Authors: Noah Reed, Jonathan Walberg, Ethan Connell, & Joe OโConnor
From February 27th to March 5th, Taiwanโs Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported no Peopleโs Liberation Army aircraft operating in the airspace near Taiwanโs Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), an unusually long pause in activity that drew significant attention among regional observers. No supply flights, no repositioning of aircraft, and not even any training exercises. While long pauses in ADIZ violations have occurred in the past, it has become extremely rare in recent years for Taiwanโs military to detect no aircraft operating in the nearby airspace outside the ADIZ for a prolonged period. The reason for this is quite simple: ADIZ violations are almost always directed at Taiwan, while activity outside Taiwanโs ADIZ could involve routine training flights or transits between coastal airbases. Thus, it is more common for the PRC to halt incursions into Taiwanโs ADIZ than to reduce aviation activity in the Eastern Theater Command writ large over a long period of time.
This pause naturally sparked speculation, however many popular theories are as of yet unsupported by observable patterns and regional events. Observers have forwarded several possible explanations, to include the ongoing operations in Iran, the upcoming summit between President Trump and Xi, an inability to operate routinely following a series of major officer purges, and domestic politics in Taiwan. Below, we parse through the most prominent suggested theories and examine if they hold up to historical trends and further scrutiny. As our central argument suggests, it remains too early to make definitive judgments given the available data. Instead, we focus on understanding the factors behind several of the leading explanations for this break from pattern.
I: Domestic Explanations and Leadership Struggles
Two domestic events in the PRC could reasonably explain the dive in PLA activity in February. First, this week marked the beginning of the โTwo Sessions,โ an annual meeting of the PRCโs National Peopleโs Congress (NPC).[i] Historically, this event coincided with lower ADIZ violations, with a notable exception of 2025.[ii] The heightened level of activity seen during 2025โs NPC meeting relative to prior years could be explained by the higher cross-Strait tension at the time, with the PLA holding its Strait Thunder-2025Aย joint exercise around Taiwan less than a month later.
Second, the end of the Spring Festival and the beginning of the Lantern Festival in the PRC could play some part in the lower activity. The Spring Festival has empirically propelled lower reported ADIZ numbers from late January into February over the last couple of years.[iii] Still, it is difficult to discern if the holidays alone drive these trends, or if it is merely one element of a broader rationale.
Finally, it is worth addressing the rumors that the PLA is simply incapable of conducting aerial activity around Taiwan due to recent turmoil in its leadership. This appears to be a less convincing explanation. After all, PLAN activity around Taiwan remains somewhat consistent, and the PLA and China Coast Guard (CCG) remain active in the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea. Moreover, it is not clear why the removal of senior leadership would cause the PLA to be incapable of flying aircraft around Taiwan, as such activity has become routine, even mundane, for several years. It also cannot explain why several waves of aerial activity occurred around Taiwan in February after the leadership investigations took place.
Overall, the National Peopleโs Congress, as well as Spring/Lantern festivals, have historically contributed to lower numbers of ADIZ and airspace violations. However, it is rare for these events to coincide with total stoppages in incursions.
II: TrumpโXi Meeting and the โBest Behaviorโ Hypothesis
Another explanation is that the pause reflects a temporary โbest behaviorโ or truce period ahead of a pending meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping later this spring.[iv] Under this interpretation, Beijing may be attempting to avoid incidents or tensions that could complicate or even cancel the meeting.[v] This suggests that China would reduce visible military pressure around Taiwan to create a more stable atmosphere prior to the meeting.
While plausible, the explanation doesnโt fit the observed pattern of activity.
First, the lull extended beyond just a halt in ADIZ incursions, but rather to all aircraft activity in the area, where regular flights and movements occur with training flights and movements between coastal bases. If the goal were to signal intent to Washington regarding Taiwan, Beijing could easily continue routine training flights in these areas while avoiding breaching Taiwanโs ADIZ. A complete halt of flights in the area goes beyond just signaling that Beijing doesnโt want to โrock the boat.โ It also assumes that Washington views the ADIZ as the principal outlet of PRC signaling over Taiwan, something that cannot necessarily be accepted at face value.
Second, the logic of a pre-summit truce, while plausible, would require a much longer pause in operations. This would become more plausible if the lull had continued. Further, it would commit the PLA to maintaining a break for a period following the summit, as a resumption of regular patrols would risk creating the impression that the summit had failed. In practice, maintaining the appearance of diplomatic restraint would likely require months of reduced activity, which is unlikely given the PLAโs ongoing pressure campaign that has seen few pauses since 2022.
Finally, the broader geopolitical context makes the argument less convincing. Some analysts frame ADIZ incursions as a signaling mechanism directed at Washington, meaning that temporarily halting them could itself be a signal, a tacit gesture of restraint ahead of a summit. But even under this logic, the timing is difficult to reconcile with current events. The United States is presently engaged in an escalating conflict with Iran involving large-scale strikes and the possibility of wider regional escalation.[vi] In that environment, it is not obvious why Beijing would view the suspension of routine PLA sorties near Taiwan as a necessary diplomatic signal. If Beijing is prepared to pursue high-level diplomacy with Washington while the United States is conducting major military operations elsewhere, it is difficult to see why the symbolic value of turning off routine Taiwan-related flights would suddenly become decisive.
Put simply, a snapshot of the rest of the world makes the idea that Beijing is shelving routine Taiwan-related air activity purely to preserve summit optics less convincing.
III: Signaling to Taiwan
Yet another explanation being advanced is that Beijing is signaling its lack of concern over Taiwanโs ongoing special defense budget debate. However, the timeline of PLA activity does not support this interpretation. The debate has been ongoing for months, yet PLA air activity remained elevated throughout that period.[vii] For example, Taiwanโs Ministry of National Defense reported 19 PLA aircraft operating around Taiwan on January 29, just days after the Taiwan Peopleโs Party unveiled its alternative special budget proposal. Activity continued shortly afterward, with 32 PLA aircraft detected on February 12, two days after Lai publicly urged the Legislative Yuan to pass the proposal during a press conference. Similarly, 22 PLA aircraft were detected on February 26, the day after Taiwanโs legislature agreed to send multiple budget proposals to committee review. These patterns suggest that PLA air activity has continued regardless of developments in Taiwanโs defense budget debate.
The PRC is likely to react to developments in Taiwanโs special defense budget proposals as they move through the Legislative Yuan. Beijing has repeatedly framed major Taiwanese defense initiatives as provocations, often responding with diplomatic pressure or military signaling. The PLAโs most recent exercise, Justice-Mission 2025A, reflects this pattern.[viii] Much of the iconography and messaging released before and during the exercise framed the drills in punitive terms, portraying them as a warning to Taipei. In that sense, the exercise reinforced the perception that advances in Taiwanโs defense budgeting process can trigger demonstrative military responses from Beijing.
Others advance this as rewarding Lai for his statements during a Spring Festival event where he referred to โMainland Chinaโ instead of just โChina,โ a term that the PRC prefers.[ix] This reference, while not necessarily insignificant in meaning, is unlikely to prompt Beijing to depart three years of policy and โrewardโ the Lai administration by giving them time to breathe over a difference in terminology.
IV: Middle East and Fuel Hypothesis, Regional activity
One external explanation for the Eastern Theater Commandโs pause in flight activity is that Beijing is temporarily conserving aviation fuel amid uncertainty about the ongoing conflict in the Middle East and potential supply disruptions. Sustained air operations require significant fuel resources, and the PLA may reduce nonessential sorties if leadership anticipates a prolonged price increase or broader market volatility.
However, the fuel-constraint explanation presents two significant challenges:
First, China has invested decades in developing strategic petroleum stockpiles to mitigate supply shocks. Public estimates indicate that Beijing maintains hundreds of millions of barrels in state strategic reserves, supplemented by commercial storage.[x] Recent planning documents and reports further suggest that China continues to expand these undisclosed strategic holdings, rather than signaling scarcity.[xi] Therefore, if the PLA were experiencing immediate operational constraints due to fuel availability, it would indicate a far more acute, system-wide stress than current stockpiling trends imply.
Second, if fuel conservation were the primary factor, a broader reduction in activity would be expected across all PLA operating areas, rather than a distinct, localized pause in aircraft activity detected around Taiwan. Chinese military activity in other regions, however, appeared to remain consistent with typical patterns.
For example, in the South China Sea, the PLAโs Southern Theater Command publicly released footage of naval and air units conducting a readiness patrol around Scarborough Shoal on February 28.[xii] The patrol involved coordinated use of early warning aircraft, anti-submarine aircraft, fighters, and bombers, accompanied by messaging that forces remain โon high alertโ and prepared to take countermeasures. A subsequent Weibo post by the Southern Theater Command highlighted a PLAAF unit undergoing โrigorous combat training,โ with a follow-on Global Times report stating that these patrols and exercises have continued โsince Februaryโ and are explicitly linked to responses to external โjoint patrolโ activity.[xiii] This reinforces that PRC operational signaling in the south has not paused during this period.
Japanese public reporting over the past week indicates continued and routine activity around the Senkaku Islands. In its March 1, 2026, update, Japanโs Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that Chinese government vessels, mainly from the China Coast Guard, have continued to enter Japanโs contiguous zone near the Senkakus almost daily.[xiv] On February 28th, Japanโs Joint Staff reported that two Peopleโs Liberation Army (PLA) Y-9 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft flew from the East China Sea, passed between Okinawa and Miyako, and continued into the Pacific as far as the Amami island chain, then reversed course and returned, prompting Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) scrambles.[xv] Overall, Japanโs official statements and recent Joint Staff reports indicate that PRC operations in the East China Sea remain active, even as aviation patterns near Taiwan fluctuate.
V. Preparing for an Invasion or Major Exercise
A more dramatic explanation is that the pause reflects preparations for a major PLA exercise. Others have posited that it could possibly be the โcalmโ before an invasion or move on one of Taiwanโs outlying islands. Under this interpretation, the halt in routine aviation activity signifies an operational pause while forces reposition, conduct planning, or prepare for a larger coordinated operation.
It is true that large exercises or operations are sometimes preceded by short-term changes in routine activity, particularly if units are redeploying, conducting maintenance, or consolidating forces in preparation for a larger event.
However, there was little evidence during the pause to support the idea that it reflected imminent large-scale operations. Even a preparation for a theater-level exercise would likely generate additional changes and disruptions in observable patterns, including major changes in naval deployments, unusual airbase activity, logistical movements, and more. Many of these indicators are regularly detected through open-source monitoring and satellite imagery. At present, there are no clear signs of these types of preparatory activities occurring on a scale that would suggest a major operation is imminent.
More broadly, if the PLA were preparing a large exercise around Taiwan, it is not obvious why routine aviation activity across the Eastern Theater Command would need to halt. Training flights and patrols would normally continue alongside preparations unless airspace was being cleared for a specific operation, something that would likely be accompanied by other visible signals.
For these reasons, while the possibility of future exercises should never be discounted given the PLAโs recent pattern of demonstrations around Taiwan, the current pause alone is not strong evidence that a major operation is imminent.
Taken together, the available evidence suggests that the brief pause in PLA aviation activity around Taiwan was unlikely to be driven by any single factor. Domestic political events in China, including the NPC โTwo Sessionsโ and the seasonal slowdown associated with the Spring Festival period, likely contributed to a temporary reduction in operational tempo. At the same time, explanations centered on diplomatic signaling, energy constraints, or preparations for major military operations remain less consistent with observed patterns of activity both around Taiwan and in other regions.
The resumption of PLA flights shortly after this lull reinforces a broader pattern that has characterized Chinese military pressure around Taiwan in recent years: cyclical activity. Periods of heightened sorties are often followed by short pauses before returning to baseline levels. Rather than indicating a change in Beijingโs strategy, the episode likely reflects the routine variability inherent in sustained military operations.
The more important analytical question is not why the PLA paused for several days, but how Beijing calibrates these cycles of pressure. Short interruptions in activity can create the perception of sudden shifts in intent, even when the underlying strategy remains unchanged.
[i] https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/what-watch-chinas-two-sessions-2026
[ii] PLA Tracker: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?gid=905433190#gid=905433190
[iii] https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-pla-has-stopped-flying-aircraft?triedRedirect=true&_src_ref=t.co
[iv] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/chinese-military-flights-around-taiwan-fall-trump-xi-meeting-may-be-factor-2026-03-05/
[v] https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/03/05/2003853320
[vi] https://www.war.gov/Spotlights/Operation-Epic-Fury/
[vii] PLA Tracker: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?gid=905433190#gid=905433190
[viii] https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/justice-mission-2025-the-narrative-battle-inside-chinas-latest-taiwan-exercise/
[ix] https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-pla-has-stopped-flying-aircraft?triedRedirect=true&_src_ref=t.co
[x] https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/chn
[xi] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/china-targets-steady-oil-output-more-gas-stockpiling-five-year-plan-2026-03-05
[xii] https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202603/1355963.shtml
[xiii] https://weibo.com/7468777622?tabtype=album&uid=7468777622&index=0; https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202603/1356043.shtml; https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202603/1355963.shtml
[xiv] https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100857530.pdf; https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html
