Author: Jaime Ocon
Taiwanโs response to Chinaโs โJustice Mission-2025โ was less about matching PLA moves and more about controlling the narrative and information environment. Taiwanโs Ministry of National Defense (MND), Coast Guard Administration (CGA), and Presidential Office moved quickly to reassure the public by framing the drills as coercive and to signal readiness through press conferences and real-time activity updates. Taiwan also tried to preempt Beijingโs psychological operations by debunking blockade claims, clarifying live-fire and warning-system protocols, and pushing back on rumors of territorial air/sea space intrusions, drones, reservist mobilization, and air and maritime safety.
Initial Responses from the Defense Ministry
On December 29, after the PLA Eastern Theater Command had announced live-fire drills, and as PLAN assets had already begun moving into position, Taiwanโs MND reported at 0950 that the ETC was conducting live-fire exercises in the waters and airspace around the Taiwan Strait.
The MND stated that in the days leading up to the drills announcement, the PLA was continuously carrying out military harassment and cognitive operations around Taiwan and the IndoโPacific, heightening regional tensions. These operations included China Coast Guard (CCG) ships breaching restricted waters in the outlying islands of Kinmen and PLA UAVs wrapping around the southern portion of Taiwanโs mainland.

Defense Minister Wellington Koo speaks with members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
In response to the exercises, Taiwanโs military raised its alert level, directing all personnel to maintain a โhigh level of vigilance,โ remain fully prepared, and โact to safeguard national sovereignty and the security of the homeland.โ The MND established an emergency operations center to implement rules of engagement and authorization procedures at strategic, operational, and tactical levels to monitor and, if necessary, intercept PLA activity. It was also announced that Taiwanโs armed forces would conduct โimmediate combat exercisesโ across the country for an unspecified period.
Local media reported that Mirage-2000 fighter jets had scrambled from Hsinchu Air Base shortly thereafter, and that the MND repositioned additional assets, including F-CK-1s, F-16s, and P-3C aircraft, to Hualien Air Base. A portion of Taiwanโs F-16s were ordered to maintain a high state of readiness and were equipped with AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles.
Taiwanโs Coast Guard
Shortly after the ETC announced Justice Mission-2025, Taiwanโs CGA detected four Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels approaching Taiwanโs northern and eastern waters. PLA Navy (PLAN) surface combatants were also dispatched to maritime exercise zones announced by the PLA. In response, the CGA deployed its own patrol vessels and established an emergency response center to work jointly with the MND on information sharing and countermeasures.

Taiwan CG ship โYilanโ shadows Chinese Coast Guard Vessel 1303 in the distance.
Presidential Office
While the MND and CGA mobilized their operational response, Taiwanโs Presidential Office condemned the drills, calling them a โdirect challenge to international law and order and a violation of international normsโ.
In the statement, Taiwanโs Presidential Office said Beijing is using military intimidation to threaten neighboring countries and risks becoming a troublemaker that undermines regional peace. Taiwan continued urging China to act rationally, exercise selfโrestraint, avoid misjudgment, and immediately halt irresponsible provocations.
First Images
The first images of CCG vessels came from Taiwanโs CGA, as CGA vessel Yilan intercepted CCG vessel 1303 approximately 23 nautical miles northwest of the Pengjia Islets. Another CGA vessel, the Taoyuan, trailed CCG 1306 just 30 nautical miles from Hualien, off Taiwanโs east coast. Linked here is a video of the reported activity and radio warnings from Taiwan.
Taiwanese F-16s also captured images of various PLA aircraft operating around Taiwan.

Taiwanโs MND Holds Day 1 Press Conference
At 1630 on December 29, Taiwanโs MND held an emergency press conference to provide more information on the scale and specifics of Chinaโs large-scale exercise. The MND reported that it identified 89 PLAAF military aircraft and drones operating in the area, 67 of which entered Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), during the first seven and a half hours of the exercise. It had also tracked 18 PLAN and 14 CCG surface ships operating around Taiwan, along with a Type 075 Amphibious Assault ship and three escort vessels sailing 160 nautical miles southeast of Taiwan.
Taiwan’s MND noted that the announced exercise zones in the south, east near Taitung, west near Penghu, and north all overlapped into Taiwan’s restricted territorial waters. That said, it clarified that no PLAN or CCG vessels had entered the restricted 12 nautical mile barrier. Finally, the MND reported that although the PLA had not conducted live-fire exercises on the first day of Justice Mission-2025, it was tracking the PLAโs Rocket Forces for signs that it might conduct such drills in the coming days.

Taiwanese intelligence officers explain Chinese military movements in a press conference.
Aviation authorities reported that 857 flights and more than 100,000 travelers were affected by Chinaโs exercises. Roughly 74 domestic flights to Kinmen and Matsu were cancelled, affecting about 6,000 passengers. Media questions prompted Taiwan’s military to admit that the transition time between Chinaโs routine training and large-scale exercises has shortened, increasing pressure on the country.
Day 2
Taiwanโs CGA released a statement early on the second day of โJustice Mission-2025โ confirming that 14 CCG vessels were still operating near Taiwan and in the restricted maritime zones near Matsu, Kinmen, Wuqiu, and Dongsha (Pratas). The CGA responded by dispatching 14 of its own vessels to designated sectors, pairing each Chinese vessel with a โone-to-one shadowing formationโ to monitor and attempt to repel CCG ships.
Total PLA activity from the MNDโs daily ADIZ report showed that from 0900 on December 29 to 0900 on December 30, 130 PLA aircraft and 22 naval and coast guard vessels had operated in the region. 90 of these aircraft breached the ADIZ median line, the 2nd most since China conducted its Joint Sword-2024 B exercises in October 2024.
At 1130, the MND reported that approximately two and a half hours earlier, PLA rocket artillery units in Fujian Province conducted live-fire exercises targeting the northernmost exercise zone, with impact zones scattered around Taiwanโs 24-nautical-mile line. Taiwanโs CGA later clarified that 7 PCH-191 rockets were fired into Zones 1 and 2.

Taiwan and Chinese Coast Guard ships sailing side by side in waters near Matsu.
Taiwanese Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo (Gu Lixiong) reported that the military, under the Presidentโs directive of โno escalation, no provocation,โ would stay on standby and continue to monitor and intercept Chinese assets approaching Taiwanโs maritime and air domain. In a press release, Koo also stated he would remain at the Joint Operations Command Center in Taipei with senior officers to maintain full situational awareness and monitor the readiness of reconnaissance, radar, and air defense units. Taiwanโs CGA also released a statement denouncing Chinaโs state mediaโs claim of a blockade of four Taiwanese ports. The CGA flagged this reporting as false information intended to mislead public opinion. It further said that all ships heading towards Taiwanese waters would be intercepted to ensure the border is protected. All normal maritime operations continued as usual.
Taiwanโs President Lai Ching-te released a statement condemning the live-fire drills, stating that โthe country continues to face various forms of harassment and influence operations, emphasizing that Taiwan will not escalate tensions or provoke confrontation but will act responsibly to maintain stabilityโ. Lai criticized the Chinese Communist Party for its efforts to amplify military pressure, remarking that such behavior is unworthy of a responsible major power.
Taiwanโs MND Holds Day 2 Press Conference
Taiwanโs MND held a second-day press conference on the exercises, reporting that it had detected 27 rocket impacts in zones 1 and 3, 71 PLA aircraft (35 entering Taiwanโs ADIZ), 15 CCG ships, 13 PLA Navy ships, and one amphibious assault group consisting of a Type 075 and three additional vessels as of December 30 at 1500. The MND also stressed that it had not observed the PLA launching Dongfeng missiles; that no PLA or CCG ships entered Taiwanโs territorial waters; and that Chinese operations in the โZone 8โ off of Taiwanโs east coast had concluded by noon.

Taiwanese intel officers answer questions from the media on Day 2 of โJustice Mission-2025โ
The MND also issued clarifying information regarding the two waves of live-fire rocket launches. The first salvo at 0900 comprised 17 rockets launched from Pingtan, Fujian, which landed about 70 nautical miles northeast of Keelung, outside 24 nautical miles and without overflying Taiwan. PLA units fired a second salvo of 10 rockets from Shishi, Quanzhou at approximately 0100. These rockets splashed down about 50 nautical miles southwest of Tainan. Taiwanโs military also took advantage of the press conference to clarify some grey-zone and psychological warfare concerns. It stated that reports that a Chinese drone breached territorial airspace to photograph Taipei 101 were false, noting that all drones remained outside the 24-nautical-mile limit. The clarification came after โโChinese outlets circulated a detailed photo of Taipeiโs urban landscape and claimed it was taken by a PLA TB-001 drone, prompting online discussion. The military said that, in addition to kinetic activity, Beijing was pairing its exercises with cognitive warfare and invited people interested in photography and video editing to help analyze imagery and counter Chinese disinformation.

An alleged image captured from a Chinese TB-001 showing Taipei 101, claiming to breach Taiwanโs territorial airspace.
Taiwanese reporters also pressed the MND as to whether rocket or missile launches might trigger activation of the national emergency warning system. The MND emphasized that established protocols govern both air alerts and live-fire contingencies: if rockets or missiles pass through Taiwanโs territorial airspace, the JAOC would issue mobile alerts through the Airborne Threat Warning System. If assessments indicate that projected impact areas could endanger Taiwan or Penghu, commanders are authorized to sound air-raid sirens, issue public warnings, and order appropriate countermeasures.
Regarding reports that the MND was activating reservists, the military clarified that immediate combat readiness drills automatically activate air and naval combat units. Only ground units tasked with securing key infrastructure as well as command posts, response centers, and support elements recalled personnel, and only those needed based on preplanned structures and mission needs.
The MND emphasized that since 2022, PLA exercises have integrated cognitive warfare by combining military and non-military means to shape perceptions in Taiwan, among allies, PRC domestic audiences, and third countries with minimal cost. Examples include distributing pre-packaged and heavily edited media alongside military drills to create the illusion that certain exercises are larger than they are. Taiwanโs military reiterated that its joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance systems had already detected abnormal PLA movements ahead of this drill, allowing preparations before the public announcement. Even after Beijing declares an end to the exercises, Taiwanโs forces would continue monitoring deployments, training patterns, and overall posture to avoid readiness gaps. Chinaโs โJustice-Mission 2025โ would conclude later that day.
National Security Bureau Conducts Review
On 1/8, about a week after Chinaโs drills, Taiwanโs National Security Bureau (NSB) was called to submit a report to the Legislative Yuan.
Taiwanโs NSB said that China’s exercises around Taiwan were part of a campaign to counter growing international support for the island. NSB officials added that the drills could also have been an attempt to divert attention from Beijing’s economic situation. NSB officials said the drills have a clear political intent: to push back in the international arena against democratic partners’ support for Taiwan. The report also confirmed that the exercises were the most expansive to date in terms of geographic scope. The drills are part of a broader โhybridโ pressure campaign combining military intimidation and economic coercion against Taiwan,

Taiwanโs military shows a map of โJustice Mission-2025โ military activity
Sentiment Among the Political Parties
Taiwanโs ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) condemned Chinaโs exercises and used the moment to criticize KMT chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (้ญ้บๆ), accusing her of prioritizing cross-strait political engagement, specifically the prospect of meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, over Taiwanโs security. Cheng argued such a meeting would be โstrategically significant,โ but the DPP countered that the KMTโs approach puts relations with Beijing ahead of deterrence and defense readiness.
In a separate statement, Cheng blamed Chinaโs military pressure on what she called the Lai administrationโs โwrong cross-strait policies.โ She said the DPPโs confrontational posture was raising security risks while failing to deliver tangible improvements for Taiwanโs forces, including better troop conditions and compensation.
The Taiwan Peopleโs Party (TPP) also condemned the drills, arguing they do nothing to promote regional stability and instead deepen cross-strait tensions. Echoing the DPP and the Presidential Office, TPP officials urged Beijing to halt military activities they said undermine stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Members of Taiwanโs DPP protest the exclusion of a defense budget bill during a Legislative Session.
These exchanges are unfolding amid heightened domestic polarization, especially over defense spending. For the fifth time, and during the second day of โJustice Mission 2025,โ opposition lawmakers blocked a proposed special defense budget of US$39.8 billion. The DPP argues the package is needed to fund new U.S. weapons, equipment, and training, while the KMT insists President Lai must brief the legislature in person before lawmakers consider the plan, arguing that a short summary is insufficient. The KMT and TPP have also advanced a motion to initiate impeachment proceedings, while the DPP accuses the opposition of using fiscal procedures in an unconstitutional way.
Chinaโs โJustice Mission 2025โ drills intensified pressure in an already fraught Taiwan security environment. The exercise, Beijingโs sixth large-scale drill of this kind since 2022, saw dozens of PLAN and PLAAF assets rapidly converge around the island and showcased an increasingly sophisticated rehearsal of Taiwan-focused operations. The key question now is whether these developments will galvanize support for passing Taiwanโs defense budget, or instead strengthen calls to dial back steps seen as likely to provoke Beijing.
