Author: Joseph O'Connor

Authors: Noah Reed, Jonathan Walberg, Ethan Connell, & Joe O’Connor

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From February 27th to March 5th, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported no People’s Liberation Army aircraft operating in the airspace near Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), an unusually long pause in activity that drew significant attention among regional observers. No supply flights, no repositioning of aircraft, and not even any training exercises.  While long pauses in ADIZ violations have occurred in the past, it has become extremely rare in recent years for Taiwan’s military to detect no aircraft operating in the nearby airspace outside the ADIZ for a prolonged period. The reason for this is quite simple: ADIZ violations are almost always directed at Taiwan, while activity outside Taiwan’s ADIZ could involve routine training flights or transits between coastal airbases. Thus, it is more common for the PRC to halt incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ than to reduce aviation activity in the Eastern Theater Command writ large over a long period of time.

This pause naturally sparked speculation, however many popular theories are as of yet unsupported by observable patterns and regional events. Observers have forwarded several possible explanations, to include the ongoing operations in Iran, the upcoming summit between President Trump and Xi, an inability to operate routinely following a series of major officer purges, and domestic politics in Taiwan. Below, we parse through the most prominent suggested theories and examine if they hold up to historical trends and further scrutiny. As our central argument suggests, it remains too early to make definitive judgments given the available data. Instead, we focus on understanding the factors behind several of the leading explanations for this break from pattern.

I: Domestic Explanations and Leadership Struggles

Two domestic events in the PRC could reasonably explain the dive in PLA activity in February. First, this week marked the beginning of the “Two Sessions,” an annual meeting of the PRC’s National People’s Congress (NPC).[i] Historically, this event coincided with lower ADIZ violations, with a notable exception of 2025.[ii] The heightened level of activity seen during 2025’s NPC meeting relative to prior years could be explained by the higher cross-Strait tension at the time, with the PLA holding its Strait Thunder-2025A joint exercise around Taiwan less than a month later.

Second, the end of the Spring Festival and the beginning of the Lantern Festival in the PRC could play some part in the lower activity. The Spring Festival has empirically propelled lower reported ADIZ numbers from late January into February over the last couple of years.[iii] Still, it is difficult to discern if the holidays alone drive these trends, or if it is merely one element of a broader rationale.

Finally, it is worth addressing the rumors that the PLA is simply incapable of conducting aerial activity around Taiwan due to recent turmoil in its leadership. This appears to be a less convincing explanation. After all, PLAN activity around Taiwan remains somewhat consistent, and the PLA and China Coast Guard (CCG) remain active in the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea. Moreover, it is not clear why the removal of senior leadership would cause the PLA to be incapable of flying aircraft around Taiwan, as such activity has become routine, even mundane, for several years. It also cannot explain why several waves of aerial activity occurred around Taiwan in February after the leadership investigations took place.

Overall, the National People’s Congress, as well as Spring/Lantern festivals, have historically contributed to lower numbers of ADIZ and airspace violations. However, it is rare for these events to coincide with total stoppages in incursions.

II: Trump–Xi Meeting and the “Best Behavior” Hypothesis

Another explanation is that the pause reflects a temporary “best behavior” or truce period ahead of a pending meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping later this spring.[iv] Under this interpretation, Beijing may be attempting to avoid incidents or tensions that could complicate or even cancel the meeting.[v] This suggests that China would reduce visible military pressure around Taiwan to create a more stable atmosphere prior to the meeting.

While plausible, the explanation doesn’t fit the observed pattern of activity.

First, the lull extended beyond just a halt in ADIZ incursions, but rather to all aircraft activity in the area, where regular flights and movements occur with training flights and movements between coastal bases. If the goal were to signal intent to Washington regarding Taiwan, Beijing could easily continue routine training flights in these areas while avoiding breaching Taiwan’s ADIZ. A complete halt of flights in the area goes beyond just signaling that Beijing doesn’t want to ‘rock the boat.’ It also assumes that Washington views the ADIZ as the principal outlet of PRC signaling over Taiwan, something that cannot necessarily be accepted at face value.

Second, the logic of a pre-summit truce, while plausible, would require a much longer pause in operations. This would become more plausible if the lull had continued. Further, it would commit the PLA to maintaining a break for a period following the summit, as a resumption of regular patrols would risk creating the impression that the summit had failed. In practice, maintaining the appearance of diplomatic restraint would likely require months of reduced activity, which is unlikely given the PLA’s ongoing pressure campaign that has seen few pauses since 2022.

 Finally, the broader geopolitical context makes the argument less convincing. Some analysts frame ADIZ incursions as a signaling mechanism directed at Washington, meaning that temporarily halting them could itself be a signal, a tacit gesture of restraint ahead of a summit. But even under this logic, the timing is difficult to reconcile with current events. The United States is presently engaged in an escalating conflict with Iran involving large-scale strikes and the possibility of wider regional escalation.[vi] In that environment, it is not obvious why Beijing would view the suspension of routine PLA sorties near Taiwan as a necessary diplomatic signal. If Beijing is prepared to pursue high-level diplomacy with Washington while the United States is conducting major military operations elsewhere, it is difficult to see why the symbolic value of turning off routine Taiwan-related flights would suddenly become decisive.

Put simply, a snapshot of the rest of the world makes the idea that Beijing is shelving routine Taiwan-related air activity purely to preserve summit optics less convincing.

III: Signaling to Taiwan

Yet another explanation being advanced is that Beijing is signaling its lack of concern over Taiwan’s ongoing special defense budget debate. However, the timeline of PLA activity does not support this interpretation. The debate has been ongoing for months, yet PLA air activity remained elevated throughout that period.[vii] For example, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported 19 PLA aircraft operating around Taiwan on January 29, just days after the Taiwan People’s Party unveiled its alternative special budget proposal. Activity continued shortly afterward, with 32 PLA aircraft detected on February 12, two days after Lai publicly urged the Legislative Yuan to pass the proposal during a press conference. Similarly, 22 PLA aircraft were detected on February 26, the day after Taiwan’s legislature agreed to send multiple budget proposals to committee review. These patterns suggest that PLA air activity has continued regardless of developments in Taiwan’s defense budget debate.

The PRC is likely to react to developments in Taiwan’s special defense budget proposals as they move through the Legislative Yuan. Beijing has repeatedly framed major Taiwanese defense initiatives as provocations, often responding with diplomatic pressure or military signaling. The PLA’s most recent exercise, Justice-Mission 2025A, reflects this pattern.[viii] Much of the iconography and messaging released before and during the exercise framed the drills in punitive terms, portraying them as a warning to Taipei. In that sense, the exercise reinforced the perception that advances in Taiwan’s defense budgeting process can trigger demonstrative military responses from Beijing.

Others advance this as rewarding Lai for his statements during a Spring Festival event where he referred to “Mainland China” instead of just “China,” a term that the PRC prefers.[ix] This reference, while not necessarily insignificant in meaning, is unlikely to prompt Beijing to depart three years of policy and “reward” the Lai administration by giving them time to breathe over a difference in terminology.

IV: Middle East and Fuel Hypothesis, Regional activity

One external explanation for the Eastern Theater Command’s pause in flight activity is that Beijing is temporarily conserving aviation fuel amid uncertainty about the ongoing conflict in the Middle East and potential supply disruptions. Sustained air operations require significant fuel resources, and the PLA may reduce nonessential sorties if leadership anticipates a prolonged price increase or broader market volatility.

However, the fuel-constraint explanation presents two significant challenges:

First, China has invested decades in developing strategic petroleum stockpiles to mitigate supply shocks. Public estimates indicate that Beijing maintains hundreds of millions of barrels in state strategic reserves, supplemented by commercial storage.[x] Recent planning documents and reports further suggest that China continues to expand these undisclosed strategic holdings, rather than signaling scarcity.[xi] Therefore, if the PLA were experiencing immediate operational constraints due to fuel availability, it would indicate a far more acute, system-wide stress than current stockpiling trends imply.

Second, if fuel conservation were the primary factor, a broader reduction in activity would be expected across all PLA operating areas, rather than a distinct, localized pause in aircraft activity detected around Taiwan. Chinese military activity in other regions, however, appeared to remain consistent with typical patterns.

For example, in the South China Sea, the PLA’s Southern Theater Command publicly released footage of naval and air units conducting a readiness patrol around Scarborough Shoal on February 28.[xii] The patrol involved coordinated use of early warning aircraft, anti-submarine aircraft, fighters, and bombers, accompanied by messaging that forces remain “on high alert” and prepared to take countermeasures. A subsequent Weibo post by the Southern Theater Command highlighted a PLAAF unit undergoing “rigorous combat training,” with a follow-on Global Times report stating that these patrols and exercises have continued “since February” and are explicitly linked to responses to external “joint patrol” activity.[xiii] This reinforces that PRC operational signaling in the south has not paused during this period.

Japanese public reporting over the past week indicates continued and routine activity around the Senkaku Islands. In its March 1, 2026, update, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that Chinese government vessels, mainly from the China Coast Guard, have continued to enter Japan’s contiguous zone near the Senkakus almost daily.[xiv] On February 28th, Japan’s Joint Staff reported that two People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Y-9 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft flew from the East China Sea, passed between Okinawa and Miyako, and continued into the Pacific as far as the Amami island chain, then reversed course and returned, prompting Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) scrambles.[xv] Overall, Japan’s official statements and recent Joint Staff reports indicate that PRC operations in the East China Sea remain active, even as aviation patterns near Taiwan fluctuate.

V. Preparing for an Invasion or Major Exercise

A more dramatic explanation is that the pause reflects preparations for a major PLA exercise. Others have posited that it could possibly be the ‘calm’ before an invasion or move on one of Taiwan’s outlying islands. Under this interpretation, the halt in routine aviation activity signifies an operational pause while forces reposition, conduct planning, or prepare for a larger coordinated operation.

It is true that large exercises or operations are sometimes preceded by short-term changes in routine activity, particularly if units are redeploying, conducting maintenance, or consolidating forces in preparation for a larger event.

However, there was little evidence during the pause to support the idea that it reflected imminent large-scale operations. Even a preparation for a theater-level exercise would likely generate additional changes and disruptions in observable patterns, including major changes in naval deployments, unusual airbase activity, logistical movements, and more. Many of these indicators are regularly detected through open-source monitoring and satellite imagery. At present, there are no clear signs of these types of preparatory activities occurring on a scale that would suggest a major operation is imminent.

More broadly, if the PLA were preparing a large exercise around Taiwan, it is not obvious why routine aviation activity across the Eastern Theater Command would need to halt. Training flights and patrols would normally continue alongside preparations unless airspace was being cleared for a specific operation, something that would likely be accompanied by other visible signals.

For these reasons, while the possibility of future exercises should never be discounted given the PLA’s recent pattern of demonstrations around Taiwan, the current pause alone is not strong evidence that a major operation is imminent.

Taken together, the available evidence suggests that the brief pause in PLA aviation activity around Taiwan was unlikely to be driven by any single factor. Domestic political events in China, including the NPC “Two Sessions” and the seasonal slowdown associated with the Spring Festival period, likely contributed to a temporary reduction in operational tempo. At the same time, explanations centered on diplomatic signaling, energy constraints, or preparations for major military operations remain less consistent with observed patterns of activity both around Taiwan and in other regions.

The resumption of PLA flights shortly after this lull reinforces a broader pattern that has characterized Chinese military pressure around Taiwan in recent years: cyclical activity. Periods of heightened sorties are often followed by short pauses before returning to baseline levels. Rather than indicating a change in Beijing’s strategy, the episode likely reflects the routine variability inherent in sustained military operations.

The more important analytical question is not why the PLA paused for several days, but how Beijing calibrates these cycles of pressure. Short interruptions in activity can create the perception of sudden shifts in intent, even when the underlying strategy remains unchanged.

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[i] https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/what-watch-chinas-two-sessions-2026

[ii] PLA Tracker: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?gid=905433190#gid=905433190

[iii] https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-pla-has-stopped-flying-aircraft?triedRedirect=true&_src_ref=t.co

[iv] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/chinese-military-flights-around-taiwan-fall-trump-xi-meeting-may-be-factor-2026-03-05/

[v] https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/03/05/2003853320

[vi] https://www.war.gov/Spotlights/Operation-Epic-Fury/

[vii] PLA Tracker: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?gid=905433190#gid=905433190

[viii] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/justice-mission-2025-the-narrative-battle-inside-chinas-latest-taiwan-exercise/

[ix] https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-pla-has-stopped-flying-aircraft?triedRedirect=true&_src_ref=t.co

[x] https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/chn

[xi] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/china-targets-steady-oil-output-more-gas-stockpiling-five-year-plan-2026-03-05

[xii] https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202603/1355963.shtml

[xiii] https://weibo.com/7468777622?tabtype=album&uid=7468777622&index=0; https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202603/1356043.shtml; https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202603/1355963.shtml

[xiv] https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100857530.pdf; https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html

[xv] https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2026/p20260302_01.pdf

Authors: Sydney Boerner & Joe O’Connor

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Introduction

On November 19, 2025, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te officially announced his administration’s proposal for a NT$1.25 trillion (US$40 billion) special defense budget through a press conference and an editorial in the Washington Post. The proposal, formally titled the Draft Special Act on Procurement for Enhancing Defense Resilience and Asymmetric Capabilities, or the National Defense Resilience Act, is supported by the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and emphasizes “Resilience” (韌性), framing security as the whole of society’s ability and capacity to withstand and recover from external pressures.

On January 26, 2026, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), an opposition party allied with the Kuomintang (KMT), introduced an alternative proposal titled the Draft Special Act for Procurement of Plans to Safeguard National Security and Strengthen Asymmetric Warfare Capabilities. The proposal emphasizes “Safeguard” (保衛), highlighting the state’s responsibility to protect territorial integrity through established hardware rather than a whole-of-society framework. It sets a ceiling of NT$400 billion (US$12.69 billion), approximately one-third of the Lai administration’s proposal, but still larger than the Tsai administration’s 10% year-over-year increase in 2021 of NT$42.1 billion (US$1.51 billion). Prior to this proposal, the KMT/TPP majority in the LY successfully blocked placing the DPP proposal on the agenda multiple times, effectively rendering it dead on arrival until this alternative was announced.

Both proposals remain actively under review in the Legislative Yuan (LY), and most importantly, are multi-year funding packages in addition to yearly “base” defense budgets. Their current status allows for comparisons between the proposals with respect to funding levels and oversight mechanisms. As of the time of writing, the KMT has also stated that they will be releasing a third budget proposal of their own, but information about it has not been released so far.

General Budget Comparison

The two proposals reflect different governance approaches and political priorities. The DPP emphasizes long-term flexibility, broader strategic objectives, and standard oversight, while the TPP emphasizes legislative control, fiscal transparency, and strict procedural accountability.

As stated above, the primary difference between the proposals is the topline ceiling of appropriations, with the TPP proposal setting a ceiling of NT$400 billion, roughly 32 percent of the DPP’s proposed NT$1.25 trillion. Both proposals share the same eight-year timeline from 2026 to 2033. The DPP proposal authorizes an eight-year lump sum with inter-category transfers and rollover of unspent funds, allowing year-over-year budgetary flexibility. In contrast, the TPP proposal requires an annual release vote on funds, prohibits inter-category transfers, and mandates that any unspent funds be returned to the National Treasury rather than rolled over, framing these requirements as measures of fiscal transparency and legislative accountability.

Oversight, reporting, and procurement procedures also differ between the proposals. The DPP proposal relies on standard oversight via the LY Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, records unit prices in a classified annex, and handles price increases through internal review under U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procedures. The proposal is exempt from the Public Debt Act, which enforces a 50% debt-to-GDP spending cap for all budgets. Additionally, it follows constitutional reporting standards, wherein the President is not required to report directly or answer questions to the LY – an issue that has recently sparked a minor constitutional crisis. Procurement may include emergency purchases from domestic suppliers or friendly third nations, and the proposal establishes links to NATO spending targets of 3.3 percent of GDP in 2026 and 5 percent by 2030 within standard procurement cycles.

In contrast, the TPP proposal grants line-item veto authority to the LY Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, requires public disclosure of unit prices, and mandates a re-vote if any item price increases by more than 5 percent. The proposal mandates the President deliver a “National Defense Report” before the LY and respond to questions, in line with the recently amended Law on the Exercise of Offices and Powers of the Legislative Yuan; the constitutionality of this action is disputed and in 2024, the Constitutional Court heard arguments on the issue. The proposal is subject to the Public Debt Act’s spending ceilings; procurement is restricted to U.S. FMS sales (with a 30-day congressional notification period); and spending focuses exclusively on hardware, in accordance with existing U.S. notifications.

Hardware and Weapons Systems Procurement

Both proposals maintain key artillery and missile capabilities, but they differ in priorities, scope, supporting systems, and integration across operational domains. The DPP proposal develops a broad, multi-domain capability that reflects the MND’s seven major objectives. In contrast, the TPP proposal prioritizes a narrower set of newly announced procurement programs within strict budget caps, with reduced integration and supporting systems, reflecting a focus on immediate operational needs and legislative oversight.

Building on the differences in governance and political priorities, the proposals also differ in their approach to hardware procurement. The DPP proposal is designed to strengthen seven major defense objectives through special provisions, including:

• “A multi-layered air interception network”
• “Command and control and decision support”
• “Multi-layered weakening”
• “Long-range precision strike”
• “Strengthening combat resilience”
• “Enhancing military capacity”
• “Defense driving economic benefits”

Procurement items include:

• “Precision artillery”
• “Long-range precision strike missiles”
• “Unmanned vehicles and their countermeasures systems”
• “Air defense, anti-ballistic missile and anti-armor missiles”
• “AI-assisted and C5ISR systems”
• “Enhancing sustained combat capacity equipment”
• “Equipment and systems jointly developed and procured by Taiwan and the United States”

In terms of precision artillery, the DPP procurement plan includes 60 M109A7 Paladin self-propelled howitzers with 4,080 precision-guided munitions, 60 M992A3 ammunition vehicles, and 12 M88A2 Hercules recovery vehicles. Long-range precision strike missile capabilities include 82 M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) multiple-launch rocket launcher systems, 1,203 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) pods, and 420 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles. Unmanned vehicles and countermeasures include 1,554 ALTIUS-700M loitering munitions and 478 ALTIUS-600ISR surveillance drones, in addition to more than 200,000 drones of various types and 1,000 unmanned surface vessels. Air defense, anti-ballistic, and anti-armor capabilities include 1,050 FGM-148 Javelin anti-armor missiles and 70 launchers, as well as 1,545 BGM-71F TOW-2B anti-armor missiles and 24 launchers. AI-assisted and C5ISR systems include artificial intelligence decision-support systems, tactical communication networks, and rapid intelligence-sharing kits. To strengthen operational sustainability, the DPP procurement plan establishes strategic stockpiles of ammunition, including 105mm and 120mm tank rounds, 30mm autocannon rounds, and 155mm artillery and grenade munitions. The proposal also calls for establishing domestic production lines for other combat equipment, including chemical protective masks, night-vision devices, armored vehicles, and mobile barrier equipment. Finally, the DPP’s proposal includes the procurement of systems jointly developed with the United States to acquire emerging technologies, enhance operational resilience, and strengthen asymmetric warfare capabilities.

In contrast, the TPP proposal adopts a narrower procurement framework centered on a defined set of high-priority, primarily ground-based, strike and anti-armor systems subject to explicit fiscal ceilings. Rather than pursuing a comprehensive, multi-domain modernization effort, the proposal emphasizes targeted investments in immediately deliverable capabilities, strict budget caps, and phased legislative oversight under the total NT$400 billion ceiling. It omits broader initiatives related to integrated air and missile defense expansion, large-scale unmanned fleets, AI-assisted C5ISR architecture, strategic stockpiling, domestic industrial expansion, and wide-ranging joint development programs, reflecting a more limited scope focused on core denial capabilities.

Regarding procurement items, the TPP plan maintains the MND’s plans for 60 M109A7 Paladin self-propelled howitzers, including the accompanying 4,080 PGMs, 60 ammunition vehicles, and 12 recovery vehicles, but caps the total at NT$126.7 billion. It also keeps plans for 82 M142 HIMARS systems with 1,203 GMLRS pods and 420 ATACMS, also capped at NT$127.6 billion.  Lastly, the TPP plan keeps the proposed procurement of 1,050 Javelin and 1,545 TOW-2B anti-tank missiles, totaling NT$11.8 billion and NT$11.1 billion, respectively. This is alongside a separate anti-armor unmanned aerial missile program, which is assumed to be ALTIUS systems, capped at NT$34.7 billion. An additional NT$88.1 billion is reserved for other urgently needed items deliverable within three to five years, provided they are individually specified and do not duplicate annual defense programs.

	DPP/MND Proposal	TPP Proposal
“Precision artillery”	60 M109A7 Paladin self-propelled howitzers w/ 4,080 precision-guided munitions	Included, capped at NT$126.7 billion
	60 M992A3 ammunition vehicles
	12 M88A2 Hercules recovery vehicles
“Long-range precision strike missiles”	82 M142 HIMARS multiple-launch rocket launcher systems	Included, capped at NT$127.6 billion
	1,203 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System pods
	420 ATACMS missiles
“Unmanned vehicles and their countermeasures systems”	1,554 ALTIUS-700M loitering munitions	Only ALTIUS systems included, capped at NT$34.7 billion
	478 ALTIUS-600ISR surveillance drones
	200,000+ drones
	1,000+ unmanned surface vessels
“Air defense, anti-ballistic missile and anti-armor missiles”	1,050 FGM-148 Javelin anti-armor missiles w/ 70 launchers	Included, capped at NT$11.8 billion
	1,545 BGM-71F TOW-2B anti-armor missiles w/ 24 launchers	Included, capped at NT$11.1 billion
“AI-assisted and C5ISR systems”	AI decision-support systems	None
	Tactical communications networks
	Rapid intelligence-sharing kits
“Enhancing sustained combat capacity equipment”	Domestic production lines and stockpiles for 105mm & 120mm tank rounds, 30mm autocannon rounds, 155mm artillery & grenade munitions	None
	Domestic production lines for chemical protective masks, night-vision goggles, and armored vehicles, and mobile barrier equipment
“Equipment and systems jointly developed and procured by Taiwan and the United States”	Included, unknown quantity	None

Infrastructure and Technology

In addition to hardware and weapons systems procurement, the DPP proposal emphasizes investments in infrastructure and integrated technology. Funding is included for “tactical mission networks,” which link units across dispersed battlefields, enable real-time data sharing, and integrate AI decision-support systems to assist operational commanders. The proposal also strengthens digital resilience by establishing redundant, protected communication networks to ensure command and control functions remain operational under contested or degraded conditions. Strategic communications capabilities are expanded across terrestrial, aerial, and satellite networks to maintain secure and continuous information flow. Early warning systems incorporate unmanned vehicles and sensor platforms to detect potential threats and transmit real-time intelligence. Hardened basing initiatives improve the protection of key command facilities, including shielding against missile strikes and electromagnetic pulse effects. These elements support the DPP’s operational objectives of command, control, and decision support and, in particular, enhancing operational resilience across the defense system.

On the other hand, the TPP proposal adopts a narrower approach focused on immediately deliverable capabilities and does not fund any of the above programs. The TPP proposal emphasizes platform-centric and hardware-focused defense measures rather than multi-domain technological integration. While it provides rapid acquisition of ground-based strike and anti-armor systems, it does not include the networked architecture, sensor integration or protected command infrastructure envisioned in the DPP proposal.

Personnel and Sustainment

Beyond infrastructure and technology, the two proposals also differ in their approach to personnel and sustainment, focusing on the support required to operate and maintain procured systems. The DPP proposal includes training tied to the operation of artillery, missile, and unmanned systems, but does not fund separate training units or simulation centers. Life-cycle support is provided within procurement categories and may cover pre-paid technical support, repair kits, and system-specific overhauls. Spare parts are included only as required for the acquired equipment, without establishing centralized pools for aircraft, armored vehicles, or naval engine turbines. Repair depots and maintenance infrastructure are referenced in connection with equipment sustainment, with no dedicated funding for depots, hardened workshops, or automated repair facilities. Strategic ammunition is purchased alongside the weapons systems, rather than as a separately authorized stockpile. Industrial base support is limited to domestic production and development associated with specific procured systems, with no independent funding for broader defense industrial expansion or research and development.

In contrast, the TPP proposal provides only the minimal sustainment necessary to operate the procured systems. Training, life-cycle support, spare parts, repair depots, strategic ammunitions, and industrial base development are largely omitted or limited to what is immediately required for the specific equipment acquisitions, included as part of FMS cases. Broader sustainment measures, including depot construction, centralized parts pools, or strategic stockpiles, remain the responsibility of the regular annual defense budget. Industrial base engagement is confined to the basic procurement compliance and cooperative requirements, without separate funding for domestic production capacity. In practice, the TPP proposal prioritizes rapid acquisition and legislative oversight over embedded operational support. In contrast, the DPP proposal incorporates limited sustainment elements to ensure ongoing operational readiness of the procured systems.

Conclusion

The major differences between the two special defense budgets center around flexibility and holistic spending, as opposed to narrower and targeted procurements of established systems. The inclusion of funding for newly announced HIMARS and Javelin sales from December in the TPP proposal indicates at least some level of good-faith bargaining for weapons, apart from Paladins, that are asymmetric in nature.  Increased oversight provisions are beneficial for open-source monitoring, such as our work, but conflict with the Lai administration’s preferences, and constitutional issues surrounding Lai himself reporting to the LY. It is clear that those provisions, more than anything else, will be one of the biggest budget battles in the near future.

As of the time of writing, the LY is set to reconvene on February 24, with Speaker Han Kuo-yu indicating that the competing special defense budget proposals will be the “very first” items to be considered by the legislature. It is assumed that other proposals will emerge, or the two proposals will change, and we await the outcome of the LY’s deliberations.