Author: Ethan Connell

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Naval mines represent one of the few weapon systems capable of imposing disproportionate costs on an amphibious assault force. In a potential Taiwan contingency, mines could delay People’s Liberation Army (PLA) shipping, channel invasion routes into designated kill zones, deny port access, and compel an attacker to allocate valuable time to mine clearance before initiating troop landings. Given that Taiwan’s survival in a cross-Strait conflict relies on gaining time for mobilization and potential external intervention, mines should occupy a central role in defense planning.

The effectiveness of Taiwan’s mine warfare (MIW) and mine countermeasures (MCM) posture depends on several factors: the number of platforms, delivery methods, survivability in combat, mine quality, and the operational geography and threat environment. When evaluated against these criteria, Taiwan presents a mixed picture. While significant investments in offensive minelaying have occurred since 2020, the MCM fleet remains outdated and insufficient for modern threats; minelayers are slow and lightly armed, and there is no confirmed air-delivered mine capability. The gap between doctrinal ambition and practical wartime capability remains substantial. Rather than exhibiting asymmetric innovation, Taiwan’s MIW and MCM posture illustrates the challenges of translating strategic concepts into a survivable, operational force structure.

The Operational Logic of Mining the Strait

Any PLA amphibious assault would require moving large numbers of troops, vehicles, and supplies across 130 to 220 kilometers of open water. That crossing force must load at embarkation ports, transit the strait, and arrive at a limited set of suitable landing areas on Taiwan’s western coastline. Mines can impose costs at each stage.

Taiwan can mine its own coastal waters, port approaches, and landing beaches to slow or funnel an invasion fleet. Mines laid in the strait or near PLA embarkation points could delay loading operations and force PLA commanders to commit mine countermeasures assets before the crossing begins. The Taiwan Strait’s bathymetry favors mining, with average depths of about 60 meters, the Taiwan Banks (averaging 20 meters) at the southern entrance, and the Changyun Ridge extending westward from Taiwan at around 30 meters depth. These conditions make the strait especially suitable for bottom and moored mines while compressing commercial and military traffic into predictable routes. The entire strait sits on Asia’s continental shelf, within the operational envelope of all modern mine types.^[1]

Three categories of capability matter here: Offensive mining targets the adversary’s waters and transit routes. Defensive mining protects one’s own ports, littorals, and landing areas. Mine countermeasures, including the detection, classification, and neutralization of enemy mines, protect one’s own freedom of movement. Taiwan needs all three, and faces different constraints in each.

Effectiveness in each category relies not only on hardware but also on the supporting operational infrastructure. This includes pre-delegation of authority to conduct mining before hostilities commence, dispersed stockpiles at multiple embarkation points, rehearsed loading and deployment procedures, integration with broader coastal defense plans, and hydrographic preparation of minefields. While it is difficult to determine from open sources whether Taiwan has established this architecture, this uncertainty significantly influences assessments of the subsequent force structure.

Taiwan’s Minelaying Capability

Taiwan’s most notable recent investment is the Min Jiang-class fast minelayer, built by Lung Teh Shipbuilding in Yilan County. These 347-ton vessels are the Republic of China Navy’s (ROCN) first purpose-built minelaying platforms. The ROCN commissioned four hulls in January 2022, assigning them to the 192nd Fleet’s Mine Laying Unit at Zuoying Naval Base in Kaohsiung.^[2] In March 2025, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) opened a third tender for six additional vessels, budgeted at NT$1.8 billion (US$54.8 million), after two prior tenders failed to attract the minimum number of bids required under procurement law.^[3] If that procurement project succeeds, Taiwan will operate 10 dedicated minelayers by around 2027.

Each Min Jiang-class vessel can carry up to 64 Mk-6 mines, 64 Wan Xiang I conical mines, 36 Wan Xiang I cylindrical mines, 40 Wan Xiang II moored mines, or 32 Wan Xiang II bottom mines.^[4] The vessels use an automated mine-laying system developed by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), a significant improvement over the manual methods used on the converted landing craft that served as Taiwan’s improvised minelayers before 2022.

The mine inventory spans two families. The Wan Xiang family, developed by NCSIST, includes influence, moored, and bottom variants. NCSIST has also pursued development of self-propelled mines and new shallow- and deep-water influence types, though open-source confirmation of their operational status is limited.^[5] Alongside these indigenous systems, Taiwan maintains stockpiles of the U.S.-designed Mk-6 moored contact mine, a design dating to 1917. The ROCN used Mk-6 mines in training exercises as late as 2024.^[6]

Reliable estimates of Taiwan’s total mine stockpile are unavailable in open sources. This issue is significant: even with 10 minelayers, each capable of carrying 32 to 64 mines per sortie, the total number of mines that could be deployed in the initial hours of a conflict depends on the depth of the stockpile, distribution across multiple loading points, and the number of sorties each vessel can complete before suffering losses. 10 minelayers, each conducting two sorties, could deploy between 640 and 1,280 mines, which is notable but not decisive given the strait’s width and the number of potential approaches. Whether Taiwan’s inventory can sustain mining operations beyond the initial wave remains uncertain and carries important operational implications.

Available open-source reporting indicates that Taiwan does not possess a confirmed air-delivered mine capability. Reports from approximately 2018 noted Taipei’s interest in acquiring U.S. Quickstrike mines, which can be deployed by aircraft at range and glide to their targets; however, this acquisition did not occur.^[7] Air-delivered mines offer faster and longer-range deployment compared to ship-based methods and eliminate the need for slow surface platforms to enter contested waters. The absence of this capability constitutes a significant operational gap.

Taiwan’s Mine Countermeasures Fleet

Taiwan’s mine countermeasures posture tells a different story than its investment in minelaying. The ROCN’s MCM fleet consists of four Yung Feng-class minehunters built in Germany by Abeking and Rasmussen in 1991, two Yung Jin-class minehunters (ex-U.S. Navy Osprey-class), and a single remaining Yung Yang-class minesweeper, a former U.S. Navy Aggressive-class vessel whose design dates to the 1950s.^[8]

Platform	Type	Number	Status / Notes
Min Jiang-class	Fast minelayer	4 (+ 6 planned)	347 tons; commissioned 2022; 14 kt max; 32–64 mines per sortie
Yung Feng-class	Minehunter	4	German-built (Abeking & Rasmussen), 1991; aging sonar and mechanical sweeping
Yung Jin-class	Minehunter	2	Ex-USN Osprey-class; fiberglass hull; limited against modern mine threats
Yung Yang-class	Minesweeper	1	Ex-USN Aggressive-class; 1950s-era design; wooden hull

These platforms are capable of conducting limited coastal mine clearance under permissive conditions. However, none are equipped to address the full spectrum of modern mine threats, such as rocket-rising mines, smart mines with anti-sweep features, or mines with target discrimination algorithms, all of which the PLA is assessed to possess or be developing.^[9]

A failed modernization program compounds the problem. In 2014, the MND awarded a NT$35 billion (about US$1.2 billion) contract to a consortium of Ching Fu Shipbuilding, Lockheed Martin, and Italy’s Intermarine to build six new MCM vessels. In 2017, prosecutors raided Ching Fu’s offices. The company’s chairman was charged with forgery and loan fraud. The contract collapsed.^[10] No replacement program has been announced. Taiwan’s MCM fleet has been frozen in time for over a decade, with no confirmed path to modernization.

Operational Constraints and Wartime Viability

Despite Taiwan’s investments, operational constraints significantly limit the potential effectiveness of its mine warfare forces in combat. These constraints differ between minelaying and mine clearance, but both are fundamentally shaped by the disparity between theoretical platform capabilities and their survivability under PLA attack.

The Min Jiang-class maxes out at 14 knots. That speed cannot outrun any modern combatant, anti-ship missile, or armed helicopter. For self-defense, the vessels carry a single T-75 20mm autocannon and two 7.62mm machine guns, with negligible protection against PLA anti-ship cruise missiles. A Beaufort 3 sea-state limitation on the class restricts operations to calm weather, meaning rougher conditions could prevent the vessels from laying mines when needed most or confine them to predictable windows that the PLA could monitor and target. Minelaying also demands that ships follow predetermined tracks at consistent, low speeds, turning them into predictable targets.^[11]

PLA intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities compound these problems. China’s ISR satellite constellation exceeded 359 systems as of early 2024, triple that of 2018, covering electro-optical, synthetic aperture radar, and signals intelligence. PLA aircraft conducted over 3,600 flights into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in 2024.^[12] Under these conditions, minelayers departing Zuoying would face a high probability of detection and tracking, particularly in the pre-conflict period when PLA surveillance is already at elevated levels. Whether continuous tracking would persist amid the fog and friction of active combat is less certain, but the vulnerability in peacetime and the crisis phase is clear.

This presents a timing problem with no clear answer. Mines work best when laid before hostilities begin or in the first hours of a conflict.^[13] Pre-war mining of international waters, however, would be politically provocative and could accelerate escalation. Waiting until conflict starts risks PLA missile strikes suppressing minelayers before they finish their runs. Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept envisions minelaying during a crisis or mobilization phase, but whether Taiwanese political leadership would authorize mining before the first shots are fired, and whether the operational architecture for rapid, pre-delegated deployment exists, remain open questions.^[14]

Mine warfare effectiveness in this context is influenced by more than the number of dedicated platforms. Factors such as air superiority over the strait, missile suppression of embarkation areas, hydrographic knowledge of planned minefields, availability of pre-surveyed mine positions, and external assistance from partners all affect the number of mines deployed and their operational impact. Taiwan’s minelaying capacity should be assessed as part of an integrated coastal defense architecture, recognizing that other components of this system also face significant constraints.

On the minelaying side, even a small number of mines laid in the strait or near PLA embarkation points could impose real costs: PLA commanders would have to commit MCM assets, delaying the crossing timeline and introducing uncertainty into an operation that demands precise coordination. The psychological burden of mines is well-documented: the suspicion of a minefield, even an unconfirmed one, can halt or reroute naval operations for days.

However, Taiwan’s capacity to realize this potential under combat conditions is limited. With four operational minelayers (potentially 10 by 2027), each with a maximum speed of 14 knots and minimal self-defense capabilities, and operating under intense surveillance in the Western Pacific, the likelihood of successfully conducting large-scale mining operations after hostilities commence is low. The absence of air-delivered mines further deprives Taiwan of the most survivable and responsive means of delivery.

The imbalance is even more pronounced regarding mine countermeasures. Mine clearance is inherently slow, hazardous, and resource-intensive. Taiwan’s current MCM fleet is insufficient for the scale of the threat. Should the PLA mine Kaohsiung, which manages over 60 percent of Taiwan’s cargo trade, the island’s capacity to sustain itself during a blockade or invasion would rely on mine clearance capabilities that are presently inadequate to meet the challenge.^[15]

The MCM problem runs in the opposite direction from minelaying. The PLA holds an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 naval mines and can deliver them by submarine, aircraft, surface ship, or, conceivably, civilian vessel.^[16] If the PLA mines Taiwan’s port approaches before or during an assault, Taiwan’s aging MCM fleet would be overwhelmed. The PLA can seed Taiwan’s ports with mines far faster than Taiwan can clear them.

The PLA’s Own Mine Clearance Problem

The discussion so far has treated the PLA primarily as a mine-laying actor and an ISR threat. But an amphibious crossing of the Taiwan Strait would also require the PLA to clear mines from its own approach routes: either mines laid defensively by the ROCN in coastal waters and around landing beaches, or mines laid by the PLAN itself to deny port access or deter outside involvement. This is not a trivial requirement to overcome.

The PLA Navy (PLAN) operates a fleet of Type 082 (Wozang-class) and Type 081 (T-43-class) minesweepers, supplemented by newer Type 082-II MCM vessels. Open-source assessments suggest the PLAN has roughly 24–36 dedicated MCM platforms, a modest number relative to the scale of an amphibious operation across a strait that could be mined at multiple points.^[17][18] The PLAN has invested in unmanned mine-clearance systems and towed sweeping gear, but whether these assets could clear defended minefields under fire, while Taiwan’s anti-ship missiles, shore-based artillery, and surviving naval units remain in play, is far from certain.

This reciprocal vulnerability is analytically significant. While Taiwan’s mine warfare gap is genuine, the PLA also faces substantial MCM constraints. If Taiwan succeeds in deploying even a moderate number of mines in critical locations before or during the initial phase of conflict, the PLA’s limited MCM capacity could create a bottleneck in the amphibious operation timeline. Thus, the mine warfare balance reflects not only Taiwan’s limitations but also the mutual clearance challenges faced by both sides.

Mine Warfare in the Broader Force Design Debate

Taiwan’s mine warfare posture aligns with the broader argument for asymmetric defense. The ODC, formulated by former Chief of the General Staff Admiral Lee Hsi-min, places mines among the key littoral and beach defense capabilities alongside anti-ship cruise missiles and mobile coastal defense systems.^[19] President Lai Ching-te personally inspected a live mine-laying drill during the Han Kuang 41 exercise in July 2025, signaling political commitment.^[20]

However, political commitment does not necessarily translate into operational capability. Several critical questions remain unresolved in open-source analysis. Is the mine inventory sufficient in both quantity and sophistication to impose a meaningful delay on a PLA crossing force, or does it serve primarily as a symbolic deterrent? Has Taiwan developed the necessary doctrine, training, and operational infrastructure to employ mines effectively under wartime conditions, including pre-delegation of authority, pre-positioned stocks at dispersed locations, protected embarkation points, and rehearsed rapid-deployment procedures? Furthermore, does the MCM gap represent a strategic vulnerability that cannot be mitigated solely through increased investment in minelaying?

Regarding the final point, available open-source evidence strongly supports this concern. If Taiwan is unable to keep its own ports operational, the denial strategy becomes untenable. A navy capable of mining adversary approaches but unable to clear mines from its own harbors faces a significant strategic asymmetry. While this conclusion is not definitive (classified programs or undisclosed procurement efforts may exist), the publicly observable MCM posture does not inspire confidence.

Taiwan has made modest investments in minelaying capabilities while permitting its mine clearance capacity to decline. Although offensive mining is more cost-effective within a denial strategy and thus defensible in theory, this approach leaves Taiwan vulnerable to a PLA mining campaign with limited options for remediation.

The failed Ching Fu procurement remains a significant setback. The collapse of a billion-dollar program due to fraud, with no replacement in the subsequent nine years, exemplifies the institutional obstacles that can prevent well-designed defense strategies from being implemented.^[21]

Implications

Taiwan’s mine warfare posture offers three findings for analysts and policymakers.

First, Taiwan’s leaders have grasped the value of asymmetric, cost-imposing tools and have acted on that understanding in the minelaying domain. The Min Jiang-class program, the Wan Xiang mine family, and the planned expansion to ten vessels represent a deliberate effort to build a capability that did not exist a decade ago. This is a modest but real achievement.

Second, developing a capability that is both survivable and operationally executable is considerably more challenging than simply recognizing its strategic value. Taiwan’s minelayers are slow and lightly armed, operating in an environment characterized by pervasive PLA ISR. The absence of air-delivered mines persists. The issue of when political leaders would authorize mining operations remains unresolved and has not been publicly addressed. Mine warfare effectiveness is determined by multiple factors beyond platforms, including air superiority, pre-positioned stockpiles, hydrographic preparation, and doctrinal readiness, all of which influence whether the capability can be employed effectively at the outset of a conflict.

Third, the gap in mine countermeasures is the most revealing indicator of Taiwan’s procurement challenges. For the United States and other partners, this suggests the need for targeted actions such as capability transfers, technology sharing, and joint planning in the mine warfare domain, which may be as important as platform sales. Unmanned MCM systems, an area where Taiwan’s domestic defense industry has not succeeded, represent a clear opportunity for collaboration. The stalled Quickstrike transfer warrants renewed focus, and joint exercises should rigorously test mine warfare scenarios.

For analysts evaluating Taiwan’s defense preparedness, the mine warfare gap serves as a clear test case. The credibility of any strategy depends on the existence of a deployable force structure to support it. In Taiwan’s situation, the persistent gap between strategic concepts and actual capabilities, between the vision of the Overall Defense Concept and the fleet available to implement it, remains the central challenge.

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^[1]Taiwan Strait geographic parameters—width, depth, and bathymetric features—are drawn from “Taiwan Strait,” Encyclopedia Britannica, and U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Sailing Directions (Enroute), Publication 157.

https://www.britannica.com/place/Taiwan-Strait

https://msi.nga.mil/Publications/SDEnroute

^[2] Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense commissioned the first four Min Jiang-class minelayers on January 14, 2022, assigning them to the 192nd Fleet’s Mine Laying Unit at Zuoying Naval Base. See Mike Yeo, “Taiwan Adds Minelaying to Defenses Against China,” Defense News, January 14, 2022.                                       

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/01/14/taiwan-adds-minelaying-to-defenses-against-china

^[3] The March 2025 tender for six additional Min Jiang-class vessels, budgeted at NT$1.8 billion, was the third attempt after two prior tenders failed to attract sufficient bids. See “Taiwan Seeks Contractor for Six Minelayers,” The Defense Post, March 6, 2025.

https://thedefensepost.com/2025/03/06/taiwan-contractor-six-minelayers

^[4] Min Jiang-class specifications, including displacement, speed, mine capacity, and armament, are drawn from publicly available technical data. See “Taiwan Seeks Contractor for Six Minelayers,” The Defense Post, March 6, 2025; and Republic of China Ministry of National Defense, ROC National Defense Report, 2023.

https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-ministry-of-national-defense-mnd-reports/

^[5] Taiwan’s Wan Xiang mine family was developed by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST). Open-source reporting on self-propelled mine development appears in the 2023 ROC National Defense Report. Confirmation of operational deployment of advanced variants remains limited.

https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-ministry-of-national-defense-mnd-reports/

^[6] Taiwan continues to train with the Mk-6 Mod 14 moored contact mine, a design dating to 1917. See Tyler Rogoway, “Taiwan Trains to Use Naval Mines Designed Over a Century Ago Against China,” The War Zone, 2024.

https://www.twz.com/taiwan-trains-to-use-naval-mines-designed-a-century-ago-against-china

^[7] Reports of Taiwan’s interest in U.S. Quickstrike air-delivered mines circa 2018, and the failure of that acquisition, appear in Blake Herzinger, “Delay, Disrupt, Degrade: Mine Warfare in Taiwan’s Porcupine Defense,” War on the Rocks.

https://warontherocks.com/delay-disrupt-degrade-mine-warfare-in-taiwans-porcupine-defense

^[8] Taiwan’s MCM fleet composition—four Yung Feng-class (German-built, 1991), two Yung Jin-class (ex-USN Osprey-class), and one remaining Yung Yang-class (ex-USN Aggressive-class)—is documented in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2025 (London: IISS, 2025); and Jane’s Fighting Ships 2024–2025.

https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/2025/the-military-balance-2025

^[9] PLA mine types, including the EM-52 rocket-rising mine, EM-53 bottom influence mine, and EM-55 mobile mine, are cataloged in Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century (2015); and in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute publications. PLA MCM platforms are assessed in The Military Balance 2025 by IISS.

https://news.usni.org/2015/04/09/document-office-of-naval-intelligence-2015-assessment-of-chinese-peoples-liberation-army-navy

https://nuke.fas.org/guide/china/plan-2015.pdf

^[10] The Ching Fu Shipbuilding scandal, involving an NT$35 billion MCM contract awarded in 2014 that collapsed by 2017 amid fraud charges, is documented in “Taiwan to Build Six New MCM Ships with U.S., Italian Help,” USNI News, November 3, 2014; and subsequent Taipei Times reporting, 2017.

https://news.usni.org/2014/11/03/taiwan-build-six-new-mcm-ships-u-s-italian-help-china-displeased

https://globaltaiwan.org/2017/11/crux-of-ching-fus-case-concerns-china/

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2019/09/29/200372310

^[11] Min Jiang-class specifications, including displacement, speed, mine capacity, and armament, are drawn from publicly available technical data. See “Taiwan Seeks Contractor for Six Minelayers,” The Defense Post, March 6, 2025; and Republic of China Ministry of National Defense, ROC National Defense Report, 2023.

https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-ministry-of-national-defense-mnd-reports/

^[12] China’s ISR satellite constellation exceeded 359 systems as of January 2024. PLA aircraft conducted 3,615 flights into Taiwan’s ADIZ in 2024. See “All Quiet in the Taiwan Strait? Explaining the Recent Drop in PLA Aircraft Activity Around Taiwan,” Taiwan Security Monitor, and U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2024 Annual Report to Congress.https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/all-quiet-in-the-taiwan-strait-explaining-the-recent-drop-in-pla-aircraft-activity-around-taiwan

https://www.uscc.gov/annual-report/2024-annual-report-congress

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/J.Michael_Dahm_Testimony.pdf

^[13] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-15: Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 6, 2016; validated March 5, 2018), https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_15pa%282018%29.pdf

^[14] The Overall Defense Concept (ODC), formulated by former Chief of the General Staff Admiral Lee Hsi-min, envisions mines as a key capability for littoral defense. See Lee Hsi-min and Eric Lee, “Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept, Explained,” The Diplomat, November 3, 2020.

https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/taiwans-overall-defense-concept-explained

^[15] Kaohsiung handles over 60 percent of Taiwan’s cargo throughput. About 44 percent of the world’s container fleet transits the Taiwan Strait each year. See Bureau of Transportation and Communications, Taiwan Statistical Yearbook 2024; and Bloomberg, “Taiwan Strait Shipping Traffic Analysis,” 2024.

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/november/taiwan-strait-oceans-most-contested-place https://www.statista.com/statistics/1045142/container-throughput-volume-in-kaohsiung-port-taiwan/

^[16] China’s naval mine inventory is estimated at 50,000 to 100,000 mines comprising over 30 varieties. See Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy “Assassin’s Mace” Capability, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, 2009. The estimate has been widely cited in subsequent assessments, including the U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, annual reports.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/7

^[17] China’s naval mine inventory is estimated at 50,000 to 100,000 mines comprising over 30 varieties. See Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy “Assassin’s Mace” Capability, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, 2009. The estimate has been widely cited in subsequent assessments, including the U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, annual reports.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/7

^[18] PLA mine types, including the EM-52 rocket-rising mine, EM-53 bottom influence mine, and EM-55 mobile mine, are cataloged in Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century (2015); and in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute publications. PLA MCM platforms are assessed in The Military Balance 2025 by IISS.

https://news.usni.org/2015/04/09/document-office-of-naval-intelligence-2015-assessment-of-chinese-peoples-liberation-army-navy

https://nuke.fas.org/guide/china/plan-2015.pdf

^[19] The Overall Defense Concept (ODC), formulated by former Chief of the General Staff Admiral Lee Hsi-min, envisions mines as a key capability for littoral defense. See Lee Hsi-min and Eric Lee, “Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept, Explained,” The Diplomat, November 3, 2020.

https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/taiwans-overall-defense-concept-explained

^[20] President Lai Ching-te inspected a live mine-laying drill during the Han Kuang 41 exercise in July 2025. See “Lai Inspects Mine Drill,” Focus Taiwan, July 14, 2025.

https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202507140021

^[21] The Ching Fu Shipbuilding scandal, involving an NT$35 billion MCM contract awarded in 2014 that collapsed by 2017 amid fraud charges, is documented in “Taiwan to Build Six New MCM Ships with U.S., Italian Help,” USNI News, November 3, 2014; and subsequent Taipei Times reporting, 2017.

https://news.usni.org/2014/11/03/taiwan-build-six-new-mcm-ships-u-s-italian-help-china-displeased

https://globaltaiwan.org/2017/11/crux-of-ching-fus-case-concerns-china/

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2019/09/29/200372310