Taiwan Security Monitor

Taiwan Affairs Office: Using a name change to pursue ‘Taiwan independence’ separatism has absolutely no future.

At the March 18 press conference of the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, a reporter asked: According to reports, Taiwan’s General Association of Chinese Culture has begun promoting a name change to remove the term “Chinese,” first by changing its English name to one using “Taiwan,” and is expected to rename itself in English as the National Cultural Association of Taiwan. What is your comment on this?

Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Chen Binhua responded: The Chinese nation has a history of immense length and a civilization of profound breadth and depth. The continuous and enduring Chinese culture is the shared spiritual home and lifeblood of compatriots on both sides of the Strait, and a strong bond that sustains national feeling and identity. This move by Taiwan’s General Association of Chinese Culture is another farce by the DPP authorities in the cultural sphere, escalating their efforts at “de-Sinicization” and manipulation of “de-Chinese-ification.” Its essence is an attempt to sever the cultural blood ties of common origin shared across the Strait and to manufacture the false perception that “Taiwanese culture is independent from Chinese culture.” Changing the English name first while delaying changes to the Chinese name is a classic sign of a guilty conscience—an attempt to proceed stealthily, hollowing out the meaning of “Chinese” step by step and paving the way for separatist “Taiwan independence” schemes. We firmly oppose this.

Taiwanese culture is rooted in Chinese culture. This is a basic fact and also the collective consensus of the broad majority of Taiwan compatriots; it cannot be distorted or denied. Any attempt to use a name change to pursue “Taiwan independence” separatism or to sever the roots of the nation runs against the course of history and harms national sentiments. It is bound to be firmly opposed by all Chinese people and is absolutely doomed to fail.

Taiwan Affairs Office: The DPP authorities’ smearing of the mainland’s care for and protection of Taiwan compatriots is utterly shameless.

At the March 18 press conference of the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, a reporter asked: Due to the situation in the Middle East, nearly 100 Taiwan compatriots who had been stranded there for several days were successfully evacuated with the assistance of Chinese embassies and consulates abroad, transited through Shanghai, and returned to Taiwan. In interviews with the media, a number of those assisted said, “We thank our motherland — it was the mainland that helped us get home.” The DPP authorities, however, claimed that these people had not actually been stranded in a Middle Eastern war zone, that they had received no notification, and that this might be part of the mainland’s “cognitive warfare.” What is your comment on this?

Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Chen Binhua responded: Compatriots on both sides of the Strait are all Chinese. We have always been concerned about the safety of Chinese citizens overseas, including Taiwan compatriots. Recently, due to the situation in the Middle East, many Taiwan compatriots were stranded there. In recent days, the Chinese Consulate General in Istanbul coordinated with relevant parties to help 93 Taiwan compatriots transfer to a mainland flight and arrive in Shanghai, where Taiwan Compatriot Permits were processed for them immediately, enabling them to transit smoothly back to Taiwan. In addition, many other Taiwan compatriots sought assistance through the China Consular Affairs APP, the 12308 consular protection hotline, and other channels. Our embassies in Iran and Israel, as well as the Consulate General in Dubai and other overseas diplomatic and consular missions, also assisted Taiwan compatriots in returning to Taiwan or evacuating to safe areas. Those who received assistance expressed sentiments such as: “No matter when, the motherland is always there for us,” “I personally experienced that people on both sides of the Strait are one family,” and “The Taiwan Compatriot Permit is a protective talisman.”

The DPP authorities have shown indifference to pleas for help from stranded Taiwan compatriots — cold, incapable, and inactive — yet they still repeatedly attack and smear the mainland’s care for and protection of Taiwan compatriots. That is truly shameless. As for who genuinely keeps Taiwan compatriots in mind, and who truly shelters them from hardship and danger, the facts are plain to see, and justice lives in the hearts of the people.

Taiwan Affairs Office: The DPP authorities’ fawning on the United States and selling out Taiwan will leave them squeezed dry and used up completely.

At the March 18 press conference of the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, a reporter asked: Recently, the United States announced that it would initiate Section 301 investigations into unfair trade practices by certain trading partners, including the Taiwan region of China. Some analysts on the island believe that, despite the DPP authorities’ willingness to give the United States whatever it wants, Washington has still not let Taiwan off the hook, which is difficult to accept. What is your comment on this?

Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Chen Binhua responded: The DPP authorities adhere to a line of “following the United States in everything and taking their cues solely from Washington.” They curry favor with the United States without principle and sell out Taiwan without any bottom line, going all out to ingratiate themselves with the U.S. at the expense of the well-being of the Taiwanese people and the island’s economic future. Yet blind compromise and retreat will not win any mercy. Instead, it has only brought escalating predation step by step, and in the end they will find it impossible to escape being exploited to the last drop. It is truly ridiculous, detestable, and tragic.

Weekly Arms Update: 3/18/26

Authors: Joe O’Connor, Shikhar Chaturvedi, Danielle Kremer, & Wyeth Lindberg

This week: the LY agreed to approve signature for four arms sales; MND officials provided updates on MQ-9B and PAC-3 procurement alongside low-cost air defense technology; a U.S. House hearing shed light on arms sales to Taiwan; and the MND confirmed the receipt of ALTIUS 600M drones, alongside weekly awards and solicitations.

Legislative Yuan Agrees to Approve LOA Signature

On Thursday, the Legislative Yuan’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee agreed to allow Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) to be signed for four U.S. arms sale cases, three of which (Paladin self-propelled howitzers, TOW-2B, and Javelin anti-armor missiles), were set to expire on March 15. A fourth LOA for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), received earlier last week with an expiry date of March 26, is also included in this agreement. The committee required that upon signing, however, the MND must immediately report delivery schedules to the LY and continue to engage in the ongoing legislative review process.

On March 18, DPP legislator Kuan-ting Chen stated to the press that the LY committee would schedule reviews of all three special defense budget proposals next week. Per Chen, the committee will have a Q&A session on March 23 (Monday) and undergo a clause-by-clause review on March 25-26 (Wednesday-Thursday). When asked, Chen also indicated he’d prioritize the Lai administration’s proposal, but aspects are open to negotiation and discussion.

LY Hearing Provides Updates on MQ-9B, PAC-3

On Monday, the LY’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee then held a hearing on the status of Taiwan’s air defense network amid conflict in the Middle East. ROCAF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Lee Ching-jan, stated that the first two MQ-9B SeaGuardian maritime surveillance drones will be delivered to Taiwan by the third quarter of this year. MND officials also reiterated that the ongoing delivery of 102 PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missiles should not be affected by conflict in the Middle East, a concern that was also expressed about MQ-9B delays.

Details on Taiwan Arms Sales from U.S. House Hearing

During a March 17 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on “Reforming America’s Defense Sales,” U.S. officials reaffirmed that security assistance for Taiwan remains the administration’s “top priority.” Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Director Michael F. Miller testified that his 2023 guidance prioritizing Taiwan over all other requirements remains active, specifically ensuring that if a “competition” for production capacity arises, Taiwan will maintain priority for deliveries like the Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems over other buyers such as Saudi Arabia. This emphasis follows the notification of a record US$11.1 billion arms package in December 2025, which includes HIMARS rocket systems, howitzers, and ALTIUS loitering munition drones designed to rapidly build asymmetric warfare advantages. While witnesses at the hearing addressed a US$21 billion backlog of undelivered weapons, TSM identifies the total value at US$32 billion in a recent February Arms Sales Backlog Update, noting that roughly 20% (US$6.26 billion) represents cases like the M1A2T Abrams tanks and Harpoons that are currently in partial delivery.

The hearing also clarified the diplomatic and legislative frameworks governing these sales amidst concerns over President Trump’s recent summit diplomacy with Xi Jinping. Despite the President’s suggestions that future packages might be discussed with Beijing, witnesses from both the State and Defense Departments stated they were unaware of any changes to the Six Assurances or longstanding U.S. policy. To address delivery bottlenecks, the committee discussed the “Porcupine Act”, which would categorize Taiwan as a “NATO plus” partner to raise notification thresholds, following the House passing a 2026 funding bill that includes US$2.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants and loans. However, TSM analysis indicates that the strategic impact of these reforms is increasingly threatened by political gridlock in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan, where delays in passing the NT$1.25 trillion special budget have left several Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) for asymmetric systems at risk of expiration. Despite these internal delays, physical deliveries of higher-end platforms continue, with the final batch of 28 M1A2T Abrams tanks currently “at sea” and expected to reach Taiwan by the end of March 2026.

MND Confirms ALTIUS 600s Delivered

According to a recent report from the Ministry of National Defense, as of March 18, the Taiwanese military has officially received all 600M ALTIUS UAVs purchased from the United States and defense contractor Anduril. These drones are said to have a range of up to 40km, along with anti-armor warheads and infrared detection capabilities. With this last delivery, the Taiwanese military now has up to 291 ALTIUS systems, costing approximately NT$9.6 billion (US$300 million). A second sale, announced in December, of 1,554 ALTIUS 700M and 478 ALTIUS 600M ISR drones, is currently in progress, but it is expected will be completed quickly owing to the speed of the first case, having only taken 14 months between notification and delivery.

Weekly Awards/Solicitations

On Thursday, the Army Logistics Command’s Army Ordnance Maintenance and Development Center awarded the 209th Factory a NT$800.00 million (US$25.14 million) contract for CM-32/33 APC maintenance kits. The contract is to be fulfilled in Jiji Township, Nantou County.

Also on Thursday, the Armaments Bureau awarded a NT$2.82 billion (US$88.52 million) contract to Pan Asia Engineering Construction Co., Ltd for the Hanyang Camp new construction project. The contract is to be fulfilled in Taoyuan City.

On Friday, the Army Command’s Military Mission to the United States awarded the American Institute in Taiwan a NT$67.59 million (US$2.12 million) contract for flares. While this award is to the AIT, it is likely for a U.S. defense contractor. The contract is to be fulfilled in the Rende District of Tainan and Pingtung City in Pingtung.

Also on Friday, the Armaments Bureau’s Production and Manufacturing Center made a repeat solicitation of bids for Night-vision detection equipment, worth NT$38.89 million (US$1.22 million).

On Monday, the Naval Command solicited bids for the purchase of new Hong Kong tugboats, worth NT$807.57 million (US$ 25.35 million).

On Wednesday, the Naval Command solicited bids for the procurement and installation of NBC protection training ground facilities, worth NT$1.51 billion (US$ 47.47 million).

U.S. Contracts Relating to Taiwan

On Tuesday, the Defense Logistics Agency awarded a US$470 million (NT$14.99 billion) contract to Pratt & Whitney, a division of RTX Corp., for the re-manufacturing of F100 engine modules. This contract uses Taiwan FMS funds alongside 12 other countries. F100 engines are used by F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jets, as well as F-15s. Work is expected to be completed by March 2029.

From 16 Aircraft to Surrounded: Fear, Virality, and the Misinformation Cascade in ADIZ Discourse

Authors: Jonathan Walberg, Noah Reed, & Ethan Connell

On March 15th, 2026, Politico published an article titled “Taiwan reports large-scale Chinese military aircraft presence near island.”[i] This title exaggerated what was in actuality a relatively normal day of PLA activity around Taiwan. Nevertheless, the piece caught the eye of many observers on social media. Within hours, thousands of finance and Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) accounts began to regurgitate the headline, without linking the article or explaining the nuance behind the report of “large-scale” activity.[ii] These posts, which seemed to imply that China was preparing significant military action against Taiwan, accumulated tens of thousands of likes, and began trending on both Twitter/X and Bluesky. 

Essentially, we witnessed a game of telephone taking place on the internet. A single headline was rapidly shared, rephrased, and simplified across platforms, with each iteration shedding context and adding interpretation. Within hours, an observation about aircraft activity became a claim about encirclement, with accounts sharing posts that declared Taiwan as “surrounded” by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

An AI-generated map that circulated on X/Bluesky during the wave of misinformation

This incident provides a useful window into how even relatively small actions by the PLA around Taiwan have the potential to significantly swing social media coverage of Taiwan by actors engaged in disinformation. In a crisis-prone environment such as Taiwan’s, where China has carefully shaped the narrative environment for years through large exercises, even one article can cascade into a broader wave of false and misleading claims, using recycled visuals and improvised escalation narratives.[iii]

The Problem With ADIZ Reporting

Following two weeks of depressed PLA activity in and around Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), Taiwan’s MND reported that 26 Chinese aircraft were detected operating around Taiwan, with 16 aircraft entering its IZ[iv]. While this instance is indeed above 2026’s daily average of 4.5, it is in fact only “large-scale” if compared to the previous two weeks of little to no activity, something that the Politico article make[v] clear. However, when viewed holistically, March 14th’s numbers are less significant, representing only the 8th largest ADIZ incursion of 2026. The event’s significance is further diminished due to the resumption of low aerial activity the following day, March 15th.[vi]

It is routine for news organizations outside Taiwan to report on PLA activity in Taiwan’s ADIZ, especially when violation numbers seem to be abnormally high or low. During the recent period of lower activity, for example, many major news organizations published stories on the unusual lull.[vii]

Reporting on something as niche as Taiwan’s ADIZ creates a structural vulnerability. Headlines often compress complex operational data into simplified, attention-grabbing phrases that lack important context. On social media, these headlines are frequently detached from the underlying reporting, leaving readers to infer meaning from incomplete signals.

This dynamic does not require deliberate manipulation. Headline framing can make routine activity appear more consequential than it is, creating openings for exaggerated interpretations. A similar pattern appears during PLA joint exercises, when maps of exercise zones or footage of missile launches circulate without context, prompting observers to interpret routine demonstrations as evidence of blockade preparations or imminent invasion.

The Misinformation Cascade Begins

The cascade began with a flurry of financial news accounts simply sharing the article title on social media, something they likely received from news wire services. The simplicity of the title, specifically the fact it could very easily be misconstrued as suggesting that China was preparing a military build-up, instantly attracted massive attention from OSINT accounts that simply aggregate the news headlines, usually in a way that exaggerates the severity of events.[viii]

What began as “Taiwan reports large-scale Chinese military aircraft presence near island” became “TAIWAN DETECTS MASSIVE CHINESE MILITARY PRESENCE SURROUNDING ISLAND” and “BREAKING; TAIWAN ON HIGH ALERT.”[ix] As these posts began to circulate, generating tens of thousands of likes and reposts, commentary accounts began to post uninformed analysis.[x] This fed into the algorithm and expanded the audience to circles outside of the “OSINT community”. Less than six hours after the publication of the original Politico article, the dominant discourse surrounding it became completely unrecognizable from its actual substance.

As the social media posts spread rapidly, some posts referencing the Politico report began to adopt the phrase “Taiwan surrounded.”[xi]

This linguistic shift was not trivial. Describing aircraft and ships “around Taiwan” conveys an operational snapshot: an observation about detected activity. Describing Taiwan as “surrounded,” however, implies a fundamentally different military posture. The term suggests physical enclosure, coercive leverage, or even the early stages of blockade operations. The difference between these descriptions marks the point where an activity report becomes a strategic claim.

In many viral posts, the progression followed a familiar pattern: The original numbers were omitted, but the language of heightened military activity and encirclement remained. As the messaging grew stronger, the belief that we were seeing something larger beginning grew as a seemingly logical conclusion. At that moment, the misinformation cascade began.

The initial spread of the Politico headline was driven by rapid reposting across financial news and OSINT accounts, many of which likely received the story through news wire services. Each repost preserved the sense of urgency while shedding the context needed to interpret the underlying activity.

But repetition alone does not explain why the narrative gained traction. Ongoing global events, emotional responses such as fear, and the pressure to keep pace with breaking news all contributed to how the headline was interpreted. Together, these forces helped transform an activity report into something that appeared far more consequential.

Context Collapse and the Vulnerability of Breaking News

This transformation illustrates a recurring problem in the information environment surrounding security crises: context collapse.[xii] Technical military reporting often relies on specialized terminology, whose meaning depends heavily on operational context. As a result, phrases like “large-scale activity,” “operating near the island,” or “around Taiwan” can be easily misinterpreted when removed from the operational reporting framework used by defense institutions. This is especially relevant during the ongoing operations in the Middle East. With airstrikes, bombings, and naval fires filling up algorithms on social media, the public is hyper fixated on action, worried about the conflict spilling over with global consequences.

On media platforms that reward simplicity and emotional clarity, those phrases can quickly evolve into stronger claims. A surge becomes an escalation. Activity becomes encirclement. A snapshot becomes a strategic turning point.

Research on crisis communication shows that information environments characterized by uncertainty and urgency often degrade shared situational awareness.[xiii] In these environments, audiences rely increasingly on simplified narratives rather than technical explanations, making complex military developments easier to misinterpret or exaggerate.[xiv]

The Taiwan Strait is particularly vulnerable to this dynamic because even routine military movements carry geopolitical significance. For audiences with limited familiarity with PLA operational patterns, the difference between an activity spike and a strategic shift may not be obvious. As a result, ambiguity can easily be filled with worst-case interpretations.

Fear as a Carrier of Misinformation

One of the major factors fueling the spread of discussion around the activity was a sense of urgency and fear. What had begun as a description of aircraft counts was quickly processed as a signal of possible escalation. This shift mattered because it changed the role of the audience. Rather than evaluating a technical report, users were reacting to what appeared to be the early stages of a crisis.

Fear alters how individuals process information under uncertainty. Research on information diffusion shows that emotionally arousing content, particularly content that evokes anxiety, reduces the likelihood that individuals will pause to verify claims before sharing them.[xv] When the perceived stakes are high, the cost of inaction can feel greater than the risk of being wrong.[xvi] In this context, sharing becomes a precautionary behavior: a way of responding to a potential threat rather than confirming a verified fact.

This dynamic helps explain how the narrative evolved so quickly. As users encountered repeated claims that Taiwan was being “surrounded,” the framing itself encouraged a particular interpretation of events, one in which time was limited and escalation plausible. Under those conditions, ambiguity is often resolved in the direction of worst-case assumptions.

The Taiwan Strait is especially susceptible to this process because it is already widely understood as a high-risk flashpoint.[xvii] Reports of increased military activity therefore do not enter a neutral information environment. They are received by audiences primed to expect crisis, making emotionally charged interpretations more intuitive and more difficult to dislodge.

Rather than distorting an already existing stable understanding of events, in this case, fear constructed a distorted understanding of events from first principles.

As the narrative spread, emotional reactions reinforced the interpretation that something larger was unfolding, even though the underlying data had not changed. By the time more precise context emerged, the initial framing had already taken hold.

The “Use It or Lose It” Logic of Virality

The initial posts that circulated widely were not detailed analyses, but rapid reposts of the headline, often stripped of its original context. As the story began to trend, users encountered a familiar dilemma: whether to wait for additional information or to share immediately while the topic was gaining attention. In fast-moving situations, that window can close quickly. Waiting to verify information risks missing the moment when a story is most visible.

This dynamic creates what can be understood as a “use it or lose it” logic. Information is most valuable when it is new and circulating widely. As a result, users are incentivized to share content as soon as they encounter it, even if the underlying details remain unclear. In the case of the Taiwan activity report, this pressure contributed to the rapid spread of simplified and, at times, misleading interpretations of the original article.

Research on information diffusion suggests that time pressure plays a significant role in reducing verification behavior. When individuals are required to make quick decisions about whether to share content, they rely more heavily on heuristic cues, such as the tone of a headline or the apparent urgency of a claim, rather than engaging in careful evaluation.[xviii] When the valence of the emotions is negative (fear or anger), and the arousal stronger, we see an even larger effect, effectively bypassing internal ’factchecking’ mechanisms.  In practice, this means that speed can substitute for accuracy in shaping what information circulates most widely.

In the hours following the Politico report, this mechanism was visible in how the story evolved. As more users shared increasingly simplified versions of the original claim, the narrative moved further away from the underlying data. Each iteration prioritized immediacy over precision, reinforcing a version of events that was easier to transmit but less accurate.

Importantly, this process does not require intentional deception. The users participating in the spread of the narrative are often responding rationally to platform incentives that reward speed, visibility, and engagement. The result, however, is an information environment in which early interpretations, rather than verified ones, play a disproportionate role in shaping collective understanding.

Visual Misinformation and the Power of the Map

The misinformation surge surrounding the Taiwan activity report was further amplified by the circulation of a misleading map.

Images carry a particular authority online. A map, diagram, or chart often appears more credible than text because it looks technical and objective. For many readers, visual representation functions as evidence rather than interpretation.[xix]

In this case, users circulated a map that purported to show Taiwan surrounded by Chinese forces. The image appeared to provide visual confirmation of the encirclement narrative.[xx] However, the map was not current, instead containing information from a Chinese exercise in May of 2024 (Joint Sword 2024A).

Despite this discrepancy, the image spread widely because it aligned with the narrative already circulating online. Once paired with the phrase “Taiwan surrounded,” the map helped transform a contested claim into something that looked authoritative.

This illustrates the powerful role visual content plays in misinformation ecosystems. Textual claims invite debate. Images often suppress it.

Why Taiwan Is Particularly Vulnerable

The Taiwan information environment is especially susceptible to rapid misinformation cascades due to several reinforcing factors.

First, China’s activity around Taiwan is both real and visible. The PLA regularly conducts air and naval exercises that simulate encirclement. Because these activities are genuine, reports about them carry immediate credibility and are easily incorporated into alarmist interpretations. Because these activities are genuine, reports about them easily gain traction.

Second, many audiences lack the context needed to interpret these developments. Without familiarity with PLA operational patterns, even routine activity can appear extraordinary.

Third, these factors combine with a media environment that rewards simplification. With the Taiwan Strait being a flashpoint that many fixate on, often viewed through the lens of great-power rivalry, social media platforms reward provocative messaging. Complex operational data rarely goes viral; emotionally resonant narratives do.

Together, these factors create what might be described as a fear market: where worst-case interpretations consistently attract attention and engagement.

The Anatomy of a Misinformation Cascade

The episode surrounding the “Taiwan surrounded” narrative illustrates a broader pattern in contemporary disinformation dynamics.

The process often follows a recognizable sequence:

  1. A real event occurs.
  2. Initial reporting frames the event in simplified terms.
  3. Emotionally charged interpretations amplify the story.
  4. Users rapidly repost the information without verification.
  5. Speculative narratives accumulate around the original claim.
  6. Visual content reinforces the narrative’s apparent credibility.
  7. The story stabilizes as a widely accepted, but inaccurate, account.

Importantly, this sequence does not require deliberate fabrication. The most effective misinformation often begins with something that is true. What changes is the interpretation.

Precision as Resilience

The lesson from this episode is not that analysts should dismiss reports of PLA activity or treat social-media reactions as irrelevant. Instead, it highlights the importance of maintaining precision in the way military developments are described and interpreted. In the Taiwan information environment, the difference between “increased PLA activity” and “Taiwan is surrounded” is not a matter of rhetorical nuance. It represents the boundary between analysis and alarmism.

Once that boundary is crossed, the information environment becomes difficult to correct. Viral narratives spread faster than careful explanations, and emotionally compelling interpretations often outcompete technical accuracy.

Precision therefore becomes a form of resilience. Analysts, journalists, and policymakers who communicate clearly about military developments help prevent routine operational activity from being misinterpreted as strategic escalation.

The recent surge of misinformation surrounding the Taiwan activity report demonstrates how quickly ambiguity can be converted into certainty online. It also serves as a reminder that in crisis-prone environments, the first casualty is often not truth itself, but proportion.

[i] https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/15/taiwan-reports-large-scale-chinese-military-aircraft-presence-near-island-00829219

[ii] https://x.com/unusual_whales/status/2033235867616383090?s=20

[iii] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/justice-mission-2025-the-narrative-battle-inside-chinas-latest-taiwan-exercise/

[iv] https://www.mnd.gov.tw/en/news/plaact/86327

[v] https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/15/taiwan-reports-large-scale-chinese-military-aircraft-presence-near-island-00829219?utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=dlvr.it

[vi] https://www.mnd.gov.tw/en/news/plaact/86330

[vii] https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/12/asia/china-taiwan-buzzing-mystery-intl-hnk, https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/articles/c2lr8ejq0w8o/simp

[viii] https://x.com/rawsalerts/status/2033282084282695857?s=20, https://x.com/Defence_Index/status/2033172908277891415?s=20, https://x.com/Globalsurv/status/2033265245582413860?s=20

[ix] https://x.com/SpencerHakimian/status/2033282256962208210?s=20, https://x.com/Globalsurv/status/2033257539291242981?s=20

[x] https://x.com/krassenstein/status/2033284541788324217?s=20, https://x.com/HotSotin/status/2033292605811798043?s=20

[xi] https://x.com/GlobalIJournal/status/2033362180351852786?s=20, https://x.com/drhossamsamy65/status/2033270501947081180?s=20 , https://x.com/PrimeH12995/status/2033572921365647430?s=20

[xii] Brandtzaeg, Petter Bae, and Marika Lüders. “Time collapse in social media: Extending the context collapse.” Social Media+ Society 4, no. 1 (2018): 2056305118763349.

[xiii] Hilberts, Sonya, Mark Govers, Elena Petelos, and Silvia Evers. “The impact of misinformation on social media in the context of natural disasters: Narrative review.” JMIR infodemiology 5 (2025): e70413.

[xiv] Shahbazi, Maryam, and Deborah Bunker. “Social media trust: Fighting misinformation in the time of crisis.” International Journal of Information Management 77 (2024): 102780

[xv] Stieglitz, Stefan, and Linh Dang-Xuan. “Emotions and information diffusion in social media—sentiment of microblogs and sharing behavior.” Journal of management information systems 29, no. 4 (2013): 217-248.

[xvi] Ecker, Ullrich KH, Stephan Lewandowsky, John Cook, Philipp Schmid, Lisa K. Fazio, Nadia Brashier, Panayiota Kendeou, Emily K. Vraga, and Michelle A. Amazeen. “The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction.” Nature Reviews Psychology 1, no. 1 (2022): 13-29., Marcus, George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. Affective intelligence and political judgment. University of Chicago Press, 2000.

[xvii] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-10/the-10-trillion-fight-modeling-a-us-china-war-over-taiwan

[xviii] Talwar, Shalini, Amandeep Dhir, Dilraj Singh, Gurnam Singh Virk, and Jari Salo. “Sharing of fake news on social media: Application of the honeycomb framework and the third-person effect hypothesis.” Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 57 (2020): 102197

[xix] Rama, Daniele, Tiziano Piccardi, Miriam Redi, and Rossano Schifanella. “A large scale study of reader interactions with images on Wikipedia.” EPJ Data Science 11, no. 1 (2022): 1.

[xx] https://x.com/WealthWatcherCo/status/2033280246254895138?s=20

Taiwan Arms Sale Backlog, February 2026 Update

Special Budget Complications Continue

Authors: Joseph O’Connor, Eric Gomez, & Shikhar Chaturvedi

Political gridlock over the Lai administration’s special procurement budget continued in February 2026, leading to concerns about recently announced U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. No new Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases were notified to Congress, and no existing sales were delivered in February. The total value of FMS cases notified to Congress but not delivered to Taiwan remains $32 billion.

Eagle-eyed readers will notice that there is a change in Figure 1. Arms sales cases are fully removed from our dataset once final delivery occurs, but we do not reduce the dollar value of the backlog for partial deliveries. We have explained our thinking in other articles.

We indicate partially delivered arms sales through color coding in our data visualizations, with the yellow-orange color representing cases that are partially delivered to the best of our knowledge. Previously, we have only done this for arms sales valued at $1 billion or more because these were the most militarily significant sales and because, given the quantities and types of capabilities involved, they tended to be the easiest to track.

However, we realize that a $1 billion threshold has its own problems. We have therefore decided to adjust our methodology for data visualizations, and from now on, any arms sale that we can verify as partially delivered will be visually indicated with the yellow-orange color. The dollar value of the backlog will only be reduced when a sale is fully delivered, but we think this new approach represents a reasonable way to show in-progress deliveries.

This methodology change moves five arms sales cases worth $1.89 billion into the partially delivered category. Combined with the two cases above, the $1 billion threshold that we were already tracking as partially delivered—M1A2T Abrams tanks and Harpoon Coastal Defense Cruise Missile systems—there are seven arms sales cases worth $6.26 billion that are partially delivered, just shy of 20 percent of the backlog’s total dollar value.  

Special Budget Updates in February

Ongoing deliberations in the Legislative Yuan (LY) relating to a special defense budget slowed down in February, as the LY recessed for the Lunar New Year holiday. Prior to recess, the legislature voted to advance a proposal made by the opposition Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) to committee review, leaving the Lai administration’s NT$1.25 trillion (US$40 billion) proposal in limbo. During the recess, 37 U.S. senators and representatives, including senior members of the House and Senate foreign affairs committees and from both parties in Congress, sent a letter to LY Speaker Han Kuo-yu and party caucus leaders, expressing concern about “ongoing deliberations in the Legislative Yuan to only partially fund a supplemental budget request.” Han, responding on February 16, stated that the budget would be one of the “very first” items to be debated, and upon re-convening on February 24, the LY voted to advance the government’s proposal, ending the month with both proposals under review by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee.

The differences between the competing proposals largely center on flexibility and holistic spending, as opposed to narrower and targeted procurements of established systems, as discussed in detail in our recent article comparing the two proposals. On the sidelines, the Kuomintang (KMT), the third and largest major party in the LY, announced in late February that they would be releasing their own special budget proposal, which they did in early March. As of the end of February, the proposal had ranged from NT$350 billion (US$11.19 billion) to NT$750 billion (US$23.97 billion) but turned out to be only NT$380 billion (US$12 billion) when announced on March 6.

Taiwan’s MND, on February 6, sounded the alarm about three Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) that are set to expire on March 15. The LOAs, which are for the December sales of Paladin self-propelled howitzers, TOW-2B anti-armor missiles, and Javelin anti-armor missiles, were not signed because of ongoing battles in the LY. MND officials stated they were seeking extensions to the LOAs if a deal was not reached soon. Signing a LOA quickly is an important milestone in the FMS process. A LOA has a payment schedule, whereby Taiwan would pay the U.S. government in installments for the capabilities it is purchasing. The U.S. government negotiates a contract with the defense industry and pays for the capabilities using the funds that Taiwan transfers per the LOA. Importantly, until a LOA is signed and a first payment is made, the Department of Defense cannot enter a contract to produce the weapons. If a LOA is not signed before it expires, then certain steps in the FMS process must be repeated or renegotiated due to potential changes in pricing.

Updates to Abrams, PAC-3 Sales

On February 2, MND officials reported that the final batch of 28 M1A2T Abrams tanks will arrive in Taiwan by the end of March. Delivery of the total 108 tanks has been ongoing since December 2024, when the first batch of 38 arrived in Taiwan.

On February 11, MND officials confirmed to the press that they would be procuring 102 PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missiles for Patriot air defense systems, which would be paid via surplus funds from a prior Patriot procurement program.  This is a positive development for the backlog, as the 102 PAC-3 MSEs are a 2022 modification to a 2010 Patriot case and can be funded through surplus from the earlier program. They are separate from and (additive to) the planned but not yet notified Patriot follow-on package (additional batteries and PAC-3 MSEs) expected to be financed through the Lai administration’s special defense budget.

Amidst these updates, reporting from the Financial Times, New York Times, and Taipei Times has revealed a future arms sale package to Taiwan, including PAC-3 MSE missiles, additional Patriot batteries, Integrated Battle Command Systems, and Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensors radars, all designed to integrate into the Lai administration’s planned “T-Dome” air defense system. The timeline of this sale, however, is in flux owing to Trump’s summit with Xi in April.

Trump Administration Announces Arms Sale Reforms

On February 6, the Trump administration launched a new round of arms-transfer reforms through Executive Order 14383 and its accompanying White House fact sheet, establishing an “America First Arms Transfer Strategy.” The order reframes arms transfers as a mechanism for expanding U.S. production capacity, strengthening supply chains, and prioritizing partners that invest in their own defense. The point was reinforced on February 10, when the Pentagon announced the realignment of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) under the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, explicitly tying security cooperation and export administration more closely to defense-industrial management and execution.

At the same time, Taiwan’s arms sales became more visibly entangled with summit diplomacy. Following the February 4 Trump–Xi call, Beijing publicly urged Washington to handle Taiwan arms sales with “prudence” and again described Taiwan as the“most important issue” in U.S.–China relations. Trump then said he was “talking” with Xi about future arms sales to Taiwan and would decide “pretty soon,” before the White House promptly clarified that there had been no change in longstanding U.S. policy. Further reporting that a major new package could move only after a Trump trip to China further underscores that dynamic.

Conclusion

Taiwan’s arms sales backlog remained steady at $32.0 billion through the end of February 2026. However, recent developments highlight the role of political factors in the backlog rather than defense industrial capacity.  

The Legislative Yuan has only just begun substantive review of competing special budget proposals, while the March 15 LOA expiration deadline is approaching for several cases notified in December.  Meanwhile, Washington’s efforts to streamline arms transfers are occurring alongside high-level diplomacy, which may influence the timing of major new Taiwan FMS notifications to Congress. 

March will be a critical month to determine whether Taipei can turn budget discussions into signed agreements and funding, and whether U.S. process improvements will result in faster execution or be offset by political considerations on both sides.

Weekly Security Review: 3/16/26

Author: Jaime Ocon

Welcome to the Weekly Security Review, where we highlight key military, security, and political developments around Taiwan in one straightforward summary!

This week, Taiwan’s army conducts a new kind of exercise, a lack of ADIZ activity around Taiwan raises suspicion, and a supplemental defense budget inches closer to being passed.

Army Wraps Up Inaugural CTC 2.0 Combat Readiness Drills

Taiwan’s Army has wrapped up a new kind of military exercise called “CTC 2.0” (Combat Training Center rotation 2.0). The Ministry of National Defense (MND) says the inaugural drills are a significant upgrade to its existing combat readiness exercise and are modeled after U.S. Army training. The first-ever rotation involved the 542nd, 584th, and 586th Combined Arms Brigades, along with the 39th Chemical Corps and 52nd Engineer Group. The goal of these exercises, per military officials, is to simulate uninterrupted high-intensity operations to improve the combat endurance of Taiwan’s troops. The military simulated live-fire scenarios using an opposing force, creating mock fires within an integrated engagement system. These live-fire scenarios put pressure on units to coordinate combined arms tactics and forced officers to issue quick orders using the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). Soldiers taking part in the drills were also tested on how they conducted logistics, with some units even performing maintenance and swapping engines on the fly. 

Since 2023, Taiwan has been making great strides to increase the realism of its military exercises, and the new CTC 2.0 is a continuation of those efforts. These drills were extended from 5 days/4 nights to 10 days/9 nights, and included one-year conscripts alongside the active volunteer force. Units that fail the drills must complete the entire exercise again. Engineers who took part in CTC 2.0 say this iteration helped them improve their ability to rapidly deploy mines, obstacles, and field fortifications under pressure across different terrains. A large number of armor crewmembers, however, say the drills are physically and mentally demanding, due to the 24-hour cycle having no predictable rest periods. Battalion commanders say the biggest challenge was issuing orders under pressure and under consistently changing battlefield conditions. 

Suspicious ADIZ Activity Around Taiwan Raises Eyebrows  

It’s been an interesting two weeks for Taiwan, which has since reported a sharp uptick in Chinese military activity around its airspace on Sunday, ending a rare 10-day lull in flights that have left analysts and observers around the world looking for answers. Regardless, Taiwan’s MND says it spotted 26 PLA military aircraft operating in the region, with 16 crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait or entering Taiwan’s air-defense identification zone (ADIZ). Seven Chinese naval vessels were also observed maneuvering in the surrounding waters. 

From February 27 to March 11, the MND reported zero People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) sorties on 11 of 13 days, being the longest pause since 2021. Beijing offered no public comment, and Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense, Wellington Koo, has cautioned against reading too much into the “de-escalation.” Koo went on to tell reporters that Chinese naval patrols “still surround us daily.” Analysts in Taipei and Washington have floated a variety of competing theories, ranging from internal leadership disruptions due to recent PLA purges to political calculations ahead of an anticipated U.S.–China summit. Some analysts have highlighted possible fuel shortages and new training formats as another possibility, but one thing is for sure: no one knows exactly why. Some observers now say that the resurgence of flights suggests the lull was tactical rather than strategic, as with the Two Sessions finished, aircraft are now starting to return.

Taiwan Security Monitor put out its own explanation for the lull in activity on March 7. You can read the full article here: 

All Quiet in the Taiwan Strait? Explaining the Recent Drop in PLA Aircraft Activity Around Taiwan

Taiwan’s Legislature Sends All Supplemental Budget Proposals to Committee Review

Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) has agreed to send all three versions of a supplemental defense budget draft to the various committees for review. The competing proposals includes the Lai administration’s NT$1.25 trillion (US$40 billion) request, a proposal by the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) worth NT$400 billion (US$12.7 billion), and a third budget by the Kuomintang (KMT) worth NT$380 billion (US$11.93 billion)   Days later, the LY agreed to allow the Cabinet to sign Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for four U.S. weapons systems. Three of those systems, Paladin self-propelled howitzers, TOW-2B, and Javelin anti-armor missiles, had a deadline of March 15. A fourth LOA, to be signed for 82 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and munitions, has a March 26 deadline. The next step is for the Cabinet to inform the Legislature of the estimated procurement timelines for these systems. The decision to push the budget forward comes just days after the KMT said it could also support the TPP’s special defense budget proposal. KMT legislator Lo Ting-wei said the plans are similar enough that the versions could be merged into a unified “blue-white” budget reflecting cooperation between the parties. 

The budget dispute has intensified after the U.S. announced a US$11 billion arms sale to Taiwan in December. Over 30 American lawmakers took to social media and sent a bipartisan letter to LY leaders, urging approval of a supplemental budget. The KMT and TPP both support increasing defense spending, but are more concerned about oversight mechanisms and specific funding details. The KMT’s version requires receipt of LOAs before releasing funds and mandates delivery by 2028, while the TPP would fund only five of the eight U.S. arms sale items. The KMT and TPP oppose the idea of the DPP receiving a “blank check” for President Lai’s administration. The DPP has continued to release more information clarifying what they would purchase, including funds for a domestic air defense network (T-Dome) and indigenous missile production. 

Visualization: US Military Aircraft Training Incident

Author: Maxwell Hollingsworth

On Feb. 24, a U.S. Air Force C-146 Wolfhound struck a concrete road barrier while attempting to take off from a designated alternate landing zone on a bypass road in Laoac, Pangasinan, during contingency training with Philippine counterparts, injuring all five personnel onboard. 

This was the first such alternate roadway landing activity in the Philippines, tied to both contingency operations and humanitarian/disaster response scenarios. 

Above is TSM’s visualization of the incident’s location.

The Taiwan Affairs Office sharply denounces Lai Ching-te’s fallacies: If he dares to take reckless risks, he will bring about his own destruction!

On March 14, State Council Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua answered reporters’ questions.

Lai Ching-te attended a so-called “30 Years of Direct Elections for the Taiwan Regional Leader and Democratic Resilience Symposium” today, where he openly claimed that the election demonstrated that “Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country.” He fabricated the fallacy that “democracy equals sovereignty,” played up the “mainland threat,” advocated “seeking independence through force,” and incited slogans such as “resist China, protect Taiwan” and “democracy versus authoritarianism.” A reporter asked for comment.

Chen Binhua said that Lai’s remarks were yet another carefully cobbled-together and packaged “Taiwan independence confession,” once again brazenly challenging the one-China principle and fully exposing Lai’s intransigent “Taiwan independence” nature and clearly malicious intentions.

He said Lai was using so-called “electoral democracy” to manufacture a basis for Taiwan’s non-existent “statehood,” fabricating a “Chinese threat to Taiwan,” clamoring about “defending sovereignty,” creating a false narrative of “democracy confronting authoritarianism,” and inciting cross-strait antagonism and confrontation. This, Chen said, completely distorts Taiwan’s history and departs from basic facts. Its purpose is to mislead the public, confuse the issue, stir up “resist China, protect Taiwan,” and pursue “independence through force” and “rejecting unification through force.” In essence, it undermines peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and pushes Taiwan toward war.

Chen said that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China and Taiwan is part of China—historically and legally clear. Although the two sides have not yet been fully reunified, China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity have never been divided. Taiwan has never been a country and cannot become one; there is fundamentally no such thing as “sovereignty.” No matter how elections are held in the Taiwan region, or who is elected, it cannot change Taiwan’s status as part of China, cannot sever the unbreakable historical and legal ties across the Strait, and cannot overturn the iron rule that Taiwan’s future can only be decided jointly by all Chinese people, including Taiwan compatriots. Differences in systems are not an obstacle to unification, still less an excuse for separation. “We will never allow anyone or any force to use democracy as a pretext to pursue a ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist agenda.” Chen warned that people like Lai should not miscalculate: if they dare to take reckless risks, they will bring about their own destruction.

Chen added that no matter what Lai says or does, he cannot change the basic trajectory of cross-strait relations, nor can he stop the historical trend that the motherland will eventually be reunified—and must be reunified. He said he hoped Taiwan compatriots would clearly recognize Lai and the “Taiwan independence” separatist forces’ ambitions and selfish aims, uphold the greater national cause, stand on the right side of history, and join hands with them to oppose “Taiwan independence” separatist acts, firmly safeguard peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and protect the shared homeland of the Chinese nation.

Weekly Arms Update: 3/11/26

Authors: Joe O’Connor & Shikhar Chaturvedi

This week: the Kuomintang releases its budget proposal, leading to a flurry of statements about special budgets; the MND confirms Abrams tanks are en route to Taiwan; Minister Koo confirms an LOA for HIMARS was received; and the ministry releases budget details on NCSIST domestic production, alongside weekly bids and solicitations.

KMT Releases Proposal + Special Budget Updates

On Thursday, 5 March, the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party released its special defense budget proposal, after weeks of internal debate as to the amount. The proposal allocates NT$380 billion (US$11.93 billion) specifically to fund the eight U.S. arms sale cases announced in December and would require additional special budget requests for future procurement to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan. Additional reporting on Friday revealed that the request was NT$30 billion (US$940 million) higher than party leadership had planned for; with the KMT also mandating that Letters of Offer and Acceptance, which outline payment and delivery schedules, be issued and signed before funds are appropriated.

Immediately after, the Lai administration began issuing statements opposing the proposal and clarifying their own. The same day, 5 March, the MND issued a statement clarifying that three sales from December (the Taiwan Tactical Network, AH-1W SuperCobra spare parts, and Harpoon missile refurbishment) were not included in the special budget and would be in annual defense budgets. The next day, 6 March, Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo spoke to the press, stating that the KMT’s requirement that all sales be completed by December 2028 is unreasonable and impossible. On Saturday, 7 March, the MND issued a second statement, specifically discussing the KMT requirement of having LOAs before funding is approved, stating that cases follow a formal acquisition timeline and that public disclosure of budget items only occurs after U.S. congressional notification.

On Sunday, 8 March, President Lai visited Jieyun Temple in Banqiao District, New Taipei, giving a speech where he compared his special defense budget to installing a security system against a “bad neighbor.” Lai also argued for the reasonableness of his budget, comparing it to yearly defense spending by Japan and South Korea, both of which are more than his planned NT$1.25 trillion (US$40 billion) in spending over eight years. Also on Sunday, when asked by CNA if the U.S. would support the KMT’s proposal, an unnamed State Department official stated that they “encourage all parties in Taiwan’s legislature to work through political differences and quickly pass a special defense budget,” not taking a partisan side on the issue.

Today, the Legislative Yuan held elections for committee “convening members,” legislators who serve as co-chairs and who control the agenda and legislative review, electing DPP legislator Chen Kuan-ting and KMT legislator Ma Wen-jun to the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, which is tasked with review of the three special budget proposals. Chen, on Monday, met with former U.S. INDOPACOM commander Admiral John Aquilino, discussing Indo-Pacific security, domestic defense production, and advocating for the Lai administration’s budget to pass quickly.

Abrams Tanks “At Sea,” Expected by End of March

An MND official told CNA on Tuesday that the final batch of 28 M1A2T Abrams tanks is “at sea,” en route to Taiwan, with delivery expected before the end of March. The first batch of 38 tanks arrived in December 2024 and was commissioned into the Army’s 584th Combined Arms Brigade in October. A second batch of 42 tanks, which arrived in July 2025, is still undergoing training and is expected to be commissioned by mid-year. This marks the last out of 108 total tanks that Taiwan began procuring in July 2019.

LOAs for HIMARS Received + MQ-9B Clarification

On Tuesday, Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo told the press that the MND had received a fourth Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) from the U.S., for the sale of 82 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and associated munitions, worth NT$127.2 billion (US$4.05 billion), initially being notified in December.  This LOA, which has a deadline of 26 March to be signed, joins three prior LOAs, for Paladin self-propelled howitzers, Javelin anti-armor missiles, and TOW-2B anti-armor missiles, that have not been signed by the MND owing to ongoing special budget negotiations and are in danger of expiry. On Thursday, 5 March, however, it was reported that the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), the KMT’s fellow opposition party in the LY, will allow the three previous LOAs, which expire on March 15, to be signed if they are reported immediately to the LY. As of the time of writing, however, we are not aware of those three LOAs having been signed.

While speaking to the press on Tuesday, Minister Koo also clarified ongoing rumors about delays in the delivery of four MQ-9B SeaGuardian maritime surveillance drones to Taiwan, stating that the ongoing conflict in the Middle East has no effect on delivery timelines to Taiwan and that the MND continues to interface with U.S. partners if that were to change.

MND Releases NCSIST Production Budget Request

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has begun releasing additional budget details tied to the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), offering a clearer picture of how Taipei intends to scale domestic weapons production under the proposed NT$1.25 trillion “Defense Resilience and Asymmetric Capabilities” special budget. Per Central News Agency reporting, the MND explained that NT$80.9 billion (US$2.55 billion) of the package will fund NCSIST mass production programs, including NT$36.1 billion (US$1.14 billion) for the Strong Bow missile system, NT$16.8 billion (US$529 million) for the Rui Yuan II surveillance drone program, and NT$28 billion (US$881.7 million) for production of “small suicide unmanned surface vessels.”

The newly released figures reinforce a trend visible across Taiwan Security Monitor’s backlog and acquisition analysis: Taiwan is increasingly pairing U.S. arms purchases with expanded domestic production capacity anchored by NCSIST. Previous special budgets (such as the Sea and Air Combat Power Improvement Plan) already used this model to accelerate missile and unmanned platform production while strengthening Taiwan’s industrial supply chain. Taiwan Security Monitor’s December 2025 update on the Arms Sales Backlog showed a growing shift in U.S. arms packages toward asymmetric capabilities that are cheaper and faster to produce. The new NCSIST allocations suggest Taiwan is now extending that logic domestically, using local production to scale asymmetric systems while relying on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs for higher-end platforms.

Weekly Awards/Solicitations

On Thursday, the Armaments Bureau’s 209th Factory awarded an NT$480 million (US$15.09 million) contract to the Armaments Bureau’s 202nd Factory for base section maintenance of 40-mm remote-controlled turret systems, which feature on Clouded Leopard infantry fighting vehicles. The contract will be fulfilled in Jiji Township, Nantou County.

On Monday, the Naval Specialty Training Center, Naval Education and Training Command, awarded an NT$180 million (US$5.66 million) contract to NCSIST for the repair of “Sea Chain IV” training simulators. We estimate this may be some sort of tactical data link. The contract will be fulfilled in the southern region of Taiwan.

On Wednesday, the 192nd Fleet, Naval Command, the ROCN’s minesweeping force, awarded an NT$51.21 million (US$1.61 million) contract to NCSIST for comprehensive mine inspection and maintenance of various mines, including maintenance of MK 6 mine projectiles. The contract will be fulfilled in the southern region of Taiwan.