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Weekly Arms Update: 5/13/26

Authors: Joe O’Connor, Shikhar Chaturvedi, Danielle Kremer, & Wyeth Lindberg

This week: the Pentagon’s auditor releases a report on arms deliveries to Taiwan; the Legislative Yuan finally passes authorization for a special defense budget; Taiwan’s NCSIST receives U.S. certification to work in the defense sector; and Shield AI partners with Taiwanese companies to enhance unmanned undersea vehicle development; alongside weekly bids and solicitations.

Pentagon IG Releases Audit of PDA Deliveries to Taiwan

On Thursday, the U.S. Department of Defense’s Office of Inspector General released a follow-up audit on the adequacy of Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) equipment delivery to Taiwan. This came after a 2024 audit which revealed serious deficiencies with packing and storage of items, including moldy body armor and loose arms and ammunition.

This audit, focusing on a shipment of M16 rifles and associated equipment in September 2025, indicated that marked improvements have been made in PDA deliveries, on handling of the rifles or “serialized items,” which were packed into waterproof bags and tagged properly. However, issues continued to persist with associated equipment, including ripped boxes and crates held together with duct tape. Air Force officials were recommended to fix regulations and develop policy for shipping from alternate aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs), both of which contributed to the issues. This is also significant as it is the first publicly disclosed PDA shipment to Taiwan during the Trump administration, indicating that deliveries of common items, such as infantry equipment, are continuing.

Special Budget Authorization Passes Legislature

On Friday, the Legislative Yuan, along party lines, voted to pass an authorization bill for special defense spending, titled the “Special Act for Safeguarding National Security and Strengthening Asymmetric Capabilities Procurement.” This proposal authorizes NT$780 billion, or US$24.89 billion, in spending solely for U.S. arms sales procurement. Split into two batches, the first batch, consisting of NT$300 billion (US$9.57 billion), will fund arms sales notified in December, including Paladins, HIMARS, and TOW-2B missiles. The remainder, approximately NT$480 billion (US$15.3 billion) will fund additional U.S. sales that are not yet notified.

Budget observers will note that this proposal is approximately 60% of the Lai administration’s proposal for NT$1.25 trillion, or US$40 billion, in spending; proposed spending for domestic drone procurement and resilience was cut. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Lai administration officials both expressed concern about the lower budget, with MND officials warning that some acquisition programs, including Strong Bow ABM systems and Team Awareness Kits, may be delayed due to lack of funding.

The majority in the LY, composed of the Kuomintang led by Cheng Li-wun, and the Taiwan People’s Party, led by Huang Kuo-chang, both praised the passage of the bill as “acting with great responsibility,” and combatting “corruption and waste.”

NCSIST Receives U.S. Defense Certification

Per Liberty Times, Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) has recently received certification to work within the U.S. defense supply chain, undergoing third-party cybersecurity evaluations for Patriot radar antennas and certain drone technology. These assessments are required under provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act and the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations and allow NCSIST to be listed on the DoD’s industrial supply chain website.

Shield AI Deepens Taiwan Autonomy Partnerships

Shield AI and Taiwanese defense manufacturer Thunder Tiger Corp. announced a new memorandum of understanding to integrate Shield AI’s Hivemind autonomy software across Thunder Tiger’s unmanned systems portfolio, beginning with a Thunder Tiger unmanned surface vessel (USV) and a planned live demonstration this summer. The partnership marks Shield AI’s clearest move into Taiwan’s maritime autonomy space and builds on a broader pattern of Taiwan-focused corporate partnerships over the past year.

As TSM noted in its April 29 Weekly Arms Update, Taiwan’s Navy is already reportedly designing its next-generation combatant with a dual-hangar configuration for both an MH-60R helicopter and a vertical take-off and landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). Liberty Times reported that the Navy identified Shield AI’s V-BAT, or a UAV with comparable capability, as the design reference. That maritime relevance now sits alongside Shield AI’s earlier contract with NCSIST to integrate Hivemind into Taiwan-developed unmanned systems. These recent developments (coupled with the Shield AI’s Taipei 101 office opening during TADTE and teaming agreement with AIDC) now signal strengthened sustainment and integration for Shield AI’s systems in Taiwan.

Weekly Awards / Solicitations

On Wednesday, the Ministry of National Defense Headquarters awarded China Telecom Co., an NT$795.00 million (US$25.12 million) contract for cloud-based private network bandwidth services. The contract is to be fulfilled in an unknown location in Taiwan.

There were no significant solicitations of note this week.

Taiwanese Army Reform Update, Q1 2026

Author: Noah Reed

Welcome to the inaugural edition of the Taiwanese Army Reform Update, where we examine recent innovations and reforms in the Republic of China Army (ROCA). This edition will examine recent drone integration and training efforts, the re-classification of several brigades, and training reforms for one-year reservists.

Drone Integration and Training Accelerates

The most significant development in the first half of 2026 relates to the proliferation and integration of unmanned systems into ROCA units. Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo stated in a 2025 Legislative Yuan testimony that the ROCA would establish independent drone battalions, subordinated to the 21^st, 58^th, and 43^rd Artillery Commands, respectively.[i] The deadline for these units to be stood up was stated to be July 2026, although the battalions under the 21^st and 58^th have seemingly already been activated and have begun providing drone certification training to personnel in several other ROCA units.[ii] Some level of drone adoption, especially reconnaissance UAVs, is also present in the 1st and 2nd Theater Commands. The 1st and 2nd Theater Commands are tasked with defending Penghu and Taiwan’s eastern Hualien and Taitung counties, respectively.

The Artillery Command’s drone battalions are responsible for both strike and reconnaissance roles, and, from available information, UAV operators are organized into base tactical teams of 5-person units. These teams consist of:

A team leader.
A deputy team leader.
A reconnaissance drone operator.
Two FPV strike drone operators.

Figure: ROCA Drone Tactical Team Order-of-Battle (Symbols from Spatial Illusions).

Outside of the Army’s artillery units, drone integration continues at the institutional as well as regular and reserve unit levels. In April of this year, the Army inaugurated the Unmanned Systems Training Command (無人系統訓練指揮部), which will integrate the training and research process between the services.[iii]

Map: Visualization of drone unit distribution and identification.

Keeping with the emphasis on education and training, reserve units have begun incorporating drones into mobilization training and have brought in licensed civilian drone operators to assist.[iv] Expect the upcoming Han Kuang exercise to heavily feature unmanned systems employment in the called-up reservist formations.

Image: The inauguration of the Unmanned Systems Training Command (Photo: MND)

Formal integration of unmanned systems into the organization of the ROCA’s combined arms brigades and regional commands will likely follow once procurement and training have reached the appropriate scale. At this moment, it is unclear if that integration will manifest into independent drone companies and battalions, or if the new equipment and drone operators will be folded into the units’ existing organizational structure.

Taiwan has made impressive strides in the adoption of unmanned systems over the last year. While the current focus of the ROCA is building the institutions required for specialized training, several new units have been established or re-constituted for a drone-centric role, and drones increasingly feature in ROCA exercises. The challenge of creating skilled drone operators in every unit will be steep, especially for reservist formations. However, Taiwan’s institutionalization of drone training has built a solid foundation for its future unmanned systems forces.

Several ROCA Units Reclassified as Combined Arms Brigades

In January of this year, the ROCA officially reclassified seven of its armored and mechanized infantry brigades to Combined Arms Brigades. This change was the natural continuation of reforms dating back to 2019, when the Ministry of National Defense (MND) began battalion-level reforms to adopt a combined arms organization.[v]

Former Brigade Name	New Brigade Name	Region & Command
269^th Mechanized Infantry Brigade	269^th Combined Arms Brigade	6^th Army Corps / 3^rd Theater (Northern Taiwan)
242^nd Armored Brigade	242^nd Combined Arms Brigade	6^th Army Corps / 3^rd Theater (Northern Taiwan)
584^th Armored Brigade	584^th Combined Arms Brigade	6^th Army Corps / 3^rd Theater (Northern Taiwan)
586^th Armored Brigade	586^th Combined Arms Brigade	10^th Army Corps / 5^th Theater (Central Taiwan)
234^th Mechanized Infantry Brigade	234^th Combined Arms Brigade	10^th Army Corps / 5^th Theater (Central Taiwan)
564^th Armored Brigade	564^th Combined Arms Brigade	8^th Army Corps / 4^th Theater (Southern Taiwan)
333^rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade	333^rd Combined Arms Brigade	8^th Army Corps // 4^th Theater (Southern Taiwan)

Figure: Former and current brigade classifications and regions.

In practice, that shift resulted in the ROCA’s regular battalions integrating armor, mechanized, and anti-tank equipment more uniformly and ensured the regional area commands would not lag behind the seven premier mechanized and armored brigades in experience and capability.

The ROCA’s headquarters said the reclassification aligns with overall force development planning and changes in the battlefield environment, while enhancing “overall defensive combat capabilities.”[vi] This does not, however, mean every brigade’s overall organization and combat role is now uniform. The former armored brigades, specifically the 584th, will receive M1A2T Abrams tanks before their former mechanized counterparts, and will still feature armor more prominently. The last of those 108 Abrams tanks arrived in late April, where they will soon join the two commissioned battalions in the 584^th Combined Arms Brigade.

The reclassification represents the end of a multi-year effort to modernize the ROCA’s force structure among its full-strength, volunteer force brigades. On paper, this effort aligns with Taiwan’s overall defensive strategy of creating several high-readiness mobile strike units, which can quickly respond to any landing attempts, while mobilized reservist and lower-readiness formations defend infrastructure and territory in their respective regions.

Map: Visualization of unit distribution and identification.

Survivability is the main concern with such a strategy. If units have time to disperse and entrench in forward positions before their garrisons come under fire, they stand to put up serious resistance. However, if units are caught with their vehicles in motor pools during the opening salvo of a conflict, there are serious concerns about their ability to maneuver to forward positions under fire, especially when roads and bridges could be damaged.

Reserve Infantry Brigades to Train with Volunteer Brigades

Reforms were also introduced to the ROCA’s reserve infantry brigades earlier this year. Taiwan’s infantry brigades are primarily used for training reservists and volunteers during peacetime, although they are expected to become full-strength combat units tasked with regional defense in the event of conflict.

To soften that process, one-year conscripts from several infantry brigades will begin to train alongside the volunteer Combined Arms Brigades during live-fire exercises, per an Executive Yuan policy reported published in January.[vii] This is an important step in training reform, and one that has the potential to improve brigade cooperation and experience. Select battalions from five reserve infantry brigades, likely the 109^th, 249^th, 101^st, 137^th, and 117^th, will attend Tri-Service live-fire exercises starting later this year.

These five brigades will also form the core of Taiwan’s reserve defense strategy and, during wartime, will protect critical infrastructure and provide defensive depth and support to the more mobile and experienced Combined Arms Brigades.

Map: Visualization of unit distribution and areas of responsibility.

[i] 陳治程, 國軍『無人機大隊』將隸軍團砲指部明年7月前分階段編成. Liberty Times. https://def.ltn.com.tw/article/breakingnews/5221462

[ii] 陳彥陵, 21砲指部無人機系統化訓練強化部隊專業技術. Youth Daily News. https://www.ydn.com.tw/tw/News/ugC_News_Detail.aspx?ID=596420

[iii] 賴佳欣, 無人系統訓練指揮部拜會消防署訓練中心強化全社會防衛韌性共同目標. VOH Network. https://www.voh.com.tw/tw/News/ugC_News_Detail.aspx?CID=1&ID=12681&P=1

[iv] 李人岳, 教召無人機課程2小時熟練後可申請證照？專家：沒想像中簡單. United Daily News. https://udn.com/news/story/10930/9177211

[v] 楊仁翔, 陸軍打擊旅全面更名「聯合兵種旅」學者：具備獨立作戰能力. RTI. https://www.rti.org.tw/news?uid=3&pid=186960

[vi] CNA/UDN report, 裝甲、機步旅更銜「聯合兵種旅」陸軍：順應建軍規畫. https://udn.com/news/story/10930/9271957

[vii] 賴于榛, 政院：強化打擊能力　今年起一年期義務役編成步兵營. CNA. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202601310030.aspx

Weekly Security Review: 5/11/26

Authors: Mina Chen, Danielle Kremer & Jaime Ocon

Welcome to the Weekly Security Review, where we highlight key military, security, and political developments around Taiwan in one straightforward summary!

This week, Taiwan’s legislature finalizes a supplemental budget focused on U.S. FMS programs, the military weighs deploying HIMARS to the outlying islands, and the Indigenous submarine Hai Kun completes weapons testing.

Taiwan’s Legislature Passes Scaled-Down NT$780 Billion Defense Budget

Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan on Friday, May 8, approved a special defence budget of NT$780 billion (US$25 billion). The vote ended 162 days of political gridlock, but the final figure falls well short of President Lai’s NT$1.25 trillion proposal. The result was shaped almost entirely by the two main opposition parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), which together hold a legislative majority.

The KMT was originally divided between a NT$380 billion version supported by chairperson Cheng Li-wun and a NT$800 billion version backed by several KMT legislators. After several internal party caucuses and pressure from Washington, the party eventually acquiesced to NT$300 billion (US$9.7 billion) for a first round of US arms procurement and NT$480 billion (US$15.3 billion) for a second. The scope of permitted purchases under the NT$300 billion cap includes Paladin self-propelled howitzers, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), ALTIUS unmanned loitering munitions, Javelin, and TOW-2B anti-armor missiles. The second tranche, with a ceiling of NT$480 billion, will consist of funding for future items that the U.S. government will issue Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) for. These are rumored to include additional Patriot and National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) batteries, as well as other items.

The final budget is approximately 40% less than President Lai Ching-te’s original eight-year budget plan. Critically, the items cut from the proposal fall into two categories: commercial procurement (combined NT$100 billion) and domestic contract manufacturing (combined NT$250 billion). There are concerns that the budget cut could both undermine Taiwan’s air defense network and also hinder the development of Taiwan’s defense industry due to a lack of domestic defense contracts.

Army Plans to Forward Deploy HIMARS to Outlying Islands

Taiwan’s military reiterated its plans to deploy U.S.-made HIMARS launchers to the outlying islands of Penghu and Dongyin. Unnamed military sources from the Liberty Times say the move is intended to extend the reach of the island’s long-range strike capabilities and push Chinese military forces farther away from Taiwan’s coastline.

Sources say the planned deployment could create a posture that would increase the tactical value of HIMARS by threatening People’s Liberation Army (PLA) bases, airfields and staging areas along China’s southeastern coast. According to the article, the core idea is to create a “dead zone” that would force the PLA to pull key forces at least 100 kilometers inland to reduce their vulnerability to Taiwanese precision strikes. By distributing long-range fires to offshore islands, Taiwan would complicate PLA targeting, preserve more warning time, and raise the cost of any attempt at a rapid amphibious assault.

Penghu is roughly 150 kilometers from China’s Fujian Province, and specialized munitions such as Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) fired from HIMARS on the islands could reach PLA landing assembly areas in Quanzhou, Xiamen, and Zhangzhou. Dongyin, Taiwan’s northernmost territory, sits even closer to the Chinese mainland and could place additional PLA facilities in range, including naval ports, radar sites, and air defense positions.

Taiwan has already begun receiving HIMARS and ATACMS from the United States, and once all planned deliveries are complete, the military expects to field 111 HIMARS launchers and 504 ATACMS missiles. Sources within Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) have reportedly also reserved space in a later procurement package for the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), with a range of roughly 500 km. If acquired, the combination of HIMARS, ATACMS, and future PrSM would give Taipei a deeper fire network capable of threatening PLA staging areas, logistics nodes, and air bases across the Strait.

Indigenous Defense Submarine Completes Weapons Test

Taiwan’s first Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS), Hai Kun (SS-711), has completed a major weapons system verification test on May 7. According to China Ship Building Corporation (CSBC), the trial was conducted on May 6 and involved the launch of two Mk48 Mod 6 Advanced Technology heavyweight torpedoes. The test was designed to oversee the vessel’s ability to detect, track, and engage a target using its combat system.

CSBC released video of the test showing the torpedoes leaving the tubes and the wire guidance system visible in the underwater footage. The test is a significant milestone for Hai Kun, which has faced delays caused by integration issues with foreign-made subsystems. The original plan called for delivery to the Taiwanese Navy in December 2025 but has since changed the delivery date to July 2026. The Mk48 Mod 6AT torpedoes will be the predominant weapons systems aboard the IDS. In 2017 and 2020, the U.S. announced separate FMS packages of Mk 48 Mod 6 torpedoes; as of the time of writing, both are considered “delayed” by the MND, in reports to the LY.

With the weapons trial complete, CSBC plans to continue preparing Hai Kun for dockside maintenance and subsequent testing.

Strait Snapshot, April 2026 Update

Authors: Ethan Connell & Jonathan Walberg

KEY FINDINGS

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense recorded 229 PLA aerial sorties around the island in April 2026, of which 169 entered Taiwan’s southwestern Air Defense Identification Zone. The total represents a 58 percent year-on-year decline from April 2025’s 546 sorties, but a 56-sortie increase from March, interrupting the consecutive monthly declines observed across the first quarter.
Two joint combat readiness patrols framed the month, on April 1 (25 aircraft) and April 25 (28 aircraft), and the PLA’s Liaoning aircraft carrier transited the Taiwan Strait on April 20. The contraction in routine sortie volume since January has not extended to either surge capacity or strategic signaling.
PLAN vessel detections averaged 7.1 per day in April, peaking at 11. These figures remain within the five-to-nine vessel baseline observed throughout 2025, reaffirming the structural decoupling between air sortie volume and naval presence.
The Taiwanese Coast Guard Administration recorded three incursions by CCG vessels into Taiwan’s restricted waters in April, all around Kinmen. April is the first month of 2026 without a Dongsha (Pratas) incursion, breaking a monthly cadence sustained from January through March. Cumulative incursions across the first four months of the year total 18, with 15 around Kinmen and three around Dongsha.

Above the Floor

April 2026 marked a partial reversal of a three-month decline that had defined the first quarter. The month’s 229 detected sorties, including 169 that crossed the Taiwan Strait median line or entered the southwestern Air Defense Identification Zone, exceeded March’s 173-sortie total by 56 but remained 58 percent below the 546 sorties recorded in April 2025. The sequential trajectory across the first four months of 2026 (270 → 190 → 173 → 229) places March’s lull as a floor rather than the continuation of a sustained downward trend, with overall activity holding well below the 2025 baseline.

The month opened and closed with joint combat readiness patrols: the April 1 JCRP involved 25 aircraft, continuing the late-March return to operations after the Two Sessions lull, while the April 25 JCRP involved 28 aircraft and coincided with the final day of Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang 42 computer-simulated wargames. Between these two patrols, daily activity remained subdued, with two zero-detection days (April 4 and April 12) and a string of single-digit days through the mid-month. The final third of April produced elevated single-day totals, with 24 aircraft on April 20, 22 aircraft on April 27, and 17 aircraft on April 10.

Figure 1. Daily PLA aerial activity around Taiwan, April 2026. Gold stars mark JCRP days; the April 20 surge corresponds with the Liaoning carrier transit.

The April 20 spike coincided with the transit of the Liaoning aircraft carrier and escorts (CV-16) through the Taiwan Strait. The PLA’s Eastern Theater Command described the movement as part of long-range combat training in the western Pacific, and Taiwan’s MND released images of the carrier’s air wing during the transit. Japan’s JS Ikazuchi (DD-107) had transited the Strait three days earlier, on April 17 (the anniversary of the Treaty of Shimonoseki) drawing Beijing’s condemnation as a deliberate provocation. Together with the two JCRPs, these events indicate that the contraction in routine sortie volume since January has not extended to surge capacity or strategic signaling.

Monthly Trajectory: A Floor, Not a Trend

Viewed against the preceding three months, April’s 229-sortie total interrupts the consecutive decline that ran from January through March. Monthly totals across the first four months of 2026 (270, 190, 173, and 229) show a curve that fell sharply through Q1 before stabilizing.

Figure 2. Monthly PLA aerial activity sortie totals, 2024–2026. April 2026 marks a modest rebound from March’s three-month low.

JCRP cadence offers a more stable read on PLA intent than aggregate sortie counts. April’s two JCRPs match February’s two and fall one short of March’s three. The April 25 peak of 28 aircraft is comparable to the 36-aircraft peak observed on March 17 and consistent with the cadence of roughly one large-format exercise per month sustained since August 2022. Reductions in routine sortie volume have not yet been accompanied by a comparable decline in the PLA’s willingness to mount high-intensity demonstrations on short notice.

At Sea: Carrier Transit and a Steady Baseline

PLAN vessel detections averaged 7.1 per day in April, peaking at 11 vessels on April 19 and again on April 28. These figures fall within the five-to-nine vessel range that has characterized PLAN presence throughout 2025 and the first four months of 2026. The Liaoning transit on April 20 registers in qualitative rather than quantitative terms: a single-day strategic signaling operation that did not move the monthly aggregate. Eastern Theater Command’s framing of the transit as long-range combat training in the western Pacific points to posture rather than escalation.

Figure 3. PLAN vessel and official ship detections around Taiwan, April 2026.

Naval presence held at baseline levels through April, reinforcing a structural observation that has held throughout 2026: air sorties appear responsive to political calendars and institutional dynamics, whereas naval presence functions as a persistent baseline feature of cross-strait military activity. The April carrier transit shows that this baseline coexists with episodic surge operations of strategic weight rather than displacing them.

Coast Guard Gray Zone Operations

China Coast Guard (CCG) activity in Taiwan’s restricted waters continued through April but contracted geographically. The CCG conducted 3 documented incursions on April 21, April 24, and April 28, all of them around Kinmen. Each incursion involved the same four-cutter rotation (hull numbers 14530, 14531, 14604, and 14609) and concluded within roughly two hours of entering restricted waters, consistent with the institutionalized two-to-three-hour Kinmen pattern documented in earlier months. Cumulative CCG incursions across the first four months of 2026 now total 18, with 15 around Kinmen and 3 around Dongsha.

Figure 4. CCG incursions into Taiwan’s restricted waters, January–April 2026, by location and vessel count.

The April pause around Dongsha is perhaps the most analytically distinctive feature of the month’s CCG activity. January, February, and March each included a single Dongsha (Pratas) operation, several with dwell times exceeding twenty-four hours; April’s gap breaks that monthly cadence for the first time in 2026. The narrower reading is that the once-monthly Dongsha rhythm reflected an operational pattern rather than a binding institutional commitment, and that May or June observations will either restore it or confirm its discontinuation. A broader reading is that the CCG temporarily consolidated around the proximate Kinmen rotation while the PLA Navy carried the month’s strategic signaling through the Liaoning transit. The Coast Guard Administration’s announcement earlier in April of US$1.88 billion in Pratas-area infrastructure and patrol upgrades indicates continuing Taiwanese concern about the durability of presence at its most remote outlying holding.

The Full Picture: Multi-Domain Overview

Figure 5. January–April 2026 multi-domain PLA activity: air sorties, naval presence, and CCG incursions.

Viewed across all three domains, the first four months of 2026 reinforce an analytical pattern visible since January. Air activity has been volatile and politically responsive, with a pronounced lull in early March and a partial rebound in April. Naval presence has been held within the established baseline throughout, including during the week of the Liaoning carrier transit. Coast Guard incursions have continued at roughly five incidents per month, with the April pattern narrowing geographically and interrupting the once-monthly Dongsha cadence. Analysts and policymakers would be well served by resisting the temptation to interpret a reduction in the headline sortie count as evidence of overall de-escalation. The multi-domain posture, taken as a whole, does not indicate a meaningful departure from the sustained pattern of PLA activity around Taiwan that has defined cross-strait military dynamics since August 2022.

Figure 6. April air activity year-over-year: total sorties and median line crossings, 2024–2026.

Methodology & Sources

Air and naval detection data are drawn from daily press releases issued by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and compiled in the PLA Activity Center database maintained by the Taiwan Security Monitor. Coast Guard incident data are compiled from Coast Guard Administration press releases and verified against contemporaneous media reporting in the China Coast Guard Incident Tracker Database. Allied and contextual events draw on Taiwan Security Monitor’s Weekly Security Reviews of April 6, April 16, April 20, and April 27. “Median line” refers to the informal centerline of the Taiwan Strait historically observed by both sides. “JCRP” denotes Joint Combat Readiness Patrols as designated by Taiwan’s MND. All analysis and commentary are by the Taiwan Security Monitor.

Weekly Arms Update: 5/6/26

Author: Joe O’Connor, Shikhar Chaturvedi, Danielle Kremer, & Wyeth Lindberg

This week: Taiwan’s indigenously-produced Hai Kun submarine completed two more submergence tests, progress reports emerged on delivery of Brave Eagle trainer aircraft and T112 battle rifles; Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo warned about payments for HIMARS being due soon; and special budget updates, alongside weekly awards and solicitations.

Hai Kun Submarine Program Undergoes Additional Tests

On Tuesday, the Hai Kun (SS-711), a prototype of Taiwan’s indigenous submarine program, undertook its seventh submergence test off Kaohsiung. Marking its 13th sea trial and the first in over a month, analysts speculated that the submarine’s crew did torpedo testing and handling, since certain equipment borrowed from the United States must be returned.

On Wednesday, the Hai Kun departed again for an eighth test, and appeared to undertake a more comprehensive exercise, including navigation, diving maneuvers, and live-fire torpedo drills, per observers speaking to CNA. Much like the prior test, a large focus appears to be on torpedo testing and overnight testing of seaworthiness.

News on Brave Eagle Trainers and T112 Rifle Development

An MND report to the Legislative Yuan revealed on Monday that the Air Force has received 56 “Brave Eagle” advanced jet trainer aircraft so far this year and is expected to receive the remaining 10 by the end of the year. A variant of the Indigenous Defense Fighter jet, the Brave Eagle has been in production and procurement since 2017.

The same MND report, and an ensuing hearing on Wednesday, revealed that failure rates of new T112 battle rifles will be investigated by the Armaments Bureau, who has also allocated funds for T112 red-dot sight production, to be completed and issued as standard equipment by 2029. The failures of some 500 T112s in ROC Military Police service, including claimed poor barrel quality, have not been reported to the Bureau, but an investigation will occur anyway, per Director Lt. Gen. Lin Wen-hsiang.

MND Officials Warn Payment for HIMARS Due End of May

In the same Legislative Yuan hearing as above on Wednesday, Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo and Director of the MND’s Department of Strategic Planning, Lt. Gen. Huang Wen-chi, warned that the final deadline is May 31 for initial payment of High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) from the U.S.; and that failure to pay would mean procurement cancellation and further delays if Taiwan wished to re-apply for sale of those systems.

Huang further stated that the initial payment is valued at NT$800 million (US$25.49 million), and was originally due on March 30, but after coordination between the MND and U.S. authorities, the deadline was set back to late May. DPP legislators, hearing this, expressed concern regarding the deadline, particularly due to delays and lack of agreement in passing a supplemental defense budget, which will fund procurement of HIMARS, as well as Paladin self-propelled howitzers, Javelin anti-armor missiles, and TOW-2B anti-armor missiles.

Special Budget Updates

On Tuesday, Kuomintang members of the Legislative Yuan and party members met internally to achieve a compromise on the party’s topline ceiling for the special defense budget, particularly after last week, where divisions began to appear and KMT Vice Chairman Chi Lin-lien threatened to expel LY Speaker Han Kuo-yu from the party for his support of NT$800 billion in spending. At this week’s meeting, KMT legislator Lai Shih-bao made a compromise proposal, consisting of the present NT$380 billion (US$12 billion) ceiling, and amending it to NT$800 billion (US$25.49 billion) once additional Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) from the United States are received. Lai did note, however, that some KMT members, who are seeking re-election in local elections this year, favor a flat NT$800 billion ceiling to assist their electoral chances.

On Wednesday, LY Speaker Han Kuo-yu convened the fourth round of caucus negotiations on the special defense budget, which like previous sessions, failed to achieve consensus on the topline budget ceiling, despite recessing to allow more private consultations. Per Han, the LY’s standard 30-day “freeze” policy has elapsed, allowing the three competing proposals (one by the Lai administration + DPP, one by the Kuomintang, and one by the Taiwan People’s Party) to advance to floor consideration. LY consideration of proposals could happen as early as Friday, May 8, per Han.

Weekly Awards / Solicitations

On Thursday, the Air Force Command’s Military Mission to the United States awarded the American Institute in Taiwan a NT$10.07 billion (US$319.42 million) contract for non-standard aircraft spare parts and accessories. The contract is to be fulfilled in Taichung (Daya District) Chiayi (Shuishang Township), Tainan (Rende District), Kaohsiung (Gangshan District), Pingtung (Pingtung), Taitung (Taitung), Hualien (Xincheng Township, Ji’an Township).

Also on Thursday, the Military Police Command solicited bids for the purchase of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for diversified administrative applications, worth NT$247.20 million (US$7.83 million).

Taiwan Affairs Office responds to Taiwanese companies cutting ties with Yan Wenqun: Pursuing “Taiwan independence” harms both others and oneself, and will inevitably be punished.

A reporter asked: The company where Yan Wenqun, the nephew of “Taiwan independence” diehard Liu Shih-fang, works issued a statement yesterday cutting ties with him and removing Yan Wenqun from all positions at its Taiwan headquarters and mainland branches. What is the spokesperson’s comment?

State Council Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Chen Binhua responded by saying: “Taiwan independence” undermines peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and harms the interests of compatriots on both sides. It is a dead end that cannot be taken. Pursuing “Taiwan independence” harms both others and oneself, and will inevitably be punished. We will never allow “Taiwan independence” diehards and their relatives to invest, do business, and seek profits on the mainland. We will never allow people who support “Taiwan independence” and damage cross-Strait relations to make money on the mainland while supporting “Taiwan independence” separatist activities. Our measures to punish “independence” target only a very small number of “Taiwan independence” elements and do not affect the broad mass of Taiwan compatriots and Taiwanese enterprises. As always, we will welcome and support Taiwan compatriots and Taiwanese enterprises in taking root and developing in the motherland’s mainland, sharing the opportunities and achievements of Chinese-style modernization, and giving Taiwan compatriots and Taiwanese enterprises a greater sense of happiness and gain.

Taiwan Affairs Office: The so-called “diplomatic achievements” fabricated by Lai Ching-te are nothing more than trickery that makes him a laughingstock before the world.

A reporter asked: Lai Ching-te’s previous attempt to “sneak visit” Eswatini was frustrated after relevant countries refused to issue flight permits for his chartered plane. According to reports, on May 2 Lai Ching-te secretly boarded an Eswatini aircraft and “sneakily arrived” in Eswatini. What is your comment?
State Council Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Chen Binhua responded by saying: Previously, because relevant countries upheld the one-China principle, Lai Ching-te was forced to cancel his attempt to take a chartered plane to “sneak visit” Eswatini. But unwilling to accept failure, and with no regard for his own dignity, he actually “fled abroad” to Eswatini in a sneaky, underhanded manner. At present, Taiwan is suffering from an earthquake, yet Lai Ching-te pays it no heed. This shows that he is cold-blooded and heartless toward the people on the island, stubborn in his “Taiwan independence” position, and a thorough “troublemaker.”
Upholding the one-China principle reflects the will of the international community, the trend of the times, and the cause of justice. Lai Ching-te’s filthy conduct, like a rat crossing the street, will surely be mocked by the international community. Maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and living stable, prosperous lives are what public opinion on the island hopes for. Lai Ching-te disregards the safety of the people and wantonly deceives them, and he will surely be cast aside by the broad mass of Taiwan compatriots. The so-called “diplomatic achievements” that Lai Ching-te has gone to such lengths to concoct are nothing more than trickery that invites ridicule from the world. The great trend of the motherland’s inevitable reunification is rolling forward and cannot be stopped.

Weekly Arms Update: 4/29/26

Authors: Joe O’Connor, Shikhar Chaturvedi, Danielle Kremer, & Wyeth Lindberg

This week: special budget negotiations remain stalled, as internal fractures emerge; a Lockheed earnings call gives details on delayed F-16s; the final batch of Abrams tanks are delivered to Taipei; and information comes out about ROCN plans to use V-BAT drones on ships, alongside weekly awards and solicitations.

Special Budget: Negotiations Stall, KMT Fractures Emerge

Negotiations on the budget this week continued, with two consultations in the Legislative Yuan’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee ending with little to no consensus reached. A hearing on Thursday elicited some agreement on execution provisions, including members agreeing on LY oversight of reallocation of funds and reporting requirements. The most recent hearing, on Monday, concluded after approximately an hour, with no resolution. LY Speaker Han Kuo-yu later told press that the next hearing would be scheduled for next week, on May 6.

Separately, internal discussions in the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) over a unified spending proposal continued, with rumors emerging that both had agreed on a budget ceiling of NT$800 billion (US$25.3 billion). An internal KMT caucus meeting today, however, revealed greater divisions, with members being split between the current proposal for NT$380 billion (US$12 billion), or NT$800 billion. This tension within the party escalated to an extent that KMT Vice Chairman Chi Lin-lien threatened to expel LY Speaker Han Kuo-yu from the party for his support of NT$800 billion in spending.

Lockheed Earnings Call Provides Updates on F-16

On Thursday, Lockheed Martin chief financial officer Evan Scott told shareholders in a quarterly earnings call that “issues during the flight test” of F-16 Block 70 fighter jets for Taiwan and Morocco contributed to a decline in profits and resultant delays in delivery. Scott also stated that “we are back on track with a successful flight test and plan to begin deliveries of the first aircraft as soon as this week.” It is unclear whether Taiwan or Morocco will receive airframes first, although previously, Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo stated that he thought they would begin receiving F-16s by September 2026.

Final Batch of Abrams Tanks Delivered to Taipei

On April 27th, the third and final batch of M1A2T Abrams tanks, purchased from the United States and equipped with 120mm smoothbore guns and incorporating advanced fire control and hunter-killer systems arrived at Taipei Port, totaling 108 tanks. The first batch consisted of 38 tanks and arrived in December of 2025; the second batch of 42 tanks arriving that July. According to sources, these 28 tanks are split: 10 are to be used by the Equipment and Training Department, while 14 will be allocated to the 269th Brigade. As for the other four tanks, there have been no further details on their disposition. Now that all tanks are present, they will participate in transition training, quality evaluations, and combat readiness. According to MND sources, if training progresses well, the tanks may be ready for service by the end of this year.

Representing 6.3% of the total US$31.72 billion backlog of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, as tracked by Taiwan Security Monitor, the delivery of the Abrams represents completion of a US$2 billion sale, originally notified to the U.S. Congress in July 2019.

Future ROCN Ships to Include Space for V-BAT UAVs

Taiwan’s Navy is reportedly planning a “dual hangar” design for its next-generation combatant, with space to support both an MH-60R anti-submarine helicopter and a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). According to Liberty Times, the design evaluation case is expected to move forward in May, and military sources said the Navy has identified Shield AI’s V-BAT as the design reference for the unmanned aviation component. The requirement reportedly includes remote-control and guidance capabilities for the UAV.

The V-BAT’s manufacturer, Shield AI, signed a February 2026 agreement with NCSIST to integrate its Hivemind autonomy platform into Taiwan-developed unmanned systems, and the company says V-BAT is designed for maritime ISR and targeting in GPS-denied and communications-contested environments.

Weekly Awards/Solicitations

On Friday, the Naval Command made a repeat solicitation of bids for the procurement and installation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protection training ground facilities, worth NT$1.51 billion (US$47.9 million).

On Monday, the Information and Communications Command made a repeat solicitation of bids for the licensing of cloud information services, worth NT$36.03 billion (US$1.14 billion).

On Tuesday, the Tactical Control Wing of the Air Force Command awarded NCSIST a NT$162.49 million (US$5.14 million) contract for maintenance of the Anyu logistics maintenance system for 2026–2030.

On Wednesday, the Naval Command made a repeat solicitation of bids for 266 transport trucks and 221 5-ton transport vans, worth NT$1.35 billion (US$42.53 million).

U.S. Contracts Relating to Taiwan

On Wednesday, the U.S. Army awarded Lockheed Martin an undefinitized contract action with a ceiling of US$1.13 billion (NT$35.75 billion) for production of High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers, for U.S. forces and FMS customers, including Taiwan and four other countries. Work is expected to be completed by April 30, 2028.

Taiwan Affairs Office: After peaceful reunification, Taiwan’s economy will gain new vitality.

At the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office press conference on April 29, a reporter asked: At previous press conferences, the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson has separately explained three of the “seven betters” for Taiwan after peaceful reunification, drawing significant attention from public opinion on both sides of the Strait. How does the spokesperson explain the idea that “after peaceful reunification, with the strong motherland as its backing, Taiwan’s economic development will be better”?

State Council Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Chen Binhua responded by saying: During the 14th Five-Year Plan period, the mainland economy reached a new level in overall size, with gross domestic product rising to a new threshold of 140 trillion yuan. Annual growth averaged 5.4 percent, ranking among the highest of the world’s major economies. New breakthroughs were achieved in technological and industrial innovation, reform and opening-up took new steps forward, and people’s well-being reached a new level. The outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan makes strategic arrangements for building a modern industrial system, accelerating high-level technological self-reliance and strength, building a strong domestic market, accelerating the construction of a high-level socialist market economic system, and expanding high-level opening-up. This year is the opening year of the 15th Five-Year Plan. Although the external environment is more complex and severe, the mainland economy had a good start in the first quarter, with GDP growing by 5.0 percent, continuing to rank among the highest of the world’s major economies. The growth rate of major macroeconomic indicators has rebounded, new growth drivers are developing rapidly, and new quality productive forces are steadily advancing. The mainland economy has strong momentum and abundant vitality, and the fundamentals of stable, positive, and long-term improvement have not changed and will not change.

After peaceful reunification, drawing on the advantages of the mainland’s super-large market and massive economy, and combining them with Taiwan’s own technological characteristics and talent advantages, Taiwan’s economy will gain new vitality, and Taiwan compatriots will receive real, tangible benefits from it. Cross-Strait trade will further unleash new growth momentum, and the mainland market of more than 1.4 billion people will become a powerful support for stable growth in Taiwan’s economy. Cross-Strait industrial chains and supply chains will become deeply integrated, further activating the internal momentum of Taiwan’s industrial development. In upgrading traditional industries, Taiwanese companies can achieve digital transformation and intelligent upgrading through collaborative innovation across upstream and downstream sectors on both sides of the Strait, generating strong momentum toward high-end, intelligent, and green development. In expanding emerging industries, Taiwanese companies can enter more new fields and new tracks by developing new technologies, new products, and new scenarios, and move upward toward the high end of industrial and value chains. In laying out future industries, Taiwanese companies can make good use of the mainland’s scientific, technological, and industrial resources, actively integrate into the innovation ecosystem, and gain greater room for development. In addition, the two sides of the Strait will achieve connectivity wherever connection is appropriate, making logistics, people-to-people movement, capital flows, and information flows smoother, and providing people in Taiwan with more employment and entrepreneurship opportunities.

Peaceful reunification will inject greater certainty and growth potential into Taiwan’s investment and business environment. It will be an unprecedented opportunity and the greatest source of confidence for Taiwan’s economic development. We hope Taiwan compatriots will join mainland compatriots in working together to promote peaceful cross-Strait reunification, share in the fruits of Chinese-style modernization, and create a bright future of sustained development and common prosperity.

Taiwan Affairs Office: Any attempt to challenge the one-China principle in the international community will only run into walls everywhere.

At the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office press conference on April 29, a reporter asked: Regarding Lai Ching-te’s cancellation of his planned “sneak visit” to Eswatini, some public opinion holds that more and more countries now see adherence to the one-China principle as a rational decision, and that it will become increasingly difficult for Taiwan to supposedly “make friends” in the international community. Others argue that the Lai Ching-te authorities are using this incident to heavily play up “mainland suppression” in order to deliberately heighten cross-Strait confrontation and create a sense of “national doom” — or “mango dried fruit,” a pun in Taiwan on “sense of national subjugation” — in line with the DPP’s usual election tactics. What is your comment?

State Council Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Chen Binhua responded by saying: Our position on Taiwan’s external exchanges is consistent and clear: they must be handled in accordance with the one-China principle. The one-China principle reflects the will of the people, the trend of the times, and the cause of justice. Any attempt to challenge the one-China principle in the international community will only run into walls everywhere.

The Lai Ching-te authorities stubbornly adhere to a “Taiwan independence” position and are the initiators of tension and instability in the Taiwan Strait. After the Lai authorities attempted to use overseas visits to achieve so-called “diplomatic breakthroughs” and were rejected by relevant countries, they not only refused to reflect on their mistakes, but also openly distorted the facts, fabricated a so-called “victim” narrative, and deceived the people on the island. The DPP has only itself to blame and has invited its own embarrassment; its habitual tricks have long since been seen through by the people of Taiwan.