Taiwan Security Monitor

Strait Snapshot, February 2026 Update

Author: Ethan Connell & Jonathan Walberg


Key Findings

  • Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense recorded 190 PLA aerial sorties around the island in February 2026, a 30 percent decline from January’s 270 and a continuation of the downward trajectory that began after the December 2025 Justice Mission exercise. Year-over-year, February’s figure represents a 61 percent decline from 492 sorties in February 2025.
  • Three joint combat readiness patrols occurred during the month: February 12 (42 aircraft), February 19 (14 aircraft), and February 25 (30 aircraft). These operations demonstrate that the PLA’s capacity for large-scale multi-domain demonstrations remains intact, despite a contraction in routine sortie volume.
  • No aircraft were detected around Taiwan on February 27 and 28, marking the onset of a quiet period that extended through the first half of March in anticipation of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (the ‘Two Sessions’).
  • PLAN vessel detections averaged approximately seven per day in February, with a peak of eleven, consistent with the five-to-nine vessel baseline observed throughout 2025. The persistence of naval presence during a month of declining air activity demonstrates the operational decoupling between the air and maritime domains.
  • Coast Guard Administration data indicate ten documented China Coast Guard (CCG) incursions into Taiwan’s restricted waters from January through February, concentrated around Kinmen (eight incidents) and Dongsha Island (two incidents).

February 2026 Air Activity

In February 2026, 190 aircraft sorties were detected around Taiwan, with 147 entering the southwestern portion of Taiwanโ€™s Air Defense Identification Zone. This total represents a significant reduction from January’s 270 sorties and continues a downward trajectory that began after the PLA’s Justice Mission-2025 exercise on December 29, 2025. That exercise involved 130 aircraft in a single day, marking the largest single-day operation around Taiwan since comprehensive daily reporting began. The post-exercise period has been characterized by a gradual normalization of activity levels, although the pace of this decline is not unprecedented in the historical record.

February exhibited a familiar pattern of quiet periods punctuated by activity surges. The peak occurred on February 12, when 42 aircraft were detected as part of a Joint Combat Readiness Patrol (JCRP), representing the largest single-day figure since the Justice Mission exercise. Two additional JCRPs followed on February 19 (14 aircraft) and February 25 (30 aircraft). Outside these exercises, daily sortie counts typically ranged from two to thirteen aircraft, with several days recording zero detections. The final two days of the month, February 27 and 28, both recorded zero aircraft, indicating the onset of the quiet period associated with China’s annual Two Sessions legislative meetings, which extended through mid-March. The Chinese Military Commission (CMC) leadership purges that began in January 2026, including the dismissal of two senior vice-chairmen, may have reinforced this pattern of restraint by introducing additional institutional caution among theater-level commanders.

Figure 1. Daily PLA activity around Taiwan, February 2026. Gold stars denote JCRP days; shaded region marks the onset of the Two Sessions quiet period.

Monthly Trajectory: Postโ€“Justice Mission Cooling

The decline from 270 sorties in January to 190 in February aligns with the broader pattern of post-exercise normalization observed after major PLA operations around Taiwan in recent years. The December 2025 Justice Mission exercise caused a significant spike in both single-day and monthly activity. The first two months of 2026 appear to reflect a return to a lower operational baseline rather than a strategic decision to permanently de-escalate. January 2026 remained elevated relative to the monthly averages of mid-2025, and February’s figure, while lower, falls within the range of monthly totals observed during non-exercise periods.

Figure 2. Monthly PLA sortie totals, 2024โ€“2026. For 2026, January and February data are shown.

The frequency of joint combat readiness patrols offers a counterpoint to the overall decline in sortie numbers. February’s three JCRPs are comparable to January’s four, indicating that the PLA’s exercise tempo has not significantly slowed, even as routine patrol activity has contracted. This distinction between routine and surge operations is analytically important: reductions in daily sortie volume do not necessarily indicate a diminished PLA capacity or willingness to conduct large-scale operations on short notice.

At Sea: Naval Presence

PLAN vessel detections in the waters around Taiwan averaged 6.6 per day in February, with a peak of eleven vessels on a single day. These figures are broadly consistent with the range of 5-9 vessels that has characterized PLAN presence throughout 2025 and into 2026. The stability of naval posture during a month when air activity declined by nearly 30 percent from January highlights a structural feature of cross-strait military dynamics: the air and maritime components of PLA activity around Taiwan appear to operate under distinct operational logics and respond to different drivers.

Figure 3. PLAN vessel and official ship detections around Taiwan, February 2026.

This decoupling is analytically significant. Observers who track sortie counts as a proxy for cross-strait tension may interpret the January-to-February decline as evidence of easing pressure. However, naval data present a different perspective: the PLAN’s sustained presence at sea indicates that the military’s overall posture in the Taiwan Strait has not meaningfully contracted, even as the air component adjusts to post-exercise and politically sensitive rhythms.

Coast Guard Gray Zone Operations

China Coast Guard activity in Taiwan’s restricted waters constitutes a third, and often underreported, dimension of cross-strait pressure. From January through February 2026, the CCG conducted at least ten documented incursions: eight around Kinmen and two near Dongsha Island (Pratas). The Kinmen operations have developed into a recognizable pattern, typically involving two to four CCG cutters entering restricted waters for two to three hours before withdrawing. This approach appears designed to normalize a regular CCG presence in waters that Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration considers under its jurisdiction.

Figure 4. CCG incursions into Taiwan’s restricted waters, Januaryโ€“February 2026, by location and vessel count.

The Kinmen incursions have involved a recurring set of CCG cutters, including hull numbers 14529, 14603, 14609, and 14530, suggesting a dedicated patrol rotation rather than ad hoc deployments. The Dongsha operations are qualitatively different. The February 6 incursion near Dongsha involved vessels 3501 and 3107, with the CCG presence lasting approximately eight hours. Although shorter than the extended dwell times observed in later months, the Dongsha deployments represent a more logistically demanding operation due to the island’s distance from Chinese territorial waters. Their continuation into February suggests an established rather than exploratory program.

Multi-Domain Overview

Figure 5. Januaryโ€“February 2026 multi-domain PLA activity: air sorties, naval presence, and CCG incursions.

An integrated view of all three domains during the first two months of 2026 reveals a more complex picture than any single metric suggests. Air activity has declined sequentially, reflecting sensitivity to both post-exercise normalization and political calendars. Naval presence has remained steady and largely unaffected by fluctuations in the air domain. Coast Guard incursions have continued at a pace consistent with an institutionalized patrol program. Analysts and policymakers assessing cross-strait dynamics should examine all three domains collectively, rather than relying solely on sortie counts as a barometer of PLA intent.

Figure 6. February air activity year-over-year: total sorties and median line crossings, 2024โ€“2026.

Methodology & Sources

Air and naval detection data are drawn from daily press releases issued by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and compiled in the PLA Activity Center database maintained by Taiwan Security Monitor. Coast Guard incident data are compiled from Coast Guard Administration press releases and verified against contemporaneous media reporting. “Median line” refers to the informal centerline of the Taiwan Strait historically observed by both sides. “JCRP” denotes Joint Combat Readiness Patrols as designated by Taiwan’s MND. All analysis and commentary are by Taiwan Security Monitor.

ยฉ 2026 Taiwan Security Monitor. All rights reserved.

Visualization: Potential US Missile Deployment Locations in the Philippines

Authors: Chris Dayton & Ethan Connell

Per USNI News, U.S. and Philippine defense officials have committed to increasing missile and drone deployments across the archipelago as part of broader First Island Chain deterrence efforts, with recent rotations spotlighting Northern Luzon and the Batanes areas nearest Taiwan. Above is our visualization of potential U.S. missile deployment locations in the Philippines and the approximate engagement envelopes for NMESIS (180 km), Typhon/MRC (450 km), and HIMARS (500 km).

Visualization: New Philippine Navy Monitoring Detatchment at Tubbahta Reef

Authors: Chris Dayton & Ethan Connell


The Philippine Navyโ€™s Western Naval Command will stand up a Naval Monitoring Detachment at Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park, with the stated goal of improving patrol, surveillance, and rapid-response coverage of Chinese naval activity in the Sulu Sea, while also supporting the reef’s protection against illegal activity. Above is our visualization of the detachment’s proposed location:

Strait Snapshot, January 2026 Update

Author: Ethan Connell & Jonathan Walberg


Key Findings

  • In January 2026, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense recorded 270 PLA aerial sorties around the island, a 21 percent decrease compared to the 340 sorties in January 2025. This month marks the first complete period of post-Justice Mission activity, following the December 29, 2025, exercise that deployed 130 aircraft in a single day.
  • Four Joint Combat Readiness Patrols (JCRPs) occurred during the month, with the January 15 JCRP involving 34 aircraft, marking the highest single-day total. The consistent scheduling of JCRPs throughout January demonstrates that the PLA retains the capability for high-intensity, multi-platform demonstrations around Taiwan, despite a reduction in routine sortie volumes compared to 2025.
  • PLAN vessel detections averaged 6.6 per day in January, with a peak of 11 vessels, aligning with the five-to-nine vessel baseline observed throughout 2025. Naval presence remained stable during the month and was largely unaffected by fluctuations in air activity.
  • The Coast Guard Administration documented five CCG incursions into Taiwan’s restricted waters in January: four near Kinmen and one near Dongsha Island (Pratas). The January 14 Dongsha incident involved CCG vessel 3501, a larger-class cutter, highlighting a qualitative distinction in Beijing’s operational approach to these two locations.

January 2026 Air Activity

January 2026 opened a new chapter in the pattern of PLA air activity around Taiwan. The month’s total of 270 detected aircraft sorties, of which 166 entered Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, represents a 21 percent decline compared with January 2025’s 340 sorties. This figure must be read in context: the Justice Mission-2025 exercise of December 29, 2025, which saw 130 aircraft deployed around Taiwan in a single day, the largest such operation since comprehensive daily reporting began, may have temporarily exhausted forward-deployed assets and maintenance capacity in the Eastern Theater Command, contributing to a lower sustained tempo in the weeks that followed.

The daily pattern was characterized by a sawtooth rhythm: brief surges tied to Joint Combat Readiness Patrols, interspersed with days of minimal or zero activity. January saw 3 days in which no aircraft were detected (New Year’s Day, January 3, and January 11), punctuated by four JCRPs (January 8, 15, 23, and 29) that produced single-day peaks of 23, 34, 26, and 26 aircraft, respectively. The January 15 JCRP, involving 34 aircraft, was the month’s most significant single-day event and demonstrated multi-platform coordination across fighter, early warning, and anti-submarine warfare aircraft.

Figure 1. Daily PLA activity around Taiwan, January 2026. Gold stars denote JCRP days; shaded columns mark days with zero aircraft detected.

The removal of two senior Central Military Commission vice-chairmen in January, as part of an ongoing anti-corruption campaign within the PLA that had already affected several high-ranking officers in 2025, introduces an additional variable in interpreting the month’s air activity data. Although it is premature to establish a direct causal relationship between personnel changes and operational tempo, disruptions to command authority at the highest levels may have fostered institutional caution, potentially reducing routine sortie generation.

Monthly Trajectory: Where January Fits

January’s 270 sorties place the month at the low end of the range observed in recent years. For comparison, January 2024 recorded 331 sorties and January 2025 recorded 340. The year-over-year decline is more modest than the raw numbers might suggest: January historically sits below the annual average, as the PLA’s operational calendar typically builds toward spring and fall peaks. What distinguishes January 2026 is the extent to which the month was shaped by the aftereffects of the December 2025 Justice Mission exercise, which represented an operational high-water mark that appears to have drawn forward maintenance and logistics resources.

Figure 2. Monthly PLA sortie totals, 2024โ€“2026. For 2026, only January data is available.

The frequency of joint combat readiness patrols in January 2026, totaling four events, surpassed the typical January cadence observed in previous years. This indicates that the decrease in total sortie volume has not corresponded with a reduction in the PLA’s readiness to conduct large-scale, multi-domain demonstrations on short notice, a trend warranting continued observation in the coming months.

At Sea: Naval Presence in January

In January, PLAN vessel detections in the waters around Taiwan averaged 6.6 per day, peaking at 11 vessels on January 14 and 15. These numbers align with the five-to-nine vessel baseline that has defined PLAN presence throughout 2025 and into the new year. The stability of naval posture during the post-Justice Mission period, when air activity was moderating, reinforces a key structural observation from Taiwan Security Monitor’s multi-domain tracking: PLAN presence around Taiwan follows a different operational cycle from PLA aerial activity, showing less sensitivity to the political and institutional factors that influence air sortie fluctuations.

Figure 3. PLAN vessel and official ship detections around Taiwan, January 2026.

Official and government ship detections remained generally low throughout January, with a notable increase on January 24 and 25, when three official ships were detected each day. This decoupling between air and naval activity is analytically significant: analysts focusing solely on sortie counts may interpret January’s data as evidence of moderation, yet the stable naval footprint demonstrates that the PLA’s overall maritime posture has not significantly diminished. China Coast Guard activity in Taiwan’s restricted waters constitutes a third, frequently underreported dimension of cross-strait pressure. In January 2026, the CCG conducted at least 5 documented incursions: 4 around Kinmen and 1 near Dongsha Island (Pratas). The Kinmen operations follow a recognizable pattern: typically three to four CCG cutters entering restricted waters near Liaoluo and Lieyu for two to three hours before withdrawing. Recurring hull numbers (14529, 14603, 14605, 14609, and 14533) indicate a dedicated patrol rotation rather than ad hoc deployments.

Figure 4. CCG incursions into Taiwan’s restricted waters, January 2026, by location and vessel count.

The January 14 Dongsha incursion differed qualitatively from the Kinmen pattern. CCG vessel 3501, a larger-class cutter, was detected west of Dongsha at 05:14 and remained in restricted waters for approximately eleven hours before departing. Although this duration was shorter than the twenty-five-hour dwell times observed at Dongsha in subsequent months, the deployment of a 3500-class cutter to Taiwan’s most remote holding indicates sustained interest in testing the Coast Guard Administration’s ability to maintain a presence at Dongsha, located approximately 450 kilometers southwest of the main island and over 300 kilometers from the nearest Taiwan-controlled port.

Multi-Domain Overview

Figure 5. January 2026 multi-domain PLA activity: air sorties, naval presence, and CCG incursions.

When considered across all three domains, January 2026 exhibits the characteristic pattern of multi-domain PLA pressure that the Taiwan Security Monitor has documented since the post-2022 period. Air activity was concentrated in distinct JCRP-driven surges, separated by extended periods of minimal activity. Naval presence remained steady and was largely uncorrelated with the daily fluctuations in air operations. Coast Guard incursions persisted along established geographic patterns, with the Dongsha deployment introducing a longer-range element to an otherwise Kinmen-focused gray-zone campaign.

Figure 6. January air activity year-over-year: total sorties and ADIZ crossings, 2024โ€“2026.

Analysts and policymakers should avoid interpreting a reduction in one domain as indicative of an overall decrease in pressure. The combined multi-domain posture, encompassing air, naval, and coast guard activities, does not reflect a significant departure from the sustained pattern of PLA activity around Taiwan that has shaped the cross-strait military balance since August 2022.

Methodology & Sources

Air and naval detection data are drawn from daily press releases issued by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and compiled in the PLA Activity Center database maintained by Taiwan Security Monitor. Coast Guard incident data are compiled from Coast Guard Administration press releases and verified against contemporaneous media reporting. Japan ADIZ scramble data are sourced from Japan Joint Staff Office press releases and reporting by USNI News. “Median line” refers to the informal centerline of the Taiwan Strait historically observed by both sides. “JCRP” denotes Joint Combat Readiness Patrols as designated by Taiwan’s MND. All analysis and commentary are by Taiwan Security Monitor.

ยฉ 2026 Taiwan Security Monitor. All rights reserved.

Failure to Launch: How Political Backpedaling Could Hand China the Carrier Edgeโ€‹

Authors: Ethan Connell & Jonathan Walberg


TSM Research Lead Ethan Connell and Associate Director Jonathan Walberg write about the necessity of electromagnetic launch systems (EMALS) on modern aircraft carriers, and on why a U.S. shift back to steam-powered launch systems could be catastrophic.

Read the full piece here.

Weekly PRC Media Review: 1/16/26

Author: Ethan Connell


Hereโ€™s the latest edition of the TSM PRC State Media Tracker. Each Friday, we highlight key excerpts from Chinaโ€™s state media organs, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Taiwan Affairs Office, all below!

Response to Events in Venezuela

14 January 2026

Comments from the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Ministry of National Defense on the implications of the United States capturing Venezuelan President Nicolรกs Maduro:

At the January 14 press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, a reporter asked: The United States recently sent troops to forcibly take control of Venezuelan President Nicolรกs Maduro and his wife and deport them, which has drawn widespread attention in Taiwan. Time magazine published an article saying that what Taiwan should really worry about is that U.S. attention will be consumed by Venezuela, thereby losing the United States as its โ€œbackerโ€; and that China does not need any international โ€œprecedentโ€ to take action on its own territory. What is your comment on this?

TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian responded that Taiwan is a part of China. The Taiwan question is Chinaโ€™s internal affair, and resolving the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people themselves and a just cause to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity. โ€œOutsiders cannot be relied upon.โ€ The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authoritiesโ€™ attempt to โ€œseek independence by relying on external forcesโ€ will only end up with them becoming โ€œdiscarded pawnsโ€ of external forces.

(Reporter): Some public opinion on the island is concerned that the mainland might emulate what the United States did with Venezuela to โ€œlegitimizeโ€ taking action against Taiwan. Some foreign media say that if the mainland wanted to copy the U.S. approach to handling the Taiwan issue, the costs and risks would be much higher. What is your comment?

(Zhang Xiaogang): The Taiwan question is purely Chinaโ€™s internal affair; how it is resolved is for the Chinese people to decide, and external forces have no right to make remarks. Dealing with โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ armed forces would be like catching a turtle in a jarโ€”any measures that can severely punish โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ elements are on the table.

The USโ€™ Economic โ€œPlunderingโ€ of Taiwan

14 January 2026

Comment from the Taiwan Affairs Office on the announcement that a tariff deal between Taiwan and the United States is nearing completion, under which U.S. tariffs on imports from Taiwan would be lowered to 15 percent, and TSMC would make additional investments in Arizona to build at least five more semiconductor plants:

At the January 14 press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, a reporter asked: The New York Times recently reported that people familiar with the matter said the United States is close to reaching a trade agreement with Taiwan, under which U.S. tariffs on imports from Taiwan would be lowered to 15 percent, and TSMC would make additional investments in Arizona to build at least five more semiconductor plants. Figures and public opinion in Taiwan have questioned whether the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities are โ€œtrading investment for tariffs,โ€ which would lead to top-tier semiconductor production capacity moving to the United States and turn TSMC into โ€œU.S. TSMC.โ€ What is your comment?

TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian responded that the so-called agreement is an act of economic plunder by the United States against Taiwan using high tariffs as leverage, and a scheme to โ€œbleedโ€ Taiwanโ€™s industries. This not only exposes the selfish nature of โ€œAmerica First,โ€ but also lays bare the malicious intent of the United States in treating Taiwan as a pawn.

She said that when faced with the blatant bullying and plunder by external forces, the DPP authorities not only offer no resistance, but instead actively cater to them, treating the islandโ€™s core technological advantages as a โ€œpledge of allegianceโ€ to ingratiate themselves with outside forces. In tariff negotiations, they โ€œkneel before even negotiating,โ€ and in the face of economic extortion, they โ€œoffer the other cheek after being slapped.โ€ The more โ€œcontracts of selling oneselfโ€ they sign, the more they will ultimately destroy Taiwanโ€™s economic development prospects and harm the long-term interests of the people of Taiwan.

17 Strategies for Cross-Strait Relations

14 January 2026

On the recent passage of draft amendments to the โ€œAct Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area” in Taiwan:

At the January 14 press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, a reporter asked: The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities have recently passed four draft amendments related to security as well as revisions to the โ€œAct Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.โ€ Public opinion on the island has pointed out that these are concrete steps to push forward Lai Ching-teโ€™s so-called โ€œ17 strategies,โ€ aimed at further restricting cross-Strait exchanges. Behind this is the DPP authoritiesโ€™ political calculation to achieve โ€œmartial law on speechโ€ and โ€œmartial law on the internet.โ€ What is your comment?

TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian responded that Lai Ching-teโ€™s so-called โ€œ17 strategiesโ€ completely go against the mainstream public opinion in Taiwan that wants peace, development, exchange, and cooperation, and fully prove that he is a โ€œdestroyer of cross-Strait peaceโ€ and a โ€œmaker of Taiwan Strait crises.โ€

She said that the DPP authoritiesโ€™ recent actions have sinister intentions and seek to open the door wide for further creating โ€œgreen terror,โ€ plotting โ€œTaiwan independence authoritarianism,โ€ and undermining cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation. These reprehensible actions that are anti-peace, anti-exchange, anti-democracy, and anti-humanity will inevitably be opposed and are doomed to fail.

Taiwanโ€™s Resolve to Fight

16 January 2026

From China’s Ministry of National Defense on a recent poll alleging 60% of respondents are “unwilling to go to the battlefield” :

(Reporter): It is reported that a Taiwan public opinion poll shows that more than 60% of respondents said they are unwilling for themselves or their family members to go to war. What is your comment?

(Zhang Xiaogang): This again shows that the overwhelming majority of people on the island want peace, development, exchange, and cooperation, and do not want to see cross-strait confrontation or antagonism, let alone armed conflict. The Lai Ching-te authorities are acting against the current, seeking โ€œindependenceโ€ and provoking war; their true face as โ€œdestroyers of peace,โ€ โ€œmanufacturers of crisis,โ€ and โ€œinstigators of warโ€ will be seen through by more and more people. I believe no one is willing to be โ€œcannon fodderโ€ for โ€œTaiwan independence.โ€ The separatist โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ forces go against public opinion and will ultimately be swept into the dustbin of history.

Japanese Cabinet Secretary Visits Taiwan

16 January 2026

A Japanese delegation led by Katsunobu Kato, member of the House of Representatives and former chief cabinet secretary, was received at the Presidential Office in Taipei City.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ response:

Nippon TV reporter: A former Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary visited Taiwan and held talks with Taiwan’s “presidentโ€ Lai Ching-te. Lai thanked the Japanese prime minister for continuing to express the position of attaching importance to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. What is Chinaโ€™s comment?

Guo Jiakun: Taiwan is a province of China; there is no such thing as a โ€œpresident.โ€ There is only one China in the world, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinaโ€™s territory. China firmly opposes any form of official interaction between countries that have diplomatic relations with China and the Taiwan authorities. We urge Japan to earnestly abide by the one-China principle and not send any wrong signals to โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist forces. We also want to stress that what Japan should most do now is retract Kลichi Hagiudaโ€™s erroneous Taiwan-related remarks.

Weekly PRC Media Review: 1/9/26

Author: Ethan Connell


Hereโ€™s the latest edition of the TSM PRC State Media Tracker. Each Friday, we highlight key excerpts from Chinaโ€™s state media organs, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Taiwan Affairs Office, all below!

“Legal Taiwan Independence” Will Be Crushed

7 January 2026

On the recent initiative by Taiwanese DPP lawmaker Lin I-chin to codify a two-state solution, with the aim to “legally define the relationship between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as an equal, state-to-state relationship”:

At the January 7 press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, a reporter asked: According to Taiwanese media reports, a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislator proposed amending the current โ€œAct Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Areaโ€ to define cross-Strait relations as โ€œTaiwan and the Peopleโ€™s Republic of China,โ€ and to delete the wording โ€œbefore national reunificationโ€ from the original provisions. Other media reports say that the proposer has already withdrawn the bill, while the proposer himself claims that โ€œit has not yet been formally submitted.โ€ What is your comment?

In response, Chen Binhua, spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, said that they are paying close attention to these developments. He said that the proposal ignores the mainstream public opinion in Taiwan and the peace and well-being of Taiwan compatriots, openly challenges the historical and legal fact that Taiwan is part of China, and attempts to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait in which there is only one China and both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. He said it is a naked attempt to push โ€œlegal Taiwan independence,โ€ deliberately escalating cross-Strait tensions and undermining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the region. Its intentions are sinister and its nature is egregious, fully demonstrating that the Lai Ching-te authorities and the DPP are nothing less than โ€œdestroyers of peace,โ€ โ€œmanufacturers of crises,โ€ and โ€œinstigators of war.โ€

Chen said that โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ means war and is a dead end with no way out. He said China has full confidence and sufficient capability to smash any attempt at โ€œlegal Taiwan independenceโ€ in any form, and will never allow โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist forces, under any name or in any way, to split Taiwan from China.

Chen added that history has already proven and will continue to prove that pursuing โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatism will never end well and will only lead to complete defeat. If โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist forces dare to take reckless risks and cross red lines, China will, in accordance with the Anti-Secession Law, take resolute measures and deliver a head-on blow. He expressed the hope that Taiwan compatriots will clearly recognize the evil nature and grave harm of โ€œTaiwan independence,โ€ firmly stand on the correct side of history, resolutely oppose โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist activities, and join together to safeguard peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and protect the shared home of the Chinese nation.

“Taiwan Independence” Will be Punished For Life

7 January 2026

On the announcement of another round of “Taiwan independence elements”, which brings the total to 26 individuals:

At the January 7 press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, a reporter asked: In recent years, the mainland has released several batches of lists of โ€œdiehard Taiwan independenceโ€ elements and โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ enforcers and accomplices. How many people are currently on each list? Will punishment be further intensified in the future to bring them to justice? Some public opinion on the island says that the mainlandโ€™s punitive measures currently have no substantive impact on these individuals. What is the spokespersonโ€™s comment on this?

In response, Chen Binhua, spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, said that โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ elements are criminals who split the country and undermine cross-Strait relations, and are also national traitors who seek โ€œindependence,โ€ provoke war, and harm the interests and well-being of their compatriots. As of now, 14 โ€œdiehard Taiwan independenceโ€ elements and 12 โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ enforcers and accomplices have been announced.

He said that any โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ elements who break the law, no matter where they are, will face all necessary measures: they will be punished in accordance with the law and held accountable for life.

Momentum Builds For National Reunification

7 January 2026

A summary of developments in cross-Strait relations in the past year and predictions for the year ahead:

At the January 7 press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, a reporter asked the spokesperson to summarize developments in cross-Strait relations in 2025 and to look ahead to cross-Strait relations in 2026.

In response, Chen Binhua, spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, said that 2025 was a year in which cross-Strait relations pressed ahead through difficulties and momentum was built for national reunification. They firmly grasped the initiative and leadership in cross-Strait relations, pushed exchanges, cooperation, and integrated development to a higher level, demonstrated stronger capabilities to deter โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatism and external interference, accumulated stronger momentum for advancing reunification, and gathered greater strength for promoting the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

First, they broke through obstacles and continued to expand cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation. They worked to overcome obstruction and restrictions imposed by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities, continued to expand people-to-people exchanges and cooperation across various fields, and promoted closer ties between compatriots on both sides and deeper, more substantive cooperation. They significantly increased the number of ports where Taiwan compatriots can obtain permits on arrival, introduced policies such as waiving the Taiwan Compatriot Permit application fee for โ€œfirst-time applicantsโ€ and offering airfare discounts, and provided โ€œgreater openness, maximum convenience, and greater safetyโ€ for Taiwan compatriots traveling to and from the mainland. They successfully held events such as the Straits Forum, the Cross-Strait Chinese Culture Summit, and the Cross-Strait Grassroots Livelihood Development Exchange Conference, leading a new wave of exchanges. The numbers of Taiwan compatriots, Taiwanese youth, and โ€œfirst-time visitorsโ€ coming to the mainland rose sharply. More and more Taiwan compatriots personally experienced the magnificence of the motherlandโ€™s landscapes, felt the dynamic vitality of Chinese-style modernization, appreciated the unique charm of Chinese culture, and took pride in being upright and dignified Chinese.

Second, they continued to deepen cross-Strait integrated development and share the opportunities of Chinese-style modernization. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee reviewed and adopted the recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan, making top-level design and strategic planning for development over the next five years. This provides strong impetus for Chinese-style modernization and opens broader space for Taiwan compatriots and enterprises to establish themselves and develop on the mainland. They respect, care for, and benefit Taiwan compatriots, implement policies of equal treatment for Taiwan compatriots and enterprises, and push for policies benefiting them to be implemented effectively. They advanced the construction of the cross-Strait integrated development demonstration zone with high quality, introduced a new batch of policies to deepen integrated development, and achieved new progress and results in Fujianโ€“Taiwan integration. They held the 2025 Cross-Strait Entrepreneurs Summit Annual Meeting and dozens of cross-Strait economic and trade exchange activities, sharing the opportunities and achievements of Chinese-style modernization with Taiwan businesspeople and enterprises. They effectively responded to external tariff bullying, safeguarded the Chinese nationโ€™s economy, and protected the interests of Taiwan businesses and enterprises on the mainland. More and more Taiwan compatriots have come to deeply recognize that both sides of the Strait form an inseparable community of shared destiny, and that the mainland is always a strong backing for Taiwan compatriots and enterprises.

Third, they resolutely opposed โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatism and external interference and firmly safeguarded the shared home of the Chinese nation. They held a symposium marking the 20th anniversary of the implementation of the Anti-Secession Law, conducted the โ€œStrait Thunderโ€“2025Aโ€ and โ€œJustice Missionโ€“2025โ€ exercises, firmly defended national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and resolutely safeguarded the common interests of compatriots on both sides of the Strait and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. They punished in accordance with the law โ€œdiehard Taiwan independenceโ€ elements and their enforcers and accomplices, effectively deterring separatist provocations. They firmly upheld the authority of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, continued to consolidate the international one-China framework, and effectively curbed external forcesโ€™ use of the โ€œTaiwan card.โ€ They united the broad masses of Taiwan compatriots, upheld the one-China principle and the โ€œ1992 Consensus,โ€ jointly opposed โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatism and external interference, firmly safeguarded the shared home of the Chinese nation, and kept the future and destiny of the nation firmly in the hands of Chinese on both sides of the Strait. More and more people on the island have seen clearly the historical trend that the motherland will inevitably be reunified and have voiced hopes that cross-Strait relations will return to the correct track of peaceful development.

Chen said that on the eve of the New Year in 2026, President Xi Jinping delivered a New Year address, extending New Year greetings to Chinese at home and abroad, in which he emphasized that โ€œcompatriots on both sides of the Strait are bound by blood, and the historical trend toward national reunification is unstoppable.โ€ In the new year, they will thoroughly implement the Partyโ€™s overall strategy for resolving the Taiwan question in the new era, uphold the one-China principle and the โ€œ1992 Consensus,โ€ resolutely oppose โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatism and external interference, unite the broad masses of Taiwan compatriots, promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and advance the great cause of national reunification.

He expressed the hope that Taiwan compatriots will continue to strengthen their resolve, backbone, and confidence in being Chinese, work together to promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and advance the cause of national reunification, and strive unremittingly for the shared future of Chinese on both sides of the Strait.

Sanctions against Liu Shifang, Cheng Yingyao, and Chen Shuyi

7 January 2026

On the announcement that Taiwanese Interior Minister Liu Shih-fang and Education Minister Cheng Ying-yao had been designated as “die-hard pro-independence elements,” along with Taiwan High Prosecutors Office prosecutor Chen Shu-yi, who was labeled as a henchman and accomplice of pro-independence forces, with threats of lifelong prosecution:

At the January 7 press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, spokesperson Chen Binhua announced that the mainland has designated Liu Shifang and Cheng Yingyao as โ€œdiehard Taiwan independenceโ€ elements, and Chen Shuyi as a โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ enforcer and accomplice.

Chen Binhua said that he was announcing two decisions by the mainland. First, Liu Shifang and Cheng Yingyao are being designated as โ€œdiehard Taiwan independenceโ€ elements and will be punished in accordance with the law. Compatriots on both sides of the Strait share the same roots, culture, and heritage, and the common aspiration of people on both sides is for peace, development, exchange, and cooperation. Liu Shifang and Cheng Yingyao have gone against this trend, committed numerous โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ misdeeds, and aroused strong indignation among compatriots on both sides of the Strait. Many members of the public have reported them to the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, demanding that they be punished.

Chen said that Liu Shifang has openly propagated โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist fallacies, harshly suppressed Taiwanese figures who support or participate in cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, persecuted mainland spouses in Taiwan, and tried by every means to set up obstacles to cross-Strait travel and block channels for communication between people on both sides. Cheng Yingyao has vigorously promoted provocative โ€œindependence-seekingโ€ rhetoric, organized the compilation of โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ teaching materials to poison young people on the island, and obstructed cross-Strait educational exchanges and cooperation. Both Liu and Cheng are stubborn in their โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ ideology, brazen in their separatist rhetoric, and egregious in their actions. They have openly sought to split the country and incited secession, seriously undermined cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, gravely damaged the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and seriously harmed the interests and well-being of compatriots on both sides of the Strait.

Chen said that, in accordance with relevant laws and regulations, the mainland has decided to place Liu Shifang and Cheng Yingyao on the list of โ€œdiehard Taiwan independenceโ€ elements and impose sanctions on them. They and their family members are banned from entering the mainland and the Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions; institutions associated with them are restricted from cooperating with relevant organizations and individuals on the mainland; their associated enterprises and financial backers will not be allowed to seek profits on the mainland; and other necessary punitive measures will be taken. They will be held legally accountable for life. Compatriots on both sides of the Strait are welcome to continue providing information on the illegal and criminal activities of Liu Shifang and Cheng Yingyao.

Chen pointed out that โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatism is a serious scourge to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and that punishing in accordance with the law the very small number of โ€œdiehard Taiwan independenceโ€ elements is meant to fundamentally safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity and protect the vital interests and well-being of Taiwan compatriotsโ€”it is by no means directed at the broad masses of Taiwan compatriots. He expressed the hope that Taiwan compatriots will clearly recognize the Taiwan-harming nature, sinister intentions, and ugly true face of this tiny number of โ€œdiehard Taiwan independenceโ€ elements, consciously draw a clear line between themselves and people like Liu Shifang and Cheng Yingyao, resolutely oppose โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist activities, firmly promote cross-Strait exchanges, cooperation, and integrated development, safeguard the shared home of the Chinese nation, and jointly create enduring well-being for compatriots on both sides of the Strait.

Chen then announced the second decision: Chen Shuyi, described as a โ€œgreen judicial thug,โ€ is being designated a โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ enforcer and accomplice and will be held legally accountable for life. According to investigations, Chen Shuyi, a prosecutor with Taiwanโ€™s โ€œHigh Prosecutors Office,โ€ has willingly acted as an enforcer and accomplice of โ€œTaiwan independence,โ€ fabricated charges, manufactured wrongful cases, persecuted Taiwanese individuals who support or participate in cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, intimidated the public, and created a โ€œgreen terror.โ€ Her actions are of a vile nature and constitute serious crimes. The authorities are hereby continuing to solicit clues and evidence of Chen Shuyiโ€™s illegal and criminal activities from both sides of the Strait (which can be sent to: [email protected]). They will base their actions on facts and the law and will punish Chen Shuyi in accordance with the law and hold her accountable for life.

Trump’s Statement on Taiwan

9 January 2026

On US President Donald Trump, who told the New York Times itโ€™s โ€œup toโ€ Xi Jinping what China does regarding Taiwan, and said he warned Xi heโ€™d be โ€œvery unhappyโ€ if Beijing changed the status quo:

Reuters reporter: Some analysts say China might draw lessons from the U.S. military strike on Venezuela. President Trump told The New York Times that if China seeks to change the status quo in Taiwan during his term, he would be very displeased. What is the Foreign Ministryโ€™s comment on Trumpโ€™s remarks? Mao Ning: Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinaโ€™s territory. The Taiwan question is purely Chinaโ€™s internal affair. Resolving the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people themselves and brooks no external interference.

Creeping Closer: Timeline and Analysis of the Justice Mission-2025 Joint Exercise

Authors: Noah Reed, Ethan Connell, & Jonathan Walberg


From December 29th to 31st, the Eastern Theater Command (ETC) of the Peopleโ€™s Liberation Army (PLA) held exercise โ€œJustice Mission-2025โ€ (ๆญฃไน‰ไฝฟๅ‘ฝ-2025) in the waters and airspace surrounding Taiwan. The drills, described by Chinese state media as a response in part to the United Statesโ€™ US$11.1 billion arms package to Taiwan announced two weeks prior,[i] were the 5th and most significant round of joint exercises around Taiwan since Nancy Pelosiโ€™s 2022 visit to Taiwan.[ii]

While following the overall thematic and operational rhythm established in prior exercises following 2022, Justice Mission-2025 also produced several firsts. These include the closest live-fire exercise to date, and the first use of a Type 075 amphibious assault ship in a joint-exercise. The exercise also featured a notable increase in attention devoted to psychological warfare and political messaging elements.

As has been the case in all past joint exercises, Justice Mission-2025 was described first and foremost as a โ€œSerious warning to โ€˜Taiwan Independenceโ€™ separatist forces and external interferenceโ€ by the Peopleโ€™s Republic of Chinaโ€™s (PRC) Ministry of National Defense (MND). (ๅฏนโ€œๅฐ็‹ฌโ€ๅˆ†่ฃ‚ๅŠฟๅŠ›ไธŽๅค–้ƒจๅŠฟๅŠ›ๅนฒๆถ‰็š„ไธฅ้‡่ญฆๅ‘Š.)[iii]

Overall, Justice Mission-2025 fulfilled a dual mandate. First, it provided relevant operational experience for the PLA and China Coast Guard (CCG), something represented in the growing scale of joint-exercises since 2022 as the PLA expands in reach and scale. Second, it sent a signal of frustration over the state of cross-Strait relations to Washington, while also attempting to place the blame for the deterioration of those relations on the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party and President Lai Ching-te.

Operational Sequencing of the Exercise

Day 1 Overview: Overall, Taiwanโ€™s MND detected 89 aircraft and 28 naval vessels, split into 15 PLAN vessels and 13 CCG vessels, operating around Taiwan during day one of the Justice Mission-2025 exercise. The day was marked by several operational themes, including:

  1. A focus on airpower, including long-range air superiority, airspace encirclement, and airborne early warning.
  2. A focus on sea-air coordination, especially as it relates to the detection and destruction of surface and sub-surface vessels.
  3. A focus on the airspace and waters east of Taiwan, consistent with an overall focus on deterring โ€œexternal interference.โ€

29 December (All Times Local)

0730-0800: Spokesperson of the ETC of the Peopleโ€™s Liberation Army, Senior Colonel Shi Yi, announced that it had dispatched its Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force troops to conduct joint military drills codenamed โ€œJustice Mission 2025โ€ in the airspace and waters surrounding Taiwan.[iv]

Alongside this announcement was the release of a navigation warning with five prohibited entry zones within which live-fire exercises would take place the following day. Later in the day, the PRCโ€™s Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) published two additional warning zones. The ETC later added an eighth zone to the east of Taiwan over radio, although they never announced it publicly via navigational warning.

Five of the eight declared zones violated Taiwanโ€™s territorial waters. Zone fourโ€™s boundary ran less than five nautical miles from Taiwanโ€™s southern coast. However, at no point did Chinese vessels cross into Taiwanโ€™s territorial waters. All Chinese vessels operated in the area between Taiwanโ€™s contiguous and territorial waters.

Notably, Taiwanโ€™s Ministry of National Defense (MND) disclosed that its intelligence agencies had noticed irregular activity and possible preparation several days prior to the start of โ€œJustice Mission,โ€ which contrasts with a claim by Chinese state media that the operation represented a โ€œcold startโ€ or โ€œsnap exercise.โ€[v]

0800-0930: Approximately one hour after announcing the exercise, the PLAโ€™s ETC claimed that it had mobilized fighters, bombers, unmanned aerial vehicles, and long-range rocket units to strikes on simulated mobile ground targets in the โ€œmiddle areasโ€ of the Taiwan Strait.[vi] Taiwanโ€™s MND did not report any rocket impacts in the Taiwan Strait during this time, and the ETC did not release footage of these strikes as it did on the next day.

0930-1130: At 1000, Taiwanโ€™s MND released a statement condemning the exercise and announced the beginning of rapid response exercises and a state of high alert.[vii] One hour later, the ETC announced maritime live-fire training to the north and southwest of Taiwan, employing destroyers, frigates, fighters, bombers, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The training focused on hunting and neutralizing targets, simulated ground strikes, and live firing against targets.[viii]

An article in the PLA Daily newspaper published on the morning of the 30th identified several of the ships involved in this portion of the exercise, including the Baoyi, Quzhou, and Taiyuan ship formations.[ix]

1130-1230: At 1200, the ETC announced that it had dispatched destroyers, frigates, fighters, and bombers to conduct anti-submarine and sea-air coordination exercises to the east of the Taiwan Strait.[x] The ETC released initial footage from the exercise, showcasing elements of all involved services at around this time.

On the heels of this announcement, the CCG announced that it was carrying out โ€œcomprehensive law-enforcement patrolsโ€ in waters surrounding Taiwan and the areas near the Matsu and Wuqiu islands. Taiwanโ€™s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) claimed that it had detected increased CCG activity several hours prior to the CCGโ€™s official announcement.[xi]

MarineTraffic Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, which shows the last pinged location of certain vessels, confirmed this claim, as several CCG vessels, including CCG 1303 and 1302, were already observed operating north of Taiwan by 12:00.[xii] TSM researchers subsequently confirmed that CCG vessels 14609, 14606, 1302, 1306, 2203, 2204, 1303, 1303, 1302 also participated in these patrols on the 29th.[xiii]

Poster showcasing involved CCG vessels published by Chinaโ€™s Coast Guard Weibo Account

1230-1630: At 1500, the ETC conducted regional patrol, information support, and aerial confrontation drills using airborne early warning aircraft, fighters, and electronic warfare aircraft to the southwest of Taiwan.[xiv] An hour later, the ETC dispatched bomber task forces to conduct far-seas combat readiness patrols east of Taiwan, focusing on long-distance joint precision strikes in remote areas.[xv]

1600-0000: At 1700, the ETC reported that a Type 075 amphibious assault ship and several accompanying vessels were operating Southeast of Taiwan. According to state media, this represented the first time the PLA had deployed a Type 075 around Taiwan during a joint exercise.[xvi]

Finally, at 2000, the ETC released footage claiming to show a TB-001 UAV from the PLA Rocket Forceโ€™s 61st Base operating close to Taipei City near the Tamsui River outlet.[xvii] Taiwanโ€™s MND has disputed the authenticity of the footage, reporting that no drone entered Taiwanโ€™s airspace during the exercise.

Image circulated by PRC State Media claiming to show a UAVโ€™s photo capture of New Taipei

30 December (All Times Local)

Day 2 Summary: Taiwanโ€™s MND reported 71 aircraft, 17 PLAN vessels, and 15 CCG vessels around Taiwan by 1500 on day 2 of Justice Mission-2025. In addition, Taiwan detected a total of 27 rocket impacts in the waters north and south of Taiwan over this period.

The second day of the drills focused on blockade operations and targeted strikes, marking the closest live-fire drills around Taiwan on record.

0730-0800: The second day of Justice Mission-2025 began at 0800, when the ETC announced that fighters, bombers, frigates, and destroyers were conducting integrated blockade and control operations, to include identification, warning, and anti-air and submarine operations, to the north and south of Taiwan.[xviii]

0800-1200: At 0900, the ETC initiated the first of two rounds of live-fire long-range rocket drills in exercise zone 1. According to Taiwanโ€™s MND, PHL-16 self-propelled Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems (MLRS) from the 72nd Group Armyโ€™s Rocket Artillery Brigade in Pingtan County, Fujian, fired at least 17 rockets into this zone.[xix]

1200-0000: At approximately 1300, PHL-16 MLRS from the 73rd Group Armyโ€™s Rocket Artillery Brigade in Shishi, Fujian, initiated a second round of live-fire long-range rocket drills. [xx] These launches targeted Zone 3 to the south of Taiwan. Taiwanโ€™s MND reported 10 rocket impacts in the exercise. [xxi]Taiwanese media outlets reported that ten rockets from the two sets of launches landed within Taiwanโ€™s contiguous waters zone, marking the closest ever recorded impacts during a live-fire exercise.[xxii]

The remainder of Day 2 was mostly devoted to a series of poster and video releases by the Eastern Theater Command and China Coast Guard, who continued their โ€œcomprehensive law enforcement patrolsโ€ into the second day.

31 December (All Times Local)

The ETC announced the end of the exercise at 16:00 on December 31. It is not clear why the ETC delayed announcing the end of the exercise until 31 December, as all exercise warning zones had already expired the day prior. Furthermore, MarineTraffic AIS data showed that China Coast Guard vessels had begun pulling back from the waters around Taiwan earlier in the day.[xxiii] In prior exercises, the ETC usually announced the end of exercises on the last day of heavy activity.

Notably, the ETC had released no prior exercise updates on the 31st, and Taiwanโ€™s MND reported only 1 aircraft violating the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over this period.[xxiv]

Justice Mission-2025โ€™s Propaganda Dimensions

Beijing deliberately crafted the messaging and reporting surrounding Justice Mission to frame the exercise as a โ€œstern warningโ€ to Taipei and its international supporters. Official statements and state media reports consistently emphasized the operation as a โ€œlegitimate and necessary actionโ€ to defend the PRCโ€™s sovereignty and promote unification.[xxv] PRC spokespeople explicitly connected the drills to Washingtonโ€™s mid-December approval of a record US$11.1 billion arms package for Taiwan, framing the exercise as a direct โ€œpunitive and deterrent actionโ€ in response.[xxvi] Foreign Ministry officials accused Taiwanโ€™s ruling party of transforming the island into a โ€œpowder kegโ€ through military expansion and arms acquisitions, cautioning that U.S. efforts to โ€œarm Taiwan to contain Chinaโ€ would โ€œonly embolden the separatists and push the Taiwan Strait closer to the peril of armed conflict.โ€[xxvii] This external context was central to PRC rhetoric, enabling Beijing to justify the drills as compelled by hostile provocations and reinforcing its narrative that Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leaders are โ€œprovocateursโ€ responsible for escalating tensions.

Official posters and slogans likewise adopted an overtly threatening tone, emphasizing the PLAโ€™s capacity to isolate and strike Taiwan. PLA media accounts disseminated a series of dramatic infographics and posters suggesting that Taiwan would be defenseless in a military confrontation. For instance, one poster depicted PLA forces severing Taiwanโ€™s supply lines, accompanied by the caption โ€œSupply cut off โ€“ how can [you] pursue โ€˜independenceโ€™?โ€ while another highlighted the โ€œoverwhelming power gapโ€ between the PRC and Taiwan, with the challenge, โ€œHow can you seek โ€˜independenceโ€™ [against such odds]?โ€[xxviii]ย These visuals, often given titles like โ€œHammer of Justiceโ€ or โ€œArrow of Justice,โ€ portrayed missiles targeting the island and blockade operations restricting access to Taiwanโ€™s ports.[xxix]

The central message was that Beijingโ€™s military strength serves as a tool of righteous punishment, capable of simultaneously defeating โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ forces and deterring external intervention from the United States. One โ€œArrow of Justiceโ€ poster went further by depicting a missile and volleys of arrows plunging into Taiwan itself, with lurid green โ€œwormโ€ figures, a common stand-in for the DPP/โ€œGreen camp,โ€ splattered across the island, visually signaling not just blockade or deterrence but the targeted eradication of โ€œinternalโ€ pro-independence actors. Paired with the slogan โ€œๅ…งๆŽงๅค–้ฆณโ€ (โ€œcontrol internally, charge outwardโ€), the imagery suggested Beijing could simultaneously suppress โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ forces on the island while striking outward to deter or punish external intervention.

 PRC civilian agencies also contributed to the propaganda campaign. For example, the China Coast Guard promoted its involvement in the drills through graphics of patrol ships encircling Taiwan and slogans such as โ€œTaiwan is Chinaโ€™s inherent territory,โ€ thereby reinforcing the exerciseโ€™s dual military and law-enforcement objectives in asserting sovereignty.[xxx]

Initial announcement poster for Justice Mission 2025. The poster depicts the PRC as two shields emblazoned with the Great Wall, defending Taiwan from the external influence of American arms sales and military platforms.

Official statements from Beijingโ€™s civilian and military representatives reinforced these themes. The State Councilโ€™s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) described the Justice Mission maneuvers as a โ€œsolemn warningโ€ to separatists and foreign actors, calling them a โ€œnecessary and just measureโ€ to protect Chinaโ€™s territorial integrity.[xxxi] TAO spokespersons accused the DPP administration of โ€œrecklessly colluding with external forcesโ€ and pursuing โ€œindependenceโ€ at the expense of Taiwanโ€™s security and welfare. They cited President Lai Ching-teโ€™s governmentโ€™s acceptance of U.S. arms and support, claiming this โ€œmilitarizationโ€ was leading the island down a โ€œdangerous path.โ€[xxxii] Beijing repeatedly stated that its actions targeted โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ elements and their supporters, not the general population. TAO officials emphasized that โ€œpeople on both sides of the Strait are one family,โ€ and that PLA operations were directed only at separatist provocations and were โ€œnot [aimed] at the Taiwan compatriots.โ€[xxxiii] By combining explicit threats with appeals to โ€œTaiwanese compatriots,โ€ the PRCโ€™s narrative sought to weaken support for the DPP by portraying Beijingโ€™s actions as protective and just. At the same time, severe rhetoric toward external actors, warning that any foreign interference would โ€œdash itself to pieces against the steel Great Wall of the PLA,โ€ highlighted the exercisesโ€™ additional audience: the United States and other regional observers.[xxxiv] Through coordinated statements and vivid propaganda, the PRC presented Justice Mission-2025 as a lawful and necessary operation to punish separatism, deter U.S. โ€œmeddling,โ€ and position itself as the purported defender of national sovereignty and guarantor of peace in the Taiwan Strait.

Regional and US Responses

While US President Donald Trump said that he โ€œwasnโ€™t worriedโ€ about Justice Mission-2025,[xxxv] and that his relationship with President Xi remains strong, the State Department called for China to โ€œcease military pressure,โ€ and that Beijingโ€™s actions spiked tensions. Trumpโ€™s comment was widely interpreted in divergent ways: by critics as dismissive or inattentive, and by supporters as a signal of confidence meant to convey U.S. military and political dominance. In this sense, the remark functioned less as an assessment of the exercises themselves than as a performative signal aimed at preserving maneuver space and projecting toughness. Following the conclusion of the exercises, on January 1, State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott reaffirmed the United Statesโ€™ policy of supporting peace and stability across the Strait, opposing unilateral changes to the status quo.[xxxvi]

On December 30th, South Koreaโ€™s Foreign Ministry released a similar statement, calling for โ€œdialogue and cooperation.โ€[xxxvii] On December 31st, Japan expressed concern over the exercises, with Foreign Ministry press Secretary Kitamura emphasizing that โ€œpeace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are important for the international community as a whole.โ€[xxxviii] The same day in Manila, Philippine Defense Secretary Teodoro expressed deep concern, adding that Chinaโ€™s coercion against Taiwan has implications โ€œbeyond the regionโ€ and risks stability across the continent.[xxxix] Also making statements expressing concern on New Yearโ€™s Eve were Australia and New Zealand,[xl] with Germany,[xli] the United Kingdom,[xlii] and France making announcements the day before.[xliii] Notably, Taiwanโ€™s Foreign Ministry thanked each of these countries for their statements condemning the exercises, including Japan, but left off the United States from the message.[xliv]

Conclusion

Justice Missionโ€“2025 underscored that Beijing is trying to institutionalize a coercive โ€œdealโ€ around Taiwan: headline joint exercises are increasingly treated as a conditional punishment for specific U.S. and Taiwanese actions, while day-to-day gray-zone pressure continues regardless. The exercise showed ongoing improvements in joint fires, seaโ€“air coordination, and geographically dispersed operations, especially east of Taiwan to deter external intervention from the US. The ambiguous third day of the exercise and subdued final phase created uncertainty surrounding the intentions and overall sequence of the exercise.

The number of aircraft and naval vessels involved during the exercise naturally grew from prior iterations, as should be expected with an increasingly large and coordinated force. December 29 saw the second-largest single-day ADIZ violation by PLA aircraft on record, with the period from December 29-30 representing the largest overall violation period. Notably, the exercise did not feature an aircraft carrier, instead opting to involve a Type 075 amphibious assault vessel for the first time.

Visualization of ADIZ violations during a major exercise, via Ben Lewis and PLATracker

The exercises featured Beijingโ€™s increasing use of coordinated propaganda, law enforcement involvement, and symbolic imagery alongside military pressure. By linking the drills to U.S. arms sales and rationalizing them as โ€œjustโ€ and โ€œdefensive,โ€ the PRC aimed to shift blame for escalation to Taipei and Washington while normalizing the PLAโ€™s presence near Taiwan. Regional reactions, which were mostly expressions of concern, underscore the gap between Beijingโ€™s claims of legitimacy and the international communityโ€™s view of destabilization. Overall, the exercise suggests that future PLA operations around Taiwan will be frequent, multi-domain, and information-driven, focusing on eroding confidence and complicating decision-making rather than preparing for immediate invasion.


[i] Global Times. โ€˜Justice Mission 2025โ€™ drills serious warning to โ€˜Taiwan independenceโ€™ separatist forces and foreign interference, MND on comment drills target US arms sale to Taiwan. December 29th, 2025. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202512/1351803.shtml

[ii] Prior joint-exercises include: 2023 โ€Joint Swordโ€, Joint Sword 2024-A, Joint Sword 2024-B, and Strait Thunder 2025-A.

[iii] PRC Ministry of National Defense. ๅ›ฝ้˜ฒ้ƒจๆ–ฐ้—ปๅ‘่จ€ไบบๅผ ๆ™“ๅˆšๅฐฑไธœ้ƒจๆˆ˜ๅŒบโ€œๆญฃไน‰ไฝฟๅ‘ฝ-2025โ€ๆผ”ไน ็ญ”่ฎฐ่€…้—ฎ. December 29th,2025.

[iv] PRC Ministry of National Defense. ไธœ้ƒจๆˆ˜ๅŒบๆตท็ฉบๅ…ตๅŠ›ๅฎžๆ–ฝ็Žฏๅฐๅฒ›ๆˆ˜ๅค‡่ญฆๅทก. December 29th, 2025.

[v] Guo Yuandan and Liu Xuanzun. Expert interprets PLA’s ‘Justice Mission 2025’ drill areas as media on Taiwan island describes exercises as ‘sudden’. Global Times. December 29th, 2025. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202512/1351721.shtml, Taiwan Military News Agency. ไธญๅ…ฑ็‰‡้ขๅฎฃๅธƒ่ปๆผ”ใ€€ๅœ‹้˜ฒ้ƒจ๏ผš็ถฟๅฏ†ๆŽŒๆก็ขบไฟๅœ‹ๅฎถๅฎ‰ๅ…จ. December 29th, 2025. https://www.mnd.gov.tw/news/mnd/85591

[vi] PRC Ministry of National Defense. ไธœ้ƒจๆˆ˜ๅŒบไฝๅฐๆนพๆตทๅณกไธญ้ƒจๆตท็ฉบๅŸŸๅผ€ๅฑ•ๅฏน้™†ๆœบๅŠจ็›ฎๆ ‡ๆ‰“ๅ‡ปๆผ”็ปƒ. December 29th, 2025.

[vii] ROC Ministry of National Defense. https://x.com/MoNDefense/status/2005460859901051243. December 29th, 2025.

[viii] PRC Ministry of National Defense.  ไธœ้ƒจๆˆ˜ๅŒบไฝๅฐๅฒ›ๅŒ—้ƒจใ€่ฅฟๅ—ๆตท็ฉบๅŸŸๅผ€ๅฑ•ๅฏนๆตทๅฎžๅผนๅฐ„ๅ‡ป็ญ‰็ง‘็›ฎ่ฎญ็ปƒ. December 29th, 2025.

[ix] Songโ€™s Defense Watch. https://x.com/songs349/status/2005953998604623997. December 30th, 2025., PLA Daily. ไธœ้ƒจๆˆ˜ๅŒบไฝๅฐๅฒ›ๅ‘จ่พนๅผ€ๅฑ•โ€œๆญฃไน‰ไฝฟๅ‘ฝ-2025โ€ๆผ”ไน . Pg 1. December 30th, 2025.

[x] PRC Ministry of National Defense. ไธœ้ƒจๆˆ˜ๅŒบไฝๅฐๅฒ›ไปฅไธœๆตท็ฉบๅŸŸๅผ€ๅฑ•ๅฏนๆตท็ชๅ‡ปใ€ๅŒบๅŸŸๅˆถ็ฉบใ€ๆœๆฝœๅๆฝœ็ญ‰็ง‘็›ฎๆผ”็ปƒ. December 29th, 2025.

[xi] Jaime Ocon. https://x.com/JaimeOcon1/status/2005475439108833748.December 29th, 2025.

[xii] Taiwan Security Monitor. https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005499477323374881.December 29th, 2025.

[xiii] Taiwan Security Monitor. https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005569169895366874. December 29th, 2025.

[xiv] PLA Eastern Theater Command Weibo. ไธœ้ƒจๆˆ˜ๅŒบไฝๅฐๅฒ›่ฅฟๅ—็ฉบๅŸŸๅผ€ๅฑ•ๅŒบๅŸŸๅทก้€ปใ€็ฉบไธญๅฏนๆŠ—ใ€ไฟกๆฏๆ”ฏๆด็ญ‰็ง‘็›ฎๆผ”็ปƒ. December 29th, 2025.

[xv] PLA Eastern Theater Command Weibo. ไธœ้ƒจๆˆ˜ๅŒบ็ป„็ป‡่ฝฐ็‚ธๆœบ็ผ–้˜Ÿ่ตดๅฐๅฒ›ไปฅไธœๅผ€ๅฑ•่ฟœๆตทๆˆ˜ๅค‡ๅทก่ˆช. December 29th, 2025.

[xvi] Guo Yuandan and Liu Xuanzun. Type 075 amphibious assault ship joins drills surrounding Taiwan for first time. Global Times. December 29th, 2025.

[xvii] Joseph Wen. https://x.com/JosephWen___/status/2005729323593224444. December 29th, 2025., PLA Eastern Theater Command Weibo. ไธœ้ƒจๆˆ˜ๅŒบๅ‘ๅธƒ#ๅพฎ่ง†้ข‘่ฟ™ไนˆ่ฟ‘้‚ฃไนˆ็พŽ้šๆ—ถๅˆฐๅฐๅŒ—#. December 29th, 2025.

[xviii] PLA Eastern Theater Command Weibo. ไธœ้ƒจๆˆ˜ๅŒบไฝๅฐๅฒ›ๅ—ๅŒ—ไธค็ซฏๅผ€ๅฑ•ๅฏนๆตท็ชๅ‡ปใ€้˜ฒ็ฉบๅๆฝœ็ญ‰็ง‘็›ฎๆผ”็ปƒ. December 30th, 2025.

[xix] Joseph Wen & Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative. https://x.com/JosephWen___/status/2005661342691398111. December 29th, 2025.

[xx] Joseph Wen & Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative. https://x.com/JosephWen___/status/2005661342691398111. December 29th, 2025.

[xxi] Joseph Wen & Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative. https://x.com/JosephWen___/status/2005661342691398111. December 29th, 2025.

[xxii] Joseph Yeh. PLA rockets land inside Taiwan’s 24 nautical mile contiguous zone: MND.ย  Focus Taiwan/CNA. December 30th, 2025.

[xxiii] Taiwan Security Monitor. https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2006216815442116690. December 30th, 2025.

[xxiv] ROC Military News Agency. ไธญๅ…ฑๆฉŸ่‰ฆ่‡บๆตทๅ‘จ้‚Šๆดปๅ‹•ใ€€ๅœ‹่ปๅšดๅฏ†็›ฃๆŽงๆ‡‰่™•. January 1st, 2026.https://mna.mnd.gov.tw/news/detail/?UserKey=a7500bc9-1570-4fc9-8818-8998d9b695cf

[xxv] Taiwan Security Monitor TAO Statement Tracker https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-the-plas-military-operations-are-a-solemn-warning-to-taiwan-independence-separatist-forces-and-external-interference-forces/

[xxvi] Taiwan Security Monitor on X/Twitter:   https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/new-arms-sales-for-taiwan-details-and-reactions/

[xxvii] Taiwan Security Monitor on X/Twitter:   https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202512/t20251229_11789718.shtml

[xxviii]  Taiwan Security Monitor on X/Twitter:   https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005869817232867426?s=20

[xxix] Taiwan Security Monitor on X/Twitter:   https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005807062735790564?s=20; https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005456163249192993?s=20

[xxx] Taiwan Security Monitor on X/Twitter:  https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005521133496623314?s=20; https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005837836851855481?s=20; https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005569169895366874?s=20

[xxxi] Taiwan Security Monitor TAO Statement Tracker https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-the-plas-military-operations-are-a-solemn-warning-to-taiwan-independence-separatist-forces-and-external-interference-forces/

[xxxii] Taiwan Security Monitor TAO Statement Tracker https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-any-country-or-force-that-plays-with-fire-on-the-taiwan-question-will-inevitably-pay-a-price/; https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-any-taiwan-independence-separatist-actions-will-never-be-tolerated-and-will-be-met-with-severe-punishment/

[xxxiii] Taiwan Security Monitor TAO Statement Tracker https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-any-taiwan-independence-separatist-actions-will-never-be-tolerated-and-will-be-met-with-severe-punishment/

[xxxiv] Taiwan Security Monitor TAO Statement Tracker https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-any-taiwan-independence-separatist-actions-will-never-be-tolerated-and-will-be-met-with-severe-punishment/

[xxxv] Ng and Ewe, โ€œTrump Downplays Chinese Military Drills Around Taiwanโ€ BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdxwxkeg9w6o

[xxxvi]US State Department on Justice Mission 2025 from CBS News: โ€œU.S. says China’s military activities near Taiwan “increase tensions unnecessarily” https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-military-activities-near-taiwan-unnecessarily-raise-tensions-us-says

[xxxvii] https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aopl/202512303004.aspx

[xxxviii] Japan Times: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/12/31/japan/china-military-exercises-taiwan-japan-europe/

[xxxix] Philippines Government Announcement: https://www.bworldonline.com/the-nation/2026/01/01/721925/philippines-concerned-over-chinas-drills-near-taiwan-says-they-undermine-regional-stability

[xl] Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Announcement: https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1329&s=121415

[xli] German Government Announcement: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/military-exercises-china-taiwan-2750712

[xlii] United Kingdom Government Announcement: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-on-chinas-military-drills-december-2025

[xliii] French Government Announcement: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/china/news/article/justice-mission-2025-exercises-around-taiwan-december-30-2025

[xliv]Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Announcement: https://x.com/MOFA_Taiwan/status/2006273783192297963?s=20

Weekly PRC Media Review: 1/2/26

Author: Ethan Connell


Hereโ€™s the latest edition of the TSM PRC State Media Tracker. Each Friday, we highlight key excerpts from Chinaโ€™s state media organs, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Taiwan Affairs Office, all below!


Justice Mission 2025 Exercises Around Taiwan

29 December 2025

From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

CCTV Reporter: This morning, the Eastern Theater Command conducted military exercises near Taiwan Island. According to reports, these drills are a response to the United Statesโ€™ recent large-scale arms sale to Taiwan totaling 11.1 billion USD. What is the spokespersonโ€™s comment?

Lin Jian: The spokesperson for the Eastern Theater Command has already released information regarding the exercises. The Peopleโ€™s Liberation Armyโ€™s military drills are a stern punishment for the โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist forces who attempt to โ€œseek independence through armed means.โ€ They are a necessary action to safeguard Chinaโ€™s national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

I want to emphasize that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities obstinately cling to a โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ position, attempting to โ€œrely on the U.S. to seek independence,โ€ and are willing to turn Taiwan into a โ€œpowder kegโ€ and โ€œammunition depot.โ€ This fully exposes their malicious nature as โ€œdestroyers of peace,โ€ โ€œcreators of crises,โ€ and โ€œinstigators of war.โ€

External forces, by โ€œusing Taiwan to contain Chinaโ€ and arming Taiwan, will only inflate the arrogance of โ€˜Taiwan independenceโ€™ forces and push the Taiwan Strait toward a dangerous state of conflict.

The Taiwan question lies at the core of Chinaโ€™s core interests. Chinaโ€™s determination to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity is unwavering. Any provocative act that crosses the line on the Taiwan question will be met with a firm Chinese response, and any attempt to obstruct Chinaโ€™s reunification will never succeed.

From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Reuters reporter: Was the trigger for Chinaโ€™s military exercises near Taiwan the U.S. arms sale to Taiwan worth 11.1 billion USD? And when the Eastern Theater Command referred to โ€œexternal interference forces,โ€ was it referring to the United States? (A reporter from Japanโ€™s NHK asked a similar question.)

Lin Jian: I want to emphasize once again that Chinaโ€™s determination to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity is unwavering. Any egregious act of crossing the line on the Taiwan question will inevitably be met with a firm response from China.

From the Ministry of National Defense:

Reporter: On December 29, the Eastern Theater Command conducted the “Justice Missionโ€“2025” exercise around Taiwan. Some foreign media claim the drills are a response to the United Statesโ€™ recent large-scale arms sales to Taiwan. Do you have any comment?

Zhang Xiaogang: The Eastern Theater Command immediately released information on the โ€œJustice Missionโ€“2025โ€ exercise. This exercise is a serious warning to โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist forces and external interference forces, and a legitimate and necessary action to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity.

In recent days, external forces have repeatedly crossed lines on the Taiwan question, attempting to embolden โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatists, intensify cross-strait confrontation, severely undermine Chinaโ€™s sovereignty and security, and gravely damage peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The Lai Ching-te authorities, meanwhile, have shamelessly aligned themselves with external forces, recklessly provoking with their pursuit of โ€œindependence,โ€ and have become the root cause of tension and the chief source of instability in the Taiwan Strait.

โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ and peace in the Taiwan Strait are as incompatible as fire and water. External forces that indulge or support โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ will only end up burning themselves and suffering the consequences. We urge relevant countries to abandon their fantasy of โ€œusing Taiwan to contain China,โ€ stop fueling tensions on the Taiwan question, and refrain from challenging Chinaโ€™s determination and resolve to defend its core interests.

We also sternly warn the DPP authorities: seeking independence by relying on external forces is doomed to fail, and resisting reunification with military force leads to a dead end. The Chinese Peopleโ€™s Liberation Army will never hesitate in combating separatism and promoting reunification. It will continue to carry out anti-secession and anti-interference operations to firmly safeguard national sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.

Japanese Lawmaker to Visit Taiwan

31 December 2025

An exchange from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding a Japanese politician’s plan to visit Taiwan as proof it is an “independent country” :

Tokyo Television reporter: A Japanese House of Councillors member, Shi Ping (Hei Seki), said on social media today that he plans to visit Taiwan early next year and claimed that he has been banned from entering China. He said that if he is able to enter Taiwan, it would prove that Taiwan is an โ€œindependent countryโ€ unrelated to China. What is Chinaโ€™s comment on this?

Lin Jian: Such despicable remarks and behavior by a scoundrel are not worth commenting on.

Reactions to “Justice Mission 2025”

31 December 2025

A release from the Taiwan Affairs Office condemning Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and stating that recent exercises are a “solemn warning” to Taiwan:

At the December 31 press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, a reporter asked for comment on the Peopleโ€™s Liberation Army Eastern Theater Commandโ€™s organization, starting on December 29, of forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force to conduct the โ€œJustice Missionโ€“2025โ€ exercise around Taiwan, which has drawn close attention on the island and caused strong reactions.

In response, Zhang Han, spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, said that the PLAโ€™s relevant military actions constitute a solemn warning to โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist forces and external interference, and are a necessary and just measure to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Lai Ching-te authorities are engaging in โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist activities, currying favor with foreign forces without principles and selling out Taiwan without limits. They are willing to sacrifice Taiwanโ€™s economic development and peopleโ€™s well-being as they recklessly rush down a misguided path of colluding with external forces to pursue โ€œindependenceโ€ provocations and militarization. This has severely damaged cross-Strait relations, gravely threatened peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and seriously harmed the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation and the vital interests of Taiwan compatriots. Any โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist actions will never be tolerated or indulged and will be met with decisive and severe blows.

Taiwan is Chinaโ€™s Taiwan. Any external forces that attempt to intervene in the Taiwan question or interfere in Chinaโ€™s internal affairs will inevitably smash themselves against the Great Wall of steel forged by the Peopleโ€™s Liberation Army and suffer crushing defeat. The historical trend toward national reunification is unstoppable, and no one should underestimate our firm resolve, unwavering will, or strong capability to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family. These military actions are directed at โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist activities and external interference, and are intended to deter โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ forces from colluding with external powers to bring turmoil to the Taiwan Strait. Their purpose is to fundamentally safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, protect the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation, and safeguard the vital interests of Taiwan compatriots. They are by no means targeted at the broad masses of Taiwan compatriots.

He expressed the hope that Taiwan compatriots will clearly recognize the extreme danger and harm of the Lai Ching-te authoritiesโ€™ โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist path, join in resolutely opposing โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatism and foreign interference, firmly safeguard the shared home of the Chinese nation, and work together to create a bright future of national reunification and national rejuvenation.

Two notes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on diplomatic reactions to the Justice Mission 2025 exercises:

China News Service reporter: After China recently took countermeasures and punitive actions on Taiwan-related issues and the Chinese Peopleโ€™s Liberation Army conducted military exercises near the island of Taiwan, many countriesโ€”including Russia, Cuba, Serbia, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and Pakistanโ€”have expressed support. What is Chinaโ€™s comment on this?

Lin Jian: Since China announced the relevant countermeasures and carried out the related military exercises, dozens of countries have expressed support for Chinaโ€™s position in various forms. They have pointed out that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinaโ€™s territory, that the Taiwan question is Chinaโ€™s internal affair, opposed any form of โ€œTaiwan independence,โ€ supported Chinaโ€™s defense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, opposed external interference in Chinaโ€™s internal affairs, and stated that they will continue to abide by the one-China principle. We highly appreciate the firm support expressed by these countries for Chinaโ€™s position.

We would like to reiterate that Chinaโ€™s resolve to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity is unwavering; its resolve to defend national reunification and national interests is unwavering; and its resolve to curb โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist forces from colluding with external forces and disrupting peace in the Taiwan Strait is unwavering. Any egregious act that crosses red lines and provokes China on the Taiwan question will be met with resolute countermeasures, and any sinister attempt to obstruct Chinaโ€™s reunification will not succeed.


China Central Television (CCTV) reporter: It is reported that Japan, Australia, EU institutions, and some European countries have publicly expressed concern over Chinaโ€™s military exercises near Taiwan. How does the spokesperson respond?

Lin Jian: These countries and institutions turn a deaf ear to โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist forces seeking independence through force and turn a blind eye to external forces interfering in Chinaโ€™s internal affairs, yet they criticize Chinaโ€™s necessary and just actions to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity. They distort facts, confuse right and wrong, and act with blatant hypocrisy. China firmly opposes this and has lodged solemn representations.

Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinaโ€™s territory. The Taiwan question is purely Chinaโ€™s internal affair and brooks no external interference. The biggest reality in the Taiwan Strait is that both sides of the Strait belong to one China, and the greatest threat to peace and stability in the Strait comes from โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist activities and the indulgence and support they receive from external forces.

The one-China principle is a broad consensus of the international community and a fundamental norm governing international relations. It is the political foundation for Chinaโ€™s relations with the 183 countries with which it has diplomatic ties. Japan, Australia, and European countries made political commitments to this principle when establishing diplomatic relations with China. We strongly urge the countries and institutions concerned to strictly abide by the one-China principle, stop interfering in Chinaโ€™s internal affairs, and stop condoning and supporting โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist activities.

China’s Coast Guard Activity

31 December 2025

An exchange from the Taiwan Affairs Office regarding the China Coast Guard’s execution of law enforcement patrols in the restricted waters surrounding Kinmen:

At the December 31 press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, a reporter asked for comment on the mainland Coast Guard once again entering the so-called โ€œrestricted watersโ€ near Kinmen to conduct law-enforcement patrols. Taiwanโ€™s maritime patrol authority claimed that โ€œthe mainland Coast Guard deliberately formed up to harass vessels, disregarded navigational safety, and created significant navigation risks for passing ships.โ€

In response, Zhang Han, spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, said that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China, and that Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu are all parts of China; therefore, there is fundamentally no such thing as so-called โ€œrestricted waters.โ€ Claims that the mainland โ€œdisregarded the navigational safety of passing vesselsโ€ are entirely groundless.

The mainland Coast Guardโ€™s law-enforcement patrols in the relevant waters are carried out in accordance with the law and are precisely intended to maintain normal navigation and operational order in those waters, as well as to safeguard the lives and property of fishermen on both sides of the Strait.

For a long time, the Democratic Progressive Party authorities have ignored the historical and objective facts of fishermen from both sides jointly operating in traditional fishing grounds. Their groundless detentions and even dangerous and rough treatment of mainland fishing vessels and fishermen are the real culprits creating navigation risks for passing ships and seriously threatening the lives and property of fishermen.

Weekly PRC Media Review: 12/19/2025

Author: Ethan Connell


Hereโ€™s the latest edition of the TSM PRC State Media Tracker. Each Friday, we highlight key excerpts from Chinaโ€™s state media organs, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Taiwan Affairs Office, all below!


Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement on the Honduras-Taiwan Relationship

16 December 2025

Taiwanโ€™s Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung, when asked how Taiwan can maintain friendly relations with Honduras while competing with mainland China, said that โ€œTaiwan is building a relationship based on trust and prosperity.โ€

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ response:

Guo Jiakun: Under the banner of โ€œtrustโ€ and โ€œprosperity,โ€ the Taiwan authorities are engaging in so-called โ€œdollar diplomacy,โ€ which cannot conceal their true nature of pursuing โ€œindependenceโ€ by any means, nor can it deceive public opinion or the people on the island. The โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ forces and the Democratic Progressive Party authorities are going against the tide of history and are destined to fail. Since China and Honduras established diplomatic relations, cooperation in various fields has yielded fruitful results, significantly enhancing Hondurasโ€™ long-term development capacity and bringing tremendous benefits to both countries and their peoples. The facts fully demonstrate that upholding the one-China principle accords with the trend of historical development and the progress of the times, and serves the fundamental interests of the countries concerned and their peoples.

Taiwan Affairs Office Statement on the Taiwanese Special Defense Budget

17 December 2025

On President Lai Ching-te’s proposed US$40 billion special budget for purchasing armaments from the United States:

Zhu Fenglian: The Taiwan question is purely Chinaโ€™s internal affair, and resolving it is a matter for the Chinese people alone, allowing no external interference. The Lai Ching-te administration, for the selfish interests of its party, continues to provoke โ€œTaiwan independence,โ€ repeatedly increases the defense budget, and pushes a โ€œwhole-of-society militarization,โ€ tying the people of Taiwan to the separatist bandwagon. Its attempts to โ€œrely on foreign forces to seek independenceโ€ and โ€œuse force to seek independenceโ€ threaten the safety and interests of the Taiwan people. โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ is a dead end; outsiders cannot be relied upon; reunification cannot be stopped. We have firm will, strong determination, and powerful capability to crush all separatist schemes for โ€œTaiwan independence,โ€ to resolutely oppose external interference, and to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement on the Announcement of US Arms Sales to Taiwan

18 December 2025

On the news that the U.S. has initiated arms sales to Taiwan totaling about US$11 billion, one of the largest such packages:

Guo Jiakun: The U.S. has openly announced a massive plan to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan, which seriously violates the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. Joint Communiquรฉs, gravely harms Chinaโ€™s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, severely undermines peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and sends a seriously wrong signal to โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist forces. China firmly opposes and strongly condemns this.

The โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist forces on the island are seeking โ€œindependence through armed meansโ€ and โ€œresisting reunification with weapons,โ€ squandering taxpayersโ€™ money to purchase weaponry and willing to turn Taiwan into a โ€œpowder keg.โ€ This will not save the doomed fate of โ€œTaiwan independence.โ€ It will only accelerate the regionโ€™s slide toward heightened tension and danger. The U.S. policy of โ€œsupporting independence with weaponsโ€ will only backfire on itself, and attempts to โ€œuse Taiwan to contain Chinaโ€ will never succeed.

The Taiwan question is the core of Chinaโ€™s core interests and the first red line that cannot be crossed in China-U.S. relations. No one should underestimate the strong will and powerful capability of the Chinese government and the Chinese people to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity. China urges the U.S. to abide by the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. Joint Communiquรฉs, honor the serious commitments made by its leaders, and immediately stop its dangerous act of arming Taiwan. China will take resolute and forceful measures to defend its national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity.

Taiwan Affairs Office Statement on Announcement of US Arms Sales to Taiwan

18 December 2025

Continued arms sales commentary, this time from the Taiwan Affairs Office:

Chen Binhua: The Taiwan question concerns Chinaโ€™s core interests and is the first red line that must not be crossed in China-U.S. relations. The U.S. side has brazenly announced a massive arms sale plan to Chinaโ€™s Taiwan region, crudely interfering in Chinaโ€™s internal affairs and seriously violating the one-China principle and the three Chinaโ€“U.S. joint communiquรฉs, especially the August 17 Communiquรฉ. It gravely harms Chinaโ€™s sovereignty and security interests and sends a serious wrong signal to โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist forces. We firmly oppose this and strongly condemn it. We demand that the U.S. immediately stop โ€œarming Taiwan,โ€ stop condoning and supporting โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist forces, abide by the one-China principle and the three Chinaโ€“U.S. joint communiquรฉs, honor the commitments made by U.S. leaders, and handle the Taiwan issue with the utmost caution.

The DPP authorities stubbornly pursue โ€œseeking independence by relying on the U.S.โ€ and โ€œseeking independence by force,โ€ constantly hyping so-called โ€œdefense resolve,โ€ and are willing to turn Taiwan into a โ€œpowder kegโ€ and an โ€œammunition depot,โ€ even at the cost of turning the Taiwanese people into cannon fodder for โ€œTaiwan independence.โ€ This will only bring grave disaster to Taiwan compatriots and fully expose their vicious nature as โ€œdestroyers of peace,โ€ โ€œcreators of crises,โ€ and โ€œinstigators of war.โ€ People across Taiwan should clearly recognize the DPP authoritiesโ€™ bottomless, pernicious essence of โ€œselling out Taiwan and courting war.โ€ We solemnly warn the DPP authorities that national reunification is an unstoppable trend; if โ€œTaiwan independenceโ€ separatist forces dare to cross the red line, we will resolutely strike back.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement on a Planned Radar Station on Kitadaito, Okinawa’s Easternmost Island

18 December 2025

On the news that Japanโ€™s Ministry of Defense signed a land lease agreement on the 15th, planning to deploy mobile radar equipment on the easternmost island of Okinawa to monitor the activities of Chinese aircraft carriers and aircraft in the waters between Okinawa and Miyako Island:

Guo Jiakun: In the relevant sea and air areas, all countries enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight in accordance with international law.

Due to the history of Japanese militarist aggression, Japanโ€™s military and security moves have long drawn close attention from its Asian neighbors and the international community. Japan has repeatedly strengthened targeted military deployments near Taiwan, and has even stated its intention to deploy intermediate-range missiles. Now it is further escalating by planning to deploy radar and troops to spy on its neighbors. Taken together with Prime Minister Takaichi’s series of erroneous and dangerous remarks regarding Taiwan, one must ask: Is Japan deliberately stirring up trouble, provoking China at close range, and seeking excuses to justify its military expansion and operations abroad? Is Japan following the design of right-wing forces to once again embark on the dangerous and disastrous path of militarism?

We urge Japan to learn from the lessons of history!