Posts - Taiwan Security Monitor

Taiwan Arms Sale Backlog, June 2025 Update

New MND Document Sheds Light on Arms Sale Status

By Eric Gomez

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) released a document in June 2025 that reports on the status of several US arms sales to the Legislative Yuan (LY). This is the third such document that I have found in my work on the arms sale backlog, with previous iterations released in June and October of last year. These MND reports are very valuable sources of information about the status of US arms sales to Taiwan. The June 2025 report does not contain any major surprises, but it does offer some additional bits of information.

There were no new arms sales to Taiwan notified to Congress in June 2025 and no reports of weapons deliveries either. The backlog remains valued at $21.54 billion, with just shy of $4.5 billion of this figure covering deliveries that have begun but are not finished. Figure 1 shows how the backlog is broken down between traditional capabilities, asymmetric capabilities, and munitions. Table 1 shows an itemized list of what arms sales are in the backlog, with information about their most recently known status.

Before delving into the MND report, I did want to highlight two other developments in June 2025.

Early in the month, Raytheon was awarded a $1.1 billion contract modification to produce several variants of approximately 2,000 AIM-9X air-to-air missiles, with over half earmarked for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customers. The contract has a completion date of October 2028. The contract award announcement does not list specific FMS customers, but Taiwan is waiting for delivery of 100 AIM-9X Block IIs from an FMS case notified to Congress in September 2022. Updates on the AIM-9X case have been hard to find, but the contract award announcement is a good sign for Taiwan and many other countries.

The other backlogged arms sale that received an update in June 2025 is an FMS case for six MS-110 reconnaissance pods, which was notified to Congress in October 2020. SIPRI’s arms transfer dataset reports that almost all these pods were already delivered to Taiwan. However, a report by Taiwan’s Central News Agency in June 2025 that cites an MND source says that delivery of the MS-110s should begin 2025, though CNA did not provide an end date for delivery. This would suggest that SIPRI’s information is incorrect or out of date.

MND’s Arms Sale Report to the LY The three MND reports to the LY on US arms sales to Taiwan that I have translated follow a similar pattern. All the reports give a total number of active arms sales cases and mention how many of those cases are considered on time, delayed, or ahead of schedule. Most of the arms sale cases are on schedule, but there is no additional information on these cases. The overall number of cases mentioned in the MND report are slightly different from the overall number in our TSM dataset. I suspect, but cannot definitively prove with current data, that the MND does not include an arms sale on its list unless the sale has a signed Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). A LOA contains a detailed payment schedule and expected delivery timeline for an FMS case and must be signed before the US military can enter a contract with the defense industry to produce new weapons systems.

There can sometimes be delays of one or two years between an FMS case being notified to Congress and a LOA being signed. So, it is possible that many recent arms sales to Taiwan (there were seven notified to Congress in 2024) are not included in MND’s list because their LOAs are being negotiated.

The June 2025 edition of the MND arms sales implementation report indicates that there are 18 arms sales currently in progress, with 15 on schedule, 2 delayed, and 1 ahead of schedule. The two delayed arms sales are AGM-154C Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) guided glide bombs and F-16 Block 70 fighter aircraft.

The JSOW sale was notified to Congress in 2017 and is one of the oldest arms sales in the backlog. The MND report says the bombs were supposed to be delivered in 2023 but limited production capacity and delays in testing pushed this back by three years to 2026. The JSOWs are supposed to arm Taiwan’s older F-16A/B fighter jets, which completed a major upgrade in late 2023. The three-year delay would mean a total gap of nine years between congressional notification and final delivery for the JSOWs. Taiwan is only purchasing around 50 bombs.

Delays in the new production F-16 Block 70 aircraft are less severe, but still noteworthy. I have previously written about the F-16 Block 70 delays for Taiwan Security Monitor. The June 2025 MND report does not contain any new information on the timeline for delivery. The MND is confident that all 66 aircraft will arrive in Taiwan before the end of 2026, despite the first aircraft only rolling off the assembly line in March 2025. In other words, the MND claims that final delivery of the F-16s will not be delayed despite delivery of the first aircraft occurring over a year behind schedule.

Finally, the June 2025 MND report echoes reporting from other sources on early delivery of the second batch of 18 HIMARS launchers, which are now expected in Taiwan before the end of next year—one year ahead of schedule. The 18 HIMARS were notified to Congress at the end of 2022, which would mean a little less than a four-year gap between notification and final delivery. By comparison, Taiwan’s first batch of 11 HIMARS took four years from notification (October 2020) to final delivery (November 2024), so Taiwan has a slightly shorter wait time for a larger order. It will probably take until 2027 for Taiwan to receive all the HIMARS munitions it is purchasing, but for the purpose of the backlog dataset once all launchers are in Taiwan I will consider the case to be delivered.

Visualization: Han Kuang 41 Major Exercise Location Heat Map

Visualization: Han Kuang 41 Major Exercise Locations

Visualization: Map of Taiwan’s Reserve Command Districts and Bases

Taiwan Arms Sale Backlog, May 2025 Update

Budget Unfreezing Reports Reveal New Information about Delivery Timelines

By Eric Gomez and Joseph O’Connor

The backlog of US weapons that have been sold but not delivered to Taiwan did not see any major shifts in the month of May. The backlog’s total value remains $21.5 billion, with deliveries of $4.4 billion—split roughly evenly between Abrams tanks and ground-launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles—in progress. See Figure 1 for a visualization of the backlog by weapons category and Table 1 for an itemized list.

Despite the lack of movement in the backlog’s dollar value, May was an important and illuminating month. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) released multiple reports to the Legislative Yuan (LY) with new information about several— though not all— of the backlogged arms sales.
One bit of housekeeping before diving into the MND reports: we have adjusted Table 1, the itemized list of backlogged arms sales. Instead of the rightmost column showing the change of status since the previous month (which mostly resulted in “No Change” month after month), it now shows the status of the arms sale based on the most current available information that TSM analysts have on hand. One of TSM’s readers suggested this change and it is a very good one, so please don’t be afraid to send (constructive) criticism to us in the future.

MND’s Budget Unfreezing Reports
There are some rather nasty politics happening in Taiwan this year. Elections in January 2024 produced a divided government. The Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Lai Ching-te was elected president, but the DPP does not have a majority in the LY, holding 51 seats to the Kuomintang’s (KMT) 54 seats (2 legislators are independent, but caucus with the KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party’s 8 seats.
The LY’s composition has led to some high profile legislative (and physical) fights, and the DPP is hoping that a recall effort will remove enough KMT lawmakers later this year to restore their majority and create a united government.
The silver lining of this messy political situation— at least, for those of us monitoring the Taiwan arms sale backlog— is the release of multiple budget unfreezing reports by the MND. During the LY’s defense budget process earlier this year, KMT lawmakers froze approximately $3 billion of 2025’s proposed defense spending (roughly 14 percent of the total budget) across 279 individual spending items. To unfreeze the money, the MND must submit short reports to the LY explaining the status of the frozen programs and providing information on how it plans to use funds in the upcoming year.
The MND released a flurry of these budget unfreezing reports in May 2025, and they contain very valuable information on the status of multiple US arms sales to Taiwan.

Stinger Missiles
There are two Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases for Stinger missiles in the arms backlog for a combined total of 500 missiles and cost of $440 million. The Stinger cases have been particularly frustrating. Per a 2024 report from the MND to the LY, Taiwan had to re-sign an important document to facilitate the arms sale due to the Army wanting to add missiles to an FMS case originally advanced by the Navy. The original Navy case for 250 missiles was due to be completed by 2022, but as of May 2025, neither case has been fully resolved.
The May 2025 budget unfreezing report on the Stinger FMS case indicates that Taiwan should receive all its currently outstanding Stinger missiles and grip stocks before the end of 2025. The report also mentions that the MND is budgeting to purchase 585 additional launchers and 2,121 additional missiles, the bulk of both going to the Army. This massive Stinger buy has not yet received Congressional notification, but it should occur soon. The report mentions that the MND submitted a Letter of Request to the United States in the first quarter of 2025.

Harpoon Coastal Defense System (HCDS)
The largest asymmetric FMS case in the backlog is a purchase of 400 ground-launched Harpoon missiles, 100 launch vehicles, and 25 radar vehicles, valued at $2.37 billion. Earlier reporting from Taiwan’s press and the March 2025 annual update to SIPRI’s dataset on arms transfers suggested that components for this arms sale had started arriving in Taiwan, though there was some uncertainty about just how much was delivered.
The budget unfreezing report for the HCDS provides more details. Per the report, the first radar truck and five launch vehicles rolled off the production line in the first quarter of 2025. There was a bit of a gap between production and shipment to Taiwan. This first batch of vehicles arrived in Taiwan in late June 2025.

MQ-9B Unmanned Aircraft
A sale of four MQ-9B surveillance drones and two ground stations received Congressional notification in November 2020. When freezing funds for the MQ-9B purchase, legislators said they were concerned that the MND had plans to store all four aircraft in a single hangar.
The budget unfreezing report states that MND has adjusted its storage plan and will distribute the MQ-9Bs across more storage facilities to reduce their vulnerability to attack. The report anticipates that construction of the MQ-9B’s support facilities will be completed by the end of 2025. All four aircraft are expected to arrive in Taiwan sometime in 2026.

Field Information Communication System (FICS)
The $280 million FICS case had preciously little publicly available information after it was notified to Congress in December 2020, besides a press report from March 2022 claiming that delivery would occur sometime in 2025. The budget unfreezing report indicates that the FICS successfully finished system component testing earlier this year. Delivery of the first batch of systems is expected before the end of 2025, but it is not clear when the final delivery will occur.

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)
Taiwan had two FMS cases for HIMARS—an initial buy of 11 launchers and Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) notified to Congress in 2020 and a plus-up of 18 additional launchers, guided rocket pods, and ATACMS in December 2022. In November 2024, the first batch of 11 launchers and several ATACMS arrived in Taiwan. The HIMARS cases are also cited as the only arms sale to Taiwan that is ahead of its original delivery schedule.
The budget unfreezing report provides more details about the pace of munitions deliveries for HIMARS. The report says that Taiwan should receive the remaining 18 launchers by the end of 2026, but deliveries of ATACMS and rocket pods could extend into 2027 given the large volume of munitions that Taiwan is purchasing. Additionally, Taiwan’s military successfully test-fired a HIMARS from its territory for the first time in May 2025.

Conclusion
Except for the secretive FICS, none of the information in the budget unfreezing reports was all that shocking or unexpected. While there are some deviations from earlier reported delivery timelines, none of these are significant. However, the budget unfreezing reports are a noteworthy example of transparency from the MND. This crop of reports is the result of a contentious political environment in Taiwan, but having a regular, publicly available reporting mechanism to keep the LY— and researchers— informed about arms sales delivery timelines would be valuable.
We at TSM will be tracking down and translating as many of these budget unfreezing reports as possible in the coming weeks.

America’s Taiwan Dilemma: Allies’ Reactions and the Stakes for US Reputation

Author: Michael Hunzeker

America’s Taiwan Dilemma: Allies’ Reactions and the Stakes for US Reputation offers a rigorous open-source analysis of how America’s key allies – Japan, South Korea, and Australia – would respond to US intervention or inaction in a Taiwan conflict. If Beijing attempts to forcibly annex Taiwan, Washington’s decisions will have far-reaching consequences for its credibility in East Asia and beyond. Yet, the long-term implications of these choices on America’s alliances and global standing remain largely unexamined-until now.

Based on over 100 interviews with leading experts from Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, and the United States, this book provides unparalleled insight into how America’s allies view the stakes in a Taiwan contingency. It captures, in their own words, their perspectives-sometimes contradictory but consistently pragmatic- as they grapple with their reliance on the United States as a distant security guarantor and their unease with an increasingly assertive China nearby.

The book identifies both common ground and divisions among allies, examining how domestic politics, threat perceptions, and regional dynamics shape their expectations of Washington. By analyzing these complexities, America’s Taiwan Dilemma explores how US policies to deter China align or conflict with strategies to maintain its alliances in the Indo-Pacific.

Essential reading for policymakers, scholars, and security analysts, this book provides critical insights into the future of US alliances and credibility amid rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait, offering a roadmap for understanding America’s role in shaping regional stability.

Available for purchase here.

Visualization: Map of Territories and Claims in the Spratly Islands

Authors: Chris Dayton, Ethan Connell

The PLA’s Southern Theater Command recently undertook live-fire exercises to the north of the Spratly Islands, which they claim under their Nine-Dash Line.

Above is our visualization of the administration of those features along with China’s claims, highlighting a May 21st incident in which a China Coast Guard ship sideswiped and water-cannoned a Philippine government vessel in the waters around Sandy Cay.

Taiwan Arms Sale Backlog, April 2025 Update

In First 100 Days Trump Sells a Lot of Weapons, Just Not to Taiwan

By Eric Gomez

The Trump administration celebrated its 100^th day in office on April 30, 2025. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) were not one of the items that the administration trumpeted as it marked this milestone. That is not very surprising. While huge nerds like me and you reading this love to follow this stuff, arms sales are not usually high on any administration’s list of Things to Trumpet. But, because people like you and me exist, let’s look at Trump’s first 100 days of FMS cases.

Since this is Taiwan Security Monitor, let’s talk about Taiwan first. There were no FMS cases notified to Congress in Trump’s first 100 days, and there were no reports of major arms sales being delivered to Taiwan in April 2025. I assess the total dollar value of the backlog to remain at $21.54 billion— but there might be some good news for the backlog to report next month (I realize the irony of an arms sale backlog dataset suffering from a backlog of monthly posts). See Figure 1 for the breakdown of the backlog by weapons category and Table 1 for an itemized list.

There were two items of reporting out of Taiwan in April 2025 worth mentioning:

First, Taiwan’s Air Force announced that it would form an additional Patriot battalion as its inventory of interceptors grows. In December 2022, Congress received notification of an amendment to an older FMS case for Patriot systems. The amendment added 100 PAC-3 MSE interceptors and upgrades to launcher systems. Press reports and statements from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense have consistently said that they expect all 100 PAC-3 MSEs to arrive by the end of 2026, but the April 2025 reporting is the first time where new military units have been mentioned.

Second, Taiwan’s indigenous submarine program missed its planned start time for sea trials, which were supposed to run from April to September of 2025. The relevant FMS case in the backlog are two cases for heavyweight torpedoes worth a combined $430 million. Accurate data on the delivery timeline for the torpedoes has been hard to find, but if a delay in sea trials leads to a delay in the submarine entering service, then it would not be surprising to see a knock-on delay in the torpedoes. Taiwan Security Monitor will keep an eye on this and report any developments as soon as possible.

Trump’s First 100 Days of Arms Sales

April 2025 was an incredibly busy month for FMS cases being notified to Congress and the last day of the month coincided with Trump’s 100^th day in office. In April alone, Congress received notifications of 18 FMS cases, both new and modifications to older sales, totaling nearly $14 billion. Looking at the first 100 days of the administration, these numbers increase to 36 FMS cases worth almost $30 billion. The Taiwan Security Monitor team created two graphics to visualize this data. Figure 2.1 shows the number of FMS cases by region while Figure 2.2 shows the dollar value of the cases by region.

The Middle East has been the biggest beneficiary of new FMS cases in Trump’s first 100 days, holding the number one spot in terms of both the number of new cases (15) and the overall dollar value ($16.7 billion). Israel has been the single largest beneficiary of FMS cases by dollar value in this period, with $10.6 billion notified. Almost all the Israel arms sales were for munitions, such as bombs and missiles.

The Indo-Pacific and Europe have also received a substantial amount of FMS support from the Trump administration despite concerns about Trump’s treatment of US allies. Many of these FMS cases have been for munitions— the AIM-120 family of air-to-air missiles have been selling like hot cakes— but these also include some noteworthy major platforms such as a sale of 20 F-16s and related munitions to the Philippines for $5.5 billion and 175 Tomahawk missiles for the Netherlands for a little over $2 billion.

Given the processing times for FMS cases, it is possible that many of these cases being notified to Congress were already in the works before Trump took office, although as more time goes by this potential explanation becomes less likely. Trump was a big fan of arms sales in his first administration, however, and one of the Executive Orders in the first 100 days of his second administration is focused on reforming the arms sales process to speed up the delivery of weapons.

Conclusion

The world is still waiting to see what will be in the Trump administration’s first arms sale to Taiwan. As Taiwan Security Monitor has reported previously, there are rumors of a multi-billion-dollar package in the works, but both the dollar value and capabilities keep changing. Whatever ends up being in the eventual Taiwan arms sale will be an important bellwether, we at Taiwan Security Monitor will keep waiting for the announcement.

Don’t Sweep Minesweepers Under the Rug: America’s Critical Naval Vulnerability

Authors: Ethan Connell & Jonathan Walberg

TSM Research Team Lead Ethan Connell and Associate Director Jonathan Walberg write about the urgent threat facing the United States Navy. In it, they talk about the looming mine threat and the role of minesweeping capabilities in modern conflict. They note the exigency of this problem, and illustrate a path forward to addressing this issue. The Center for Maritime Strategy’s Maritime Operations Center. May 20th, 2025.

Read the full piece here.

Visualization: Third Taiwan Strait Crisis

Author: Chris Dayton

Often forgotten in contemporary discussions of Taiwan’s security is the 1995/96 Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.

This cycle of escalation lasted from July of 1995 to March of 1996, involving live fire drills, missile launches, and massive amphibious exercises.

Above is our visualization of the different stages of the crisis, beginning with the PRC’s backlash to then Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States, and ending with the PRC’s pressure campaign leading up to the 1996 Taiwanese Election.