Author: Jonathan Walberg

Authors: Noah Reed, Ethan Connell, & Jonathan Walberg

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From December 29^th to 31^st, the Eastern Theater Command (ETC) of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) held exercise “Justice Mission-2025” (正义使命-2025) in the waters and airspace surrounding Taiwan. The drills, described by Chinese state media as a response in part to the United States’ US$11.1 billion arms package to Taiwan announced two weeks prior,[i] were the 5^th and most significant round of joint exercises around Taiwan since Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan.[ii]

While following the overall thematic and operational rhythm established in prior exercises following 2022, Justice Mission-2025 also produced several firsts. These include the closest live-fire exercise to date, and the first use of a Type 075 amphibious assault ship in a joint-exercise. The exercise also featured a notable increase in attention devoted to psychological warfare and political messaging elements.

As has been the case in all past joint exercises, Justice Mission-2025 was described first and foremost as a “Serious warning to ‘Taiwan Independence’ separatist forces and external interference” by the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Ministry of National Defense (MND). (对“台独”分裂势力与外部势力干涉的严重警告.)[iii]

Overall, Justice Mission-2025 fulfilled a dual mandate. First, it provided relevant operational experience for the PLA and China Coast Guard (CCG), something represented in the growing scale of joint-exercises since 2022 as the PLA expands in reach and scale. Second, it sent a signal of frustration over the state of cross-Strait relations to Washington, while also attempting to place the blame for the deterioration of those relations on the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party and President Lai Ching-te.

Operational Sequencing of the Exercise

Day 1 Overview: Overall, Taiwan’s MND detected 89 aircraft and 28 naval vessels, split into 15 PLAN vessels and 13 CCG vessels, operating around Taiwan during day one of the Justice Mission-2025 exercise. The day was marked by several operational themes, including:

1. A focus on airpower, including long-range air superiority, airspace encirclement, and airborne early warning.
2. A focus on sea-air coordination, especially as it relates to the detection and destruction of surface and sub-surface vessels.
3. A focus on the airspace and waters east of Taiwan, consistent with an overall focus on deterring “external interference.”

29 December (All Times Local)

0730-0800: Spokesperson of the ETC of the People’s Liberation Army, Senior Colonel Shi Yi, announced that it had dispatched its Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force troops to conduct joint military drills codenamed “Justice Mission 2025” in the airspace and waters surrounding Taiwan.[iv]

Alongside this announcement was the release of a navigation warning with five prohibited entry zones within which live-fire exercises would take place the following day. Later in the day, the PRC’s Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) published two additional warning zones. The ETC later added an eighth zone to the east of Taiwan over radio, although they never announced it publicly via navigational warning.

Five of the eight declared zones violated Taiwan’s territorial waters. Zone four’s boundary ran less than five nautical miles from Taiwan’s southern coast. However, at no point did Chinese vessels cross into Taiwan’s territorial waters. All Chinese vessels operated in the area between Taiwan’s contiguous and territorial waters.

Notably, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) disclosed that its intelligence agencies had noticed irregular activity and possible preparation several days prior to the start of “Justice Mission,” which contrasts with a claim by Chinese state media that the operation represented a “cold start” or “snap exercise.”[v]

0800-0930: Approximately one hour after announcing the exercise, the PLA’s ETC claimed that it had mobilized fighters, bombers, unmanned aerial vehicles, and long-range rocket units to strikes on simulated mobile ground targets in the “middle areas” of the Taiwan Strait.[vi] Taiwan’s MND did not report any rocket impacts in the Taiwan Strait during this time, and the ETC did not release footage of these strikes as it did on the next day.

0930-1130: At 1000, Taiwan’s MND released a statement condemning the exercise and announced the beginning of rapid response exercises and a state of high alert.[vii] One hour later, the ETC announced maritime live-fire training to the north and southwest of Taiwan, employing destroyers, frigates, fighters, bombers, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The training focused on hunting and neutralizing targets, simulated ground strikes, and live firing against targets.[viii]

An article in the PLA Daily newspaper published on the morning of the 30^th identified several of the ships involved in this portion of the exercise, including the Baoyi, Quzhou, and Taiyuan ship formations.[ix]

1130-1230: At 1200, the ETC announced that it had dispatched destroyers, frigates, fighters, and bombers to conduct anti-submarine and sea-air coordination exercises to the east of the Taiwan Strait.[x] The ETC released initial footage from the exercise, showcasing elements of all involved services at around this time.

On the heels of this announcement, the CCG announced that it was carrying out “comprehensive law-enforcement patrols” in waters surrounding Taiwan and the areas near the Matsu and Wuqiu islands. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) claimed that it had detected increased CCG activity several hours prior to the CCG’s official announcement.[xi]

MarineTraffic Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, which shows the last pinged location of certain vessels, confirmed this claim, as several CCG vessels, including CCG 1303 and 1302, were already observed operating north of Taiwan by 12:00.[xii] TSM researchers subsequently confirmed that CCG vessels 14609, 14606, 1302, 1306, 2203, 2204, 1303, 1303, 1302 also participated in these patrols on the 29^th.[xiii]

1230-1630: At 1500, the ETC conducted regional patrol, information support, and aerial confrontation drills using airborne early warning aircraft, fighters, and electronic warfare aircraft to the southwest of Taiwan.[xiv] An hour later, the ETC dispatched bomber task forces to conduct far-seas combat readiness patrols east of Taiwan, focusing on long-distance joint precision strikes in remote areas.[xv]

1600-0000: At 1700, the ETC reported that a Type 075 amphibious assault ship and several accompanying vessels were operating Southeast of Taiwan. According to state media, this represented the first time the PLA had deployed a Type 075 around Taiwan during a joint exercise.[xvi]

Finally, at 2000, the ETC released footage claiming to show a TB-001 UAV from the PLA Rocket Force’s 61^st Base operating close to Taipei City near the Tamsui River outlet.[xvii] Taiwan’s MND has disputed the authenticity of the footage, reporting that no drone entered Taiwan’s airspace during the exercise.

30 December (All Times Local)

Day 2 Summary: Taiwan’s MND reported 71 aircraft, 17 PLAN vessels, and 15 CCG vessels around Taiwan by 1500 on day 2 of Justice Mission-2025. In addition, Taiwan detected a total of 27 rocket impacts in the waters north and south of Taiwan over this period.

The second day of the drills focused on blockade operations and targeted strikes, marking the closest live-fire drills around Taiwan on record.

0730-0800: The second day of Justice Mission-2025 began at 0800, when the ETC announced that fighters, bombers, frigates, and destroyers were conducting integrated blockade and control operations, to include identification, warning, and anti-air and submarine operations, to the north and south of Taiwan.[xviii]

0800-1200: At 0900, the ETC initiated the first of two rounds of live-fire long-range rocket drills in exercise zone 1. According to Taiwan’s MND, PHL-16 self-propelled Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems (MLRS) from the 72^nd Group Army’s Rocket Artillery Brigade in Pingtan County, Fujian, fired at least 17 rockets into this zone.[xix]

1200-0000: At approximately 1300, PHL-16 MLRS from the 73^rd Group Army’s Rocket Artillery Brigade in Shishi, Fujian, initiated a second round of live-fire long-range rocket drills. [xx] These launches targeted Zone 3 to the south of Taiwan. Taiwan’s MND reported 10 rocket impacts in the exercise. [xxi]Taiwanese media outlets reported that ten rockets from the two sets of launches landed within Taiwan’s contiguous waters zone, marking the closest ever recorded impacts during a live-fire exercise.[xxii]

The remainder of Day 2 was mostly devoted to a series of poster and video releases by the Eastern Theater Command and China Coast Guard, who continued their “comprehensive law enforcement patrols” into the second day.

31 December (All Times Local)

The ETC announced the end of the exercise at 16:00 on December 31. It is not clear why the ETC delayed announcing the end of the exercise until 31 December, as all exercise warning zones had already expired the day prior. Furthermore, MarineTraffic AIS data showed that China Coast Guard vessels had begun pulling back from the waters around Taiwan earlier in the day.[xxiii] In prior exercises, the ETC usually announced the end of exercises on the last day of heavy activity.

Notably, the ETC had released no prior exercise updates on the 31^st, and Taiwan’s MND reported only 1 aircraft violating the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over this period.[xxiv]

Justice Mission-2025’s Propaganda Dimensions

Beijing deliberately crafted the messaging and reporting surrounding Justice Mission to frame the exercise as a “stern warning” to Taipei and its international supporters. Official statements and state media reports consistently emphasized the operation as a “legitimate and necessary action” to defend the PRC’s sovereignty and promote unification.[xxv] PRC spokespeople explicitly connected the drills to Washington’s mid-December approval of a record US$11.1 billion arms package for Taiwan, framing the exercise as a direct “punitive and deterrent action” in response.[xxvi] Foreign Ministry officials accused Taiwan’s ruling party of transforming the island into a “powder keg” through military expansion and arms acquisitions, cautioning that U.S. efforts to “arm Taiwan to contain China” would “only embolden the separatists and push the Taiwan Strait closer to the peril of armed conflict.”[xxvii] This external context was central to PRC rhetoric, enabling Beijing to justify the drills as compelled by hostile provocations and reinforcing its narrative that Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leaders are “provocateurs” responsible for escalating tensions.

Official posters and slogans likewise adopted an overtly threatening tone, emphasizing the PLA’s capacity to isolate and strike Taiwan. PLA media accounts disseminated a series of dramatic infographics and posters suggesting that Taiwan would be defenseless in a military confrontation. For instance, one poster depicted PLA forces severing Taiwan’s supply lines, accompanied by the caption “Supply cut off – how can [you] pursue ‘independence’?” while another highlighted the “overwhelming power gap” between the PRC and Taiwan, with the challenge, “How can you seek ‘independence’ [against such odds]?”[xxviii] These visuals, often given titles like “Hammer of Justice” or “Arrow of Justice,” portrayed missiles targeting the island and blockade operations restricting access to Taiwan’s ports.[xxix]

The central message was that Beijing’s military strength serves as a tool of righteous punishment, capable of simultaneously defeating “Taiwan independence” forces and deterring external intervention from the United States. One “Arrow of Justice” poster went further by depicting a missile and volleys of arrows plunging into Taiwan itself, with lurid green “worm” figures, a common stand-in for the DPP/“Green camp,” splattered across the island, visually signaling not just blockade or deterrence but the targeted eradication of “internal” pro-independence actors. Paired with the slogan “內控外馳” (“control internally, charge outward”), the imagery suggested Beijing could simultaneously suppress “Taiwan independence” forces on the island while striking outward to deter or punish external intervention.

 PRC civilian agencies also contributed to the propaganda campaign. For example, the China Coast Guard promoted its involvement in the drills through graphics of patrol ships encircling Taiwan and slogans such as “Taiwan is China’s inherent territory,” thereby reinforcing the exercise’s dual military and law-enforcement objectives in asserting sovereignty.[xxx]

Official statements from Beijing’s civilian and military representatives reinforced these themes. The State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) described the Justice Mission maneuvers as a “solemn warning” to separatists and foreign actors, calling them a “necessary and just measure” to protect China’s territorial integrity.[xxxi] TAO spokespersons accused the DPP administration of “recklessly colluding with external forces” and pursuing “independence” at the expense of Taiwan’s security and welfare. They cited President Lai Ching-te’s government’s acceptance of U.S. arms and support, claiming this “militarization” was leading the island down a “dangerous path.”[xxxii] Beijing repeatedly stated that its actions targeted “Taiwan independence” elements and their supporters, not the general population. TAO officials emphasized that “people on both sides of the Strait are one family,” and that PLA operations were directed only at separatist provocations and were “not [aimed] at the Taiwan compatriots.”[xxxiii] By combining explicit threats with appeals to “Taiwanese compatriots,” the PRC’s narrative sought to weaken support for the DPP by portraying Beijing’s actions as protective and just. At the same time, severe rhetoric toward external actors, warning that any foreign interference would “dash itself to pieces against the steel Great Wall of the PLA,” highlighted the exercises’ additional audience: the United States and other regional observers.[xxxiv] Through coordinated statements and vivid propaganda, the PRC presented Justice Mission-2025 as a lawful and necessary operation to punish separatism, deter U.S. “meddling,” and position itself as the purported defender of national sovereignty and guarantor of peace in the Taiwan Strait.

Regional and US Responses

While US President Donald Trump said that he “wasn’t worried” about Justice Mission-2025,[xxxv] and that his relationship with President Xi remains strong, the State Department called for China to “cease military pressure,” and that Beijing’s actions spiked tensions. Trump’s comment was widely interpreted in divergent ways: by critics as dismissive or inattentive, and by supporters as a signal of confidence meant to convey U.S. military and political dominance. In this sense, the remark functioned less as an assessment of the exercises themselves than as a performative signal aimed at preserving maneuver space and projecting toughness. Following the conclusion of the exercises, on January 1, State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott reaffirmed the United States’ policy of supporting peace and stability across the Strait, opposing unilateral changes to the status quo.[xxxvi]

On December 30^th, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry released a similar statement, calling for “dialogue and cooperation.”[xxxvii] On December 31^st, Japan expressed concern over the exercises, with Foreign Ministry press Secretary Kitamura emphasizing that “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are important for the international community as a whole.”[xxxviii] The same day in Manila, Philippine Defense Secretary Teodoro expressed deep concern, adding that China’s coercion against Taiwan has implications “beyond the region” and risks stability across the continent.[xxxix] Also making statements expressing concern on New Year’s Eve were Australia and New Zealand,[xl] with Germany,[xli] the United Kingdom,[xlii] and France making announcements the day before.[xliii] Notably, Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry thanked each of these countries for their statements condemning the exercises, including Japan, but left off the United States from the message.[xliv]

Conclusion

Justice Mission–2025 underscored that Beijing is trying to institutionalize a coercive “deal” around Taiwan: headline joint exercises are increasingly treated as a conditional punishment for specific U.S. and Taiwanese actions, while day-to-day gray-zone pressure continues regardless. The exercise showed ongoing improvements in joint fires, sea–air coordination, and geographically dispersed operations, especially east of Taiwan to deter external intervention from the US. The ambiguous third day of the exercise and subdued final phase created uncertainty surrounding the intentions and overall sequence of the exercise.

The number of aircraft and naval vessels involved during the exercise naturally grew from prior iterations, as should be expected with an increasingly large and coordinated force. December 29 saw the second-largest single-day ADIZ violation by PLA aircraft on record, with the period from December 29-30 representing the largest overall violation period. Notably, the exercise did not feature an aircraft carrier, instead opting to involve a Type 075 amphibious assault vessel for the first time.

The exercises featured Beijing’s increasing use of coordinated propaganda, law enforcement involvement, and symbolic imagery alongside military pressure. By linking the drills to U.S. arms sales and rationalizing them as “just” and “defensive,” the PRC aimed to shift blame for escalation to Taipei and Washington while normalizing the PLA’s presence near Taiwan. Regional reactions, which were mostly expressions of concern, underscore the gap between Beijing’s claims of legitimacy and the international community’s view of destabilization. Overall, the exercise suggests that future PLA operations around Taiwan will be frequent, multi-domain, and information-driven, focusing on eroding confidence and complicating decision-making rather than preparing for immediate invasion.

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[i] Global Times. ‘Justice Mission 2025’ drills serious warning to ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces and foreign interference, MND on comment drills target US arms sale to Taiwan. December 29^th, 2025. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202512/1351803.shtml

[ii] Prior joint-exercises include: 2023 ”Joint Sword”, Joint Sword 2024-A, Joint Sword 2024-B, and Strait Thunder 2025-A.

[iii] PRC Ministry of National Defense. 国防部新闻发言人张晓刚就东部战区“正义使命-2025”演习答记者问. December 29th,2025.

[iv] PRC Ministry of National Defense. 东部战区海空兵力实施环台岛战备警巡. December 29th, 2025.

[v] Guo Yuandan and Liu Xuanzun. Expert interprets PLA’s ‘Justice Mission 2025’ drill areas as media on Taiwan island describes exercises as ‘sudden’. Global Times. December 29th, 2025. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202512/1351721.shtml, Taiwan Military News Agency. 中共片面宣布軍演　國防部：綿密掌握確保國家安全. December 29^th, 2025. https://www.mnd.gov.tw/news/mnd/85591

[vi] PRC Ministry of National Defense. 东部战区位台湾海峡中部海空域开展对陆机动目标打击演练. December 29th, 2025.

[vii] ROC Ministry of National Defense. https://x.com/MoNDefense/status/2005460859901051243. December 29th, 2025.

[viii] PRC Ministry of National Defense.  东部战区位台岛北部、西南海空域开展对海实弹射击等科目训练. December 29th, 2025.

[ix] Song’s Defense Watch. https://x.com/songs349/status/2005953998604623997. December 30th, 2025., PLA Daily. 东部战区位台岛周边开展“正义使命-2025”演习. Pg 1. December 30th, 2025.

[x] PRC Ministry of National Defense. 东部战区位台岛以东海空域开展对海突击、区域制空、搜潜反潜等科目演练. December 29th, 2025.

[xi] Jaime Ocon. https://x.com/JaimeOcon1/status/2005475439108833748.December 29th, 2025.

[xii] Taiwan Security Monitor. https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005499477323374881.December 29th, 2025.

[xiii] Taiwan Security Monitor. https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005569169895366874. December 29th, 2025.

[xiv] PLA Eastern Theater Command Weibo. 东部战区位台岛西南空域开展区域巡逻、空中对抗、信息支援等科目演练. December 29th, 2025.

[xv] PLA Eastern Theater Command Weibo. 东部战区组织轰炸机编队赴台岛以东开展远海战备巡航. December 29th, 2025.

[xvi] Guo Yuandan and Liu Xuanzun. Type 075 amphibious assault ship joins drills surrounding Taiwan for first time. Global Times. December 29th, 2025.

[xvii] Joseph Wen. https://x.com/JosephWen___/status/2005729323593224444. December 29th, 2025., PLA Eastern Theater Command Weibo. 东部战区发布#微视频这么近那么美随时到台北#. December 29th, 2025.

[xviii] PLA Eastern Theater Command Weibo. 东部战区位台岛南北两端开展对海突击、防空反潜等科目演练. December 30th, 2025.

[xix] Joseph Wen & Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative. https://x.com/JosephWen___/status/2005661342691398111. December 29th, 2025.

[xx] Joseph Wen & Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative. https://x.com/JosephWen___/status/2005661342691398111. December 29th, 2025.

[xxi] Joseph Wen & Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative. https://x.com/JosephWen___/status/2005661342691398111. December 29th, 2025.

[xxii] Joseph Yeh. PLA rockets land inside Taiwan’s 24 nautical mile contiguous zone: MND.  Focus Taiwan/CNA. December 30th, 2025.

[xxiii] Taiwan Security Monitor. https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2006216815442116690. December 30th, 2025.

[xxiv] ROC Military News Agency. 中共機艦臺海周邊活動　國軍嚴密監控應處. January 1st, 2026.https://mna.mnd.gov.tw/news/detail/?UserKey=a7500bc9-1570-4fc9-8818-8998d9b695cf

[xxv] Taiwan Security Monitor TAO Statement Tracker https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-the-plas-military-operations-are-a-solemn-warning-to-taiwan-independence-separatist-forces-and-external-interference-forces/

[xxvi] Taiwan Security Monitor on X/Twitter:   https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/new-arms-sales-for-taiwan-details-and-reactions/

[xxvii] Taiwan Security Monitor on X/Twitter:   https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202512/t20251229_11789718.shtml

[xxviii]  Taiwan Security Monitor on X/Twitter:   https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005869817232867426?s=20

[xxix] Taiwan Security Monitor on X/Twitter:   https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005807062735790564?s=20; https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005456163249192993?s=20

[xxx] Taiwan Security Monitor on X/Twitter:  https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005521133496623314?s=20; https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005837836851855481?s=20; https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005569169895366874?s=20

[xxxi] Taiwan Security Monitor TAO Statement Tracker https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-the-plas-military-operations-are-a-solemn-warning-to-taiwan-independence-separatist-forces-and-external-interference-forces/

[xxxii] Taiwan Security Monitor TAO Statement Tracker https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-any-country-or-force-that-plays-with-fire-on-the-taiwan-question-will-inevitably-pay-a-price/; https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-any-taiwan-independence-separatist-actions-will-never-be-tolerated-and-will-be-met-with-severe-punishment/

[xxxiii] Taiwan Security Monitor TAO Statement Tracker https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-any-taiwan-independence-separatist-actions-will-never-be-tolerated-and-will-be-met-with-severe-punishment/

[xxxiv] Taiwan Security Monitor TAO Statement Tracker https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-any-taiwan-independence-separatist-actions-will-never-be-tolerated-and-will-be-met-with-severe-punishment/

[xxxv] Ng and Ewe, “Trump Downplays Chinese Military Drills Around Taiwan” BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdxwxkeg9w6o

[xxxvi]US State Department on Justice Mission 2025 from CBS News: “U.S. says China’s military activities near Taiwan “increase tensions unnecessarily” https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-military-activities-near-taiwan-unnecessarily-raise-tensions-us-says

[xxxvii] https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aopl/202512303004.aspx

[xxxviii] Japan Times: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/12/31/japan/china-military-exercises-taiwan-japan-europe/

[xxxix] Philippines Government Announcement: https://www.bworldonline.com/the-nation/2026/01/01/721925/philippines-concerned-over-chinas-drills-near-taiwan-says-they-undermine-regional-stability

[xl] Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Announcement: https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1329&s=121415

[xli] German Government Announcement: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/military-exercises-china-taiwan-2750712

[xlii] United Kingdom Government Announcement: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-on-chinas-military-drills-december-2025

[xliii] French Government Announcement: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/china/news/article/justice-mission-2025-exercises-around-taiwan-december-30-2025

[xliv]Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Announcement: https://x.com/MOFA_Taiwan/status/2006273783192297963?s=20