan TV’s Sisters Who Make Waves 2026, which has sparked discussion among audiences on both sides of the Strait, particularly because several veteran Taiwanese entertainers appeared on the program.

TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua said Hunan TV and Mango TV’s variety programs are popular with Taiwanese audiences. He noted that from the original Sisters Who Make Waves to the current Sisters Who Make Waves 2026, the program has featured Taiwanese entertainers in every season and is centered on showcasing women’s talent and promoting cultural exchange.

Chen said Taiwanese and mainland entertainers performing, competing, and creating together have revived shared memories for many people on both sides of the Strait, while also introducing them to younger audiences. He said the TAO welcomes more Taiwanese entertainers to come to the mainland for program recordings, performances, and other cultural activities, contributing to shared cultural resonance and emotional ties between people on both sides. He also wished this season’s participating “Taiwanese sisters” success.

Taiwan Affairs Office: The Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair and does not permit outsiders to interfere/comment.

At the April 15 State Council Taiwan Affairs Office press conference, a reporter asked about KMT Chair Cheng Li-wun’s recent visit to mainland China. AIT Taipei Office Director Raymond Greene had said that the United States’ consistent position is to support stable cross-Strait exchanges, that it hopes the mainland will maintain channels of communication with all political parties in Taiwan—especially the “democratically elected government”—and that it hopes the mainland will abandon “threats or military pressure” against Taiwan.

In response, TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua stated that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China. As long as they recognize the “1992 Consensus” and oppose “Taiwan independence,” there are no obstacles to exchanges between any political party or group in Taiwan and the mainland.

Chen said the root cause of tensions and instability in the Taiwan Strait is the DPP authorities’ collusion with external forces in continuously seeking “independence” and making provocations. He said certain people on the U.S. side are “jumping up and down,” repeatedly hyping the so-called “mainland threat or military pressure,” which he described as “completely reversing black and white” and as having “malicious intentions.” He emphasized that the Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair and “does not permit outsiders to comment/interfere.” He said the U.S. should abide by the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. joint communiqués, and handle the Taiwan issue with the utmost caution.

Taiwan Arms Sale Backlog, March 2026 Update

Abrams and ALTIUS Delivered, But Further Delays Emerge

Authors: Joe O’Connor, Eric Gomez, Shikhar Chaturvedi, Danielle Kremer, and Wyeth Lindberg

Taiwan’s legislature failed to reach an agreement on a special procurement budget to fund U.S. arms sales in March, which is already delaying Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases worth over $10 billion.

But March had good news for the U.S. arms sale backlog as well. A June 2024 FMS case for ALTIUS drones was fully delivered, reducing the backlog’s dollar value by $300 million. The final tranche of Abrams tanks is also on its way to Taiwan by ship. Once these tanks arrive the backlog will come down by $2 billion, but we were not able to verify their delivery before the end of March so that FMS case is still coded as delivery in progress for this month. No new FMS cases were notified to Congress this month.

The delivery of ALTIUS drones brings the backlog’s total value down slightly to $31.72 billion.

Figure 1 illustrates the breakdown of the backlog between asymmetric weapons, traditional weapons, and munitions. Table 1 provides an itemized list of all arms sales in the backlog, including the most up-to-date information on their status. In that table, arms sales that have been partially but not fully delivered are indicated in italics. New and completed arms sales are indicated with bolding and underlining.

Special Budget Updates in March

On March 5, the Kuomintang (KMT) released their proposal for US$12.02 billion (NT$380 billion) in spending, to fund only the arms approved in December 2025. This proposal required that Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) be approved before funds are appropriated, instead of having funds in advance. The KMT’s proposal also required that funds for future arms sales from the US be approved as a second bill, instead of the Lai administration or Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) proposals, which allocate funds for future arms purchases.

Following its release, Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo and statements carried by the Military News Agency (MNA) pushed back against the proposal, arguing that its sunset provision of December 2028 is incompatible with current delivery timelines and unrealistic. The MND also clarified in a statement that three sales announced in December, including the Taiwan Tactical Network, as well as AH-1W spare parts and Harpoon missile refurbishment, were not included within the administration’s NT$1.25 trillion special budget request, instead being folded under annual defense spending.

Table 1
*Itemized list of backlogged capabilities by weapons category, March 2026*
Capability Sold	Dollar Value (In Millions)	Share of total backlog, March 2026	Current Status as of March 2026
Traditional	$14,927	47.06%
F-16C/D Block 70	$8,000	25.22%	March 2026: Taiwanese officials attended an Acceptance Check Flight in the U.S. for the first F-16 airframe. Minister Koo also stated to press that the first F-16 could arrive as early as September 2026.
Paladin Self-Propelled Howitzer	$4,030	12.71%	March 2026: MND officials warned that Letter of Offer and Acceptance for Paladins, as well as three other sales, would expire at end of month if not signed. LY agreed to allow signature of LOAs before special defense budget is approved.
M1A2T Abrams Tanks	$2,000	6.31%	March 2026: MND officials stated that the final batch of 28 Abrams are “at sea” enroute to Taiwan. Further statements indicated delivery either at the end of March or in April. As of the end of March, TSM cannot independently verify delivery.
F-16 IRST Systems	$500	1.58%	December 2025: US DoD awarded an undefinitized contract action to Lockheed Martin for targeting pods, including 55 IRST pods for Taiwan. Work is expected to complete by June 2031.
MS-110 Recce Pods	$367	1.16%	February 2026: Three MS-110 pods expected to arrive by the end of 2026. This may fulfill the FMS case, but getting accurate, consistent numbers on MS-110 delivery has been challenging.
MK 75 76mm Gun Mounts	$30	0.09%	No information since posting of Congressional notification.
Asymmetric	$14,463	45.60%
HIMARS (Announced December 2025)	$4,050	12.77%	March 2026: MND officials warned that Letter of Offer and Acceptance for HIMARS, as well as three other sales, would expire at end of month if not signed. LY agreed to allow signature of LOAs before special defense budget is approved. MND officials also warned that initial payment for HIMARS would be due, but agreements with U.S. officials resulted in an extension.
Harpoon Coastal Defense System	$2,370	7.47%	March 2026: U.S. DSCA Director Michael Miller confirmed in a House hearing that Taiwan has priority for delivery of HCDS over Saudi Arabia.
National Advanced Surface-to-Surface Air Missile System (NASAMS)	$1,160	3.66%	February 2026: Press reports citing MND sources repeated earlier reporting that Taiwan plans on purchasing 9 additional NASAMS systems and associated missiles. This appears to be one of the arms sales cases being held up by special procurement budget deadlock in the LY.
ALTIUS (Announced December 2025)	$1,100	3.47%	January 2026: MND reported that it would purchase 1,554 ALTIUS-700M loitering munitions and 478 ALTIUS-600M ISR drones. The FMS notification did not specify the number of drones being purchased.
Tactical Mission Network	$1,010	3.18%	January 2026: LY votes to move a special procurement budget proposed by the TPP to committee for consideration. The bill would not fund the Tactical Mission Network, but would fund almost all other FMS cases notified to Congress in December 2025.
PAC-3 MSE Interceptors	$882	2.78%	March 2026: MND officials stated that ongoing delivery of 102 MSE missiles should not be affected by conflict in the Middle East.
AN/TPS-77 and AN/TPS-78 Radar Systems	$828	2.61%	September 2025: Taiwanese press report citing 2026 budget request says that all radar systems will be delivered by the end of 2028. TPS-77s scheduled to begin arriving in 2026; TPS-78s to begin arriving in 2027.
MQ-9B Unmanned Aircraft	$600	1.89%	March 2026: Taiwanese officials attended a “handover” ceremony in the U.S. for two of the expected four drones, clarifying that they expect to remain for further testing. LY testimony from MND officials also clarified that delivery is expected by the third quarter of 2026 and should not be delayed by ongoing conflict in the Middle East.
HIMARS (Announced December 2022)	$520	1.64%	February 2026: Press reports citing MND sources indicate that 18 launchers, 20 ATACMS, and 864 GMLRS are expected to arrive before the fourth quarter of 2026. This is consistent with previously reported delivery timelines.
Javelin Missiles	$375	1.18%	March 2026: MND officials warned that Letter of Offer and Acceptance for Javelins, as well as three other sales, would expire at end of month if not signed. LY agreed to allow signature of LOAs before special defense budget is approved.
Air-Launched Harpoon Missiles	$355	1.12%	January 2023: Press report indicates that missiles will be delivered by 2030.
TOW Missiles	$353	1.11%	March 2026: MND officials warned that Letter of Offer and Acceptance for TOWs, as well as three other sales, would expire at end of month if not signed. LY agrees to allow signature of LOAs before special defense budget is approved.
ALTIUS (Announced June 2024)	$300	0.90%	March 2026: MND confirms receipt of all 291 ALTIUS-600M UAVs.
Field Information Communications System	$280	0.88%	May 2025: Budget unfreezing report by MND indicates that testing of the system concluded in early 2025. The first batch of equipment is expected in the fourth quarter of 2025.
C4 Modernization	$265	0.84%	No information since posting of Congressional notification.
Volcano Anti-Tank Mining System	$180	0.57%	February 2026: Press reports citing MND sources indicate delivery of 14 Volcano systems will occur “soon.” This is consistent with previously reported delivery timelines.
Taiwan Advanced Tactical Data Link System Upgrade	$75	0.24%	August 2024: Taiwan’s E-Procurement System announced the award of a contract for the Link-16 system with completion date in 2026.
Switchblade 300 Loitering Missile System	$60	0.19%	September 2025: Taiwanese press reported details of delivery schedule: 66 drones already delivered to Military Police Command; 150 drones expected to be delivered to ROC Army by end of 2025, 469 drones by the end of 2026.
Munitions	$2,329	7.34%
AGM-84H SLAM-ER Missile	$1,008	3.18%	December 2025: Taiwanese press report citing a publication by the LY’s budget office indicates a multi-year delay in finalizing details on cost and delivery schedule for AGM-84 missiles. Press report suggests that there is no finalized Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for this case, which would lay out a payment and delivery schedule.
F-16 Munitions	$619	1.95%	July 2025: US DoD awarded Raytheon a $3.5 billion contract for Lots 39 and 40 of AMRAAM production, to be completed in 2031. Taiwan is one of many FMS customers and specific delivery timeline is not clear.
Mk 48 Heavyweight Torpedoes (Announced June 2017)	$250	0.79%	December 2025: MND report to LY on arms sale delivery status reiterates that Mk-48 is one of three delayed arms sales cases.
AGM-154C Joint Standoff Weapon	$186	0.58%	December 2025: MND report to LY on arms sale delivery status reiterates that AGM-154C is one of three delayed arms sales cases.
Mk 48 Heavyweight Torpedoes (Announced May 2020)	$180	0.57%	December 2025: MND report to LY on arms sale delivery status reiterates that Mk-48 is one of three delayed arms sales cases.
AIM-9X Block II Missiles	$86	0.27%	March 2024: SIPRI annual update indicates delivery is expected to occur by 2030.

On March 25, the Legislative Yuan’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee began a two-day markup period of the three budget proposals, aiming to combine them into one bill. Committee members reached consensus on several provisions, including those relating to procurement planning, taken from the KMT proposal, as well as legal authorities, but crucially failed to reach consensus on provisions relating to the topline budget amount and specific procurement items. In the hearing, opposition legislators questioned the government’s proposed spending categories, concerned that they were vague or classified. By law, the special budget entered a “freeze” to allow for further negotiation, which is expected to go into April. Discussed below, these repeated delays and lack of consensus, while somewhat productive in challenging Lai administration policy, have also had negative knock-on effects, resulting in delayed or extended payments for several arms sales.

March also featured several statements from Taiwanese officials on the status of the special budget. On March 8, President Lai, speaking at a temple in New Taipei, stated his administration’s budget was reasonable and compared it to a security system against a “bad neighbor.” On March 28, Premier Cho Jung-tai urged opposition parties to perceive the need for national defense and the nation’s requirements, after a markup hearing in which General Huang Wen-chi, head of the MND’s Strategic Planning Department, was visibly upset. The same day, Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim echoed the same sentiments, speaking at the 2026 Taiwan Civil Defense Annual Conference and noting that the administration’s budget seeks to improve “whole-of-society resilience.”

American officials also weighed in. On March 9, a State Department spokesperson stated that Washington “encourage[s] all parties in Taiwan’s legislature to work through political differences and quickly pass a special defense budget,” specifically addressing whether the United States would support a KMT proposal. On March 26, Director of the American Institute in Taiwan, Raymond Greene, also urged the LY to pass a budget, calling U.S. support for it “rock solid.”

December Cases Face LOA and Payment Extensions, Possible Delays

Taipei spent most of March trying to prevent a procedural problem from becoming a delivery problem. In early February, the Ministry of National Defense warned that the LOAs for TOW anti-armor missiles, Javelin anti-armor missiles, and M109A7 self-propelled howitzers would expire on March 15 unless the Legislative Yuan acted. Following this, the LY moved on March 12–13 to authorize the Executive Yuan to sign four U.S. LOAs, adding HIMARS to the original three cases. While a crucial step, as it prevented the deals from stalling at the signature stage, it did not fully solve the larger problem. In the FMS process, an LOA must be signed and an initial payment made before the U.S. procurement agency can enter into an agreement with the defense industry to build the weapons. Clearing the LOA signature step is a move in the right direction, but Taiwan’s special procurement budget impasse means that it cannot make an initial payment, which means delays in finalizing production contracts.

On March 26, Liberty Times reported that the initial payment deadline for HIMARS was approaching and that U.S. officials had indicated there was little room for delay, with Taiwanese officials warning that missing the current deadline could push negotiations for a new LOA back to the end of the year. Four days later, CNA reported that the United States had agreed to extend the HIMARS first-payment deadline with a revised timeline tied to the U.S. Department of Defense’s contract negotiations with Lockheed Martin, the system’s manufacturer. Taiwan is still seeking similar flexibility for the TOW, Javelin, and M109A7 cases.

Updates to Abrams, ALTIUS Deliveries

On March 10, MND officials reported that the final tranche of 28 M1A2T Abrams tanks is “at sea,” en route to Taiwan, however we were unable to verify delivery of the tanks before the end of March.. 80 of the 108 tanks have already arrived, including 38 delivered in December 2024 and 42 delivered in July 2025. Once delivered, this tranche will mark the last of 108 Abrams that Taiwan began procuring in July 2019. From a procurement perspective, the Abrams case is a useful execution benchmark inside the broader U.S.–Taiwan pipeline. Taiwan Security Monitor’s backlog tracker has identified Abrams as one of the smoother Foreign Military Sales deliveries. Final delivery of the Abrams would reduce the backlog by $2 billion, a sizable decrease.

As of March 18, the Taiwanese military has officially received all ALTIUS-600M UAVs purchased from the United States and defense contractor Anduril. Announced on June 18, 2024, the first batch of ALTIUS-600M drones was delivered to Taiwan on August 4, 2025, a turn-around time between approval and initial delivery of less than 14 months. With this last delivery, the Taiwanese military now has up to 291 ALTIUS systems, costing approximately NT$9.6 billion (US$300 million). A second sale, announced in December, of 1,554 ALTIUS 700M and 478 ALTIUS 600M ISR drones, is currently in progress, and is also expected to be completed quickly.

F-16 Block 70 and MQ-9B Production Updates

As of March 21, the first Taiwanese F-16 Block 70 has completed its Acceptance Check Flight at Lockheed Martin facilities in Greenville, South Carolina. These tests were attended by several Taiwanese officials, including Deputy Minister of National Defense Hsu Szu-chien, Deputy Air Force Chief of Staff General Tian Zhongyi, and the Taiwanese Representative to the United States, Alexander Yui. An MND press release after the visit stated that this success means Lockheed will begin its deliveries to Taiwan. On the same day, the MND also confirmed that several Taiwanese officials attended a handover ceremony in the United States for two of the four MQ-9B SeaGuardian maritime surveillance drones purchased for NT$21.7 billion (US$674.02 million). However, the MND clarified that the two drones would stay in the United States for continued testing, with delivery to Taiwan expected in the third quarter of this year.

Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo also stated in a recent press conference that the first two MQ-9B SeaGuardians are expected to be delivered by the third quarter of the year and that the first F-16 Block 70 could arrive as early as September 2026. He has also clarified that the United States’ ongoing conflict in the Middle East has no effect on delivery timelines to Taiwan.

Conclusion

Taken together, March’s developments show a backlog that is still slowly moving in the right direction, but with growing signs that Taiwan’s main bottleneck is no longer only United States’ production capacity. The completion of ALTIUS deliveries, the near-finish of the Abrams case, and visible progress on the F-16 Block 70 and MQ-9B programs are welcome developments. At the same time, repeated delays in passing a special defense budget, uncertainty over LOA follow-through and initial payments, and the need to seek deadline extensions from Washington indicate that domestic political and procedural friction in Taiwan are increasingly shaping the pace of FMS execution.

Errata: Percentages in Table 1 inaccurately reflected sale value and have been appropriately updated.

Weekly Security Review: 4/16/26

Authors: Jaime Ocon & Danielle Kremer

Welcome to the Weekly Security Review, where we highlight key military, security, and political developments around Taiwan in one straightforward summary!

This week, Taiwan’s opposition leader lays out a path for more cooperation with China, Taiwanese intelligence points to a surge in Chinese ships in the region, and Taiwan’s Army conducts live fire drills with special forces.

Taiwan’s Opposition Chairwoman Meets with Chinese President Xi, Pledges Closer Cooperation

Opposition Kuomintang (KMT) Chairwoman, Cheng Li-wun, wrapped up a visit to China, where she met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and called for expanded exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland. Cheng later announced a set of 10 proposals she said were aimed at strengthening ties. Some of those proposals include resuming individual travel by residents of Shanghai and Fujian Province to Taiwan, gradually moving towards “full normalization” of direct cross-strait passenger flights.

Chinese state media says the meeting highlighted Beijing’s efforts to maintain cross-strait communication despite rising tensions. While the meeting was brief, Xi used Cheng’s visit to repeat China’s position that any improvement in relations must be tied to opposition for Taiwan independence. Cheng told the media that she presented dialogue and practical exchanges as the best way to reduce friction and avoid further escalation.

This visit was notable because it underscored the KMT’s willingness to engage Beijing directly at a time when official cross-strait channels remain strained. The last time a sitting KMT chair visited China was back in 2016, when Hung Hsiu-chu made the trip. The recent trip also gave China an opportunity to showcase a Taiwanese opposition leader willing to speak publicly about expanding ties. Initial polling showed the majority of the Taiwanese public thought the trip would do “more harm than good,” but it is yet to be seen how the trip will affect the upcoming local election in the fall.

Taiwan’s Army, Special Forces Conduct Annual Live-fire Drills in Pingtung

On April 6th, Taiwan’s 602nd Army Aviation and Special Forces Command Brigade conducted their annual “Joint Bravery Exercise” in Pingtung alongside the Taiwanese Army’s 234th Combined Arms Brigade. Said exercises are meant to adhere to the principle of “combat-oriented” training, allowing officers and soldiers to hone their combat skills in real battlefield conditions through intensive drills. Air Force helicopter exercises began early in the morning on the 6th, with maintenance and equipment checks alongside ammunition retrievals of 20mm ammunition and 2.75-inch Poseidon rockets, from weapons crews. Once the preparation was complete, the pilots received orders to start their helicopters and took off to commence said live-fire exercises.

Alongside these helicopter tests, the joint forces conducted live-fire drills on the ground in coordination with infantry and armored units. In this exercise, units focused on firepower coordination and capturing positions. To do this, they deployed with multiple heavy artillery pieces, including but not limited to 105mm tank guns and 120mm mortars. With the success of the first stage, the drill intensified. Attack helicopters were deployed to provide air support by executing low-altitude strikes simulating assaults on enemy positions. In doing so, the joint forces created a three-dimensional combat network, which they claim is a fully integrated air-ground battlefield system capable of coordinated multi-domain operations.

While these exercises were on a 24-hour schedule, a representative of the Army stated that the exercise was designed to begin with night combat, simulating how enemy defenses weaken, and outer positions are destroyed, allowing the main force to launch a daytime counterattack with ease. According to multiple reports, the Taiwanese military and MNDofficials called the exercise a success and plan to expand similar joint training exercises to further enhance combat readiness. The exercise ended on April 8th.

Taiwanese Intelligence Officials Concerned Over Uptick in Chinese Military Activity

As of April 10th, Taiwanese officials are monitoring naval and military activity in the strait. According to Reuters, “China has deployed nearly 100 naval and coast guard vessels in and around the South and East China Seas this week.” This raises security concerns for Taiwan, as China typically deploys only 50-60 vessels in that region, and heightened naval activity at this time of year is quite rare. They also reported seven Chinese military aircraft operating in Taiwanese airspace. Taiwanese officials are still monitoring this increase in military activity in the South and East China Seas.

In a Facebook post by Minister of the Ocean Affairs Council Kuan Bi-ling, a “sea situation map” was shared, sparking debate over the possible disclosure of classified information. The image clearly shows the locations of six Chinese warships and two coast guard vessels around Taiwan. They also mention that the Taiwanese Coast Guard can determine and track PLA naval vessels by type and hull number. Off the western coast of Taiwan, it was reported that they have identified a Type 052D multi-functional destroyer equipped with phased-array radar and missile systems, a Type 815 electronic reconnaissance ship designed to intercept Taiwanese signals at close range, and a Type 054A guided missile frigate with balanced air defense, anti-ship, and anti-submarine capabilities. On the cross-strait, two People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Coast Guard ships have been detected and confirmed to be Type 818 coast guard cutters. They have also found a Type 054A guided missile frigate, which is said to be specifically designed for anti-submarine warfare.

The use of naval vessels to intimidate and encircle Taiwan is Beijing’s “dual-track approach of military pressure and political exchanges.” The use of this tactic aims to maintain sustained coercive pressure on Taiwan while signaling openness to political engagement, thereby weakening Taiwan’s deterrence and influencing decision-making. According to sources, Beijing does not plan to withdraw the air and sea blockade.

Ling’s Facebook post added that “Because the leader of the main opposition party is planning to meet with Chinese leadership … it is necessary to appropriately disclose to the public and the international community the situation of China’s harassment in our waters, so that our people are informed and understand the serious implications.”.

Architecture Over Arsenal: What Link-22 Would Mean for Taiwan’s Defense

Author: Shikhar Chaturvedi & Kiran Khalifa

Testing the Network: Taiwan’s Command-and-Control Challenge

During the “Joint Sword” exercises in late 2024, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) tested Taiwan’s ability to maintain command and control (C2) under a total blockade. Modern Militaries’ C2 architecture relies on Tactical Data Links (TDLs) to allow radars, aircraft, ships, and missile units to share information and coordinate action in real time. The drills highlighted a key weakness in Taiwan’s aging C2 architecture and current TDLs. Taiwan’s Syun An Link-16 & Link-11 remain largely horizon-limited in a battlespace that would not be. Since then, amid continued pressure such as “Justice Mission-2025” and the ever-present risk of communications paralysis in a crisis, Taiwan has begun a quiet but consequential shift in how it approaches defense.

(Source: TSM, Exercise zones from the post-2022 Pelosi visit to Justice Mission 2025)

At the center of that shift is Link-22, a NATO-developed tactical data link (TDL) designed to function as the connective tissue of a modern force. It allows ships, aircraft, and ground units to exchange information across greater distances and under degraded conditions. While the procurement of fighter jets and tanks dominates headlines, their effectiveness is determined by whether those platforms can see, talk, and coordinate under stress. Link-22’s secure, Beyond Line-of-Sight (BLOS) architecture is meant to keep that network alive, linking the “brain” of Taiwan’s C6ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) with the missile batteries and naval assets that would execute a response. As Taiwan advances its US$40 billion special defense proposal, stands on the cusp of a new U.S. security package, and continues work on projects like “T-Dome,” the potential inclusion of Link-22 underscores a broader shift toward decentralized, multi-domain defense.

While Taiwan has not formally adopted Link-22, recent U.S. planning support for tactical data link upgrades suggests that Washington and Taipei may be laying the groundwork for a future transition. If eventually funded and fielded, Link-22 will complement Taiwan’s broader T-Dome defense initiative, blunt China’s ability to disrupt command-and-control, and signal deeper U.S.–Taiwan and coalition-oriented interoperability.

The Architecture of Resilience: The Link-22 Edge

Tactical data links (TDLs) are a key enabler for modern military organizations/operations. They create a secure, high-speed network that allows warships, aircraft, and ground units to automatically exchange real-time radar data, targeting coordinates, and identification information. By feeding sensor data from every participant into a unified network, TDLs create a Common Operational Picture. This shared operational picture can significantly improve situational awareness across the battlespace, but in practice, it remains complex, bandwidth-constrained, and dependent on operator training and system integration.

Link-22 represents the latest evolution of this technology, developed under the NATO Improved Link Eleven program. Formed by a consortium of seven nations (the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Spain), the system was engineered to overcome the obsolescence of the 1950s-era Link-11 while complementing the widely used Link-16. Its operational maturity was underscored during 2024’s Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise, where it successfully connected ten diverse platforms from seven nations; today, 26 countries have adopted the technology.

(Source: NATO Improved Link Eleven Project Management Office)

Beyond the Horizon: The Three Strategic Breakthroughs of Link-22

For Taiwan, the transition to Link-22 provides three operational / tactical advances:

(1.) “Beyond-Horizon Connectivity” Without Satellites: Standard Link-16 systems rely on Ultra High Frequency (UHF) radio bands, which transmit primarily along line-of-sight paths. Because UHF signals travel in straight lines and are limited by the curvature of the Earth, ship-to-ship communication is typically restricted to roughly 25 to 35 nautical miles without relays. Link-22 adds a powerful High Frequency (HF) band, which reflects off the ionosphere and enables secure data transfers across distances exceeding 1,000 nautical miles. Crucially, this provides Beyond Line-of-Sight (BLOS) coordination without relying on satellites. In a conflict where space-based communications are jammed or disabled, Link-22 helps ensure that Taiwan’s forces remain connected across the Strait and the wider Western Pacific.

(Source: TSM, Kiran Khalifa & Shikhar Chaturvedi)

Link-22 Comparison with Legacy Architecture

Feature	Link 11	Link 16	Link 22
Frequency	UF / UHF	UHF (960-1215 MHz)	HF and UHF
Range	300-1000 NM (HF)	25-35 NM (ship to ship)	Up to 1,000 NM
Single point of failure	Yes	No	No
Data rate	1,090 bps (HF)	Up to 107,520 bps	4,053 bps (HF) / 12,666 (UHF)
Jam resistance	Poor	Strong	Strong (dual-band hopping, ECCM)
Max participants	61	125+	125 per Super Network
Link 16 compatibility	None		Full

Source: Comparison adapted from ROC Naval Academic Bimonthly; Northrop Grumman Link 22 System Guidebook, 4^th Edition.

(2.) Decentralized Survivability: The legacy Link-11 architecture relied on a controlling station which, if disabled or destroyed, would cause the entire network to collapse. Link-22 replaces this structure with a decentralized architecture built around Dynamic Time Division Multiple Access (DTDMA). The DTDMA system allows communication across the network without relying on a single controller, eliminating a central point of failure. If a participant of the DTDMA system is lost to a strike, the network automatically reconfigures through the remaining participants, allowing information to continue flowing even under sustained attack.

(Source: TSM, Shikhar Chaturvedi & Kiran Khalifa)

(3.) Seamless Architectural Integration: Link-22 was designed to function as an extension of existing networks rather than a total replacement. It shares compatible message standards with Link-16, creating what operators describe as a “network of networks.” For Taiwan’s military, this allows Link-22 to plug directly into the Link-11’s legacy architecture. Its integration enhances battlefield intelligence sharing without requiring a wholesale replacement of Taiwan’s existing hardware infrastructure.

(Source: NILE, Link 22 System with NILE Communication Equipment)

Understanding these Strategic Breakthroughs

On February 2024 the State Department approved a US$75 million sale for “Advanced Tactical Data Link System Upgrade Planning” to Taiwan, providing the essential framework required to bridge critical gaps in Taiwan’s aging Syun An (Link-16) system. This structural groundwork was accelerated in December 2024 by a US$265 million sale of 309 Multifunctional Information Distribution System Joint Tactical Radio System (MIDS JTRS) Variant 5 terminals. These high-assurance hardware components ensure the secure flow of tactical information across Taiwan’s Patriot batteries, F-16 Block 20 jets, and E-2K platforms.

A future Link-22 transfer would also carry political significance. More than a routine sustainment package, it would suggest deeper U.S. support for Taiwan’s transition toward a more resilient and interoperable command-and-control architecture. Because Link-22 is a NATO-exclusive technology, U.S. assistance in its transfer effectively solidifies Taiwan’s status as a “quasi-major non-NATO ally” extending Taiwan’s defense beyond a bilateral U.S. agreement.

Yet the strategic value of Link-22 should not be overstated. Its benefits depend on the survival of the platforms and nodes carrying it, including ships, aircraft, and air-defense systems that would likely be priority targets in the opening phase of a cross-Strait conflict. In that sense, Link-22 does not eliminate Taiwan’s vulnerability so much as reduce the risk of communications collapse among the forces that remain. It also raises a broader strategic tradeoff: strengthening a network built around high-end platforms improves resilience and coalition interoperability, but it does not by itself resolve the larger debate over whether Taiwan should continue investing in systems tied to conventional naval and air operations rather than pushing further toward a more asymmetric force design.

Networking and Deterrence: Link-22 in PLA Calculus

China’s reaction to Taiwan’s data link modernization has differed noticeably from its routine objections to conventional arms sales. When PLA-affiliated commentators and Chinese officials responded to reporting on a potential Link-22 transfer, the focus was not on individual hardware platforms but on “structural integration”. Chinese military expert Song Zhongping argued in the Global Times that while sales of 76 mm autocannons and Link-11 upgrades only serve to “sustain” existing combat capabilities, acquiring Link-22 crosses a strategic threshold by placing Taiwan “under the U.S. combat command structure.” A March 2024 Tencent News analysis went further, labeling it “the most dangerous arms sale to Taiwan to date.” The consistent theme across Chinese commentary is that Link-22 enables encrypted, real-time coordination that effectively embeds the island’s defense within a broader, U.S.-led operational network.

Chinese analysis draws a clear distinction between Link-16 sustainment and Link-22 acquisition and ultimately reflects Beijing’s concern of the “remote control” effect. Chinese experts warn that Link-22’s integration allows the U.S. to monitor Taiwan’s front-line intelligence from 1,800 kilometers away and potentially directly control Taiwanese missile launchers and air defense platforms during a conflict. From Beijing’s perspective, Link-22 acts as a “nerve center” that connects the island’s “flesh and bones” (like HIMARS and PAC-3 MSE missiles) to a U.S.-controlled “brain.”

Beijing’s concern also stems from its own priorities in information dominance. The PLA has invested heavily in electronic warfare and link systems like the XS-3 and DTS-03 to maintain a tactical edge. The 2024 restructuring of the PLA’s Strategic Support Force into the Information Support Force underscored a recognition that network resilience is the center of gravity in high-intensity conflict. The coalition dimension further amplifies Beijing’s calculus. As a NATO-exclusive standard, Link-22 extends Taiwan’s defense beyond a bilateral U.S. agreement. From Beijing’s perspective, the risk is a networked defense perimeter across the First Island Chain.

Conclusion

Link-22 can strengthen the network architecture needed to better connect Taiwan’s emerging missile, air-defense, and unmanned capabilities, improving coordination and enabling them to function more effectively as part of an integrated warfighting system. Still, it is best understood as a force multiplier, not a silver bullet. Its benefits depend on the survival of ships, aircraft, and air-defense nodes carrying it, many of which would likely be priority targets in the opening phase of a conflict.

If funded and fielded, Link-22 will complement Taiwan’s broader T-Dome initiative, complicate China’s ability to disrupt command-and-control through communication paralysis and potentially signal deeper U.S.–Taiwan and coalition-oriented interoperability across the First Island Chain. But that same signal is precisely what makes the system politically sensitive: Beijing will almost certainly view it not as a routine technical upgrade, but as a step toward tighter wartime alignment between Taiwan and a broader U.S.-led regional network.

Visualization: NCSIST Anti-Ship Missile Range

Weekly Arms Update: 4/8/26

Author: Joe O’Connor, Shikhar Chaturvedi, Danielle Kremer, and Wyeth Lindberg

This week: the special budget remained frozen as the Kuomintang’s chairwoman visits the PRC; the U.S. House introduced a bill on Taiwan’s undersea cable resilience; two congressional delegations arrived in Taiwan for visits with officials; and NCSIST announced a plan to test low-cost ammunition prototypes, alongside weekly awards and solicitations.

Special Budget Frozen as KMT Chairwoman Visits PRC

Progress on special budget negotiations continued to be frozen this week, as KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun began leading a delegation to the PRC. On April 2, the Legislative Yuan’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee convener, DPP legislator Chen Kuan-ting, reported that KMT members had requested negotiations be delayed until April 15-16. Chen, who had already delayed negotiations until April 9, stated that the DPP caucus does not intend to change its current schedule and will continue with negotiations on the planned date.

DPP legislators criticized KMT counterparts upon hearing of this, with one member, Lin Chu-yin, accusing them of deliberately waiting until after Cheng’s visit and accusing them of trying to delay. Chen, however, attempted to appeal to younger KMT members, who have generally been more supportive of the Lai administration’s proposal than some of their other party members. As of the time of writing, it is assumed that negotiations will continue Thursday.

U.S. House Introduces Bill on Taiwan’s Cable Resilience

On April 2, U.S. Representatives Mike Lawler (R-NY), Dave Min (D-CA), and Greg Stanton (D-AZ) introduced the House version of the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act. Designed to address many of the concerns in the South China Sea, this bill prioritizes establishing advanced monitoring to detect disruptions in real time, strengthening early warning through global intelligence sharing, establishing rapid-response protocols, and expanding coordination to boost resilience. The legislation would also support joint patrols with the U.S. and Taiwanese Coast Guard in the area, as well as the creation of a Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group to identify vulnerabilities and develop contingency plans. The bill would require the U.S. to pressure China to follow international norms and impose sanctions on those responsible for sabotaging critical undersea systems affecting Taiwan and allies. It is currently in its second stage, waiting to be passed by the United States Senate.

Two U.S. Congressional Delegations Visit Taiwan, Meet with Lai

Following a bipartisan congressional delegation that visited Taiwan at the end of March, two more U.S. legislative delegations arrived in Taiwan this week to meet with government officials. A group of four House members from the Republican Study Committee, consisting of Reps. Zach Nunn (R-IA), Scott Fitzgerald (R-WI), Julie Fedorchak (R-ND), and Jefferson Shreve (R-IN), arrived in Taipei on Sunday, April 5, and are expected to remain until Saturday, April 11. On Tuesday, the delegation attended a Taiwan-U.S. forum on economics and trade, alongside Maryland Secretary of State Susan C. Lee, where the representatives discussed tariffs, trade policy, and investment. On Tuesday, the delegation also met President Lai, who they presented with a congressional record of recognition; and met Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo at MND headquarters, discussing “gray-zone” issues with Taiwan.

A separate, simultaneous visit by U.S. Senator Jim Banks (R-IN), also began Tuesday, where the lawmaker met with President Lai, Legislative Yuan President Han Kuo-yu, and Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo. Banks’ meeting with Lai centered around support for Taiwan and ongoing special budget negotiations, with the senator expressing hope that a budget will be passed soon and comparing Taiwan’s special spending to President Trump’s plans for a US$1.5 trillion defense budget. At the LY, Banks met with President Han Kuo-yu, as well as members from all three political parties in the legislature, and further discussed ways to build consensus in passing the special defense budget. A later meeting with Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo at MND headquarters also reinforced this point, also discussing the U.S. congressional notification procedure for arms sales. In the evening, Banks’ delegation attended a banquet at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hosted by Deputy Minister Chen Ming-chi, where the delegation reiterated earlier remarks made, and noted that this visit corresponds with the 47^th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, marking an auspicious moment for U.S.-Taiwan affairs.

NCSIST Announces Plan to Test Low-Cost Munitions

According to Liberty Times, the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) has developed several types of “low-cost air defense munitions.” One type is made to counter drone swarm attacks, and a second one is designed to defend against enemy missiles and long-range rocket attacks. So far, there has been no further information has been provided on either of the munitions. Both are said to start planned combat testing later in the first half of next year. In addition to the two independently developed defense munitions, NCSIST has signed a contract with a Canadian manufacturer, AirShare, to develop “ribbon rocket systems.” These systems use ribbons that catch enemy drones’ propellers, causing them to lose flight capability, then use a parachute to slow the drone’s descent. The parachute reduces impact damage, specifically so the drone can be recovered intact for reverse engineering. This defense munition is also said to begin testing in the first half of next year.

Weekly Awards/Solicitations

On Thursday, the Armaments Bureau solicited bids for the purchase of road and electrical/mechanical engineering services in support of the Weihai project. The Wehai Project refers to the MND’s years-long project to renovate and upgrade Zuoying Naval Base. The contract is worth NT$5.30 billion (US$165.98 million).

Also on Thursday, the Army Command made a repeat solicitation of bids for official staff vehicles, worth NT$203.32 million (US$6.37 million).

On Wednesday, the Air Force Command’s Military Mission to the United States awarded a NT$88.76 million (US$2.79 million) contract to Integrated Procurement Technologies for the open-ended supply of aviation spare parts. Available evidence suggests that this contractor is providing spare parts for the F-CK-1 Ching-Kuo (otherwise known as the Indigenous Defense Fighter or IDF).

Taiwan Affairs Office: The DPP authorities, driven by selfish “Taiwan independence” interests, engage in smears and defamation that have no public support

At the April 8 Taiwan Affairs Office press conference, a reporter asked: regarding Kuomintang Chair Cheng Li-wun leading a delegation to visit the mainland, a TAO spokesperson had previously said that affairs across the Strait are “family matters” that should be discussed and handled by the family itself. In response, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council said that this mainland formulation reveals an intention to oppose outside involvement and to recast cross-Strait issues as internal affairs. What is your comment on this?

TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian responded that both sides of the Strait belong to one China, that people on both sides are Chinese and one family. Affairs across the Strait, she said, are family matters for compatriots on both sides and should naturally be discussed and handled by the family itself. She added that people on both sides have sufficient wisdom and ability to resolve their own issues. She said that, on the common political foundation of adhering to the “1992 Consensus” and opposing “Taiwan independence,” they are willing to work with all political parties, groups, and individuals in Taiwan, including the Chinese Kuomintang, to promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, seek peace for the Taiwan Strait, seek well-being for compatriots, and seek national rejuvenation for the Chinese nation. She concluded by saying that the DPP authorities, driven by selfish “Taiwan independence” interests, engage in smears and defamation that do not win public support.