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Strait Snapshot, February 2026 Update

Author: Ethan Connell & Jonathan Walberg

Key Findings

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense recorded 190 PLA aerial sorties around the island in February 2026, a 30 percent decline from January’s 270 and a continuation of the downward trajectory that began after the December 2025 Justice Mission exercise. Year-over-year, February’s figure represents a 61 percent decline from 492 sorties in February 2025.
Three joint combat readiness patrols occurred during the month: February 12 (42 aircraft), February 19 (14 aircraft), and February 25 (30 aircraft). These operations demonstrate that the PLA’s capacity for large-scale multi-domain demonstrations remains intact, despite a contraction in routine sortie volume.
No aircraft were detected around Taiwan on February 27 and 28, marking the onset of a quiet period that extended through the first half of March in anticipation of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (the ‘Two Sessions’).
PLAN vessel detections averaged approximately seven per day in February, with a peak of eleven, consistent with the five-to-nine vessel baseline observed throughout 2025. The persistence of naval presence during a month of declining air activity demonstrates the operational decoupling between the air and maritime domains.
Coast Guard Administration data indicate ten documented China Coast Guard (CCG) incursions into Taiwan’s restricted waters from January through February, concentrated around Kinmen (eight incidents) and Dongsha Island (two incidents).

February 2026 Air Activity

In February 2026, 190 aircraft sorties were detected around Taiwan, with 147 entering the southwestern portion of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. This total represents a significant reduction from January’s 270 sorties and continues a downward trajectory that began after the PLA’s Justice Mission-2025 exercise on December 29, 2025. That exercise involved 130 aircraft in a single day, marking the largest single-day operation around Taiwan since comprehensive daily reporting began. The post-exercise period has been characterized by a gradual normalization of activity levels, although the pace of this decline is not unprecedented in the historical record.

February exhibited a familiar pattern of quiet periods punctuated by activity surges. The peak occurred on February 12, when 42 aircraft were detected as part of a Joint Combat Readiness Patrol (JCRP), representing the largest single-day figure since the Justice Mission exercise. Two additional JCRPs followed on February 19 (14 aircraft) and February 25 (30 aircraft). Outside these exercises, daily sortie counts typically ranged from two to thirteen aircraft, with several days recording zero detections. The final two days of the month, February 27 and 28, both recorded zero aircraft, indicating the onset of the quiet period associated with China’s annual Two Sessions legislative meetings, which extended through mid-March. The Chinese Military Commission (CMC) leadership purges that began in January 2026, including the dismissal of two senior vice-chairmen, may have reinforced this pattern of restraint by introducing additional institutional caution among theater-level commanders.

Figure 1. Daily PLA activity around Taiwan, February 2026. Gold stars denote JCRP days; shaded region marks the onset of the Two Sessions quiet period.

Monthly Trajectory: Post–Justice Mission Cooling

The decline from 270 sorties in January to 190 in February aligns with the broader pattern of post-exercise normalization observed after major PLA operations around Taiwan in recent years. The December 2025 Justice Mission exercise caused a significant spike in both single-day and monthly activity. The first two months of 2026 appear to reflect a return to a lower operational baseline rather than a strategic decision to permanently de-escalate. January 2026 remained elevated relative to the monthly averages of mid-2025, and February’s figure, while lower, falls within the range of monthly totals observed during non-exercise periods.

Figure 2. Monthly PLA sortie totals, 2024–2026. For 2026, January and February data are shown.

The frequency of joint combat readiness patrols offers a counterpoint to the overall decline in sortie numbers. February’s three JCRPs are comparable to January’s four, indicating that the PLA’s exercise tempo has not significantly slowed, even as routine patrol activity has contracted. This distinction between routine and surge operations is analytically important: reductions in daily sortie volume do not necessarily indicate a diminished PLA capacity or willingness to conduct large-scale operations on short notice.

At Sea: Naval Presence

PLAN vessel detections in the waters around Taiwan averaged 6.6 per day in February, with a peak of eleven vessels on a single day. These figures are broadly consistent with the range of 5-9 vessels that has characterized PLAN presence throughout 2025 and into 2026. The stability of naval posture during a month when air activity declined by nearly 30 percent from January highlights a structural feature of cross-strait military dynamics: the air and maritime components of PLA activity around Taiwan appear to operate under distinct operational logics and respond to different drivers.

Figure 3. PLAN vessel and official ship detections around Taiwan, February 2026.

This decoupling is analytically significant. Observers who track sortie counts as a proxy for cross-strait tension may interpret the January-to-February decline as evidence of easing pressure. However, naval data present a different perspective: the PLAN’s sustained presence at sea indicates that the military’s overall posture in the Taiwan Strait has not meaningfully contracted, even as the air component adjusts to post-exercise and politically sensitive rhythms.

Coast Guard Gray Zone Operations

China Coast Guard activity in Taiwan’s restricted waters constitutes a third, and often underreported, dimension of cross-strait pressure. From January through February 2026, the CCG conducted at least ten documented incursions: eight around Kinmen and two near Dongsha Island (Pratas). The Kinmen operations have developed into a recognizable pattern, typically involving two to four CCG cutters entering restricted waters for two to three hours before withdrawing. This approach appears designed to normalize a regular CCG presence in waters that Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration considers under its jurisdiction.

Figure 4. CCG incursions into Taiwan’s restricted waters, January–February 2026, by location and vessel count.

The Kinmen incursions have involved a recurring set of CCG cutters, including hull numbers 14529, 14603, 14609, and 14530, suggesting a dedicated patrol rotation rather than ad hoc deployments. The Dongsha operations are qualitatively different. The February 6 incursion near Dongsha involved vessels 3501 and 3107, with the CCG presence lasting approximately eight hours. Although shorter than the extended dwell times observed in later months, the Dongsha deployments represent a more logistically demanding operation due to the island’s distance from Chinese territorial waters. Their continuation into February suggests an established rather than exploratory program.

Multi-Domain Overview

Figure 5. January–February 2026 multi-domain PLA activity: air sorties, naval presence, and CCG incursions.

An integrated view of all three domains during the first two months of 2026 reveals a more complex picture than any single metric suggests. Air activity has declined sequentially, reflecting sensitivity to both post-exercise normalization and political calendars. Naval presence has remained steady and largely unaffected by fluctuations in the air domain. Coast Guard incursions have continued at a pace consistent with an institutionalized patrol program. Analysts and policymakers assessing cross-strait dynamics should examine all three domains collectively, rather than relying solely on sortie counts as a barometer of PLA intent.

Figure 6. February air activity year-over-year: total sorties and median line crossings, 2024–2026.

Methodology & Sources

Air and naval detection data are drawn from daily press releases issued by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and compiled in the PLA Activity Center database maintained by Taiwan Security Monitor. Coast Guard incident data are compiled from Coast Guard Administration press releases and verified against contemporaneous media reporting. “Median line” refers to the informal centerline of the Taiwan Strait historically observed by both sides. “JCRP” denotes Joint Combat Readiness Patrols as designated by Taiwan’s MND. All analysis and commentary are by Taiwan Security Monitor.

Visualization: Potential US Missile Deployment Locations in the Philippines

Authors: Chris Dayton & Ethan Connell

Per USNI News, U.S. and Philippine defense officials have committed to increasing missile and drone deployments across the archipelago as part of broader First Island Chain deterrence efforts, with recent rotations spotlighting Northern Luzon and the Batanes areas nearest Taiwan. Above is our visualization of potential U.S. missile deployment locations in the Philippines and the approximate engagement envelopes for NMESIS (180 km), Typhon/MRC (450 km), and HIMARS (500 km).

Weekly Arms Update: 2/25/26

Author: Joe O’Connor, Shikhar Chaturvedi, Danielle Kremer, & Wyeth Lindberg

This week: Military sources reveal plans to purchase nine more NASAMS fire units, the Navy releases their unmanned surface vessel acquisition plan, the Strong Bow missile system passes operational test and evaluation, and the Legislative Yuan reconvenes to debate special defense budgets, alongside weekly awards and solicitations.

MND Reveals Nine NASAMS Fire Units to be Bought

As part of President Lai’s Taiwan Shield project, the Taiwanese military announced the possible purchase of nine additional National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) fire units, funded by a budget of NT$1.25 trillion (US$39.8 billion). With this purchase, and a previous purchase in 2024, Taiwan will have procured 12 fire units, roughly four batteries’ worth. This missile system will allow Taiwan to defend against aircraft, cruise missiles, and other aerial threats.

Navy Releases USV Acquisition Plan

The Navy’s unmanned surface vessel (USV) program convened an industry briefing meeting before the Lunar New Year, per Liberty Times, to discuss procurement timelines. Navy officials stated on Monday that the acquisition of approximately 1,000 USVs will begin in three phases, with iterative batch tenders of various types being solicited in 2028. Further phases between 2029 and 2033 would enhance 3D recognition and build upon AI technologies to enhance “swarm-control” capabilities. However, the Navy also pointed out that progress on this would increase if the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), Taiwan’s state-owned weapons development center, were entrusted with program execution.

Strong Bow System Passes Operational Tests

Taiwan’s domestically developed “Strong Bow” (強弓) air and missile defense system appears to have crossed a critical readiness threshold, with recent reporting indicating that the program has completed operational evaluation and is prepared to transition into mass production pending Legislative Yuan approval of the Lai administration’s NT$1.25 trillion special defense budget, tied to the broader “Taiwan Shield / T Dome” framework. Strong Bow is intended to expand Taiwan’s engagement envelope upward, pairing a new Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar claimed to exceed 500 km in surveillance range, with an interceptor layer in the 70 km band, while integrating decision support tools designed to manage saturation conditions alongside existing Sky Bow and Patriot systems. Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo has consistently framed “Taiwan Shield” as a “sensor-to-shooter integration” challenge, stressing that AI-assisted fusion and fire control coordination are essential to raising interception probability rather than simply increasing interceptor counts.

From a procurement perspective, our weekly arms update from early February highlights an MND policy document outlining plans for two launchers and 128 missiles, while the regulated products list also reflects adjacent support equipment tied to the mid-layer anti-tactical ballistic missile architecture. Taken together, Strong Bow’s operational test milestone should be viewed as an important potential inflection point in the “T-Dome” acquisition pipeline.

Legislative Yuan + Special Defense Budget Updates

On Tuesday, the Legislative Yuan (LY) returned from a short Lunar New Year recess. After stating last week that the two rival special defense budget proposals would be among the “very first” to be considered, the chamber voted to advance the Lai administration’s NT$1.25 trillion (US$40 billion) special budget proposal to a joint review by the LY’s Finance Committee and the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee. This leaves both proposals in the committee review stage, after the TPP’s proposal was advanced on 30 January, prior to the recess.

MND officials, including Minister Wellington Koo, continue to express concern over the timing of budget proposals, pointing to Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) for three U.S. arms sales approved in December that expire if not signed by March 15. The sales, which include TOW and Javelin anti-armor missiles, as well as Paladin self-propelled howitzers, totaling approximately NT$149.0 billion (US$4.76 billion), would be subject to renegotiation or cancellation if the LOAs are not signed. Koo, expressing worry about this possibility, said that he hoped the LY would pass the administration’s proposal to avert this from happening.

On the sidelines of the LY: the Kuomintang (KMT) announced that they would be releasing their own special budget proposal soon, with plans to submit for review by 6 March. Per KMT sources, the proposal could range from a cap of NT$350 billion (US$11.19 billion) to NT$750 billion (US$23.97 billion) and would likely include significant pay raises for military personnel.

Weekly Awards/Solicitations

On Monday, the Production and Manufacturing Center, Armaments Bureau, made a repeat solicitation of bids for FED #215 primers for rifle cartridges, worth NT$38.00 million (US$1.21 million).

On Tuesday, the Ministry of National Defense solicited bids for procurement of frozen meat products, worth NT$1.96 billion (US$62.60 million).

On Wednesday, the Information, Communications, and Electronic Force Command solicited bids for the licensing of cloud information services, worth NT$36.03 billion (US$1.15 billion).

U.S. Contracts Relating to Taiwan

On Friday, the U.S. Air Force awarded BAE Systems Information and Electronic Systems Integration a US$98.87 million indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract for F-16 commodities sustainment, likely covering spare and other consumable parts. The contract supports Foreign Military Sales (FMS) for Taiwan’s 66 F-16C/D Block 70 aircraft, along with at least 20 other countries. No Taiwan FMS funds were obligated at the time of award. Contract work is expected to continue through February 2037.

On Wednesday, the U.S. Army awarded a contract modification worth US$18.99 million to Iron Mountain Solutions, Inc., for technical support to the Utility Helicopters Project Office. This extension uses Taiwan FMS funds alongside 20 other countries. Work is expected to be completed by September 2026 and is an extension of a contract originally awarded in February 2021.

Weekly Security Review: 2/23/26

Author: Jaime Ocon

Welcome to the Weekly Security Review, where we highlight key military, security, and political developments around Taiwan in one straightforward summary!

This week, Taiwan’s military reveals a strategic reserve force, missile drills are set to debut in eastern Taitung, an Australian frigate transits the Taiwan Strait, and China conducts a combat patrol in the middle of the Lunar New Year.

601st Army Aviation Revealed as Strategic Reserve Force

An unnamed military official quoted by the Liberty Times revealed that the 601st Army Aviation Brigade will serve as one of the country’s strategic reserve units during wartime. The comments were made after the Military News Agency posted a video showing the brigade conducting combat readiness training during the Lunar New Year Holiday. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) added that the 601st is a standby rapid response force for Taiwan’s Northern Command. During a conflict, this unit would be tasked with defending key installations in northern Taiwan, conducting counterterrorism operations at government facilities, and supporting disaster relief efforts. The MND says the brigade can quickly respond to enemy decapitation attempts or special operations infiltrations.

Stationed roughly 30 miles away in Taoyuan City, the 601st centers around a fleet of roughly 30 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters, 15 UH-60M Blackhawk utility helicopters, and 13 OH-58D Kiowa multipurpose helicopters. They support broader operations within Taiwan’s 6th Army Corps, which is responsible for all of northern Taiwan. The MND says the 601st provides the military with precise strike capabilities, high mobility, and a flexible force composition, making it an indispensable air combat asset within Taiwan’s armed forces’ joint operations framework.

The 601st Brigade is not the only strategic reserve force under the MND. Recently, the Marine Corps’ 66th Brigade has also adopted a similar role, taking responsibility for the defense of the capital, Taipei. On top of that, the MND has approved the transfer of the 66th Brigade’s wartime operational command from the 6th Army Corps to the General Staff Headquarters. In theory, this command transfer should improve efficiency and shorten the command chain in providing orders to soldiers on the ground. It also means that during wartime, the brigade is not bound by the command of any single combat zone (North, Central, Southern, etc.) and can support various frontlines across Taiwan.

Military to Debut Sky Horse TOW Missile Drills in Eastern Taitung

Sources within Taiwan’s army say they will hold live-fire shooting drills along the east coast of Taitung in March, the first time in three decades. The annual drills, known as the “Sky Horse” exercise (天馬操演), will focus on using anti-armor missiles and heavy artillery to strike targets at sea. Sources quoted by the Taipei Times say this year, “[t]he scenario simulates Chinese forces breaking through Taiwan’s sea and air defenses, with amphibious fleets preparing to land along the east coast.” The report goes on to describe that “[g]round forces would then employ heavy firepower in coastal interception operations to block an assault on eastern Taiwan.”

This drill usually takes place in the spring and summer and features dozens of Humvees equipped with TOW missiles parked on the shoreline as soldiers conduct several rounds of target practice on the west coast of southern Taiwan, but that changed last year. In August 2025, the military conducted similar live-fire drills for the first time in central Taiwan along Taichung’s Dajia River, with the MND focusing on realism and location-specific training. The shift to eastern Taiwan is apparently also part of this effort. The main focus of this year’s exercise would be to test new TOW-2B Radio Frequency systems, 1,700 of which were recently acquired from the U.S., and so the MND is eager to implement these weapon systems into their training structure.

It’s also important to add that this drill is quite a spectacle and draws a fair bit of pressure as dozens of media with cameras are broadcasting the shooting drill live, so every shot is scrutinized quite heavily. Last year, an early round of training saw 10 successful hits out of 17 shots, prompting a massive debate online about the effectiveness of Taiwan’s training. However, the military later explained that four of the missiles were defective and that later rounds showed a higher hit rate.

Australian Navy Ship Transits Through Taiwan Strait

An Australian Anzac-class frigate, HMAS Toowoomba (FFH 156), conducted a routine transit of the Taiwan Strait, according to a government source. In a report from Reuters, government officials from Australia said the transit was part of a “Regional Presence Deployment in the Indo-Pacific region,” and that “all interactions with foreign ships and aircraft were safe and professional.” According to a Liberty Times report, Toowoomba‘s embarked MH-60 Seahawk helicopter was warned by Taiwanese authorities after crossing the Strait’s median line.

In response, Chinese state media claimed that the PLA tracked, monitored, and shadowed the Australian vessel throughout its transit. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, not confirming that the transit occurred, stated that it would not proactively disclose the movements of aircraft or ships from friendly partner countries. While U.S. Taiwan Strait transits are relatively routine, other countries, including the United Kingdom, France, and New Zealand, have increasingly conducted similar operations. For a full list of Taiwan Strait transits, see our Taiwan Strait Transit Tracker.

Lunar New Year Activity

Taiwan’s MND reported that it had detected 14 People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) aircraft operating in the region as part of a Joint Combat Readiness Patrol on 19 February. 10 of those aircraft crossed the Taiwanese side of the median line and/or Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Among the group, the MND identified a mix of J-10, J-11, and J-16 fighter jets as well as KJ-500 early warning aircraft coordinating with PLA naval vessels. The MND says that regardless of the PLA using the pretext of a “joint combat readiness patrol,” the operation still harasses the air and seas around Taiwan. In response, Taiwan’s military employed joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance measures to maintain situational awareness and dispatched aircraft, naval vessels, and missile systems.

The patrol came on the 3rd day of the Lunar New Year holiday, and there was no reported PLA activity on the first two days. For comprehensive data regarding PLA activity around Taiwan, check out the PLA Activity Center on our website.

Taiwan’s NT$1.25 Trillion Question: Comparing the DPP and TPP Defense Budget Plans

Authors: Sydney Boerner & Joe O’Connor

Introduction

On November 19, 2025, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te officially announced his administration’s proposal for a NT$1.25 trillion (US$40 billion) special defense budget through a press conference and an editorial in the Washington Post. The proposal, formally titled the Draft Special Act on Procurement for Enhancing Defense Resilience and Asymmetric Capabilities, or the National Defense Resilience Act, is supported by the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and emphasizes “Resilience” (韌性), framing security as the whole of society’s ability and capacity to withstand and recover from external pressures.

On January 26, 2026, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), an opposition party allied with the Kuomintang (KMT), introduced an alternative proposal titled the Draft Special Act for Procurement of Plans to Safeguard National Security and Strengthen Asymmetric Warfare Capabilities. The proposal emphasizes “Safeguard” (保衛), highlighting the state’s responsibility to protect territorial integrity through established hardware rather than a whole-of-society framework. It sets a ceiling of NT$400 billion (US$12.69 billion), approximately one-third of the Lai administration’s proposal, but still larger than the Tsai administration’s 10% year-over-year increase in 2021 of NT$42.1 billion (US$1.51 billion). Prior to this proposal, the KMT/TPP majority in the LY successfully blocked placing the DPP proposal on the agenda multiple times, effectively rendering it dead on arrival until this alternative was announced.

Both proposals remain actively under review in the Legislative Yuan (LY), and most importantly, are multi-year funding packages in addition to yearly “base” defense budgets. Their current status allows for comparisons between the proposals with respect to funding levels and oversight mechanisms. As of the time of writing, the KMT has also stated that they will be releasing a third budget proposal of their own, but information about it has not been released so far.

General Budget Comparison

The two proposals reflect different governance approaches and political priorities. The DPP emphasizes long-term flexibility, broader strategic objectives, and standard oversight, while the TPP emphasizes legislative control, fiscal transparency, and strict procedural accountability.

As stated above, the primary difference between the proposals is the topline ceiling of appropriations, with the TPP proposal setting a ceiling of NT$400 billion, roughly 32 percent of the DPP’s proposed NT$1.25 trillion. Both proposals share the same eight-year timeline from 2026 to 2033. The DPP proposal authorizes an eight-year lump sum with inter-category transfers and rollover of unspent funds, allowing year-over-year budgetary flexibility. In contrast, the TPP proposal requires an annual release vote on funds, prohibits inter-category transfers, and mandates that any unspent funds be returned to the National Treasury rather than rolled over, framing these requirements as measures of fiscal transparency and legislative accountability.

Oversight, reporting, and procurement procedures also differ between the proposals. The DPP proposal relies on standard oversight via the LY Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, records unit prices in a classified annex, and handles price increases through internal review under U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procedures. The proposal is exempt from the Public Debt Act, which enforces a 50% debt-to-GDP spending cap for all budgets. Additionally, it follows constitutional reporting standards, wherein the President is not required to report directly or answer questions to the LY – an issue that has recently sparked a minor constitutional crisis. Procurement may include emergency purchases from domestic suppliers or friendly third nations, and the proposal establishes links to NATO spending targets of 3.3 percent of GDP in 2026 and 5 percent by 2030 within standard procurement cycles.

In contrast, the TPP proposal grants line-item veto authority to the LY Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, requires public disclosure of unit prices, and mandates a re-vote if any item price increases by more than 5 percent. The proposal mandates the President deliver a “National Defense Report” before the LY and respond to questions, in line with the recently amended Law on the Exercise of Offices and Powers of the Legislative Yuan; the constitutionality of this action is disputed and in 2024, the Constitutional Court heard arguments on the issue. The proposal is subject to the Public Debt Act’s spending ceilings; procurement is restricted to U.S. FMS sales (with a 30-day congressional notification period); and spending focuses exclusively on hardware, in accordance with existing U.S. notifications.

Hardware and Weapons Systems Procurement

Both proposals maintain key artillery and missile capabilities, but they differ in priorities, scope, supporting systems, and integration across operational domains. The DPP proposal develops a broad, multi-domain capability that reflects the MND’s seven major objectives. In contrast, the TPP proposal prioritizes a narrower set of newly announced procurement programs within strict budget caps, with reduced integration and supporting systems, reflecting a focus on immediate operational needs and legislative oversight.

Building on the differences in governance and political priorities, the proposals also differ in their approach to hardware procurement. The DPP proposal is designed to strengthen seven major defense objectives through special provisions, including:

“A multi-layered air interception network”
“Command and control and decision support”
“Multi-layered weakening”
“Long-range precision strike”
“Strengthening combat resilience”
“Enhancing military capacity”
“Defense driving economic benefits”

Procurement items include:

“Precision artillery”
“Long-range precision strike missiles”
“Unmanned vehicles and their countermeasures systems”
“Air defense, anti-ballistic missile and anti-armor missiles”
“AI-assisted and C5ISR systems”
“Enhancing sustained combat capacity equipment”
“Equipment and systems jointly developed and procured by Taiwan and the United States”

In terms of precision artillery, the DPP procurement plan includes 60 M109A7 Paladin self-propelled howitzers with 4,080 precision-guided munitions, 60 M992A3 ammunition vehicles, and 12 M88A2 Hercules recovery vehicles. Long-range precision strike missile capabilities include 82 M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) multiple-launch rocket launcher systems, 1,203 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) pods, and 420 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles. Unmanned vehicles and countermeasures include 1,554 ALTIUS-700M loitering munitions and 478 ALTIUS-600ISR surveillance drones, in addition to more than 200,000 drones of various types and 1,000 unmanned surface vessels. Air defense, anti-ballistic, and anti-armor capabilities include 1,050 FGM-148 Javelin anti-armor missiles and 70 launchers, as well as 1,545 BGM-71F TOW-2B anti-armor missiles and 24 launchers. AI-assisted and C5ISR systems include artificial intelligence decision-support systems, tactical communication networks, and rapid intelligence-sharing kits. To strengthen operational sustainability, the DPP procurement plan establishes strategic stockpiles of ammunition, including 105mm and 120mm tank rounds, 30mm autocannon rounds, and 155mm artillery and grenade munitions. The proposal also calls for establishing domestic production lines for other combat equipment, including chemical protective masks, night-vision devices, armored vehicles, and mobile barrier equipment. Finally, the DPP’s proposal includes the procurement of systems jointly developed with the United States to acquire emerging technologies, enhance operational resilience, and strengthen asymmetric warfare capabilities.

In contrast, the TPP proposal adopts a narrower procurement framework centered on a defined set of high-priority, primarily ground-based, strike and anti-armor systems subject to explicit fiscal ceilings. Rather than pursuing a comprehensive, multi-domain modernization effort, the proposal emphasizes targeted investments in immediately deliverable capabilities, strict budget caps, and phased legislative oversight under the total NT$400 billion ceiling. It omits broader initiatives related to integrated air and missile defense expansion, large-scale unmanned fleets, AI-assisted C5ISR architecture, strategic stockpiling, domestic industrial expansion, and wide-ranging joint development programs, reflecting a more limited scope focused on core denial capabilities.

Regarding procurement items, the TPP plan maintains the MND’s plans for 60 M109A7 Paladin self-propelled howitzers, including the accompanying 4,080 PGMs, 60 ammunition vehicles, and 12 recovery vehicles, but caps the total at NT$126.7 billion. It also keeps plans for 82 M142 HIMARS systems with 1,203 GMLRS pods and 420 ATACMS, also capped at NT$127.6 billion. Lastly, the TPP plan keeps the proposed procurement of 1,050 Javelin and 1,545 TOW-2B anti-tank missiles, totaling NT$11.8 billion and NT$11.1 billion, respectively. This is alongside a separate anti-armor unmanned aerial missile program, which is assumed to be ALTIUS systems, capped at NT$34.7 billion. An additional NT$88.1 billion is reserved for other urgently needed items deliverable within three to five years, provided they are individually specified and do not duplicate annual defense programs.

	DPP/MND Proposal	TPP Proposal
“Precision artillery”	60 M109A7 Paladin self-propelled howitzers w/ 4,080 precision-guided munitions	Included, capped at NT$126.7 billion
	60 M992A3 ammunition vehicles
	12 M88A2 Hercules recovery vehicles
“Long-range precision strike missiles”	82 M142 HIMARS multiple-launch rocket launcher systems	Included, capped at NT$127.6 billion
	1,203 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System pods
	420 ATACMS missiles
“Unmanned vehicles and their countermeasures systems”	1,554 ALTIUS-700M loitering munitions	Only ALTIUS systems included, capped at NT$34.7 billion
	478 ALTIUS-600ISR surveillance drones
	200,000+ drones
	1,000+ unmanned surface vessels
“Air defense, anti-ballistic missile and anti-armor missiles”	1,050 FGM-148 Javelin anti-armor missiles w/ 70 launchers	Included, capped at NT$11.8 billion
	1,545 BGM-71F TOW-2B anti-armor missiles w/ 24 launchers	Included, capped at NT$11.1 billion
“AI-assisted and C5ISR systems”	AI decision-support systems	None
	Tactical communications networks
	Rapid intelligence-sharing kits
“Enhancing sustained combat capacity equipment”	Domestic production lines and stockpiles for 105mm & 120mm tank rounds, 30mm autocannon rounds, 155mm artillery & grenade munitions	None
	Domestic production lines for chemical protective masks, night-vision goggles, and armored vehicles, and mobile barrier equipment
“Equipment and systems jointly developed and procured by Taiwan and the United States”	Included, unknown quantity	None

Infrastructure and Technology

In addition to hardware and weapons systems procurement, the DPP proposal emphasizes investments in infrastructure and integrated technology. Funding is included for “tactical mission networks,” which link units across dispersed battlefields, enable real-time data sharing, and integrate AI decision-support systems to assist operational commanders. The proposal also strengthens digital resilience by establishing redundant, protected communication networks to ensure command and control functions remain operational under contested or degraded conditions. Strategic communications capabilities are expanded across terrestrial, aerial, and satellite networks to maintain secure and continuous information flow. Early warning systems incorporate unmanned vehicles and sensor platforms to detect potential threats and transmit real-time intelligence. Hardened basing initiatives improve the protection of key command facilities, including shielding against missile strikes and electromagnetic pulse effects. These elements support the DPP’s operational objectives of command, control, and decision support and, in particular, enhancing operational resilience across the defense system.

On the other hand, the TPP proposal adopts a narrower approach focused on immediately deliverable capabilities and does not fund any of the above programs. The TPP proposal emphasizes platform-centric and hardware-focused defense measures rather than multi-domain technological integration. While it provides rapid acquisition of ground-based strike and anti-armor systems, it does not include the networked architecture, sensor integration or protected command infrastructure envisioned in the DPP proposal.

Personnel and Sustainment

Beyond infrastructure and technology, the two proposals also differ in their approach to personnel and sustainment, focusing on the support required to operate and maintain procured systems. The DPP proposal includes training tied to the operation of artillery, missile, and unmanned systems, but does not fund separate training units or simulation centers. Life-cycle support is provided within procurement categories and may cover pre-paid technical support, repair kits, and system-specific overhauls. Spare parts are included only as required for the acquired equipment, without establishing centralized pools for aircraft, armored vehicles, or naval engine turbines. Repair depots and maintenance infrastructure are referenced in connection with equipment sustainment, with no dedicated funding for depots, hardened workshops, or automated repair facilities. Strategic ammunition is purchased alongside the weapons systems, rather than as a separately authorized stockpile. Industrial base support is limited to domestic production and development associated with specific procured systems, with no independent funding for broader defense industrial expansion or research and development.

In contrast, the TPP proposal provides only the minimal sustainment necessary to operate the procured systems. Training, life-cycle support, spare parts, repair depots, strategic ammunitions, and industrial base development are largely omitted or limited to what is immediately required for the specific equipment acquisitions, included as part of FMS cases. Broader sustainment measures, including depot construction, centralized parts pools, or strategic stockpiles, remain the responsibility of the regular annual defense budget. Industrial base engagement is confined to the basic procurement compliance and cooperative requirements, without separate funding for domestic production capacity. In practice, the TPP proposal prioritizes rapid acquisition and legislative oversight over embedded operational support. In contrast, the DPP proposal incorporates limited sustainment elements to ensure ongoing operational readiness of the procured systems.

Conclusion

The major differences between the two special defense budgets center around flexibility and holistic spending, as opposed to narrower and targeted procurements of established systems. The inclusion of funding for newly announced HIMARS and Javelin sales from December in the TPP proposal indicates at least some level of good-faith bargaining for weapons, apart from Paladins, that are asymmetric in nature. Increased oversight provisions are beneficial for open-source monitoring, such as our work, but conflict with the Lai administration’s preferences, and constitutional issues surrounding Lai himself reporting to the LY. It is clear that those provisions, more than anything else, will be one of the biggest budget battles in the near future.

As of the time of writing, the LY is set to reconvene on February 24, with Speaker Han Kuo-yu indicating that the competing special defense budget proposals will be the “very first” items to be considered by the legislature. It is assumed that other proposals will emerge, or the two proposals will change, and we await the outcome of the LY’s deliberations.

Weekly Arms Update: 2/18/26

Author: Joe O’Connor, Shikhar Chaturvedi, Danielle Kremer, and Wyeth Lindberg

This week: the Army pushes back on reports that testing of new ALTIUS drones was not effective; a bipartisan US letter is sent to Taiwanese legislators worried about defense spending; reports show that a potential US arms sale could include radars and counter-drone systems alongside PAC-3 missiles, and Trump announces that he will make a decision “pretty soon” on additional sales to Taiwan,

Army Pushes Back on ALTIUS Test Failures

In August 2025, Taiwan received its first batch of “Hunter Owl” ALTIUS-600M UAV attack drones from the United States. As such, Taiwan began using its Army Artillery Testing Center to conduct the drones’ first live-fire exercises. However, reporters claimed the results were less than ideal, this week, with only two out of five drones successfully completing the tests. In response to media reports, Taiwan’s army stated that the drones were performing normally and emphasized that they planned to incorporate the new weapons and equipment into these exercises soon. In December, an additional sale of 1,554 ALTIUS-700M loitering munitions and 478 ALTIUS-600 ISR drones was announced, indicating that more will be arriving soon.

US Legislators Send Letter to LY; Speaker Responds

On Thursday, 37 US senators and representatives, including senior members of the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committees and representing both parties in Congress, sent a letter to the speaker of the Legislative Yuan (LY) and party leaders, expressing concern about “ongoing deliberations in the Legislative Yuan to only partially fund a supplemental budget request.” After noting that “the US must address the massive backlog in weapons deliveries,” the letter noted that “we need Taiwan to step up with us,” urging the LY to pass the special defense budget advanced by the Lai administration. On Monday, LY Speaker Han Kuo-yu responded in a joint statement, saying that they will prioritize the review of the special defense budget when the LY reconvenes on February 24.

Potential US Arms Sale to Include Radars, M-ACE

MND sources told the Taipei Times on Friday that the next potential arms sale to Taiwan could include much more than PAC-3 MSE interceptor missiles, including improved radars and counter-drone equipment. Per sources, the sale could include Integrated Battle Command Systems, which coordinate Patriot and other AD systems, as well as Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensors (LTAMDS) radars, which would replace currently installed radars on Patriots. Additionally, a separate sale may include Mobile-Acquisition, Cueing and Effector (M-ACE) counter-drone systems, which consist of sensors, jammers, and autocannons mounted on pickup trucks and produced by Northrop Grumman.

Trump to Decide “Soon” on Arms Sales to Taiwan

On Monday, President Donald Trump said he is “talking” with Xi Jinping about potential additional U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and that a decision will be made “pretty soon,” prompting a rapid White House clarification that there has been no change in U.S. policy. Beijing, for its part, has elevated arms sales as the “most important” issue in U.S.–China relations ahead of a possible April summit, urging Washington to act prudently. The U.S.–Taiwan arms-sale backlog remains roughly US$32 billion, with no new cases notified since December. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s stalled special defense budget continues to shape how quickly notified systems can move into execution. At a February 11 Presidential Office press conference, President Lai warned that U.S. and other major suppliers’ production lines are already “排滿” (fully booked) and cautioned that delays in passing the special defense budget could push Taiwan out of priority queues, further slowing delivery of key systems. Taken together, Trump’s pending decision should be viewed less as a standalone political headline and more as a potential inflection point in the backlog queue. While current White House communications may signal commitment, deterrent value will ultimately hinge on whether weapons are actually contracted, funded, and delivered on time.

Weekly Awards/Solicitations

There were no significant awards or bid solicitations this week.

Visualization: ROCAF Lunar New Year Transport Support Mission

Author: Noah Reed

Happy Lunar New Year from Taiwan Security Monitor! Over the next several weeks, C-130H transport aircraft of the ROCAF’s 10th Airlift Group will undertake civilian transport support operations, helping people travel to their families in the outlying islands during the holiday. To support this mission, crews have reconfigured the interior cabins on the C-130 aircraft, and pilots have trained for smooth takeoffs and landings.

Weekly Security Review: 2/16/26

Author: Jaime Ocon

Welcome to the Weekly Security Review, where we highlight key military, security, and political developments around Taiwan in one straightforward summary!

This week, President Lai urges the opposition to pass a $40B special budget, the military considers a live-fire test of ATACMS, and China’s Coast Guard breaches Taiwan’s restricted waters in three separate incidents.

President Lai Holds Press Conference on Special Defense Budget

Taiwan’s President, Lai Ching-te, held a snap press conference on Wednesday, 11 February, to explain the rationale behind the country’s record NT$1.25 trillion (US$40 billion) supplemental defense budget. A spending package that was presented to the Legislative Yuan (LY) in December but has since been blocked more than 10 times by the opposition Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and Kuomintang (KMT). The press conference began with a plea from President Lai: “National defense cannot wait. Our safety cannot wait. Support for our troops cannot wait.” Lai went on to urge the public to look at what other countries are doing to ensure their security. “Indo-Pacific neighbors have also increased defense spending in reaction to China’s mounting military aggression” Lai added, saying that “Taiwan cannot fall”. Lai’s complete speech can be found here.

Also addressing the news conference was Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo, as well as Vice President Hsiao-Bi Khim and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Minister Koo explained that the budget delay risks a “rupture” in the joint line of defense against China. “In the Indo-Pacific region, especially among the countries in the first island chain, Taiwan plays a critical and almost destined role,” Koo said. At the press conference,Koo repeated that “Taiwan and the U.S. have continued to have intensive talks about what weapons Taiwan needs.”

The press conference comes after months of infighting between the DPP-backed Lai administration and the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) on the passage of a record-breaking supplemental defense budget. The “Special Act for the Procurement Program to Strengthen Defense Resilience and Asymmetric Capabilities” is worth NT$1.25 trillion (US$40 billion) and would fund various U.S. weapon systems and equipment. A complete breakdown of approved U.S. systems can be found here.

The opposition continues to delay and oppose the bill due to a lack of oversight and reservations about handing over a “blank check” to President Lai. The DPP, however, says the KMT and TPP’s demands are unconstitutional, citing a prior ruling that found requiring the President to provide real-time responses to lawmakers’ questions to be unlawful. Recently, 37 U.S. senators and representatives signed a bipartisan letter, addressed to Taiwan’s opposition party leaders in the KMT and TPP, urging politicians there to sign the deal. The letter included praise for Taiwan’s recent military reforms but also worries about sustaining that momentum. “Nevertheless, we fear that without significant increases in Taiwan’s defense spending at levels reflected in President Lai’s proposed special budget, this progress will be insufficient,” the letter said. Taiwan’s parliament, meanwhile, returns from winter recess at the end of February.

Military Reportedly Prepping Rare ATACMS Live-Fire Test in Late 2026

Taiwan’s military could be gearing up to conduct a rare live-fire test of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) in the weeks following August’s Han Kuang military exercises, according to Liberty Times.

Every year in the summer, Taiwan’s armed forces conduct live-fire missile tests to ensure the quality of their weapons and also conduct target practice with munitions approaching their expiration date. Last May was the first time that Taiwan conducted a live-fire test of recently delivered HIMARS, firing more than 30 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) pods. Other munitions like PAC-2 interceptors, Thunderbolt-2000 MLRS rockets, and Land Sword-2 missiles were also fired.

Military officials quoted in the report say that they are looking to verify the performance of recently delivered ATACMS missiles, which can reach targets up to 300 km away. Taiwan has received the first batch of 64 ATACMS missiles in November 2024, originally from a deal notified in 2020. In December 2025, the U.S. approved an additional 420 ATACMS missiles as part of a sale of 82 additional HIMARS systems and munitions. There is, however, no contract or set delivery time for these munitions. Other systems like the Altius-700M loitering munitions might also be incorporated into the annual drill, but Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has yet to comment on the future tests.

TSM recently released its January Taiwan Arms Sales Backlog report, which includes a public repository of all publicly announced arms sales, including ATACMS. You can check that out here:

Taiwan Arms Sale Backlog, January 2026 Update

China Steps Up Maritime Pressure With Multiple Coast Guard Intrusions Near Taiwan

It was a busy week for Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) as they saw three separate incidents involving Chinese Coast Guard ships breaching restricted waters near Kinmen. The intrusions are tied for the most in a single week, involving the same Chinese ships with hull nos. 14603, 14529, 14609, and 14530. The CGA said it deployed its own vessels to shadow and intercept China’s Coast Guard ships, as well as issued radio warnings. Each incident averaged roughly two hours of CCG ships breaching Kinmen’s restricted waters. This marks the seventh total incursion into Kinmen’s waters for 2026.

Taiwan’s CGA has been trying to match China’s Coast Guard presence in the seas around the Taiwan Strait and has embarked on an ambitious ship-building initiative to combat China’s grey-zone tactics. Also this week, Taiwan accepted delivery of its newest Anping-class offshore patrol vessel, the Lanyu (蘭嶼艦), the 11th vessel of its type. The ship is equipped for law enforcement, firefighting, and search-and-rescue missions but can also be fitted with Hsiung Feng II and III anti-ship missiles if needed during a conflict.

Taiwan Arms Sale Backlog, January 2026 Update

Special Budget Complications Continue

By Joseph O’Connor and Eric Gomez

The first month of 2026 was relatively slow for the US arms sale backlog to Taiwan. No new Foreign Military Sales (FMS) were notified to Congress or fully delivered; the topline value of the backlog saw no change since December. Deadlock on the special defense budget in the Legislative Yuan (LY) continued, with the opposition Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) submitting its own, reduced proposal. Additionally, the Department of Defense awarded a contract for the production of F-16 simulators being purchased by Taiwan.

The arms sale backlog as of January 31, 2026, remains $32.0 billion. For arms sales valued at over $1 billion, deliveries in progress are marked in yellow-orange in our visualizations, meaning that the true dollar value is lower than the topline. Figure 1 illustrates the breakdown of the backlog between asymmetric weapons, traditional weapons, and munitions. Table 1 provides an itemized list of all arms sales in the backlog, including the most up-to-date information on their status.

Special Defense Budget Complications

The MND’s special defense budget, initially announced by President Lai in November 2025, continued its tumultuous journey through the LY in January. The administration’s proposal, a budget of NT$1.25 trillion (US$40 billion) to be spent over eight years, remained in the LY’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee. Legislators in the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) — which hold a combined 62 seats to the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) 51—have prevented Lai’s budget from advancing to the full LY. On January 19, Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo delivered a closed-door, confidential briefing to the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, but little concrete information about the budget was released.

Meanwhile, the TPP announced a counter proposal for the special defense budget, worth NT$400 billion (US$12.69 billion) on January 26 in a press conference, sending it to the LY Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee for review on January 30. This reduced budget proposal contains funding for five of the eight cases announced in December, including Paladin self-propelled howitzers, HIMARS launchers and munitions, Javelin and TOW anti-tank missiles, and ALTIUS loitering munitions, for a total of NT$311.9 billion (US$9.90 billion). The December FMS cases not funded in the TPP’s proposed budget are tactical mission networks, and spare parts for attack helicopters and Harpoon anti-ship missiles. The proposal also omitted funding for local partnerships with the Taiwanese defense industrial base, including the procurement of some 200,000 drones. The NT$400 billion represents a spending ceiling, with the LY needing to vote on new funding each year until the total amount is reached. This gives the LY much more oversight power over arms sale spending, giving them multiple opportunities to pause or redirect funding if cases fall behind schedule.

Interestingly, the inclusion of the five most significant cases from December indicates an implicit desire to continue procurement of mostly asymmetric systems. The TPP proposal also includes oversight provisions, including “comprehensive special reports” on case statuses over the last five years, how said procurement cases improve joint operational effectiveness, acquisition timelines, and delivery dates, and fiscal impacts. An MND press conference on 26 January refuted these oversight provisions as being time-prohibitive and having effects on the progress of backlogged cases. If passed, however, this level of oversight would provide more effective monitoring of the backlog.

MND Hints at Further Sales

After a Cabinet meeting on 15 January, Vice Minister of National Defense Hsu Szu-chien stated that four more arms sales from the US were in the pipeline, but had yet to be notified to Congress, without giving more details. As of the end of January, it is thought that additional Patriot air defense missile batteries and PAC-3 MSE missiles are one of those sales, but no details have been confirmed by the MND. This, of course, presents more opportunities for the backlog to only grow, but only after these sales have been notified to the U.S. Congress.

F-16 Simulator Contract Awarded

On 29 January, the U.S. Air Force awarded a contract definitization modification valued at US$69.88 million (using US$59.42 million of Taiwan FMS funds) for the procurement of F-16 Block 70 training simulators for the ROC Air Force. This is an extension of a contract originally awarded in January 2023 and appears to be the sixth such extension. Work under the contract is expected to be completed by August 2028, pending further contract extensions. This contract award is part of the US$8 billion F-16 Block 70 sale approved in August 2019.

Other Updates

A few other updates on backlogged cases emerged this month. First, after the 19 January confidential hearing, Minister Koo revealed that from the December sale, 1,554 ALTIUS-700M loitering munitions and 478 ALTIUS-600ISR drones would be procured. This case is worth US$1.1 billion, and previously, the quantity of drones was not specified. Owing to the speed of the first sale of ALTIUS being delivered to Taiwan, we expect this December case to also be fulfilled quickly.

During the month, the MND released details about production line enhancement projects set to be funded under their special defense budget proposal. Among other projects, the 202nd Factory of the MND’s Armaments Bureau is set to increase 155mm artillery shell production. This affects the recent December sale of Paladin self-propelled howitzers, as those are the only systems in Taiwan’s inventory that would use that caliber of shell. MND sources also stated that surplus 155mm shells would be sold via a partnership with the United States.

On 21 January, the U.S. Army awarded a contract extension worth US$202.78 million (using US$52.38 million in Taiwan FMS funds) to Lockheed Martin for inspection, recertification, and repair of PAC-3 missiles, presumably including missiles in Taiwan’s possession or to be delivered to Taiwan. Similar to the above F-16 contract, this is an extension of a contract originally awarded in June 2022, and work is expected to be completed by June 2028.

Conclusion

January marked the continuation of ongoing budgetary battles in the LY, which have no intention of ending soon, particularly with an opposition alternative being proposed. The special defense budget debate is now the central variable: if the LY cannot reach a workable compromise soon, Taiwan risks procurement delays in the earliest phases of an FMS case. The budget drama also sends mixed signals to allies and adversaries of Taiwan on its willingness to provide for its own defense. However, the TPP’s emphasis on greater transparency and oversight would be welcome for providing more information about how arms sale cases are progressing—or stalling.

Weekly Arms Update: 2/11/26

Author: Joe O’Connor, Shikhar Chaturvedi, Danielle Kremer, and Wyeth Lindberg

This week: the Ministry of National Defense warns that some sales are in peril due to budgetary constraints; the Navy’s Hai Kun indigenous submarine finishes testing; the Air Force announces a plan to buy upgraded C-130H Hercules; and the MND announces additional PAC-3 MSE missiles on the way to Taiwan, alongside weekly awards and solicitations.

MND Announces LOA Extensions for Missiles, Paladins

On Friday, the MND announced that they would be seeking extensions to Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) for several arms sales announced in December, including TOW and Javelin anti-tank missiles, and Paladin self-propelled howitzers. LOAs are a critical first step in the Foreign Military Sales implementation process that sets out payment schedules and delivery timelines for items, and if not signed by March 15, the above cases would be subject to cancellation or renegotiation. Per the MND, the LOAs have not been signe,d and initial payments have not been made owing to ongoing battles in the Legislative Yuan over the special defense budget, including dueling proposals worth NT$1.25 trillion that the MND requested, and one worth NT$400 billion advanced by the opposition.

Hai Kun Submarine Continues Testing Exercises

With Taiwan’s indigenously produced Hai Kun submarine conducting its most recent underwater test of flare and decoy deployment, the first phase of the program’s testing has officially come to a successful end. These tests off the coast of Kaohsiung included deep water dives with the submarine reaching 150 meters, and shallow water tests to verify the submarine’s stability and watertightness. The second phase of testing, its timing having not been announced, will consist of sonar, combat system, and maneuver-torpedo tests. Taiwanese military and political officials plan to use this new phase to verify the reliability of the Hai Kun.

ROCAF Announces Plan to Buy Upgraded C-130Hs

Taiwan’s Air Force has essentially abandoned its mid‑life “Taiwushan III” plan to upgrade all 20 C‑130H airlifters, moving instead to buying 10 new C-130J “Super Hercules,” after U.S. cost estimates ballooned from around NT$100 billion for cockpit and avionics upgrades to more than NT$250 billion once FAA certification and structural reinforcements were included. According to Central News Agency reporting, the cancelled program aimed to integrate digital flight displays, improve maritime search‑and‑rescue systems and add simulators, but senior officers said software costs and airframe reinforcement made the investment uneconomical. Under the new plan, the Air Force will pursue a “high–low mix”: the advanced C‑130J, with more powerful engines, six‑bladed propellers and a fully digital cockpit, will handle demanding missions like nighttime and austere operations, while the remaining C‑130Hs will get domestic upgrades and support routine transport tasks.

Additional PAC-3 MSE Missiles Confirmed by MND

On Wednesday, MND sources confirmed that Taiwan is receiving 102 PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missiles for Patriot air defense systems, to be paid using surplus funds from a Patriot procurement program. This sale appears in our Arms Sales Backlog as a 2022 plus-up (modification) from a 2010 sale of Patriot systems to Taiwan, and includes the addition of 1-2 missiles, likely for testing. This tranche of PAC-3 MSEs is in addition to a planned, but not officially notified, future sale of Patriot batteries and PAC-3s that will be paid using the special defense budget.

Weekly Awards/Solicitations

Last Thursday, the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency awarded Xinshifu Co., Ltd and Shencai Fashion Industry Co., Ltd a NT$142.85 million (US$4.53 million) contract for digital camouflage-patterned tents. The contract will be fulfilled nationwide.

On Monday, the Armaments Bureau solicited bids for combat battle vests, worth NT$868.40 million (US$27.70 million).

On Tuesday, the Naval Command awarded a NT$195.00 million (US$6.22 million) contract to the American Institute in Taiwan for the assessment of the use of underwater technology. The contract will be fulfilled in Taipei’s Zhongshan District and Taoyuan’s Longtan District, respectively.