Author: Jonathan Walberg

Strait Snapshot, March 2026 Update

Author: Ethan Connell & Jonathan Walberg

Key Findings

In March 2026, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense recorded 173 PLA aerial sorties around the island, representing a 60 percent year-over-year decline and extending the downward trend observed since the December 2025 Justice Mission exercises.
Between late February and mid-March, air operations declined to near-zero levels for thirteen days. This lull coincided with China’s annual Two Sessions legislative period of the National People’s Congress and followed the dismissal of two senior Central Military Commission vice-chairmen in January. This pattern aligns with previously documented instances of institutional caution during politically sensitive periods.
Taiwanese Coast Guard Administration data shows 15 documented CCG incursions into Taiwan’s restricted waters from January through March, concentrated around Kinmen (12 incidents) and Dongsha Island (three incidents), with dwell times in the Dongsha incursions exceeding 24 hours.
In March, PLAN vessel detections around Taiwan averaged approximately seven per day, consistent with the five-to-nine vessel baseline observed throughout 2025. The continued naval presence during a period of reduced air activity suggests that the air and maritime domains are governed by distinct operational logics.

The March Lull

March 2026 marked a significant deviation from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) air activity patterns observed around Taiwan during the previous twelve months. The 173 detected aircraft sorties, including 121 that entered Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, constitute a 60 percent reduction from March 2025, when 431 sorties were recorded. This figure also continues the sequential decline observed in the first three months of 2026: January recorded 270 sorties, February recorded 190, and March recorded 173.

A notable feature of the month was the lull in PLA air activity in early March, during which Taiwan detected only limited aircraft activity around the island. Rather than pointing to a single discrete cause, this slowdown is better understood as the product of overlapping factors. The strongest explanation remains the PRC’s domestic calendar: the annual “Two Sessions,” combined with the tail end of the Spring Festival period, has historically aligned with a lower operational tempo around Taiwan. Other theories, including the idea that leadership turmoil within the PLA or fuel pressures linked to Middle East instability drove the reduction, are harder to sustain. As TSM noted in The Monitor, those explanations fit the available evidence less well, especially given continued Chinese activity in the East and South China Seas during the same period.

Figure 1. Daily PLA activity around Taiwan, March 2026. The shaded region marks the quiet period.

Air operations resumed in the second half of March. On March 17, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported a joint combat readiness patrol (JCRP) involving thirty-six aircraft, marking the month’s single-day peak. This was followed by a second JCRP on March 28 with nineteen aircraft and a third on April 1. The resumption of large-scale exercises after a period of relative quiet aligns with patterns observed in previous years. The PLA appears to adjust its daily sortie rate in response to political calendars and internal dynamics while maintaining the capacity for periodic high-intensity demonstrations.

Monthly Trajectory: A Sustained Decline

March’s figures are a continuation of a three-month decline. From January through March 2026, monthly sortie totals fell from 270 to 190 to 173, respectively. This trajectory comes on the heels of the elevated activity of late 2025, when the PLA’s Justice Mission-2025 exercise on December 29 saw the use of 130 aircraft in a single day, the largest single-day operation around Taiwan since comprehensive daily reporting began.

Figure 2. Monthly PLA sortie totals, 2024–2026. The January–March 2026 trend shows consecutive declines.

However, the frequency of Joint Combat Readiness Patrols (JCRPs), which represent the highest-intensity format of PLA air operations around Taiwan, has remained broadly stable. March 2026 included three JCRPs, matching the number in March 2025 and exceeding the two recorded in March 2024. This continuity indicates that the reduction in routine sortie volume has not been accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the PLA’s willingness or ability to conduct large-scale, multi-domain demonstrations on short notice.

At Sea: Persistent Naval Presence

PLAN vessel detections in the waters around Taiwan averaged 7.2 per day in March, with a peak of eleven on a single day. These figures are consistent with the range of 5-9 vessels that have characterized PLAN presence throughout 2025. The stability of the naval posture during a month of minimal air activity highlights a structural difference in how the PLA manages its air and maritime components around Taiwan. Air sorties appear responsive to political calendars and institutional dynamics, whereas naval presence serves as a persistent baseline feature of cross-strait military activity.

Figure 3. PLAN vessel and official ship detections around Taiwan, March 2026.

This divergence between air and naval activity patterns holds analytical significance for assessments of cross-strait tension. Analysts who focus solely on sortie counts may interpret the March figures as evidence of de-escalation, however the unchanged naval footprint demonstrates that the PLA’s overall posture in the Taiwan Strait has not meaningfully decreased.

Coast Guard Gray Zone Operations

China Coast Guard (CCG) activity in Taiwan’s restricted waters represents a third, often underreported, dimension of cross-strait pressure. From January through March 2026, the CCG conducted at least 15 documented incursions: 12 around Kinmen and three near Dongsha Island (Pratas). The Kinmen operations have developed into a recognizable pattern, typically involving two to four CCG cutters entering restricted waters for two to three hours before withdrawing. This approach appears intended to establish a regular CCG presence in waters considered under the jurisdiction of Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration.

Figure 4. CCG incursions into Taiwan’s restricted waters, January–March 2026, by location and vessel count.

The Kinmen incursions have involved a recurring set of CCG cutters (specifically, hull numbers 14529, 14603, 14605, and 14609), indicating a dedicated patrol rotation rather than ad hoc deployments. The Dongsha operations differ qualitatively, involving larger vessels from the 3101 and 3102 classes and featuring extended dwell times, with the March 18th incursion east of Dongsha lasting over twenty-five consecutive hours. The increasing dwell times at Dongsha merit particular attention, as they challenge the Coast Guard Administration’s capacity to maintain a sustained presence at Taiwan’s most remote holding.

The Full Picture: Multi-Domain Overview

Figure 5. January–March 2026 multi-domain PLA activity: air sorties, naval presence, and CCG incursions.

An examination of all three domains simultaneously reveals that the first three months of 2026 present a more complex situation than any single metric suggests. Air activity has been volatile and responsive to political events, while naval presence has remained steady and largely unaffected by fluctuations in the air domain. Coast Guard incursions have persisted and, in the Dongsha cases, have increased in duration. Analysts and policymakers should avoid interpreting a reduction in one domain as an overall reduction in pressure. The multi-domain posture, considered in its entirety, does not indicate meaningful de-escalation.

Figure 6. March air activity year-over-year: total sorties and median line crossings, 2024–2026.

Methodology & Sources

Air and naval detection data are drawn from daily press releases issued by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and compiled in the PLA Activity Center database maintained by Taiwan Security Monitor. Coast Guard incident data are compiled from Coast Guard Administration press releases, verified against contemporaneous media reporting, and compiled in the China Coast Guard Incident Tracker Database. “Median line” refers to the informal centerline of the Taiwan Strait historically observed by both sides. “JCRP” denotes Joint Combat Readiness Patrols as designated by Taiwan’s MND. All analysis and commentary are by Taiwan Security Monitor.

From 16 Aircraft to Surrounded: Fear, Virality, and the Misinformation Cascade in ADIZ Discourse

Authors: Jonathan Walberg, Noah Reed, & Ethan Connell

On March 15^th, 2026, Politico published an article titled “Taiwan reports large-scale Chinese military aircraft presence near island.”[i] This title exaggerated what was in actuality a relatively normal day of PLA activity around Taiwan. Nevertheless, the piece caught the eye of many observers on social media. Within hours, thousands of finance and Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) accounts began to regurgitate the headline, without linking the article or explaining the nuance behind the report of “large-scale” activity.[ii] These posts, which seemed to imply that China was preparing significant military action against Taiwan, accumulated tens of thousands of likes, and began trending on both Twitter/X and Bluesky.

Essentially, we witnessed a game of telephone taking place on the internet. A single headline was rapidly shared, rephrased, and simplified across platforms, with each iteration shedding context and adding interpretation. Within hours, an observation about aircraft activity became a claim about encirclement, with accounts sharing posts that declared Taiwan as “surrounded” by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

An AI-generated map that circulated on X/Bluesky during the wave of misinformation

This incident provides a useful window into how even relatively small actions by the PLA around Taiwan have the potential to significantly swing social media coverage of Taiwan by actors engaged in disinformation. In a crisis-prone environment such as Taiwan’s, where China has carefully shaped the narrative environment for years through large exercises, even one article can cascade into a broader wave of false and misleading claims, using recycled visuals and improvised escalation narratives.[iii]

The Problem With ADIZ Reporting

Following two weeks of depressed PLA activity in and around Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), Taiwan’s MND reported that 26 Chinese aircraft were detected operating around Taiwan, with 16 aircraft entering its IZ[iv]. While this instance is indeed above 2026’s daily average of 4.5, it is in fact only “large-scale” if compared to the previous two weeks of little to no activity, something that the Politico article make[v] clear. However, when viewed holistically, March 14th’s numbers are less significant, representing only the 8th largest ADIZ incursion of 2026. The event’s significance is further diminished due to the resumption of low aerial activity the following day, March 15th.[vi]

It is routine for news organizations outside Taiwan to report on PLA activity in Taiwan’s ADIZ, especially when violation numbers seem to be abnormally high or low. During the recent period of lower activity, for example, many major news organizations published stories on the unusual lull.[vii]

Reporting on something as niche as Taiwan’s ADIZ creates a structural vulnerability. Headlines often compress complex operational data into simplified, attention-grabbing phrases that lack important context. On social media, these headlines are frequently detached from the underlying reporting, leaving readers to infer meaning from incomplete signals.

This dynamic does not require deliberate manipulation. Headline framing can make routine activity appear more consequential than it is, creating openings for exaggerated interpretations. A similar pattern appears during PLA joint exercises, when maps of exercise zones or footage of missile launches circulate without context, prompting observers to interpret routine demonstrations as evidence of blockade preparations or imminent invasion.

The Misinformation Cascade Begins

The cascade began with a flurry of financial news accounts simply sharing the article title on social media, something they likely received from news wire services. The simplicity of the title, specifically the fact it could very easily be misconstrued as suggesting that China was preparing a military build-up, instantly attracted massive attention from OSINT accounts that simply aggregate the news headlines, usually in a way that exaggerates the severity of events.[viii]

What began as “Taiwan reports large-scale Chinese military aircraft presence near island” became “TAIWAN DETECTS MASSIVE CHINESE MILITARY PRESENCE SURROUNDING ISLAND” and “BREAKING; TAIWAN ON HIGH ALERT.”[ix] As these posts began to circulate, generating tens of thousands of likes and reposts, commentary accounts began to post uninformed analysis.[x] This fed into the algorithm and expanded the audience to circles outside of the “OSINT community”. Less than six hours after the publication of the original Politico article, the dominant discourse surrounding it became completely unrecognizable from its actual substance.

As the social media posts spread rapidly, some posts referencing the Politico report began to adopt the phrase “Taiwan surrounded.”[xi]

This linguistic shift was not trivial. Describing aircraft and ships “around Taiwan” conveys an operational snapshot: an observation about detected activity. Describing Taiwan as “surrounded,” however, implies a fundamentally different military posture. The term suggests physical enclosure, coercive leverage, or even the early stages of blockade operations. The difference between these descriptions marks the point where an activity report becomes a strategic claim.

In many viral posts, the progression followed a familiar pattern: The original numbers were omitted, but the language of heightened military activity and encirclement remained. As the messaging grew stronger, the belief that we were seeing something larger beginning grew as a seemingly logical conclusion. At that moment, the misinformation cascade began.

The initial spread of the Politico headline was driven by rapid reposting across financial news and OSINT accounts, many of which likely received the story through news wire services. Each repost preserved the sense of urgency while shedding the context needed to interpret the underlying activity.

But repetition alone does not explain why the narrative gained traction. Ongoing global events, emotional responses such as fear, and the pressure to keep pace with breaking news all contributed to how the headline was interpreted. Together, these forces helped transform an activity report into something that appeared far more consequential.

Context Collapse and the Vulnerability of Breaking News

This transformation illustrates a recurring problem in the information environment surrounding security crises: context collapse.[xii] Technical military reporting often relies on specialized terminology, whose meaning depends heavily on operational context. As a result, phrases like “large-scale activity,” “operating near the island,” or “around Taiwan” can be easily misinterpreted when removed from the operational reporting framework used by defense institutions. This is especially relevant during the ongoing operations in the Middle East. With airstrikes, bombings, and naval fires filling up algorithms on social media, the public is hyper fixated on action, worried about the conflict spilling over with global consequences.

On media platforms that reward simplicity and emotional clarity, those phrases can quickly evolve into stronger claims. A surge becomes an escalation. Activity becomes encirclement. A snapshot becomes a strategic turning point.

Research on crisis communication shows that information environments characterized by uncertainty and urgency often degrade shared situational awareness.[xiii] In these environments, audiences rely increasingly on simplified narratives rather than technical explanations, making complex military developments easier to misinterpret or exaggerate.[xiv]

The Taiwan Strait is particularly vulnerable to this dynamic because even routine military movements carry geopolitical significance. For audiences with limited familiarity with PLA operational patterns, the difference between an activity spike and a strategic shift may not be obvious. As a result, ambiguity can easily be filled with worst-case interpretations.

Fear as a Carrier of Misinformation

One of the major factors fueling the spread of discussion around the activity was a sense of urgency and fear. What had begun as a description of aircraft counts was quickly processed as a signal of possible escalation. This shift mattered because it changed the role of the audience. Rather than evaluating a technical report, users were reacting to what appeared to be the early stages of a crisis.

Fear alters how individuals process information under uncertainty. Research on information diffusion shows that emotionally arousing content, particularly content that evokes anxiety, reduces the likelihood that individuals will pause to verify claims before sharing them.[xv] When the perceived stakes are high, the cost of inaction can feel greater than the risk of being wrong.[xvi] In this context, sharing becomes a precautionary behavior: a way of responding to a potential threat rather than confirming a verified fact.

This dynamic helps explain how the narrative evolved so quickly. As users encountered repeated claims that Taiwan was being “surrounded,” the framing itself encouraged a particular interpretation of events, one in which time was limited and escalation plausible. Under those conditions, ambiguity is often resolved in the direction of worst-case assumptions.

The Taiwan Strait is especially susceptible to this process because it is already widely understood as a high-risk flashpoint.[xvii] Reports of increased military activity therefore do not enter a neutral information environment. They are received by audiences primed to expect crisis, making emotionally charged interpretations more intuitive and more difficult to dislodge.

Rather than distorting an already existing stable understanding of events, in this case, fear constructed a distorted understanding of events from first principles.

As the narrative spread, emotional reactions reinforced the interpretation that something larger was unfolding, even though the underlying data had not changed. By the time more precise context emerged, the initial framing had already taken hold.

The “Use It or Lose It” Logic of Virality

The initial posts that circulated widely were not detailed analyses, but rapid reposts of the headline, often stripped of its original context. As the story began to trend, users encountered a familiar dilemma: whether to wait for additional information or to share immediately while the topic was gaining attention. In fast-moving situations, that window can close quickly. Waiting to verify information risks missing the moment when a story is most visible.

This dynamic creates what can be understood as a “use it or lose it” logic. Information is most valuable when it is new and circulating widely. As a result, users are incentivized to share content as soon as they encounter it, even if the underlying details remain unclear. In the case of the Taiwan activity report, this pressure contributed to the rapid spread of simplified and, at times, misleading interpretations of the original article.

Research on information diffusion suggests that time pressure plays a significant role in reducing verification behavior. When individuals are required to make quick decisions about whether to share content, they rely more heavily on heuristic cues, such as the tone of a headline or the apparent urgency of a claim, rather than engaging in careful evaluation.[xviii] When the valence of the emotions is negative (fear or anger), and the arousal stronger, we see an even larger effect, effectively bypassing internal ’factchecking’ mechanisms. In practice, this means that speed can substitute for accuracy in shaping what information circulates most widely.

In the hours following the Politico report, this mechanism was visible in how the story evolved. As more users shared increasingly simplified versions of the original claim, the narrative moved further away from the underlying data. Each iteration prioritized immediacy over precision, reinforcing a version of events that was easier to transmit but less accurate.

Importantly, this process does not require intentional deception. The users participating in the spread of the narrative are often responding rationally to platform incentives that reward speed, visibility, and engagement. The result, however, is an information environment in which early interpretations, rather than verified ones, play a disproportionate role in shaping collective understanding.

Visual Misinformation and the Power of the Map

The misinformation surge surrounding the Taiwan activity report was further amplified by the circulation of a misleading map.

Images carry a particular authority online. A map, diagram, or chart often appears more credible than text because it looks technical and objective. For many readers, visual representation functions as evidence rather than interpretation.[xix]

In this case, users circulated a map that purported to show Taiwan surrounded by Chinese forces. The image appeared to provide visual confirmation of the encirclement narrative.[xx] However, the map was not current, instead containing information from a Chinese exercise in May of 2024 (Joint Sword 2024A).

Despite this discrepancy, the image spread widely because it aligned with the narrative already circulating online. Once paired with the phrase “Taiwan surrounded,” the map helped transform a contested claim into something that looked authoritative.

This illustrates the powerful role visual content plays in misinformation ecosystems. Textual claims invite debate. Images often suppress it.

Why Taiwan Is Particularly Vulnerable

The Taiwan information environment is especially susceptible to rapid misinformation cascades due to several reinforcing factors.

First, China’s activity around Taiwan is both real and visible. The PLA regularly conducts air and naval exercises that simulate encirclement. Because these activities are genuine, reports about them carry immediate credibility and are easily incorporated into alarmist interpretations. Because these activities are genuine, reports about them easily gain traction.

Second, many audiences lack the context needed to interpret these developments. Without familiarity with PLA operational patterns, even routine activity can appear extraordinary.

Third, these factors combine with a media environment that rewards simplification. With the Taiwan Strait being a flashpoint that many fixate on, often viewed through the lens of great-power rivalry, social media platforms reward provocative messaging. Complex operational data rarely goes viral; emotionally resonant narratives do.

Together, these factors create what might be described as a fear market: where worst-case interpretations consistently attract attention and engagement.

The Anatomy of a Misinformation Cascade

The episode surrounding the “Taiwan surrounded” narrative illustrates a broader pattern in contemporary disinformation dynamics.

The process often follows a recognizable sequence:

A real event occurs.
Initial reporting frames the event in simplified terms.
Emotionally charged interpretations amplify the story.
Users rapidly repost the information without verification.
Speculative narratives accumulate around the original claim.
Visual content reinforces the narrative’s apparent credibility.
The story stabilizes as a widely accepted, but inaccurate, account.

Importantly, this sequence does not require deliberate fabrication. The most effective misinformation often begins with something that is true. What changes is the interpretation.

Precision as Resilience

The lesson from this episode is not that analysts should dismiss reports of PLA activity or treat social-media reactions as irrelevant. Instead, it highlights the importance of maintaining precision in the way military developments are described and interpreted. In the Taiwan information environment, the difference between “increased PLA activity” and “Taiwan is surrounded” is not a matter of rhetorical nuance. It represents the boundary between analysis and alarmism.

Once that boundary is crossed, the information environment becomes difficult to correct. Viral narratives spread faster than careful explanations, and emotionally compelling interpretations often outcompete technical accuracy.

Precision therefore becomes a form of resilience. Analysts, journalists, and policymakers who communicate clearly about military developments help prevent routine operational activity from being misinterpreted as strategic escalation.

The recent surge of misinformation surrounding the Taiwan activity report demonstrates how quickly ambiguity can be converted into certainty online. It also serves as a reminder that in crisis-prone environments, the first casualty is often not truth itself, but proportion.

[i] https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/15/taiwan-reports-large-scale-chinese-military-aircraft-presence-near-island-00829219

[ii] https://x.com/unusual_whales/status/2033235867616383090?s=20

[iii] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/justice-mission-2025-the-narrative-battle-inside-chinas-latest-taiwan-exercise/

[iv] https://www.mnd.gov.tw/en/news/plaact/86327

[v] https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/15/taiwan-reports-large-scale-chinese-military-aircraft-presence-near-island-00829219?utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=dlvr.it

[vi] https://www.mnd.gov.tw/en/news/plaact/86330

[vii] https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/12/asia/china-taiwan-buzzing-mystery-intl-hnk, https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/articles/c2lr8ejq0w8o/simp

[viii] https://x.com/rawsalerts/status/2033282084282695857?s=20, https://x.com/Defence_Index/status/2033172908277891415?s=20, https://x.com/Globalsurv/status/2033265245582413860?s=20

[ix] https://x.com/SpencerHakimian/status/2033282256962208210?s=20, https://x.com/Globalsurv/status/2033257539291242981?s=20

[x] https://x.com/krassenstein/status/2033284541788324217?s=20, https://x.com/HotSotin/status/2033292605811798043?s=20

[xi] https://x.com/GlobalIJournal/status/2033362180351852786?s=20, https://x.com/drhossamsamy65/status/2033270501947081180?s=20 , https://x.com/PrimeH12995/status/2033572921365647430?s=20

[xii] Brandtzaeg, Petter Bae, and Marika Lüders. “Time collapse in social media: Extending the context collapse.” Social Media+ Society 4, no. 1 (2018): 2056305118763349.

[xiii] Hilberts, Sonya, Mark Govers, Elena Petelos, and Silvia Evers. “The impact of misinformation on social media in the context of natural disasters: Narrative review.” JMIR infodemiology 5 (2025): e70413.

[xiv] Shahbazi, Maryam, and Deborah Bunker. “Social media trust: Fighting misinformation in the time of crisis.” International Journal of Information Management 77 (2024): 102780

[xv] Stieglitz, Stefan, and Linh Dang-Xuan. “Emotions and information diffusion in social media—sentiment of microblogs and sharing behavior.” Journal of management information systems 29, no. 4 (2013): 217-248.

[xvi] Ecker, Ullrich KH, Stephan Lewandowsky, John Cook, Philipp Schmid, Lisa K. Fazio, Nadia Brashier, Panayiota Kendeou, Emily K. Vraga, and Michelle A. Amazeen. “The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction.” Nature Reviews Psychology 1, no. 1 (2022): 13-29., Marcus, George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. Affective intelligence and political judgment. University of Chicago Press, 2000.

[xvii] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-10/the-10-trillion-fight-modeling-a-us-china-war-over-taiwan

[xviii] Talwar, Shalini, Amandeep Dhir, Dilraj Singh, Gurnam Singh Virk, and Jari Salo. “Sharing of fake news on social media: Application of the honeycomb framework and the third-person effect hypothesis.” Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 57 (2020): 102197

[xix] Rama, Daniele, Tiziano Piccardi, Miriam Redi, and Rossano Schifanella. “A large scale study of reader interactions with images on Wikipedia.” EPJ Data Science 11, no. 1 (2022): 1.

[xx] https://x.com/WealthWatcherCo/status/2033280246254895138?s=20

All Quiet in the Taiwan Strait? Explaining the Recent Drop in PLA Aircraft Activity Around Taiwan

Authors: Noah Reed, Jonathan Walberg, Ethan Connell, & Joe O’Connor

From February 27th to March 5th, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported no People’s Liberation Army aircraft operating in the airspace near Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), an unusually long pause in activity that drew significant attention among regional observers. No supply flights, no repositioning of aircraft, and not even any training exercises. While long pauses in ADIZ violations have occurred in the past, it has become extremely rare in recent years for Taiwan’s military to detect no aircraft operating in the nearby airspace outside the ADIZ for a prolonged period. The reason for this is quite simple: ADIZ violations are almost always directed at Taiwan, while activity outside Taiwan’s ADIZ could involve routine training flights or transits between coastal airbases. Thus, it is more common for the PRC to halt incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ than to reduce aviation activity in the Eastern Theater Command writ large over a long period of time.

This pause naturally sparked speculation, however many popular theories are as of yet unsupported by observable patterns and regional events. Observers have forwarded several possible explanations, to include the ongoing operations in Iran, the upcoming summit between President Trump and Xi, an inability to operate routinely following a series of major officer purges, and domestic politics in Taiwan. Below, we parse through the most prominent suggested theories and examine if they hold up to historical trends and further scrutiny. As our central argument suggests, it remains too early to make definitive judgments given the available data. Instead, we focus on understanding the factors behind several of the leading explanations for this break from pattern.

I: Domestic Explanations and Leadership Struggles

Two domestic events in the PRC could reasonably explain the dive in PLA activity in February. First, this week marked the beginning of the “Two Sessions,” an annual meeting of the PRC’s National People’s Congress (NPC).[i] Historically, this event coincided with lower ADIZ violations, with a notable exception of 2025.[ii] The heightened level of activity seen during 2025’s NPC meeting relative to prior years could be explained by the higher cross-Strait tension at the time, with the PLA holding its Strait Thunder-2025A joint exercise around Taiwan less than a month later.

Second, the end of the Spring Festival and the beginning of the Lantern Festival in the PRC could play some part in the lower activity. The Spring Festival has empirically propelled lower reported ADIZ numbers from late January into February over the last couple of years.[iii] Still, it is difficult to discern if the holidays alone drive these trends, or if it is merely one element of a broader rationale.

Finally, it is worth addressing the rumors that the PLA is simply incapable of conducting aerial activity around Taiwan due to recent turmoil in its leadership. This appears to be a less convincing explanation. After all, PLAN activity around Taiwan remains somewhat consistent, and the PLA and China Coast Guard (CCG) remain active in the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea. Moreover, it is not clear why the removal of senior leadership would cause the PLA to be incapable of flying aircraft around Taiwan, as such activity has become routine, even mundane, for several years. It also cannot explain why several waves of aerial activity occurred around Taiwan in February after the leadership investigations took place.

Overall, the National People’s Congress, as well as Spring/Lantern festivals, have historically contributed to lower numbers of ADIZ and airspace violations. However, it is rare for these events to coincide with total stoppages in incursions.

II: Trump–Xi Meeting and the “Best Behavior” Hypothesis

Another explanation is that the pause reflects a temporary “best behavior” or truce period ahead of a pending meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping later this spring.[iv] Under this interpretation, Beijing may be attempting to avoid incidents or tensions that could complicate or even cancel the meeting.[v] This suggests that China would reduce visible military pressure around Taiwan to create a more stable atmosphere prior to the meeting.

While plausible, the explanation doesn’t fit the observed pattern of activity.

First, the lull extended beyond just a halt in ADIZ incursions, but rather to all aircraft activity in the area, where regular flights and movements occur with training flights and movements between coastal bases. If the goal were to signal intent to Washington regarding Taiwan, Beijing could easily continue routine training flights in these areas while avoiding breaching Taiwan’s ADIZ. A complete halt of flights in the area goes beyond just signaling that Beijing doesn’t want to ‘rock the boat.’ It also assumes that Washington views the ADIZ as the principal outlet of PRC signaling over Taiwan, something that cannot necessarily be accepted at face value.

Second, the logic of a pre-summit truce, while plausible, would require a much longer pause in operations. This would become more plausible if the lull had continued. Further, it would commit the PLA to maintaining a break for a period following the summit, as a resumption of regular patrols would risk creating the impression that the summit had failed. In practice, maintaining the appearance of diplomatic restraint would likely require months of reduced activity, which is unlikely given the PLA’s ongoing pressure campaign that has seen few pauses since 2022.

Finally, the broader geopolitical context makes the argument less convincing. Some analysts frame ADIZ incursions as a signaling mechanism directed at Washington, meaning that temporarily halting them could itself be a signal, a tacit gesture of restraint ahead of a summit. But even under this logic, the timing is difficult to reconcile with current events. The United States is presently engaged in an escalating conflict with Iran involving large-scale strikes and the possibility of wider regional escalation.[vi] In that environment, it is not obvious why Beijing would view the suspension of routine PLA sorties near Taiwan as a necessary diplomatic signal. If Beijing is prepared to pursue high-level diplomacy with Washington while the United States is conducting major military operations elsewhere, it is difficult to see why the symbolic value of turning off routine Taiwan-related flights would suddenly become decisive.

Put simply, a snapshot of the rest of the world makes the idea that Beijing is shelving routine Taiwan-related air activity purely to preserve summit optics less convincing.

III: Signaling to Taiwan

Yet another explanation being advanced is that Beijing is signaling its lack of concern over Taiwan’s ongoing special defense budget debate. However, the timeline of PLA activity does not support this interpretation. The debate has been ongoing for months, yet PLA air activity remained elevated throughout that period.[vii] For example, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported 19 PLA aircraft operating around Taiwan on January 29, just days after the Taiwan People’s Party unveiled its alternative special budget proposal. Activity continued shortly afterward, with 32 PLA aircraft detected on February 12, two days after Lai publicly urged the Legislative Yuan to pass the proposal during a press conference. Similarly, 22 PLA aircraft were detected on February 26, the day after Taiwan’s legislature agreed to send multiple budget proposals to committee review. These patterns suggest that PLA air activity has continued regardless of developments in Taiwan’s defense budget debate.

The PRC is likely to react to developments in Taiwan’s special defense budget proposals as they move through the Legislative Yuan. Beijing has repeatedly framed major Taiwanese defense initiatives as provocations, often responding with diplomatic pressure or military signaling. The PLA’s most recent exercise, Justice-Mission 2025A, reflects this pattern.[viii] Much of the iconography and messaging released before and during the exercise framed the drills in punitive terms, portraying them as a warning to Taipei. In that sense, the exercise reinforced the perception that advances in Taiwan’s defense budgeting process can trigger demonstrative military responses from Beijing.

Others advance this as rewarding Lai for his statements during a Spring Festival event where he referred to “Mainland China” instead of just “China,” a term that the PRC prefers.[ix] This reference, while not necessarily insignificant in meaning, is unlikely to prompt Beijing to depart three years of policy and “reward” the Lai administration by giving them time to breathe over a difference in terminology.

IV: Middle East and Fuel Hypothesis, Regional activity

One external explanation for the Eastern Theater Command’s pause in flight activity is that Beijing is temporarily conserving aviation fuel amid uncertainty about the ongoing conflict in the Middle East and potential supply disruptions. Sustained air operations require significant fuel resources, and the PLA may reduce nonessential sorties if leadership anticipates a prolonged price increase or broader market volatility.

However, the fuel-constraint explanation presents two significant challenges:

First, China has invested decades in developing strategic petroleum stockpiles to mitigate supply shocks. Public estimates indicate that Beijing maintains hundreds of millions of barrels in state strategic reserves, supplemented by commercial storage.[x] Recent planning documents and reports further suggest that China continues to expand these undisclosed strategic holdings, rather than signaling scarcity.[xi] Therefore, if the PLA were experiencing immediate operational constraints due to fuel availability, it would indicate a far more acute, system-wide stress than current stockpiling trends imply.

Second, if fuel conservation were the primary factor, a broader reduction in activity would be expected across all PLA operating areas, rather than a distinct, localized pause in aircraft activity detected around Taiwan. Chinese military activity in other regions, however, appeared to remain consistent with typical patterns.

For example, in the South China Sea, the PLA’s Southern Theater Command publicly released footage of naval and air units conducting a readiness patrol around Scarborough Shoal on February 28.[xii] The patrol involved coordinated use of early warning aircraft, anti-submarine aircraft, fighters, and bombers, accompanied by messaging that forces remain “on high alert” and prepared to take countermeasures. A subsequent Weibo post by the Southern Theater Command highlighted a PLAAF unit undergoing “rigorous combat training,” with a follow-on Global Times report stating that these patrols and exercises have continued “since February” and are explicitly linked to responses to external “joint patrol” activity.[xiii] This reinforces that PRC operational signaling in the south has not paused during this period.

Japanese public reporting over the past week indicates continued and routine activity around the Senkaku Islands. In its March 1, 2026, update, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that Chinese government vessels, mainly from the China Coast Guard, have continued to enter Japan’s contiguous zone near the Senkakus almost daily.[xiv] On February 28th, Japan’s Joint Staff reported that two People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Y-9 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft flew from the East China Sea, passed between Okinawa and Miyako, and continued into the Pacific as far as the Amami island chain, then reversed course and returned, prompting Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) scrambles.[xv] Overall, Japan’s official statements and recent Joint Staff reports indicate that PRC operations in the East China Sea remain active, even as aviation patterns near Taiwan fluctuate.

V. Preparing for an Invasion or Major Exercise

A more dramatic explanation is that the pause reflects preparations for a major PLA exercise. Others have posited that it could possibly be the ‘calm’ before an invasion or move on one of Taiwan’s outlying islands. Under this interpretation, the halt in routine aviation activity signifies an operational pause while forces reposition, conduct planning, or prepare for a larger coordinated operation.

It is true that large exercises or operations are sometimes preceded by short-term changes in routine activity, particularly if units are redeploying, conducting maintenance, or consolidating forces in preparation for a larger event.

However, there was little evidence during the pause to support the idea that it reflected imminent large-scale operations. Even a preparation for a theater-level exercise would likely generate additional changes and disruptions in observable patterns, including major changes in naval deployments, unusual airbase activity, logistical movements, and more. Many of these indicators are regularly detected through open-source monitoring and satellite imagery. At present, there are no clear signs of these types of preparatory activities occurring on a scale that would suggest a major operation is imminent.

More broadly, if the PLA were preparing a large exercise around Taiwan, it is not obvious why routine aviation activity across the Eastern Theater Command would need to halt. Training flights and patrols would normally continue alongside preparations unless airspace was being cleared for a specific operation, something that would likely be accompanied by other visible signals.

For these reasons, while the possibility of future exercises should never be discounted given the PLA’s recent pattern of demonstrations around Taiwan, the current pause alone is not strong evidence that a major operation is imminent.

Taken together, the available evidence suggests that the brief pause in PLA aviation activity around Taiwan was unlikely to be driven by any single factor. Domestic political events in China, including the NPC “Two Sessions” and the seasonal slowdown associated with the Spring Festival period, likely contributed to a temporary reduction in operational tempo. At the same time, explanations centered on diplomatic signaling, energy constraints, or preparations for major military operations remain less consistent with observed patterns of activity both around Taiwan and in other regions.

The resumption of PLA flights shortly after this lull reinforces a broader pattern that has characterized Chinese military pressure around Taiwan in recent years: cyclical activity. Periods of heightened sorties are often followed by short pauses before returning to baseline levels. Rather than indicating a change in Beijing’s strategy, the episode likely reflects the routine variability inherent in sustained military operations.

The more important analytical question is not why the PLA paused for several days, but how Beijing calibrates these cycles of pressure. Short interruptions in activity can create the perception of sudden shifts in intent, even when the underlying strategy remains unchanged.

[i] https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/what-watch-chinas-two-sessions-2026

[ii] PLA Tracker: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?gid=905433190#gid=905433190

[iii] https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-pla-has-stopped-flying-aircraft?triedRedirect=true&_src_ref=t.co

[iv] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/chinese-military-flights-around-taiwan-fall-trump-xi-meeting-may-be-factor-2026-03-05/

[v] https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/03/05/2003853320

[vi] https://www.war.gov/Spotlights/Operation-Epic-Fury/

[vii] PLA Tracker: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?gid=905433190#gid=905433190

[viii] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/justice-mission-2025-the-narrative-battle-inside-chinas-latest-taiwan-exercise/

[ix] https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-pla-has-stopped-flying-aircraft?triedRedirect=true&_src_ref=t.co

[x] https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/chn

[xi] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/china-targets-steady-oil-output-more-gas-stockpiling-five-year-plan-2026-03-05

[xii] https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202603/1355963.shtml

[xiii] https://weibo.com/7468777622?tabtype=album&uid=7468777622&index=0; https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202603/1356043.shtml; https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202603/1355963.shtml

[xiv] https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100857530.pdf; https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html

[xv] https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2026/p20260302_01.pdf

Strait Snapshot, February 2026 Update

Author: Ethan Connell & Jonathan Walberg

Key Findings

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense recorded 190 PLA aerial sorties around the island in February 2026, a 30 percent decline from January’s 270 and a continuation of the downward trajectory that began after the December 2025 Justice Mission exercise. Year-over-year, February’s figure represents a 61 percent decline from 492 sorties in February 2025.
Three joint combat readiness patrols occurred during the month: February 12 (42 aircraft), February 19 (14 aircraft), and February 25 (30 aircraft). These operations demonstrate that the PLA’s capacity for large-scale multi-domain demonstrations remains intact, despite a contraction in routine sortie volume.
No aircraft were detected around Taiwan on February 27 and 28, marking the onset of a quiet period that extended through the first half of March in anticipation of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (the ‘Two Sessions’).
PLAN vessel detections averaged approximately seven per day in February, with a peak of eleven, consistent with the five-to-nine vessel baseline observed throughout 2025. The persistence of naval presence during a month of declining air activity demonstrates the operational decoupling between the air and maritime domains.
Coast Guard Administration data indicate ten documented China Coast Guard (CCG) incursions into Taiwan’s restricted waters from January through February, concentrated around Kinmen (eight incidents) and Dongsha Island (two incidents).

February 2026 Air Activity

In February 2026, 190 aircraft sorties were detected around Taiwan, with 147 entering the southwestern portion of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. This total represents a significant reduction from January’s 270 sorties and continues a downward trajectory that began after the PLA’s Justice Mission-2025 exercise on December 29, 2025. That exercise involved 130 aircraft in a single day, marking the largest single-day operation around Taiwan since comprehensive daily reporting began. The post-exercise period has been characterized by a gradual normalization of activity levels, although the pace of this decline is not unprecedented in the historical record.

February exhibited a familiar pattern of quiet periods punctuated by activity surges. The peak occurred on February 12, when 42 aircraft were detected as part of a Joint Combat Readiness Patrol (JCRP), representing the largest single-day figure since the Justice Mission exercise. Two additional JCRPs followed on February 19 (14 aircraft) and February 25 (30 aircraft). Outside these exercises, daily sortie counts typically ranged from two to thirteen aircraft, with several days recording zero detections. The final two days of the month, February 27 and 28, both recorded zero aircraft, indicating the onset of the quiet period associated with China’s annual Two Sessions legislative meetings, which extended through mid-March. The Chinese Military Commission (CMC) leadership purges that began in January 2026, including the dismissal of two senior vice-chairmen, may have reinforced this pattern of restraint by introducing additional institutional caution among theater-level commanders.

Figure 1. Daily PLA activity around Taiwan, February 2026. Gold stars denote JCRP days; shaded region marks the onset of the Two Sessions quiet period.

Monthly Trajectory: Post–Justice Mission Cooling

The decline from 270 sorties in January to 190 in February aligns with the broader pattern of post-exercise normalization observed after major PLA operations around Taiwan in recent years. The December 2025 Justice Mission exercise caused a significant spike in both single-day and monthly activity. The first two months of 2026 appear to reflect a return to a lower operational baseline rather than a strategic decision to permanently de-escalate. January 2026 remained elevated relative to the monthly averages of mid-2025, and February’s figure, while lower, falls within the range of monthly totals observed during non-exercise periods.

Figure 2. Monthly PLA sortie totals, 2024–2026. For 2026, January and February data are shown.

The frequency of joint combat readiness patrols offers a counterpoint to the overall decline in sortie numbers. February’s three JCRPs are comparable to January’s four, indicating that the PLA’s exercise tempo has not significantly slowed, even as routine patrol activity has contracted. This distinction between routine and surge operations is analytically important: reductions in daily sortie volume do not necessarily indicate a diminished PLA capacity or willingness to conduct large-scale operations on short notice.

At Sea: Naval Presence

PLAN vessel detections in the waters around Taiwan averaged 6.6 per day in February, with a peak of eleven vessels on a single day. These figures are broadly consistent with the range of 5-9 vessels that has characterized PLAN presence throughout 2025 and into 2026. The stability of naval posture during a month when air activity declined by nearly 30 percent from January highlights a structural feature of cross-strait military dynamics: the air and maritime components of PLA activity around Taiwan appear to operate under distinct operational logics and respond to different drivers.

Figure 3. PLAN vessel and official ship detections around Taiwan, February 2026.

This decoupling is analytically significant. Observers who track sortie counts as a proxy for cross-strait tension may interpret the January-to-February decline as evidence of easing pressure. However, naval data present a different perspective: the PLAN’s sustained presence at sea indicates that the military’s overall posture in the Taiwan Strait has not meaningfully contracted, even as the air component adjusts to post-exercise and politically sensitive rhythms.

Coast Guard Gray Zone Operations

China Coast Guard activity in Taiwan’s restricted waters constitutes a third, and often underreported, dimension of cross-strait pressure. From January through February 2026, the CCG conducted at least ten documented incursions: eight around Kinmen and two near Dongsha Island (Pratas). The Kinmen operations have developed into a recognizable pattern, typically involving two to four CCG cutters entering restricted waters for two to three hours before withdrawing. This approach appears designed to normalize a regular CCG presence in waters that Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration considers under its jurisdiction.

Figure 4. CCG incursions into Taiwan’s restricted waters, January–February 2026, by location and vessel count.

The Kinmen incursions have involved a recurring set of CCG cutters, including hull numbers 14529, 14603, 14609, and 14530, suggesting a dedicated patrol rotation rather than ad hoc deployments. The Dongsha operations are qualitatively different. The February 6 incursion near Dongsha involved vessels 3501 and 3107, with the CCG presence lasting approximately eight hours. Although shorter than the extended dwell times observed in later months, the Dongsha deployments represent a more logistically demanding operation due to the island’s distance from Chinese territorial waters. Their continuation into February suggests an established rather than exploratory program.

Multi-Domain Overview

Figure 5. January–February 2026 multi-domain PLA activity: air sorties, naval presence, and CCG incursions.

An integrated view of all three domains during the first two months of 2026 reveals a more complex picture than any single metric suggests. Air activity has declined sequentially, reflecting sensitivity to both post-exercise normalization and political calendars. Naval presence has remained steady and largely unaffected by fluctuations in the air domain. Coast Guard incursions have continued at a pace consistent with an institutionalized patrol program. Analysts and policymakers assessing cross-strait dynamics should examine all three domains collectively, rather than relying solely on sortie counts as a barometer of PLA intent.

Figure 6. February air activity year-over-year: total sorties and median line crossings, 2024–2026.

Methodology & Sources

Air and naval detection data are drawn from daily press releases issued by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and compiled in the PLA Activity Center database maintained by Taiwan Security Monitor. Coast Guard incident data are compiled from Coast Guard Administration press releases and verified against contemporaneous media reporting. “Median line” refers to the informal centerline of the Taiwan Strait historically observed by both sides. “JCRP” denotes Joint Combat Readiness Patrols as designated by Taiwan’s MND. All analysis and commentary are by Taiwan Security Monitor.

Strait Snapshot, January 2026 Update

Author: Ethan Connell & Jonathan Walberg

Key Findings

In January 2026, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense recorded 270 PLA aerial sorties around the island, a 21 percent decrease compared to the 340 sorties in January 2025. This month marks the first complete period of post-Justice Mission activity, following the December 29, 2025, exercise that deployed 130 aircraft in a single day.
Four Joint Combat Readiness Patrols (JCRPs) occurred during the month, with the January 15 JCRP involving 34 aircraft, marking the highest single-day total. The consistent scheduling of JCRPs throughout January demonstrates that the PLA retains the capability for high-intensity, multi-platform demonstrations around Taiwan, despite a reduction in routine sortie volumes compared to 2025.
PLAN vessel detections averaged 6.6 per day in January, with a peak of 11 vessels, aligning with the five-to-nine vessel baseline observed throughout 2025. Naval presence remained stable during the month and was largely unaffected by fluctuations in air activity.
The Coast Guard Administration documented five CCG incursions into Taiwan’s restricted waters in January: four near Kinmen and one near Dongsha Island (Pratas). The January 14 Dongsha incident involved CCG vessel 3501, a larger-class cutter, highlighting a qualitative distinction in Beijing’s operational approach to these two locations.

January 2026 Air Activity

January 2026 opened a new chapter in the pattern of PLA air activity around Taiwan. The month’s total of 270 detected aircraft sorties, of which 166 entered Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, represents a 21 percent decline compared with January 2025’s 340 sorties. This figure must be read in context: the Justice Mission-2025 exercise of December 29, 2025, which saw 130 aircraft deployed around Taiwan in a single day, the largest such operation since comprehensive daily reporting began, may have temporarily exhausted forward-deployed assets and maintenance capacity in the Eastern Theater Command, contributing to a lower sustained tempo in the weeks that followed.

The daily pattern was characterized by a sawtooth rhythm: brief surges tied to Joint Combat Readiness Patrols, interspersed with days of minimal or zero activity. January saw 3 days in which no aircraft were detected (New Year’s Day, January 3, and January 11), punctuated by four JCRPs (January 8, 15, 23, and 29) that produced single-day peaks of 23, 34, 26, and 26 aircraft, respectively. The January 15 JCRP, involving 34 aircraft, was the month’s most significant single-day event and demonstrated multi-platform coordination across fighter, early warning, and anti-submarine warfare aircraft.

Figure 1. Daily PLA activity around Taiwan, January 2026. Gold stars denote JCRP days; shaded columns mark days with zero aircraft detected.

The removal of two senior Central Military Commission vice-chairmen in January, as part of an ongoing anti-corruption campaign within the PLA that had already affected several high-ranking officers in 2025, introduces an additional variable in interpreting the month’s air activity data. Although it is premature to establish a direct causal relationship between personnel changes and operational tempo, disruptions to command authority at the highest levels may have fostered institutional caution, potentially reducing routine sortie generation.

Monthly Trajectory: Where January Fits

January’s 270 sorties place the month at the low end of the range observed in recent years. For comparison, January 2024 recorded 331 sorties and January 2025 recorded 340. The year-over-year decline is more modest than the raw numbers might suggest: January historically sits below the annual average, as the PLA’s operational calendar typically builds toward spring and fall peaks. What distinguishes January 2026 is the extent to which the month was shaped by the aftereffects of the December 2025 Justice Mission exercise, which represented an operational high-water mark that appears to have drawn forward maintenance and logistics resources.

Figure 2. Monthly PLA sortie totals, 2024–2026. For 2026, only January data is available.

The frequency of joint combat readiness patrols in January 2026, totaling four events, surpassed the typical January cadence observed in previous years. This indicates that the decrease in total sortie volume has not corresponded with a reduction in the PLA’s readiness to conduct large-scale, multi-domain demonstrations on short notice, a trend warranting continued observation in the coming months.

At Sea: Naval Presence in January

In January, PLAN vessel detections in the waters around Taiwan averaged 6.6 per day, peaking at 11 vessels on January 14 and 15. These numbers align with the five-to-nine vessel baseline that has defined PLAN presence throughout 2025 and into the new year. The stability of naval posture during the post-Justice Mission period, when air activity was moderating, reinforces a key structural observation from Taiwan Security Monitor’s multi-domain tracking: PLAN presence around Taiwan follows a different operational cycle from PLA aerial activity, showing less sensitivity to the political and institutional factors that influence air sortie fluctuations.

Figure 3. PLAN vessel and official ship detections around Taiwan, January 2026.

Official and government ship detections remained generally low throughout January, with a notable increase on January 24 and 25, when three official ships were detected each day. This decoupling between air and naval activity is analytically significant: analysts focusing solely on sortie counts may interpret January’s data as evidence of moderation, yet the stable naval footprint demonstrates that the PLA’s overall maritime posture has not significantly diminished. China Coast Guard activity in Taiwan’s restricted waters constitutes a third, frequently underreported dimension of cross-strait pressure. In January 2026, the CCG conducted at least 5 documented incursions: 4 around Kinmen and 1 near Dongsha Island (Pratas). The Kinmen operations follow a recognizable pattern: typically three to four CCG cutters entering restricted waters near Liaoluo and Lieyu for two to three hours before withdrawing. Recurring hull numbers (14529, 14603, 14605, 14609, and 14533) indicate a dedicated patrol rotation rather than ad hoc deployments.

Figure 4. CCG incursions into Taiwan’s restricted waters, January 2026, by location and vessel count.

The January 14 Dongsha incursion differed qualitatively from the Kinmen pattern. CCG vessel 3501, a larger-class cutter, was detected west of Dongsha at 05:14 and remained in restricted waters for approximately eleven hours before departing. Although this duration was shorter than the twenty-five-hour dwell times observed at Dongsha in subsequent months, the deployment of a 3500-class cutter to Taiwan’s most remote holding indicates sustained interest in testing the Coast Guard Administration’s ability to maintain a presence at Dongsha, located approximately 450 kilometers southwest of the main island and over 300 kilometers from the nearest Taiwan-controlled port.

Multi-Domain Overview

Figure 5. January 2026 multi-domain PLA activity: air sorties, naval presence, and CCG incursions.

When considered across all three domains, January 2026 exhibits the characteristic pattern of multi-domain PLA pressure that the Taiwan Security Monitor has documented since the post-2022 period. Air activity was concentrated in distinct JCRP-driven surges, separated by extended periods of minimal activity. Naval presence remained steady and was largely uncorrelated with the daily fluctuations in air operations. Coast Guard incursions persisted along established geographic patterns, with the Dongsha deployment introducing a longer-range element to an otherwise Kinmen-focused gray-zone campaign.

Figure 6. January air activity year-over-year: total sorties and ADIZ crossings, 2024–2026.

Analysts and policymakers should avoid interpreting a reduction in one domain as indicative of an overall decrease in pressure. The combined multi-domain posture, encompassing air, naval, and coast guard activities, does not reflect a significant departure from the sustained pattern of PLA activity around Taiwan that has shaped the cross-strait military balance since August 2022.

Methodology & Sources

Air and naval detection data are drawn from daily press releases issued by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and compiled in the PLA Activity Center database maintained by Taiwan Security Monitor. Coast Guard incident data are compiled from Coast Guard Administration press releases and verified against contemporaneous media reporting. Japan ADIZ scramble data are sourced from Japan Joint Staff Office press releases and reporting by USNI News. “Median line” refers to the informal centerline of the Taiwan Strait historically observed by both sides. “JCRP” denotes Joint Combat Readiness Patrols as designated by Taiwan’s MND. All analysis and commentary are by Taiwan Security Monitor.

Justice Mission–2025: The Narrative Battle Inside China’s Latest Taiwan Exercise

Author: Jonathan Walberg

When the People’s Liberation Army’s Eastern Theater Command launched its Justice Mission–2025 exercises around Taiwan on December 29th, the visible indicators were familiar: joint air and naval maneuvers,^[1] expanded operating zones, and calibrated signaling toward Taipei and external actors.^[2] What distinguished this iteration was not just the scale or geometry of the activity, but the depth and coherence of the narrative campaign that unfolded alongside it.

Rather than treating messaging as post hoc propaganda, Beijing used Justice Mission–2025 to actively storyboard a theory of coercion in real time. A coordinated series of posters released through PLA and affiliated channels visually depicted how Beijing intends to punish pro-independence forces; why such punishment is legitimate, and why resistance is futile. In the days immediately following the exercise, Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) press conferences reinforced and formalized those same narrative frames through authoritative political language.

Taken together, the posters and follow-on statements show how China increasingly integrates narrative warfare with military signaling to shape Taiwanese and American expectations about legitimacy, inevitability, escalation, and identity.

Justice as the Organizing Frame of the Exercise

The narrative architecture of Justice Mission–2025 begins with the exercise name itself: “Justice Mission–2025” (正义使命–2025). The term zhengyi (justice or righteousness) is used to morally pre-legitimize the operation. The exercise is framed not as discretionary pressure or political signaling, but as enforcement of an already rightful order. Beijing’s message is that the mission is “justice,” and resistance is implicitly illegitimate.

This framing was reinforced with a reiteration of messaging on “How to Curb ‘Independence.” The phrasing is revealing. Instead of depicting a political dispute between two actors, the problem is framed as a technical control challenge: how to suppress or restrain a condition. “Independence” becomes something mechanical to be constrained rather than a societal preference or political identity. Taiwan itself is rendered visually as an object—cut by cables, fractured into segments, encircled by forces—reinforcing a systems-control worldview rather than a political one.

The TAO immediately echoed this framing after the exercise. Responding directly to Justice Mission–2025, a spokesperson described the PLA’s actions as “a necessary and just measure to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity” and “a stern warning” to “Taiwan independence” and “external interference.”^[4] The political language locks in the moral logic embedded in the posters: coercion is corrective, not escalatory.

Shield and Sword: Encoding Enforcement Logic

Several of the exercise posters establish a clear moral dualism between protection and punishment. “Shield of Justice” (正义之盾) depicts PLA symbolism forming a protective barrier over Taiwan, visually communicating that China is acting as a stabilizing force safeguarding rightful order.^[5] This poster also features a shield bearing the Great Wall of China forcing American C-130s to turn away from Taiwan. The messaging here is clear: To the people of Taiwan, America won’t be able to come to your aid. To Washington, your efforts to intervene in a contingency will be futile compared to the ‘great power’ of China, as shown through the symbolism of the Great Wall.

Building off of this messaging is another poster titled “Sword of Justice” (正义之剑), which depicts a blade striking downward into the island.^[6] Justice is not passive; it enforces compliance. Punishment is portrayed as morally righteous rather than coercive. Together, the shield-and-sword motif communicates a simple conditional logic: alignment brings protection, resistance brings righteous force.

This same logic surfaced in TAO messaging tied to the exercise. Officials accused the Lai administration of “recklessly colluding with external forces,” “selling out Taiwan,” and pushing the island toward confrontation, while warning that such actions “will be firmly struck down.”^[7] The sword imagery becomes political language: punishment is framed as an unavoidable consequence rather than a choice. Another TAO briefing extended the sword narrative outward toward external actors, warning that any country or force that “plays with fire on the Taiwan question will inevitably pay a price,” reinforcing deterrence signaling that accompanied the exercise’s expanded operational footprint.^[8]

Systemic Isolation: Ports, Cables, and Everyday Vulnerability

One of the most analytically important themes of the Justice Mission–2025 posters is the emphasis on systemic isolation rather than battlefield confrontation. “Seal Ports, Cut Lines” (封港断线) depicts hammers crushing Taiwan in the North and South, and maritime access constrained.^[9] Another poster shows handcuffs on the island, and Chinese Coast Guard vessels “choking off” Taiwan’s ports.^[10] In this messaging, Taiwan’s vulnerability is framed not primarily in terms of military defeat, but in terms of disrupted connectivity: data flows, trade routes, energy supply, logistics, and digital lifelines.

This logic is paired with a carefully calibrated assurance. The posters and TAO statements consistently distinguish between “Taiwan independence forces” and the broader population, framing coercion as corrective rather than collective. This is a classic coercive move: threats are made credible by being conditional, while reassurance is offered to those willing to disengage from the targeted behavior. The message is not that Taiwan as a society must be destroyed, but that normalcy will return once pro-independence leadership is rejected.

This imagery subtly shifts the imagined battlespace away from amphibious invasion toward persistent, incremental coercion applied against civilian infrastructure and economic normalcy. The message is that pressure can be sustained below traditional thresholds of war while still imposing cumulative strategic effects.

Post-exercise TAO messaging reinforced this normalization logic through law-enforcement framing. In a briefing addressing mainland China Coast Guard activity near Kinmen, the spokesperson asserted that there are “fundamentally no such things as so-called ‘restricted waters’” and that patrols are conducted “in accordance with the law” to maintain navigation order and protect fishermen.^[11] Maritime pressure is reframed as routine governance rather than escalation.

This political framing directly complements posters featuring handcuffs and Coast Guard imagery. Together, they normalize gray-zone pressure as administrative control rather than crisis behavior, as well as push the norm of Chinese ships being able to interdict vessels heading to Taiwan’s ports.^[12]

Deter Externally, Contain Internally: Managing Escalation

Another poster cluster encodes escalation management logic. “Counter External Influence” (反控外调) sits above a set of arrows in flight at Taiwan, implicitly threatening the Taiwanese people.^[13] The arrows are piercing green worms, a reference to an earlier 2025 poster displaying Taiwan President Lai Ching-te as a green worm.^[14] The imagery reflects not operational anti-access in the narrow military sense, but a narrative adaptation of anti-access logic. Rather than depicting missiles denying airspace or sinking ships, the posters show arrows striking Taiwan itself, signaling that foreign involvement will translate into intensified pressure on the island. The intended audience is therefore not primarily external militaries, but Taiwanese observers being warned that outside intervention will not insulate them from coercion. In this sense, the messaging exploits both Taiwanese vulnerability and U.S. preoccupation with anti-access scenarios, emphasizing political consequences over operational mechanisms.

Language from the TAO tied directly to Justice Mission–2025 reinforced this precise logic. Officials emphasized that the PLA’s actions target “separatist activities and external interference—not the people of Taiwan,” while urging Taiwanese citizens to recognize the danger of their leadership’s course and oppose independence.^[15] The narrative pressures Taiwan internally while attempting to reduce reputational costs externally.

Precision and Exposure: Targeting Critical Nodes

Several posters emphasize surveillance and precision dominance. “Lock the island” (锁岛) overlays Taiwan with targeting graphics and highlighted infrastructure nodes. Below it, the message of “How could you possibly pursue ‘independence’?” (何以谋“独” )^[16]. The narrative message is omniscience: critical systems are known, mapped, and vulnerable. Coercion is framed as precise and technologically controlled rather than indiscriminate. Beijing intentionally couples its supposed revelation of Taiwanese capabilities in an attempt to puncture the hope the Taiwanese have in their own military.

This reinforces deterrence through perceived exposure rather than sheer destructive threat. Psychologically, it compresses uncertainty and signals that escalation pathways are already mapped.

Narrative Warfare as Operational Preparation

Justice Mission–2025 demonstrates that China increasingly treats exercises as integrated narrative operations rather than isolated military demonstrations. The posters storyboarded a coercive pathway: justice and legitimacy; suppression of independence; protection and punishment; systemic isolation; escalation control; precision targeting; and administrative normalization. The TAO then formalized that storyboard into authoritative political language.

The objective is not merely intimidation. It is expectation management: normalizing coercion, relocating blame, compressing escalation timelines, and psychologically conditioning audiences toward acceptance of pressure as lawful and inevitable through calibrated threats and assurances that deliberately play to existing fears: Taiwanese fears of isolation and cutoff, accommodationist hopes that restraint will restore normalcy, and external concerns that China can exploit anti-access dynamics to keep interveners out.

For analysts and policymakers, the implication is methodological as well as strategic. Monitoring aircraft counts and maritime tracks alone no longer captures the full signaling environment. Visual messaging, slogan sequencing, and political language now provide early indicators of how Beijing conceptualizes coercive pathways and escalation control.

Justice Mission–2025 illustrates how narrative warfare is being embedded directly into China’s military signaling toolkit, shaping how future coercion will be interpreted long before a crisis unfolds.

[1] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005636702183039129?s=20

[2] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/visualization-historical-pla-exercise-zones-2022-2025/

[3] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005431801721094379?s=20

[4] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-the-plas-military-operations-are-a-solemn-warning-to-taiwan-independence-separatist-forces-and-external-interference-forces/

[5] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005453180860084427?s=20

[6] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005456163249192993?s=20

[7] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-any-taiwan-independence-separatist-actions-will-never-be-tolerated-and-will-be-met-with-severe-punishment/

[8] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-any-country-or-force-that-plays-with-fire-on-the-taiwan-question-will-inevitably-pay-a-price/

[9] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005807062735790564?s=20

[10] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005837836851855481?s=20

[11] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-the-coast-guard-is-conducting-law-enforcement-patrols-in-the-relevant-waters-to-safeguard-the-lives-and-property-of-fishermen-on-both-sides-of-the-taiwan-strait/

[12] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005837836851855481?s=20

[13] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005456163249192993?s=20

[14] https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202504/1331297.shtml

[15] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-the-plas-military-operations-are-a-solemn-warning-to-taiwan-independence-separatist-forces-and-external-interference-forces/

[16] https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005473337783492633?s=20

Failure to Launch: How Political Backpedaling Could Hand China the Carrier Edge

Taiwan Announced Billions More for Defense. Here’s How It Can Deliver.

Creeping Closer: Timeline and Analysis of the Justice Mission-2025 Joint Exercise

Authors: Noah Reed, Ethan Connell, & Jonathan Walberg

From December 29^th to 31^st, the Eastern Theater Command (ETC) of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) held exercise “Justice Mission-2025” (正义使命-2025) in the waters and airspace surrounding Taiwan. The drills, described by Chinese state media as a response in part to the United States’ US$11.1 billion arms package to Taiwan announced two weeks prior,[i] were the 5^th and most significant round of joint exercises around Taiwan since Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan.[ii]

While following the overall thematic and operational rhythm established in prior exercises following 2022, Justice Mission-2025 also produced several firsts. These include the closest live-fire exercise to date, and the first use of a Type 075 amphibious assault ship in a joint-exercise. The exercise also featured a notable increase in attention devoted to psychological warfare and political messaging elements.

As has been the case in all past joint exercises, Justice Mission-2025 was described first and foremost as a “Serious warning to ‘Taiwan Independence’ separatist forces and external interference” by the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Ministry of National Defense (MND). (对“台独”分裂势力与外部势力干涉的严重警告.)[iii]

Overall, Justice Mission-2025 fulfilled a dual mandate. First, it provided relevant operational experience for the PLA and China Coast Guard (CCG), something represented in the growing scale of joint-exercises since 2022 as the PLA expands in reach and scale. Second, it sent a signal of frustration over the state of cross-Strait relations to Washington, while also attempting to place the blame for the deterioration of those relations on the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party and President Lai Ching-te.

Operational Sequencing of the Exercise

Day 1 Overview: Overall, Taiwan’s MND detected 89 aircraft and 28 naval vessels, split into 15 PLAN vessels and 13 CCG vessels, operating around Taiwan during day one of the Justice Mission-2025 exercise. The day was marked by several operational themes, including:

A focus on airpower, including long-range air superiority, airspace encirclement, and airborne early warning.
A focus on sea-air coordination, especially as it relates to the detection and destruction of surface and sub-surface vessels.
A focus on the airspace and waters east of Taiwan, consistent with an overall focus on deterring “external interference.”

29 December (All Times Local)

0730-0800: Spokesperson of the ETC of the People’s Liberation Army, Senior Colonel Shi Yi, announced that it had dispatched its Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force troops to conduct joint military drills codenamed “Justice Mission 2025” in the airspace and waters surrounding Taiwan.[iv]

Alongside this announcement was the release of a navigation warning with five prohibited entry zones within which live-fire exercises would take place the following day. Later in the day, the PRC’s Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) published two additional warning zones. The ETC later added an eighth zone to the east of Taiwan over radio, although they never announced it publicly via navigational warning.

Five of the eight declared zones violated Taiwan’s territorial waters. Zone four’s boundary ran less than five nautical miles from Taiwan’s southern coast. However, at no point did Chinese vessels cross into Taiwan’s territorial waters. All Chinese vessels operated in the area between Taiwan’s contiguous and territorial waters.

Notably, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) disclosed that its intelligence agencies had noticed irregular activity and possible preparation several days prior to the start of “Justice Mission,” which contrasts with a claim by Chinese state media that the operation represented a “cold start” or “snap exercise.”[v]

0800-0930: Approximately one hour after announcing the exercise, the PLA’s ETC claimed that it had mobilized fighters, bombers, unmanned aerial vehicles, and long-range rocket units to strikes on simulated mobile ground targets in the “middle areas” of the Taiwan Strait.[vi] Taiwan’s MND did not report any rocket impacts in the Taiwan Strait during this time, and the ETC did not release footage of these strikes as it did on the next day.

0930-1130: At 1000, Taiwan’s MND released a statement condemning the exercise and announced the beginning of rapid response exercises and a state of high alert.[vii] One hour later, the ETC announced maritime live-fire training to the north and southwest of Taiwan, employing destroyers, frigates, fighters, bombers, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The training focused on hunting and neutralizing targets, simulated ground strikes, and live firing against targets.[viii]

An article in the PLA Daily newspaper published on the morning of the 30^th identified several of the ships involved in this portion of the exercise, including the Baoyi, Quzhou, and Taiyuan ship formations.[ix]

1130-1230: At 1200, the ETC announced that it had dispatched destroyers, frigates, fighters, and bombers to conduct anti-submarine and sea-air coordination exercises to the east of the Taiwan Strait.[x] The ETC released initial footage from the exercise, showcasing elements of all involved services at around this time.

On the heels of this announcement, the CCG announced that it was carrying out “comprehensive law-enforcement patrols” in waters surrounding Taiwan and the areas near the Matsu and Wuqiu islands. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) claimed that it had detected increased CCG activity several hours prior to the CCG’s official announcement.[xi]

MarineTraffic Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, which shows the last pinged location of certain vessels, confirmed this claim, as several CCG vessels, including CCG 1303 and 1302, were already observed operating north of Taiwan by 12:00.[xii] TSM researchers subsequently confirmed that CCG vessels 14609, 14606, 1302, 1306, 2203, 2204, 1303, 1303, 1302 also participated in these patrols on the 29^th.[xiii]

Poster showcasing involved CCG vessels published by China’s Coast Guard Weibo Account

1230-1630: At 1500, the ETC conducted regional patrol, information support, and aerial confrontation drills using airborne early warning aircraft, fighters, and electronic warfare aircraft to the southwest of Taiwan.[xiv] An hour later, the ETC dispatched bomber task forces to conduct far-seas combat readiness patrols east of Taiwan, focusing on long-distance joint precision strikes in remote areas.[xv]

1600-0000: At 1700, the ETC reported that a Type 075 amphibious assault ship and several accompanying vessels were operating Southeast of Taiwan. According to state media, this represented the first time the PLA had deployed a Type 075 around Taiwan during a joint exercise.[xvi]

Finally, at 2000, the ETC released footage claiming to show a TB-001 UAV from the PLA Rocket Force’s 61^st Base operating close to Taipei City near the Tamsui River outlet.[xvii] Taiwan’s MND has disputed the authenticity of the footage, reporting that no drone entered Taiwan’s airspace during the exercise.

Image circulated by PRC State Media claiming to show a UAV’s photo capture of New Taipei

30 December (All Times Local)

Day 2 Summary: Taiwan’s MND reported 71 aircraft, 17 PLAN vessels, and 15 CCG vessels around Taiwan by 1500 on day 2 of Justice Mission-2025. In addition, Taiwan detected a total of 27 rocket impacts in the waters north and south of Taiwan over this period.

The second day of the drills focused on blockade operations and targeted strikes, marking the closest live-fire drills around Taiwan on record.

0730-0800: The second day of Justice Mission-2025 began at 0800, when the ETC announced that fighters, bombers, frigates, and destroyers were conducting integrated blockade and control operations, to include identification, warning, and anti-air and submarine operations, to the north and south of Taiwan.[xviii]

0800-1200: At 0900, the ETC initiated the first of two rounds of live-fire long-range rocket drills in exercise zone 1. According to Taiwan’s MND, PHL-16 self-propelled Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems (MLRS) from the 72^nd Group Army’s Rocket Artillery Brigade in Pingtan County, Fujian, fired at least 17 rockets into this zone.[xix]

1200-0000: At approximately 1300, PHL-16 MLRS from the 73^rd Group Army’s Rocket Artillery Brigade in Shishi, Fujian, initiated a second round of live-fire long-range rocket drills. [xx] These launches targeted Zone 3 to the south of Taiwan. Taiwan’s MND reported 10 rocket impacts in the exercise. [xxi]Taiwanese media outlets reported that ten rockets from the two sets of launches landed within Taiwan’s contiguous waters zone, marking the closest ever recorded impacts during a live-fire exercise.[xxii]

The remainder of Day 2 was mostly devoted to a series of poster and video releases by the Eastern Theater Command and China Coast Guard, who continued their “comprehensive law enforcement patrols” into the second day.

31 December (All Times Local)

The ETC announced the end of the exercise at 16:00 on December 31. It is not clear why the ETC delayed announcing the end of the exercise until 31 December, as all exercise warning zones had already expired the day prior. Furthermore, MarineTraffic AIS data showed that China Coast Guard vessels had begun pulling back from the waters around Taiwan earlier in the day.[xxiii] In prior exercises, the ETC usually announced the end of exercises on the last day of heavy activity.

Notably, the ETC had released no prior exercise updates on the 31^st, and Taiwan’s MND reported only 1 aircraft violating the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over this period.[xxiv]

Justice Mission-2025’s Propaganda Dimensions

Beijing deliberately crafted the messaging and reporting surrounding Justice Mission to frame the exercise as a “stern warning” to Taipei and its international supporters. Official statements and state media reports consistently emphasized the operation as a “legitimate and necessary action” to defend the PRC’s sovereignty and promote unification.[xxv] PRC spokespeople explicitly connected the drills to Washington’s mid-December approval of a record US$11.1 billion arms package for Taiwan, framing the exercise as a direct “punitive and deterrent action” in response.[xxvi] Foreign Ministry officials accused Taiwan’s ruling party of transforming the island into a “powder keg” through military expansion and arms acquisitions, cautioning that U.S. efforts to “arm Taiwan to contain China” would “only embolden the separatists and push the Taiwan Strait closer to the peril of armed conflict.”[xxvii] This external context was central to PRC rhetoric, enabling Beijing to justify the drills as compelled by hostile provocations and reinforcing its narrative that Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leaders are “provocateurs” responsible for escalating tensions.

Official posters and slogans likewise adopted an overtly threatening tone, emphasizing the PLA’s capacity to isolate and strike Taiwan. PLA media accounts disseminated a series of dramatic infographics and posters suggesting that Taiwan would be defenseless in a military confrontation. For instance, one poster depicted PLA forces severing Taiwan’s supply lines, accompanied by the caption “Supply cut off – how can [you] pursue ‘independence’?” while another highlighted the “overwhelming power gap” between the PRC and Taiwan, with the challenge, “How can you seek ‘independence’ [against such odds]?”[xxviii] These visuals, often given titles like “Hammer of Justice” or “Arrow of Justice,” portrayed missiles targeting the island and blockade operations restricting access to Taiwan’s ports.[xxix]

The central message was that Beijing’s military strength serves as a tool of righteous punishment, capable of simultaneously defeating “Taiwan independence” forces and deterring external intervention from the United States. One “Arrow of Justice” poster went further by depicting a missile and volleys of arrows plunging into Taiwan itself, with lurid green “worm” figures, a common stand-in for the DPP/“Green camp,” splattered across the island, visually signaling not just blockade or deterrence but the targeted eradication of “internal” pro-independence actors. Paired with the slogan “內控外馳” (“control internally, charge outward”), the imagery suggested Beijing could simultaneously suppress “Taiwan independence” forces on the island while striking outward to deter or punish external intervention.

PRC civilian agencies also contributed to the propaganda campaign. For example, the China Coast Guard promoted its involvement in the drills through graphics of patrol ships encircling Taiwan and slogans such as “Taiwan is China’s inherent territory,” thereby reinforcing the exercise’s dual military and law-enforcement objectives in asserting sovereignty.[xxx]

Initial announcement poster for Justice Mission 2025. The poster depicts the PRC as two shields emblazoned with the Great Wall, defending Taiwan from the external influence of American arms sales and military platforms.

Official statements from Beijing’s civilian and military representatives reinforced these themes. The State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) described the Justice Mission maneuvers as a “solemn warning” to separatists and foreign actors, calling them a “necessary and just measure” to protect China’s territorial integrity.[xxxi] TAO spokespersons accused the DPP administration of “recklessly colluding with external forces” and pursuing “independence” at the expense of Taiwan’s security and welfare. They cited President Lai Ching-te’s government’s acceptance of U.S. arms and support, claiming this “militarization” was leading the island down a “dangerous path.”[xxxii] Beijing repeatedly stated that its actions targeted “Taiwan independence” elements and their supporters, not the general population. TAO officials emphasized that “people on both sides of the Strait are one family,” and that PLA operations were directed only at separatist provocations and were “not [aimed] at the Taiwan compatriots.”[xxxiii] By combining explicit threats with appeals to “Taiwanese compatriots,” the PRC’s narrative sought to weaken support for the DPP by portraying Beijing’s actions as protective and just. At the same time, severe rhetoric toward external actors, warning that any foreign interference would “dash itself to pieces against the steel Great Wall of the PLA,” highlighted the exercises’ additional audience: the United States and other regional observers.[xxxiv] Through coordinated statements and vivid propaganda, the PRC presented Justice Mission-2025 as a lawful and necessary operation to punish separatism, deter U.S. “meddling,” and position itself as the purported defender of national sovereignty and guarantor of peace in the Taiwan Strait.

Regional and US Responses

While US President Donald Trump said that he “wasn’t worried” about Justice Mission-2025,[xxxv] and that his relationship with President Xi remains strong, the State Department called for China to “cease military pressure,” and that Beijing’s actions spiked tensions. Trump’s comment was widely interpreted in divergent ways: by critics as dismissive or inattentive, and by supporters as a signal of confidence meant to convey U.S. military and political dominance. In this sense, the remark functioned less as an assessment of the exercises themselves than as a performative signal aimed at preserving maneuver space and projecting toughness. Following the conclusion of the exercises, on January 1, State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott reaffirmed the United States’ policy of supporting peace and stability across the Strait, opposing unilateral changes to the status quo.[xxxvi]

On December 30^th, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry released a similar statement, calling for “dialogue and cooperation.”[xxxvii] On December 31^st, Japan expressed concern over the exercises, with Foreign Ministry press Secretary Kitamura emphasizing that “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are important for the international community as a whole.”[xxxviii] The same day in Manila, Philippine Defense Secretary Teodoro expressed deep concern, adding that China’s coercion against Taiwan has implications “beyond the region” and risks stability across the continent.[xxxix] Also making statements expressing concern on New Year’s Eve were Australia and New Zealand,[xl] with Germany,[xli] the United Kingdom,[xlii] and France making announcements the day before.[xliii] Notably, Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry thanked each of these countries for their statements condemning the exercises, including Japan, but left off the United States from the message.[xliv]

Conclusion

Justice Mission–2025 underscored that Beijing is trying to institutionalize a coercive “deal” around Taiwan: headline joint exercises are increasingly treated as a conditional punishment for specific U.S. and Taiwanese actions, while day-to-day gray-zone pressure continues regardless. The exercise showed ongoing improvements in joint fires, sea–air coordination, and geographically dispersed operations, especially east of Taiwan to deter external intervention from the US. The ambiguous third day of the exercise and subdued final phase created uncertainty surrounding the intentions and overall sequence of the exercise.

The number of aircraft and naval vessels involved during the exercise naturally grew from prior iterations, as should be expected with an increasingly large and coordinated force. December 29 saw the second-largest single-day ADIZ violation by PLA aircraft on record, with the period from December 29-30 representing the largest overall violation period. Notably, the exercise did not feature an aircraft carrier, instead opting to involve a Type 075 amphibious assault vessel for the first time.

Visualization of ADIZ violations during a major exercise, via Ben Lewis and PLATracker

The exercises featured Beijing’s increasing use of coordinated propaganda, law enforcement involvement, and symbolic imagery alongside military pressure. By linking the drills to U.S. arms sales and rationalizing them as “just” and “defensive,” the PRC aimed to shift blame for escalation to Taipei and Washington while normalizing the PLA’s presence near Taiwan. Regional reactions, which were mostly expressions of concern, underscore the gap between Beijing’s claims of legitimacy and the international community’s view of destabilization. Overall, the exercise suggests that future PLA operations around Taiwan will be frequent, multi-domain, and information-driven, focusing on eroding confidence and complicating decision-making rather than preparing for immediate invasion.

[i] Global Times. ‘Justice Mission 2025’ drills serious warning to ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces and foreign interference, MND on comment drills target US arms sale to Taiwan. December 29^th, 2025. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202512/1351803.shtml

[ii] Prior joint-exercises include: 2023 ”Joint Sword”, Joint Sword 2024-A, Joint Sword 2024-B, and Strait Thunder 2025-A.

[iii] PRC Ministry of National Defense. 国防部新闻发言人张晓刚就东部战区“正义使命-2025”演习答记者问. December 29th,2025.

[iv] PRC Ministry of National Defense. 东部战区海空兵力实施环台岛战备警巡. December 29th, 2025.

[v] Guo Yuandan and Liu Xuanzun. Expert interprets PLA’s ‘Justice Mission 2025’ drill areas as media on Taiwan island describes exercises as ‘sudden’. Global Times. December 29th, 2025. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202512/1351721.shtml, Taiwan Military News Agency. 中共片面宣布軍演　國防部：綿密掌握確保國家安全. December 29^th, 2025. https://www.mnd.gov.tw/news/mnd/85591

[vi] PRC Ministry of National Defense. 东部战区位台湾海峡中部海空域开展对陆机动目标打击演练. December 29th, 2025.

[vii] ROC Ministry of National Defense. https://x.com/MoNDefense/status/2005460859901051243. December 29th, 2025.

[viii] PRC Ministry of National Defense. 东部战区位台岛北部、西南海空域开展对海实弹射击等科目训练. December 29th, 2025.

[ix] Song’s Defense Watch. https://x.com/songs349/status/2005953998604623997. December 30th, 2025., PLA Daily. 东部战区位台岛周边开展“正义使命-2025”演习. Pg 1. December 30th, 2025.

[x] PRC Ministry of National Defense. 东部战区位台岛以东海空域开展对海突击、区域制空、搜潜反潜等科目演练. December 29th, 2025.

[xi] Jaime Ocon. https://x.com/JaimeOcon1/status/2005475439108833748.December 29th, 2025.

[xii] Taiwan Security Monitor. https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005499477323374881.December 29th, 2025.

[xiii] Taiwan Security Monitor. https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005569169895366874. December 29th, 2025.

[xiv] PLA Eastern Theater Command Weibo. 东部战区位台岛西南空域开展区域巡逻、空中对抗、信息支援等科目演练. December 29th, 2025.

[xv] PLA Eastern Theater Command Weibo. 东部战区组织轰炸机编队赴台岛以东开展远海战备巡航. December 29th, 2025.

[xvi] Guo Yuandan and Liu Xuanzun. Type 075 amphibious assault ship joins drills surrounding Taiwan for first time. Global Times. December 29th, 2025.

[xvii] Joseph Wen. https://x.com/JosephWen___/status/2005729323593224444. December 29th, 2025., PLA Eastern Theater Command Weibo. 东部战区发布#微视频这么近那么美随时到台北#. December 29th, 2025.

[xviii] PLA Eastern Theater Command Weibo. 东部战区位台岛南北两端开展对海突击、防空反潜等科目演练. December 30th, 2025.

[xix] Joseph Wen & Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative. https://x.com/JosephWen___/status/2005661342691398111. December 29th, 2025.

[xx] Joseph Wen & Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative. https://x.com/JosephWen___/status/2005661342691398111. December 29th, 2025.

[xxi] Joseph Wen & Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative. https://x.com/JosephWen___/status/2005661342691398111. December 29th, 2025.

[xxii] Joseph Yeh. PLA rockets land inside Taiwan’s 24 nautical mile contiguous zone: MND. Focus Taiwan/CNA. December 30th, 2025.

[xxiii] Taiwan Security Monitor. https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2006216815442116690. December 30th, 2025.

[xxiv] ROC Military News Agency. 中共機艦臺海周邊活動　國軍嚴密監控應處. January 1st, 2026.https://mna.mnd.gov.tw/news/detail/?UserKey=a7500bc9-1570-4fc9-8818-8998d9b695cf

[xxv] Taiwan Security Monitor TAO Statement Tracker https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-the-plas-military-operations-are-a-solemn-warning-to-taiwan-independence-separatist-forces-and-external-interference-forces/

[xxvi] Taiwan Security Monitor on X/Twitter: https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/new-arms-sales-for-taiwan-details-and-reactions/

[xxvii] Taiwan Security Monitor on X/Twitter: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202512/t20251229_11789718.shtml

[xxviii] Taiwan Security Monitor on X/Twitter: https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005869817232867426?s=20

[xxix] Taiwan Security Monitor on X/Twitter: https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005807062735790564?s=20; https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005456163249192993?s=20

[xxx] Taiwan Security Monitor on X/Twitter: https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005521133496623314?s=20; https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005837836851855481?s=20; https://x.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2005569169895366874?s=20

[xxxi] Taiwan Security Monitor TAO Statement Tracker https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-the-plas-military-operations-are-a-solemn-warning-to-taiwan-independence-separatist-forces-and-external-interference-forces/

[xxxii] Taiwan Security Monitor TAO Statement Tracker https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-any-country-or-force-that-plays-with-fire-on-the-taiwan-question-will-inevitably-pay-a-price/; https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-any-taiwan-independence-separatist-actions-will-never-be-tolerated-and-will-be-met-with-severe-punishment/

[xxxiii] Taiwan Security Monitor TAO Statement Tracker https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-any-taiwan-independence-separatist-actions-will-never-be-tolerated-and-will-be-met-with-severe-punishment/

[xxxiv] Taiwan Security Monitor TAO Statement Tracker https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-affairs-office-any-taiwan-independence-separatist-actions-will-never-be-tolerated-and-will-be-met-with-severe-punishment/

[xxxv] Ng and Ewe, “Trump Downplays Chinese Military Drills Around Taiwan” BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdxwxkeg9w6o

[xxxvi]US State Department on Justice Mission 2025 from CBS News: “U.S. says China’s military activities near Taiwan “increase tensions unnecessarily” https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-military-activities-near-taiwan-unnecessarily-raise-tensions-us-says

[xxxvii] https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aopl/202512303004.aspx

[xxxviii] Japan Times: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/12/31/japan/china-military-exercises-taiwan-japan-europe/

[xxxix] Philippines Government Announcement: https://www.bworldonline.com/the-nation/2026/01/01/721925/philippines-concerned-over-chinas-drills-near-taiwan-says-they-undermine-regional-stability

[xl] Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Announcement: https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1329&s=121415

[xli] German Government Announcement: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/military-exercises-china-taiwan-2750712

[xlii] United Kingdom Government Announcement: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-on-chinas-military-drills-december-2025

[xliii] French Government Announcement: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/china/news/article/justice-mission-2025-exercises-around-taiwan-december-30-2025

[xliv]Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Announcement: https://x.com/MOFA_Taiwan/status/2006273783192297963?s=20

Taiwan, want to stop the gray-zone? Put your money where your mouth is.

Author: Jonathan Walberg

Photo of Hongtai58 released by the Taiwan Coast Guard

The conviction stemming from the severing of Taiwan’s TP3 undersea cable was not merely a local legal success but a demonstration that gray-zone coercion can be countered when ambiguity is met with evidence and enforcement. Gray-zone strategies rely on deniability, repetition, and administrative normalization—coast-guard pressure, maritime militias, cable interference, and disinformation meant to exhaust institutions and condition the public to view incursions as routine. If left unchallenged, these tactics gradually reshape realities on the ground, shift the burden of proof onto Taipei, and narrow its political and operational options.

The effective response lies less in escalating conventional military power than in sustained investment in attribution, law enforcement, and narrative control. Although most global undersea cable faults are accidental, that very background noise makes persistent surveillance, pattern analysis, and prosecutorial capacity essential. Patrol vessels, sensors, and legal authorities convert suspicion into proof and protests into penalties, raising the cost of coercion at a fraction of the price of advanced fighter aircraft or major combatants.

Partnerships and disciplined transparency further strengthen deterrence. Cooperation with allies, insurers, and port authorities can impose economic and legal consequences on China-linked “shadow fleets,” while selective, evidence-based disclosure undermines disinformation without fueling panic. The TP3 verdict signaled that Taiwan’s maritime domain is governed by rules and consequences; sustaining that message requires consistently funding the institutions that patrol, document, prosecute, and communicate. If Taipei seeks fewer gray-zone tests, it must resource the people and tools that confront them every day.

Read at Small Wars Journal.