Taiwan Security Monitor

Justice Missionโ€“2025: The Narrative Battle Inside Chinaโ€™s Latest Taiwan Exercise

Author: Jonathan Walberg


When the Peopleโ€™s Liberation Armyโ€™s Eastern Theater Command launched its Justice Missionโ€“2025 exercises around Taiwan on December 29th, the visible indicators were familiar: joint air and naval maneuvers,[1] expanded operating zones, and calibrated signaling toward Taipei and external actors.[2] What distinguished this iteration was not just the scale or geometry of the activity, but the depth and coherence of the narrative campaign that unfolded alongside it.

Rather than treating messaging as post hoc propaganda, Beijing used Justice Missionโ€“2025 to actively storyboard a theory of coercion in real time. A coordinated series of posters released through PLA and affiliated channels visually depicted how Beijing intends to punish pro-independence forces; why such punishment is legitimate, and why resistance is futile. In the days immediately following the exercise, Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) press conferences reinforced and formalized those same narrative frames through authoritative political language.

Taken together, the posters and follow-on statements show how China increasingly integrates narrative warfare with military signaling to shape Taiwanese and American expectations about legitimacy, inevitability, escalation, and identity.

Justice as the Organizing Frame of the Exercise

The narrative architecture of Justice Missionโ€“2025 begins with the exercise name itself: โ€œJustice Missionโ€“2025โ€ (ๆญฃไน‰ไฝฟๅ‘ฝโ€“2025). The term zhengyi (justice or righteousness) is used to morally pre-legitimize the operation. The exercise is framed not as discretionary pressure or political signaling, but as enforcement of an already rightful order. Beijingโ€™s message is that the mission is โ€œjustice,โ€ and resistance is implicitly illegitimate.

The narrative architecture of Justice Missionโ€“2025 begins with the exercise name itself: โ€œJustice Missionโ€“2025โ€ (ๆญฃไน‰ไฝฟๅ‘ฝโ€“2025). The term zhengyi (justice or righteousness) is used to morally pre-legitimize the operation. The exercise is framed not as discretionary pressure or political signaling, but as enforcement of an already rightful order. Beijingโ€™s message is that the mission is โ€œjustice,โ€ and resistance is implicitly illegitimate.

This framing was reinforced with a reiteration of messaging on โ€œHow to Curb โ€˜Independence.โ€ The phrasing is revealing. Instead of depicting a political dispute between two actors, the problem is framed as a technical control challenge: how to suppress or restrain a condition. โ€œIndependenceโ€ becomes something mechanical to be constrained rather than a societal preference or political identity. Taiwan itself is rendered visually as an objectโ€”cut by cables, fractured into segments, encircled by forcesโ€”reinforcing a systems-control worldview rather than a political one.

The TAO immediately echoed this framing after the exercise. Responding directly to Justice Missionโ€“2025, a spokesperson described the PLAโ€™s actions as โ€œa necessary and just measure to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrityโ€ and โ€œa stern warningโ€ to โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ and โ€œexternal interference.โ€[4] The political language locks in the moral logic embedded in the posters: coercion is corrective, not escalatory.

Shield and Sword: Encoding Enforcement Logic

Several of the exercise posters establish a clear moral dualism between protection and punishment. โ€œShield of Justiceโ€ (ๆญฃไน‰ไน‹็›พ) depicts PLA symbolism forming a protective barrier over Taiwan, visually communicating that China is acting as a stabilizing force safeguarding rightful order.[5] This poster also features a shield bearing the Great Wall of China forcing American C-130s to turn away from Taiwan. The messaging here is clear: To the people of Taiwan, America wonโ€™t be able to come to your aid. To Washington, your efforts to intervene in a contingency will be futile compared to the โ€˜great powerโ€™ of China, as shown through the symbolism of the Great Wall.

Building off of this messaging is another poster titled โ€œSword of Justiceโ€ (ๆญฃไน‰ไน‹ๅ‰‘), which depicts a blade striking downward into the island.[6] Justice is not passive; it enforces compliance. Punishment is portrayed as morally righteous rather than coercive. Together, the shield-and-sword motif communicates a simple conditional logic: alignment brings protection, resistance brings righteous force.

This same logic surfaced in TAO messaging tied to the exercise. Officials accused the Lai administration of โ€œrecklessly colluding with external forces,โ€ โ€œselling out Taiwan,โ€ and pushing the island toward confrontation, while warning that such actions โ€œwill be firmly struck down.โ€[7] The sword imagery becomes political language: punishment is framed as an unavoidable consequence rather than a choice. Another TAO briefing extended the sword narrative outward toward external actors, warning that any country or force that โ€œplays with fire on the Taiwan question will inevitably pay a price,โ€ reinforcing deterrence signaling that accompanied the exerciseโ€™s expanded operational footprint.[8]

Systemic Isolation: Ports, Cables, and Everyday Vulnerability

One of the most analytically important themes of the Justice Missionโ€“2025 posters is the emphasis on systemic isolation rather than battlefield confrontation. โ€œSeal Ports, Cut Linesโ€ (ๅฐๆธฏๆ–ญ็บฟ) depicts hammers crushing Taiwan in the North and South, and maritime access constrained.[9] Another poster shows handcuffs on the island, and Chinese Coast Guard vessels โ€œchoking offโ€ Taiwanโ€™s ports.[10] In this messaging, Taiwanโ€™s vulnerability is framed not primarily in terms of military defeat, but in terms of disrupted connectivity: data flows, trade routes, energy supply, logistics, and digital lifelines.

This logic is paired with a carefully calibrated assurance. The posters and TAO statements consistently distinguish between โ€œTaiwan independence forcesโ€ and the broader population, framing coercion as corrective rather than collective. This is a classic coercive move: threats are made credible by being conditional, while reassurance is offered to those willing to disengage from the targeted behavior. The message is not that Taiwan as a society must be destroyed, but that normalcy will return once pro-independence leadership is rejected.

This imagery subtly shifts the imagined battlespace away from amphibious invasion toward persistent, incremental coercion applied against civilian infrastructure and economic normalcy. The message is that pressure can be sustained below traditional thresholds of war while still imposing cumulative strategic effects.

Post-exercise TAO messaging reinforced this normalization logic through law-enforcement framing. In a briefing addressing mainland China Coast Guard activity near Kinmen, the spokesperson asserted that there are โ€œfundamentally no such things as so-called โ€˜restricted watersโ€™โ€ and that patrols are conducted โ€œin accordance with the lawโ€ to maintain navigation order and protect fishermen.[11] Maritime pressure is reframed as routine governance rather than escalation.

This political framing directly complements posters featuring handcuffs and Coast Guard imagery. Together, they normalize gray-zone pressure as administrative control rather than crisis behavior, as well as push the norm of Chinese ships being able to interdict vessels heading to Taiwanโ€™s ports.[12]

Deter Externally, Contain Internally: Managing Escalation

Another poster cluster encodes escalation management logic. โ€œCounter External Influenceโ€ (ๅๆŽงๅค–่ฐƒ) sits above a set of arrows in flight at Taiwan, implicitly threatening the Taiwanese people.[13] The arrows are piercing green worms, a reference to an earlier 2025 poster displaying Taiwan President Lai Ching-te as a green worm.[14] The imagery reflects not operational anti-access in the narrow military sense, but a narrative adaptation of anti-access logic. Rather than depicting missiles denying airspace or sinking ships, the posters show arrows striking Taiwan itself, signaling that foreign involvement will translate into intensified pressure on the island. The intended audience is therefore not primarily external militaries, but Taiwanese observers being warned that outside intervention will not insulate them from coercion. In this sense, the messaging exploits both Taiwanese vulnerability and U.S. preoccupation with anti-access scenarios, emphasizing political consequences over operational mechanisms.

Language from the TAO tied directly to Justice Missionโ€“2025 reinforced this precise logic. Officials emphasized that the PLAโ€™s actions target โ€œseparatist activities and external interferenceโ€”not the people of Taiwan,โ€ while urging Taiwanese citizens to recognize the danger of their leadershipโ€™s course and oppose independence.[15] The narrative pressures Taiwan internally while attempting to reduce reputational costs externally.

Precision and Exposure: Targeting Critical Nodes

Several posters emphasize surveillance and precision dominance. โ€œLock the islandโ€ (้”ๅฒ›) overlays Taiwan with targeting graphics and highlighted infrastructure nodes. Below it, the message of โ€œHow could you possibly pursue โ€˜independenceโ€™?โ€ (ไฝ•ไปฅ่ฐ‹โ€œ็‹ฌโ€ )[16]. The narrative message is omniscience: critical systems are known, mapped, and vulnerable. Coercion is framed as precise and technologically controlled rather than indiscriminate. Beijing intentionally couples its supposed revelation of Taiwanese capabilities in an attempt to puncture the hope the Taiwanese have in their own military. 

This reinforces deterrence through perceived exposure rather than sheer destructive threat. Psychologically, it compresses uncertainty and signals that escalation pathways are already mapped.

Narrative Warfare as Operational Preparation

Justice Missionโ€“2025 demonstrates that China increasingly treats exercises as integrated narrative operations rather than isolated military demonstrations. The posters storyboarded a coercive pathway: justice and legitimacy; suppression of independence; protection and punishment; systemic isolation; escalation control; precision targeting; and administrative normalization. The TAO then formalized that storyboard into authoritative political language.

The objective is not merely intimidation. It is expectation management: normalizing coercion, relocating blame, compressing escalation timelines, and psychologically conditioning audiences toward acceptance of pressure as lawful and inevitable through calibrated threats and assurances that deliberately play to existing fears: Taiwanese fears of isolation and cutoff, accommodationist hopes that restraint will restore normalcy, and external concerns that China can exploit anti-access dynamics to keep interveners out.

For analysts and policymakers, the implication is methodological as well as strategic. Monitoring aircraft counts and maritime tracks alone no longer captures the full signaling environment. Visual messaging, slogan sequencing, and political language now provide early indicators of how Beijing conceptualizes coercive pathways and escalation control.

Justice Missionโ€“2025 illustrates how narrative warfare is being embedded directly into Chinaโ€™s military signaling toolkit, shaping how future coercion will be interpreted long before a crisis unfolds.


[1] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005636702183039129?s=20

[2] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/visualization-historical-pla-exercise-zones-2022-2025/

[3] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005431801721094379?s=20

[4] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-the-plas-military-operations-are-a-solemn-warning-to-taiwan-independence-separatist-forces-and-external-interference-forces/

[5] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005453180860084427?s=20

[6] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005456163249192993?s=20

[7] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-any-taiwan-independence-separatist-actions-will-never-be-tolerated-and-will-be-met-with-severe-punishment/

[8] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-any-country-or-force-that-plays-with-fire-on-the-taiwan-question-will-inevitably-pay-a-price/

[9] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005807062735790564?s=20

[10] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005837836851855481?s=20

[11] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-the-coast-guard-is-conducting-law-enforcement-patrols-in-the-relevant-waters-to-safeguard-the-lives-and-property-of-fishermen-on-both-sides-of-the-taiwan-strait/

[12] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005837836851855481?s=20

[13] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005456163249192993?s=20

[14] https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202504/1331297.shtml

[15] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-the-plas-military-operations-are-a-solemn-warning-to-taiwan-independence-separatist-forces-and-external-interference-forces/

[16] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005473337783492633?s=20

Visualization: Planned HIMARS Deployments on Outlying Islands

Author: Chris Dayton


Taiwan’s military reportedly plans to deploy its recently acquired HIMARS launcher platforms to its outlying islands of Penghu and Dongyin, a move that could put many of China’s coastal naval facilities and airfields in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces within range of Taiwanese missiles. This comes after reports that Taiwan intends to expand its M142 HIMARS inventory to 111 launchers in future material purchases from the United States. Our visualization shows possible deployment locations and the operational range of HIMARS munitions in Taiwan’s inventory.

Weekly Arms Sales Tracker: 1/28/26

Author:Joe Oโ€™Connor


This week: US and Taiwanese companies partner on drones, a former ROCA commander reveals details about the sale of Abrams tanks to Taiwan, the TPP issues their own special budget proposal, the Navy prepares dive tests on its Hai Kun submarine, alongside weekly awards and solicitations.

Taiwanese GTOC and US Companies Partner on Drones

On Friday, Taiwanese company G-Tech Optoelectronics Corp. (GTOC) and US companies Aerkomm and Firestorm Labs signed strategic partnerships to establish a military-grade drone industrial chain in Taiwan. GTOC Chairman Huang Kun-chien stated at the event that the Ukraine conflict has changed thinking on drone usage, and that supply chain resilience is critical. Firestone Labs was founded just before the Ukraine war as an innovator, while Aerkomm brings significant aerospace and satellite communications to the partnership. As a part of the strategic partnership, the three companies will embark on โ€œdecentralized production [and] localized supportโ€ models to produce drones.

Ex-Army Commander Reveals Abrams Sale Expedited

Former Army Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. Huang Kuo-ming told Liberty Times this week that the sale of M1 Abrams tanks to Taiwan was actually directly negotiated with the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the United Statesโ€™ de facto embassy, bypassing the Ministry of National Defenseโ€™s normal procedures. Huang stated that the MND was focusing on air and naval capabilities, while the Army urgently needed new tanks. Huang proposed that the Army go directly to the AIT and received permission from the Armyโ€™s then-commander. When the AIT was receptive to the idea of the sale, Gen. Huang then sent then-Col. Huang Wen-chi to the US to brief US officials on the sale. According to Gen. Huang, the MND was surprised when the sale was announced to hear that the Army had already been in discussions with the US on its own.

TPP Issues Special Budget Proposal, Cuts to NT$400 Billion

On Monday, the Taiwan Peopleโ€™s Party (TPP), an opposition party in the Legislative Yuan, released its proposal for a special defense budget, reducing the budget ceiling from NT$1.25 trillion (US$40 billion) to NT$400 billion (US$12.74 billion) and mandating additional oversight. On Tuesday, the MND held its own press conference in opposition to the TPPโ€™s proposal, criticizing it as hasty and unprofessional, and providing clarification. Director of the MND Strategic Planning and Operations Department, Maj. Gen. Huang Wen-chi, provided background on project development and the Five-Year Force Structure Plan, stating that the TPPโ€™s proposal would not allow for revision of project documents within an appropriate timeline, and that additional oversight is not required as each project must undergo audits by the MNDโ€™s Audit Department alongside LY oversight.

Navyโ€™s Hai Kun Submarine Undergoes Dive Tests

On Wednesday, CSBC announced that the Navyโ€™s Hai Kun indigenous submarine will conduct its first dive trial off Kaohsiung on Thursday, 29 January. Construction on Hai Kun began in November 2020, its keel was laid in November 2021, and it last completed sea trials in June 2025. The testing program has been beset by technical problems, including hydraulic issues and a main engine failure, and has drawn criticism over cost overruns and inefficiencies. CSBC has pushed back, arguing that Hai Kun is cheaper than comparable South Korean or Australian programs and should be considered a โ€œmid-rangeโ€ submarine in terms of price.

Weekly Awards/Solicitations: Ammunition, Ship Parts

On Thursday, the Army Command awarded a NT$238.03 million (US$7.58 million) contract to Shaoteng Construction Co. for renovation of 30-mm cannon training facilities. The contract will be fulfilled in Kaohsiung City. 30-mm cannons are used on the CM34 variant of the Clouded Leopard APC.

On Friday, the Naval Command awarded a NT$1.39 billion (US$44.37 million) contract to Wartsila Taiwan, Ltd., for main engine spare parts and logistics support services for naval vessels. The contractโ€™s fulfillment location was not stipulated.

On Monday, the Tactical Control Wing, Air Force Command awarded an NT$735.58 million (US$23.54 million) contract to NCSIST for reconnaissance radar auxiliary facility maintenance. The contract will be fulfilled in Wufeng Township, Hsinchu County. This is likely for the Air Force Surveillance and Early Warning Center, a PAVE Phased Array Warning System with a purported range of ~3,000 nautical miles.

On Wednesday, the Army Ordnance Maintenance and Development Center, Army Logistics Command awarded a NT$288 million (US$9.22 million) contract to the Armament Bureauโ€™s 209th Factory for commercial repair and maintenance of 40-mm grenade launcher variants of the CM-32/33 Clouded Leopard APC. On the same day, the Center also awarded a NT$186 million (US$5.95 million) contract to NCSISTโ€™s Manufacturing Center for commercial repair and maintenance of 30-mm autocannon turret systems on CM-34 Clouded Leopard APCs. Both contracts will be fulfilled at the Centerโ€™s headquarters in Jiji Township, Nantou County.

Also on Wednesday, the Armaments Bureau awarded a NT$1.07 billion (US$34.10 million) contract to Cheng Yuen International Co. and Taiwan HoYa International Co. for 7.62-mm blank cartridges and 3 other ammunition items. The contract will be fulfilled in Dashu District, Kaohsiung City.

Taiwan Affairs Office: The โ€œKMTโ€“CPC Think Tank Forumโ€ will be held in Beijing on February 3.

At the January 28 press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, TAO spokesperson Zhang Han announced that, following consultations between relevant bodies of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CPC), the โ€œKMTโ€“CPC Think Tank Forumโ€ will be held in Beijing on February 3. The forum is jointly organized by the Cross-Strait Research Center of the Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and the National Policy Research Foundation of the Chinese Kuomintang.

The theme of this yearโ€™s forum is โ€œProspects for Cross-Strait Exchange and Cooperation.โ€ Representatives, experts, and scholars from both parties and from sectors including tourism, industry, science and technology, healthcare, and environmental protection from both sides of the Strait will attend. They will conduct in-depth exchanges and discussions on topics such as cross-Strait tourism, industry, the environment, and sustainable development cooperation, jointly deliberate on major plans for the development of cross-Strait relations, and seek ways to advance the interests and well-being of compatriots on both sides of the Strait.

Taiwan Affairs Office: Holding the โ€œKMTโ€“CPC Think Tank Forumโ€ accords with the expectations of people on both sides of the Strait.

At the January 28 press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, a reporter asked: Recently, Kuomintang (KMT) chair Cheng Li-wen said that Taiwanโ€™s mainstream public opinion strongly hopes for cross-Strait exchanges. She also said she has felt goodwill and sincerity from the mainland side, and hopes the KMT will shoulder its historical responsibility to help โ€œbreak the iceโ€ in cross-Strait relations and ease the current tensions. What is your comment?

TAO spokesperson Zhang Han responded that wanting peace, development, exchange, and cooperation is mainstream public opinion on the island. The mainland is willing, on the shared political basis of adhering to the โ€œ1992 Consensusโ€ and opposing โ€œTaiwan independence,โ€ to work together with Taiwanโ€™s political partiesโ€”including the KMTโ€”as well as groups and people from all walks of life, to strengthen exchanges and interactions, maintain positive engagement, jointly promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and benefit compatriots on both sides of the Strait.

He said that the upcoming โ€œKMTโ€“CPC Think Tank Forumโ€ is a concrete manifestation of the two partiesโ€™ efforts to seek peace for the Taiwan Strait, well-being for the people, and national rejuvenation, and that it accords with mainstream public opinion on the island and meets the expectations of people on both sides of the Strait.

Taiwan Affairs Office: Lai Ching-te is nothing less than a โ€œdestroyer of peace,โ€ a โ€œmaker of crises,โ€ and an โ€œinstigator of war.โ€

At the January 28 press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, a reporter asked: Lai Ching-te recently said at an economic forum that โ€œour resolve to safeguard national sovereignty will not change; our commitment to defending a democratic and free way of life will not change; our efforts to maintain the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations will not change; and under the principle of equal dignity, our commitment to maintain dialogue and exchanges with China to promote peace and shared prosperity will not change.โ€ What is your comment?

TAO spokesperson Zhang Han responded that Lai Ching-te is accustomed to confusing right and wrong and turning black into white. The facts are that Lai Ching-te stubbornly adheres to a โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist stance and refuses to acknowledge the โ€œ1992 Consensus,โ€ seriously challenging the one-China principle; he seeks โ€œindependence by relying on external forcesโ€ and โ€œindependence by force,โ€ continuously escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait; he disregards the mainstream public opinion in Taiwan that wants peace, development, exchange, and cooperation, and keeps manipulating โ€œanti-Chinaโ€ sentiment; and he goes even further in creating โ€œgreen authoritarianism,โ€ implementing โ€œTaiwan independence autocracy,โ€ and deliberately obstructing and undermining cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation. The facts have repeatedly proven that Lai Ching-te is nothing less than a โ€œdestroyer of peace,โ€ a โ€œmaker of crises,โ€ and an โ€œinstigator of war.โ€

Taiwan Affairs Office: Peaceful reunification will make Taiwan better in all respects, including infrastructure development.

At the January 28 press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, a reporter asked: Recently, news that the mainlandโ€™s high-speed railway network has exceeded 50,000 kilometers in operating length has sparked heated discussion in Taiwan. Some commentators say that Taiwan has long suffered from energy shortages and aging infrastructure, and that if mainland capital and technology were introduced, projects such as tunneling through the Central Mountain Range and improving transportation in eastern Taiwan would not be a problem. Traveling from Hualien or Taitung back to Taipei would no longer require worrying about road closures or landslidesโ€”that would be a real sense of security. Some netizens have also said they look forward to the day when they can take a high-speed train across the Taiwan Strait to travel between the two sides. What is your comment?

TAO spokesperson Zhang Han responded that the mainlandโ€™s high-speed rail construction is world-renowned. Since the start of the 14th Five-Year Plan period, the mainland has built and put into operation more than 12,000 kilometers of high-speed rail, bringing 128 counties into the high-speed rail era. At present, the total length of high-speed rail lines is 50,400 kilometers, covering 97% of cities with urban populations of more than 500,000, forming the worldโ€™s largest and most modern high-speed railway network. The fast-running high-speed trains make distances โ€œsmaller,โ€ make dreams โ€œbigger,โ€ and make faraway places no longer distant.

He said that peaceful reunification will create enormous opportunities for Taiwanโ€™s economic and social development. With a strong motherland as its backing, Taiwan will be better in all respects, including infrastructure development. Taiwan compatriots, together with mainland compatriots, will share in the dignity and glory of the great country, share in the achievements of Chinese-style modernization, and usher in a bright future of prosperity and stability.

Taiwan Affairs Office: Enable Taiwan compatriots to share in the mainlandโ€™s development achievements in every aspect of daily lifeโ€”food, clothing, housing, and transportation.

At the January 28 press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, a reporter asked: The Taiwan authorities recently released data showing that in 2025 Taiwanโ€™s total imports of consumer goods reached US$49.4 billion, a record high, of which nearly one quarter (24.5%) came from the mainland, ranking first among sources. Mainland products have long been popular among Taiwanese consumers for being good quality and good value. What is your comment?

TAO spokesperson Zhang Han responded that the mainland has the worldโ€™s largest, most comprehensive, and most complete industrial system, and its manufacturing scale has ranked first globally for many consecutive years. Intelligent, green, and integrated development is accelerating. From leisure snacks, home appliances, and mobile phones to new-energy vehicles and industrial robots and other high-end equipment, a dazzling array of โ€œMade in Chinaโ€ products has entered millions of households, gone all over the world, and led consumption trends.

He said that compatriots on both sides of the Strait share common cultural traditions and living habits, so it is natural that mainland consumer goods are deeply loved by the people of Taiwan. Strengthening cross-Strait economic cooperation and deepening cross-Strait integrated development is the right path that serves the common interests of compatriots on both sides. They will continue working to allow Taiwan compatriots to share in the mainlandโ€™s development achievements in all aspects of daily lifeโ€”food, clothing, housing, and transportationโ€”and also welcome more Taiwan compatriots to come to the mainland to look around and see for themselves, and personally experience the mainlandโ€™s rapid, day-by-day development and changes.

Taiwan Affairs Office: Our sincerity in restoring mainland residentsโ€™ travel to Taiwan remains unchanged.

At the January 28 press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, a reporter asked: Recently, Chinaโ€™s Ministry of Culture and Tourism released the 2026 edition of model group-tour contract templates, including the Model Contract for Mainland Residents Traveling to Taiwan. Given that the resumption of cross-Strait tourism is currently obstructed, the simultaneous update of this text has drawn attention. Taiwanโ€™s Tourism Administration said that if the mainland side has goodwill to restore cross-Strait tourism, it should reply as soon as possible and conduct consultations on tourism issues through the โ€œtwo associations.โ€ What is your comment on this? In addition, is the policy announced by the mainland in January last year to resume group tours to Taiwan for residents of Fujian and Shanghai still valid?

TAO spokesperson Zhang Han responded that between 2013 and 2014, the current group-tour contract model texts were successively issued, including five model contracts covering group tours, mainland residents traveling to Taiwan, and other categories. This revision is a package update of the existing texts. In 2024, the mainland resumed travel by Fujian residents to Kinmen and Matsu. The current revision of the Model Contract for Mainland Residents Traveling to Taiwan helps to meet market demand in a timely manner, further standardize market order, and safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of tourists and travel agencies.

He said that driven by their confrontational โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ nature and political self-interest, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities turn a deaf ear to mainstream public opinion in Taiwan and the voices of the industry, turn a blind eye to the harm to the interests of grassroots people and businesses, and repeatedly use various pretexts to obstruct, restrict, and set up barriers to tourism and exchanges in various fields. This is deeply unpopular. The islandโ€™s tourism industry has already expressed extreme disappointment and strong indignation. If the authorities do not change course and continue to act out of selfish motives, they will only further lose public support and bring the consequences upon themselves.

Zhang said that the mainland has always upheld the concept that โ€œpeople on both sides of the Strait are one family,โ€ and has continuously worked to promote cross-Strait travel and exchanges and cooperation in tourism and other fields, releasing goodwill. Their sincerity in restoring mainland residentsโ€™ travel to Taiwan remains unchanged. The key question now is whether the DPP authorities can face up to mainstream public opinion in Taiwan and the voices of the industry, and create favorable conditions for cross-Strait travel and exchanges and cooperation.

Taiwan Affairs Office: Scenic area and tourist attraction ticket discounts/fee waivers apply to โ€œfirst-timeโ€ Taiwan visitors (ๅฐ่ƒžโ€œ้ฆ–ๆฅๆ—โ€)

At the January 28 press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, a reporter asked: Recently, a retired Taiwanese serviceman entered a scenic area on the mainland using his Taiwan military retirement ID and requested free admission on the same basis as retired PLA personnel, which has attracted attention online. May retired Taiwanese servicemen receive the same treatment as retired PLA personnel in mainland scenic areas?

TAO spokesperson Zhang Han responded that since 2024, some mainland scenic areas have introduced various facilitation measures for Taiwan compatriots visiting the mainland. Among them, Taiwan compatriots who hold a Taiwan Compatriot Permit issued for the first time (issuance number โ€œ01โ€) are eligible, within one year, for ticket fee reductions or waivers when visiting mainland scenic areas and tourist attractions. The scope of application of these facilitation measures is clearly defined as Taiwan compatriot โ€œfirst-time visitorsโ€ (ๅฐ่ƒžโ€œ้ฆ–ๆฅๆ—โ€).

As for the specific provisions regarding preferential ticket policies for retired personnel of the Chinese Peopleโ€™s Liberation Army, he said that these can be checked separately.