Category: Arms Sales Backlog

Abrams and ALTIUS Delivered, But Further Delays Emerge

Authors: Joe O’Connor, Eric Gomez, Shikhar Chaturvedi, Danielle Kremer, and Wyeth Lindberg 

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Taiwan’s legislature failed to reach an agreement on a special procurement budget to fund U.S. arms sales in March, which is already delaying Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases worth over $10 billion.  

Special Budget Updates in March 

On March 5, the Kuomintang (KMT) released their proposal for US$12.02 billion (NT$380 billion) in spending, to fund only the arms approved in December 2025. This proposal required that Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) be approved before funds are appropriated, instead of having funds in advance. The KMT’s proposal also required that funds for future arms sales from the US be approved as a second bill, instead of the Lai administration or Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) proposals, which allocate funds for future arms purchases. 

Following its release, Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo and statements carried by the Military News Agency (MNA) pushed back against the proposal, arguing that its sunset provision of December 2028 is incompatible with current delivery timelines and unrealistic. The MND also clarified in a statement that three sales announced in December, including the Taiwan Tactical Network, as well as AH-1W spare parts and Harpoon missile refurbishment, were not included within the administration’s NT$1.25 trillion special budget request, instead being folded under annual defense spending. 

Conclusion

Taken together, March’s developments show a backlog that is still slowly moving in the right direction, but with growing signs that Taiwan’s main bottleneck is no longer only United States’  production capacity. The completion of ALTIUS deliveries, the near-finish of the Abrams case, and visible progress on the F-16 Block 70 and MQ-9B programs are welcome developments. At the same time, repeated delays in passing a special defense budget, uncertainty over LOA follow-through and initial payments, and the need to seek deadline extensions from Washington indicate that domestic political and procedural friction in Taiwan are increasingly shaping the pace of FMS execution.  

Errata: Percentages in Table 1 inaccurately reflected sale value and have been appropriately updated.

Special Budget Complications Continue

Authors: Joseph O’Connor, Eric Gomez, & Shikhar Chaturvedi

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Political gridlock over the Lai administration’s special procurement budget continued in February 2026, leading to concerns about recently announced U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. No new Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases were notified to Congress, and no existing sales were delivered in February. The total value of FMS cases notified to Congress but not delivered to Taiwan remains $32 billion.

Eagle-eyed readers will notice that there is a change in Figure 1. Arms sales cases are fully removed from our dataset once final delivery occurs, but we do not reduce the dollar value of the backlog for partial deliveries. We have explained our thinking in other articles.

We indicate partially delivered arms sales through color coding in our data visualizations, with the yellow-orange color representing cases that are partially delivered to the best of our knowledge. Previously, we have only done this for arms sales valued at $1 billion or more because these were the most militarily significant sales and because, given the quantities and types of capabilities involved, they tended to be the easiest to track.

However, we realize that a $1 billion threshold has its own problems. We have therefore decided to adjust our methodology for data visualizations, and from now on, any arms sale that we can verify as partially delivered will be visually indicated with the yellow-orange color. The dollar value of the backlog will only be reduced when a sale is fully delivered, but we think this new approach represents a reasonable way to show in-progress deliveries.

This methodology change moves five arms sales cases worth $1.89 billion into the partially delivered category. Combined with the two cases above, the $1 billion threshold that we were already tracking as partially delivered—M1A2T Abrams tanks and Harpoon Coastal Defense Cruise Missile systems—there are seven arms sales cases worth $6.26 billion that are partially delivered, just shy of 20 percent of the backlog’s total dollar value.  

The differences between the competing proposals largely center on flexibility and holistic spending, as opposed to narrower and targeted procurements of established systems, as discussed in detail in our recent article comparing the two proposals. On the sidelines, the Kuomintang (KMT), the third and largest major party in the LY, announced in late February that they would be releasing their own special budget proposal, which they did in early March. As of the end of February, the proposal had ranged from NT$350 billion (US$11.19 billion) to NT$750 billion (US$23.97 billion) but turned out to be only NT$380 billion (US$12 billion) when announced on March 6.

Taiwan’s MND, on February 6, sounded the alarm about three Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) that are set to expire on March 15. The LOAs, which are for the December sales of Paladin self-propelled howitzers, TOW-2B anti-armor missiles, and Javelin anti-armor missiles, were not signed because of ongoing battles in the LY. MND officials stated they were seeking extensions to the LOAs if a deal was not reached soon. Signing a LOA quickly is an important milestone in the FMS process. A LOA has a payment schedule, whereby Taiwan would pay the U.S. government in installments for the capabilities it is purchasing. The U.S. government negotiates a contract with the defense industry and pays for the capabilities using the funds that Taiwan transfers per the LOA. Importantly, until a LOA is signed and a first payment is made, the Department of Defense cannot enter a contract to produce the weapons. If a LOA is not signed before it expires, then certain steps in the FMS process must be repeated or renegotiated due to potential changes in pricing.

Conclusion

Taiwan’s arms sales backlog remained steady at $32.0 billion through the end of February 2026. However, recent developments highlight the role of political factors in the backlog rather than defense industrial capacity.  

The Legislative Yuan has only just begun substantive review of competing special budget proposals, while the March 15 LOA expiration deadline is approaching for several cases notified in December.  Meanwhile, Washington’s efforts to streamline arms transfers are occurring alongside high-level diplomacy, which may influence the timing of major new Taiwan FMS notifications to Congress. 

March will be a critical month to determine whether Taipei can turn budget discussions into signed agreements and funding, and whether U.S. process improvements will result in faster execution or be offset by political considerations on both sides.

Special Budget Complications Continue

By Joseph O’Connor and Eric Gomez

The first month of 2026 was relatively slow for the US arms sale backlog to Taiwan. No new Foreign Military Sales (FMS) were notified to Congress or fully delivered; the topline value of the backlog saw no change since December. Deadlock on the special defense budget in the Legislative Yuan (LY) continued, with the opposition Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) submitting its own, reduced proposal. Additionally, the Department of Defense awarded a contract for the production of F-16 simulators being purchased by Taiwan.

The arms sale backlog as of January 31, 2026, remains $32.0 billion. For arms sales valued at over $1 billion, deliveries in progress are marked in yellow-orange in our visualizations, meaning that the true dollar value is lower than the topline. Figure 1 illustrates the breakdown of the backlog between asymmetric weapons, traditional weapons, and munitions. Table 1 provides an itemized list of all arms sales in the backlog, including the most up-to-date information on their status.

Meanwhile, the TPP announced a counter proposal for the special defense budget, worth NT$400 billion (US$12.69 billion) on January 26 in a press conference, sending it to the LY Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee for review on January 30. This reduced budget proposal contains funding for five of the eight cases announced in December, including Paladin self-propelled howitzers, HIMARS launchers and munitions, Javelin and TOW anti-tank missiles, and ALTIUS loitering munitions, for a total of NT$311.9 billion (US$9.90 billion). The December FMS cases not funded in the TPP’s proposed budget are tactical mission networks, and spare parts for attack helicopters and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.  The proposal also omitted funding for local partnerships with the Taiwanese defense industrial base, including the procurement of some 200,000 drones. The NT$400 billion represents a spending ceiling, with the LY needing to vote on new funding each year until the total amount is reached. This gives the LY much more oversight power over arms sale spending, giving them multiple opportunities to pause or redirect funding if cases fall behind schedule.

Interestingly, the inclusion of the five most significant cases from December indicates an implicit desire to continue procurement of mostly asymmetric systems. The TPP proposal also includes oversight provisions, including “comprehensive special reports” on case statuses over the last five years, how said procurement cases improve joint operational effectiveness, acquisition timelines, and delivery dates, and fiscal impacts. An MND press conference on 26 January refuted these oversight provisions as being time-prohibitive and having effects on the progress of backlogged cases. If passed, however, this level of oversight would provide more effective monitoring of the backlog.

Conclusion

January marked the continuation of ongoing budgetary battles in the LY, which have no intention of ending soon, particularly with an opposition alternative being proposed. The special defense budget debate is now the central variable: if the LY cannot reach a workable compromise soon, Taiwan risks procurement delays in the earliest phases of an FMS case. The budget drama also sends mixed signals to allies and adversaries of Taiwan on its willingness to provide for its own defense.  However, the TPP’s emphasis on greater transparency and oversight would be welcome for providing more information about how arms sale cases are progressing—or stalling.

Trump Administration Notifies Congress of $11 Billion in New Taiwan Arms Sales

By Eric Gomez and Joseph O’Connor

On December 17, 2025, the Trump administration notified Congress of over $11 billion worth of new Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases to Taiwan, the largest ever package of US arms sales to Taiwan by dollar value. This new package raises the total dollar value of the US arms sale backlog to Taiwan to approximately $32 billion. At least $4.4 billion of this amount has been partially delivered to Taiwan.

Seeing such a steep growth in the total dollar value of the backlog seems alarming at first glance, but overall, the December 2025 FMS cases are a good thing for Taiwan. The new arms sales are heavily weighted in favor of asymmetric systems that will likely be produced and delivered rapidly.

As always, Figure 1 shows how the backlog is divided between traditional systems, asymmetric systems, and munitions. Table 1 is an itemized list of the FMS cases that Taiwan is waiting to receive, with the latest information on delivery schedules. In Table 1, items in green text are new additions to the backlog; those in red text are newly delivered items that have been removed from the backlog, and yellow/orange text represents arms sales worth at least $1 billion that are partially delivered.

Traditional Capabilities: 1 Case, $4.03 Billion

The only traditional capability in the December 2025 arms sale package is the sale of 60 M109A7 Paladin self-propelled howitzers plus support equipment such as ammunition carriers and armored recovery vehicles. Taiwan previously attempted to purchase 40 M109A6 Paladins in 2021, but shortly after the Ukraine war began, the sale was cancelled, and Taiwan instead focused on buying additional HIMARS.

Taiwan could have probably found better ways to spend $4 billion, but in the world of traditional capabilities, self-propelled howitzers are not that bad an investment. Artillery pieces are still important in modern battlefields, and while it may not be as mobile as a HIMARS launcher, a Paladin can still use mobility to improve its survivability. Taiwan also already operates earlier variants of the Paladin, which should help with the quick absorption of the new systems. Finally, the defense industrial base has improved its production rates of 155mm artillery shells and Paladin howitzers because of the Ukraine war, which will hopefully mean a shorter gap between Congressional notification and delivery to Taiwan.

Stinger Delivery Completed

While the massive recent arms sale package has understandably received most of the attention this month, there were two arms sales that were removed from the backlog. Taiwan was waiting on the delivery of 500 Stinger man-portable air defense missiles that were sold across two FMS cases (December 2015 and July 2019) worth a combined $440 million.

Though Taiwan originally planned on purchasing just 250 for the Navy, and got relatively close to finalizing a contract a few years after the 2015 notification to Congress, the Taiwanese Army desired Stingers of its own, halting progress on the sale to allow for renegotiations. A 2024 MND document further mentions that supply chain issues and material shortages exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to sluggish progress on Stinger production, and that since 2021, there have been two official letters of protest submitted about the project.

A budget unfreezing report from earlier in 2025 and testimony by Defense Minister Wellington Koo to the Legislative Yuan in November indicated that Taiwan would finally receive a delivery of 500 Stingers, which would satisfy the two FMS cases, by the end of 2025. Taiwan has reportedly developed plans to purchase approximately 2,000 additional Stingers from the United States, but such a sale has not yet received Congressional notification.

Other Case Updates: F-16 Testing and IRST Production

News emerged about the status of F-16V production this month, as the first Taiwanese airframe, #6831, underwent taxiing tests on December 20 and a flight test on December 30, both at Lockheed Martin’s production facility in Greenville, South Carolina. Delivery of the aircraft and additional testing of more airframes are expected to begin early this year. Once the first airframe arrives in Taiwan, we will mark the F-16 case as being a delivery in progress.

On December 31, the U.S. Air Force awarded a $328.5 million undefinitized contract action (UCA) to Lockheed Martin for production of three types of targeting pods, including Sniper, IRST, and LANTIRN pods. Of this, 55 IRST pods are to be produced for the ROCAF, using $157.3 million worth of FMS funds for Taiwan, and work is expected to be completed by June 2031. It is worth noting that a UCA is expressly not final in terms of cost and quantity, but authorizes production of those systems. The last update for the IRST case was in June 2024, when a contract was signed for production.

Conclusion

The December 2025 arms sale package significantly increases the size of the backlog while also improving its underlying composition. Unlike previous FMS cases that added slow-to-deliver, traditional capabilities like F-16s and Abrams tanks, the new cases prioritize asymmetric systems, which will likely have faster production times and have a lower per-unit cost. A Taiwanese military that is better prepared to implement an asymmetric defense strategy should be able to impose costs on China through dispersed fires, expendable unmanned systems, and mobile air defense.

This update also highlights the main challenge for 2026: closing the gap between FMS notification to Congress and weapons in the hands of Taiwan’s soldiers. The recently completed Stinger cases show how even sales of asymmetric capabilities can be slowed down by bureaucratic inefficiencies, supply chain disruption, and defense industry bottlenecks. Maintaining progress on HIMARS, ALTIUS, and other asymmetric programs will require ongoing prioritization by both governments, transparent delivery timelines, and consistent follow-through on training, basing, and sustainment.

New Report to LY, Special Budget, and NASAMS Contracts

By Joseph O’Connor and Eric Gomez

While November 2025 did not see any major topline activity in the backlog itself, the second Trump administration made its first maintenance sale of aircraft parts to Taiwan, valued at $330 million. Additionally, many valuable status updates emerged from a new MND report to the Legislative Yuan on arms sales, alongside regular hearings. Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te also publicly announced Taiwan’s special budget for the first time, which will not directly affect the backlog but signals additional purchases in the future.

November’s Report to LY and Other Status Updates

On November 3rd, the MND submitted a report to the Legislative Yuan on the status of US arms sales, noting a total of 25 FMS cases that are ongoing, up from 18 in June 2025. The report classified three major sales as “delayed,” namely, F-16 Block 70/72 aircraft, AGM-154C Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOWs), and MK 48 torpedoes, corresponding with earlier statements in October from Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo about delays associated with those sales.

On AGM-154C JSOWs: The report indicates they will continue to be delayed, with delivery not expected until 2027 or 2028, instead of 2026; in line with Premier Cho Jung-tai’s statements in October to that same effect. The AGM-154C has been categorized as a delayed sale by the MND since March 2024, and a contract to produce them was not signed until February 2024.

On MK 48 torpedoes: November’s report categorizes them as delayed for the first time, slipping from 2026 to 2028 and a closeout of 2030, per statements made by the Navy’s Chief of Staff, Vice Adm. Chiu Chun-jung, after the LY report was submitted.

Though known for a while, the November report categorized the sale of 18 HIMARS launchers, 20 ATACMS missiles, and 864 GMLRS rockets as “ahead of schedule,” expected by the fourth quarter of 2026, instead of the projected timeline of 2027. This is likely owing to significant production increases on the US side. Koo, while testifying to the LY concerning the monthly report, also stated that sales of Stinger and Harpoon missiles were on schedule.

A few other status updates appeared in November, from various MND announcements and statements by officials. First, Air Force Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Lee Ching-jan informed the LY on November 6th that the first two MQ-9B SeaGuardian maritime surveillance drones will be delivered to Taiwan by the third quarter of 2026, continuing on a normal timeline. The MND announced on November 11th that as a part of the “T-Dome” air defense concept, batches of the 100 total PAC-3 MSE interceptors will begin arriving by the end of 2025, with expected completion by 2027. Lastly, Director of the MND Strategic Planning Department Maj. Gen. Huang Wen-chi stated that delivery of the 6 total MS-110 reconnaissance pods will begin in batches before the end of 2025.

The inclusion of these monthly reports by the MND to the LY is a useful and transparent step in determining the status of all sales, but, in particular, those that the MND considers “delayed.”

Conclusion

The more frequent publication of reports on arms sale timelines to the LY is an encouraging and transparent step from Taiwanese officials. It is worth noting that there are many more than three sales that are delayed, but the MND only appears to categorize “delayed” sales as those that Taiwan has paid for. TSM is working on a complete translation of Koo’s testimony before the LY that we will publish in the new year; and will also have a more in-depth response to the issue of Taiwanese perception between “delayed” and “backlogged” sales.

As of the time of writing, there are many new developments in Taiwanese arms sales, in particular, the addition of a US$11 billion arms package. We at TSM will provide more detail on what that means for the backlog next month.

Delays Mount for F-16s, Torpedoes

By Eric Gomez

The backlog of US arms sales notified to Congress slightly worsened in October 2025, as senior Lai administration officials admitted to new delays while under questioning by lawmakers in the Legislative Yuan (LY). A summit between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping did not result in any significant changes to US policy toward Taiwan, which suggests that future arms sales remain on the table. A new “T-Dome” initiative for air and missile defense, announced by President Lai, offers hints as to what Taiwan wants to prioritize; however, no new arms sales were notified to Congress in October.

We assess the Taiwan arms sale backlog to be unchanged from September 2025. The topline dollar value of the backlog remains $21.54 billion, though in-progress deliveries of Abrams tanks and Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems mean the true dollar value is lower than the topline. Figure 1 illustrates the breakdown of the backlog between asymmetric weapons, traditional weapons, and munitions. Table 1 provides an itemized list of all arms sales in the backlog, including the most up-to-date information on their status.

This month, Premier Cho Jung-tai informed lawmakers that 10 F-16s will be assembled by the end of the year; however, they will not begin arriving in Taiwan until sometime in 2026. Moreover, Cho did not specify when full delivery would take place. To put this new timeline in context, in June 2024 Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo testified to lawmakers that he anticipated taking delivery of the first aircraft in the fourth quarter of 2024, with full delivery of 66 aircraft occurring by the end of 2026.

The same press report on Cho’s comments to lawmakers mentioned two other delayed arms sales: the AGM-154C glide bomb and Mk-48 heavyweight torpedoes. The AGM-154C has long been one of the most egregious delayed arms sales in the backlog. Congress received notification of the sale of 50 AGM-154Cs in June 2017. However, a contract to produce the weapons was not finalized until February 2024, almost seven years later. The MND releases periodic updates to the LY on the status of arms sales, and the AGM-154C has been considered a delayed sale in those reports since at least March 2024.

Mk-48 heavyweight torpedoes, however, are a new addition to the category of delayed arms sales. MND has been very tight-lipped about the Mk-48s, which are intended to arm Taiwan’s new, indigenously produced submarine, which is also experiencing mounting delays in undergoing sea trials. The first Mk-48 sale was notified to Congress simultaneously with the AGM-154C sale, and a second notification for torpedoes was issued in May 2020. Prior to October 2025, the last update on the torpedoes came in September 2025, when press reports said that Taiwan would receive 14 torpedoes in 2027 and 10 in 2028 (this falls short of the 46 torpedoes notified to Congress).

In early November, the most recent version of the MND report to the LY on arms sale delivery status was publicly released; however, Taiwan Security Monitor has not yet finished translating it. Based on previous versions of this report, the most recent version should have more detailed delivery timelines for the three arms sales that MND considers delayed. We will post a full translation of this report once it is available and include more information about delivery delays in the November 2025 monthly update. 

Conclusion

The October 2025 data reinforces a now-familiar pattern: Taiwan’s arms sale backlog is not growing, but existing delays are becoming more severe and visible. The slippage of major programs, such as the F-16s, AGM-154C glide bombs, and now the Mk-48 torpedoes, highlights persistent bottlenecks in U.S. production capacity and the long timelines required to move weapons from notification to delivery. At the same time, emerging initiatives such as President Lai’s “T-Dome” concept signal where Taiwan intends to invest next, particularly in layered air and missile defense.

Whether these potential purchases meaningfully reshape the backlog will depend on the fate of Taiwan’s five-year special procurement budget and the ability of both Washington and Taipei to align funding, contracting, and delivery schedules. November’s release of updated MND reporting should clarify how far timelines have slipped, and whether progress toward new air defense systems offsets mounting delays in legacy programs.

Partial Deliveries, Future Schedules and Co-Production News

By Eric Gomez and Joseph O’Connor

New Information on Partial Delivery of Switchblade Drones
A press report from Taiwan’s Liberty Times, citing the Ministry of National Defense (MND) 2026 budget request, indicates that, in addition to the partial delivery of Altius-600M drones last month, Taiwan has also started receiving Switchblade 300 drones. The Military Police Command has already received 66 Switchblade drones. The army is receiving 619 Switchblades, with 150 expected by the end of 2025 and 469 by the end of 2026. The original Congressional notification for the Switchblade sale had 720 drones, but from the press report and other sources, this number has evidently been reduced to 685.

The same press report also indicated that a second batch of Altius-600M drones should arrive in Taiwan by the end of 2025, which would complete the FMS case. If the defense industry can stick to these delivery schedules, it will be a significant achievement in the speedy delivery of FMS cases. Both cases were notified to Congress in mid-June 2024, meaning that it took just slightly over a year to go from notification to initial delivery. In the world of arms sales, this is a breakneck pace. Given Taiwan’s urgent need for large numbers of unmanned systems to offset China’s military advantages, the rapid pace of Switchblade and Altius deliveries is a heartening development.

Updated Delivery Timelines for Multiple Arms Sales
We were able to find new information about delivery timelines for five arms sale cases in the backlog. These are covered in alphabetical order.

AN/TPS-77/78 Radar Systems
In October 2024, Congress was notified of an FMS case for an unspecified number of AN/TPS-77 and AN/TPS-78 mobile air defense radar systems valued at $828 million. A press report in September 2025 provided more information about the number of radar systems being procured and their delivery timeline. Taiwan is purchasing four TPS-77s and five TPS-78s. The TPS-77s will begin arriving in 2026, while the TPS-78s will begin arriving in 2027. Both radar systems should be completely delivered by the end of 2028.

F-16 Block 70s
Taiwan’s first F-16 Block 70 aircraft rolled off the production line in March 2025, but the jets have not been flown to Taiwan yet. Taiwanese news sources reported that the first two aircraft would arrive in early October, around the time of the National Day holiday on October 10. The ROCAF has denied the press reports, but the Air Force Chief of Staff testified to the Legislative Yuan (LY) that he expects 10 aircraft to arrive before the end of the year.

Harpoon Coastal Defense System
The $2.37 billion sale of 100 ground-based Harpoon launchers, 25 radar vehicles, and 400 missiles is the largest asymmetric arms sale by dollar value in the backlog. In May 2025, the MND informed the LY that 5 launch vehicles and 1 radar vehicle had already been delivered. A press report from September 2025 indicates that Taiwan will take delivery of the first batch of ground-launched Harpoon missiles before the end of 2025. Assuming that there will be enough missiles to fully arm the five launchers, with four tubes apiece, this would be 20 total missiles.

MK-48 Heavyweight Torpedoes
Taiwan News, citing the MND’s budget request for 2026, reported in September that Taiwan will receive four training Mk-48 heavyweight torpedoes next year, with 14 additional torpedoes arriving in 2027 and 10 in 2028. There was a 2017 Congressional notification for 46 Mk-48s for $250 million, and it is not clear if these 28 total torpedoes represent a reduction in the original arms sale or if deliveries will continue past 2028. These torpedoes will arm Taiwan’s new class of indigenously produced submarines, which have run into delays.

MQ-9B Drones
Last month, we shared information from the 2026 MND budget request saying that two MQ-9B drones are expected to be delivered next year. Additional reporting from September clarifies that the two remaining drones will be delivered in 2028, and that all four will be the SeaGuardian variant of the MQ-9B, optimized for maritime reconnaissance.

Barracuda Missile Co-Production
The final major update from September 2025 was an announcement by Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) that it will co-produce with Anduril Industries the Barracuda, a low-cost anti-ship missile. NCSIST claims that each missile will cost approximately $216,000 and be made in Taiwan. Little else is known about the Barracuda or the details of the co-production agreement, but if NCSIST and Anduril can indeed join forces to manufacture such missiles in Taiwan at scale, it would be a major positive development for Taiwan moving toward a sustainable asymmetric defense posture.

Co-production means that Taiwanese companies would produce American-designed weapons in Taiwan. Such agreements would require export licensing of sensitive US technology, which undergoes a complex and lengthy review and approval process. This may mean a slower up-front process, but successful co-production agreements between the United States and Taiwan would take pressure off an overburdened US defense industrial base while also giving the Taiwanese defense industry experience building more weapons. The Barracuda missile is not part of the backlog because it does not have an FMS case notified to Congress.

Conclusion
Although the dollar value of Taiwan’s arms sale backlog has not changed, 2025 has been a busy year for US-Taiwan arms sales. There is considerably more information available about delivery schedules and partial deliveries than last year, including much-faster-than-expected timelines for critical asymmetric capabilities like man-portable drones. We hope our methodological note explains our reasoning for not adjusting the backlog’s dollar value yet despite the partial delivery developments.

Altius Deliveries and 2026 Delivery Schedules

By Joseph O’Connor and Eric Gomez

August featured a major development in arms sales to Taiwan, as US manufacturer Anduril announced the delivery of the first set of Altius drones to the MND, just six months after the initial contract was announced. In late August, the 2026 defense budget request was submitted to the Legislative Yuan, and included a schedule of incoming deliveries, including MQ-9B drones and Mk 48 heavyweight torpedoes.

The overall size of the U.S. arms sale backlog to Taiwan remains $21.54 billion. For arms sales valued at over $1 billion, deliveries in progress are marked in yellow-orange in our visualizations. Figure 1 shows the current composition of the arms sale backlog by weapon category. Table 1 shows an itemized list of arms sales in the backlog with the most recently available information about their status.

Conclusion

The Altius delivery is extremely significant and a potential sign of things to come for future arms sales deliveries, especially lower-cost, asymmetric items. The updated schedules for 2026 deliveries are mixed, but completion of MS-110 pods and Volcano systems are welcome in reducing the $21 billion backlog.

Second Batch of Abrams Tanks Arrives

By Eric Gomez and Joseph O’Connor

A second batch of Abrams tanks arrived in Taiwan in late July, but besides this development, July was quiet in terms of arms sales updates. From July 9-18, Taiwan’s military conducted its annual Han Kuang series of exercises, which featured several developments of note.

Abrams Tank Delivery and Other Arms Sale Updates

The biggest piece of arms sales backlog news in July was the arrival of a second batch of 42 M1A2T Abrams tanks. Taiwan has now taken delivery of 80 Abrams tanks. The final batch of 28 tanks is expected to arrive in the first quarter of 2026, which seems likely given the successful on-time deliveries of the first two batches. The Abrams sale, valued at $2 billion, was originally notified to Congress in July 2019.

As a reminder, the TSM dataset does not reduce the overall dollar value of the backlog for partial deliveries, which is why there is no change in the backlog’s overall composition or dollar value from June 2025. The Abrams case, the third largest case by dollar value, has been a relatively smooth arms sale compared to other large cases in the backlog. Final delivery in early 2026 will bring the backlog’s overall value below the $20 billion threshold, assuming there are no new arms sales announced between now and then.

There were two other small developments in July worth mentioning:

First, at the end of the month, Raytheon was awarded a $3.5 billion contract to produce Lots 39 and 40 of AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), with a completion date in the third quarter of fiscal year 2031. The AMRAAM is one of the most popular U.S. arms sale items, as shown by the 19 foreign country customers mentioned in the contract award announcement. It is unclear when Taiwan will receive the missiles and how many missiles are being produced. Taiwan is currently waiting for delivery of 123 AMRAAM-ER missiles from a 2024 sale of National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems and 200 AIM-120C-8 missiles from a 2023 sale of various F-16 munitions.

Second, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced plans to purchase five types of commercial, off-the-shelf drones, with almost 50,000 to be purchased in 2026. Commercial drones have played a significant role in helping Ukraine stymie Russia and would be an important fixture of an asymmetric defense strategy for Taiwan. The MND has made welcome investments and efforts to expand its use of drones of various sizes and capabilities across the military, including purchasing approximately 1,000 small drones via U.S. arms sales (720 Switchblades and 291 ALTIUS drones).

While the overall value of the U.S. arms sales backlog to Taiwan did not change in July, the on-time delivery of a second batch of Abrams tanks is a good sign and a harbinger of a very large decrease in the backlog early next year.

New MND Document Sheds Light on Arms Sale Status

By Eric Gomez

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) released a document in June 2025 that reports on the status of several US arms sales to the Legislative Yuan (LY). This is the third such document that I have found in my work on the arms sale backlog, with previous iterations released in June and October of last year. These MND reports are very valuable sources of information about the status of US arms sales to Taiwan. The June 2025 report does not contain any major surprises, but it does offer some additional bits of information.

There can sometimes be delays of one or two years between an FMS case being notified to Congress and a LOA being signed. So, it is possible that many recent arms sales to Taiwan (there were seven notified to Congress in 2024) are not included in MND’s list because their LOAs are being negotiated.

The June 2025 edition of the MND arms sales implementation report indicates that there are 18 arms sales currently in progress, with 15 on schedule, 2 delayed, and 1 ahead of schedule. The two delayed arms sales are AGM-154C Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) guided glide bombs and F-16 Block 70 fighter aircraft.

The JSOW sale was notified to Congress in 2017 and is one of the oldest arms sales in the backlog. The MND report says the bombs were supposed to be delivered in 2023 but limited production capacity and delays in testing pushed this back by three years to 2026. The JSOWs are supposed to arm Taiwan’s older F-16A/B fighter jets, which completed a major upgrade in late 2023. The three-year delay would mean a total gap of nine years between congressional notification and final delivery for the JSOWs. Taiwan is only purchasing around 50 bombs.

Delays in the new production F-16 Block 70 aircraft are less severe, but still noteworthy. I have previously written about the F-16 Block 70 delays for Taiwan Security Monitor. The June 2025 MND report does not contain any new information on the timeline for delivery. The MND is confident that all 66 aircraft will arrive in Taiwan before the end of 2026, despite the first aircraft only rolling off the assembly line in March 2025. In other words, the MND claims that final delivery of the F-16s will not be delayed despite delivery of the first aircraft occurring over a year behind schedule.

Finally, the June 2025 MND report echoes reporting from other sources on early delivery of the second batch of 18 HIMARS launchers, which are now expected in Taiwan before the end of next year—one year ahead of schedule. The 18 HIMARS were notified to Congress at the end of 2022, which would mean a little less than a four-year gap between notification and final delivery. By comparison, Taiwan’s first batch of 11 HIMARS took four years from notification (October 2020) to final delivery (November 2024), so Taiwan has a slightly shorter wait time for a larger order. It will probably take until 2027 for Taiwan to receive all the HIMARS munitions it is purchasing, but for the purpose of the backlog dataset once all launchers are in Taiwan I will consider the case to be delivered.